GIFT  OF 


MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 


SUBJECTS: 

THE  SOUL  AND  FUTURE  LIFE. 


FREDERIC  HARRISON,   R.  H.  BUTTON,   PROF.  HUXLEY 

LORD  BLACHFORD,  HON.  RODEN  NOEL,  LORD 

SELBORNE,    CANON  BARRY,    MR.  W.  R. 

GREG,   REV.  BALDWIN  BROWN, 

DR.  W.  G.  WARD  ; 


THE  INFLUENCE  UPON  MORALITY  OF  A 
DECLINE  IN  RELIGIOUS  BELIEF. 


SIR  JAMES   FITZ JAMES   STEPHEN,    LORD   SELBORNE,    DR 

MARTINEAU,  MR.  FREDERIC  HARRISON,  THE  DEAN 

OF  ST.  PAUL'S,  THE  DUKE  OF  ARGYLL,  PROF. 

CLIFFORD,  DR.  WARD,  PROF.  HUXLEY, 

MR.  R.  H.  BUTTON. 


fetwt: 
ROSE-BELFORD    PUBLISHING    COMPANY, 

1878, 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

PREFACE ,. 5 

THE  SOUL  AND  FUTURE  LIFE  : — 

Mr.  Frederic  Harrison    17 

Mr.  R.  H.  Button 62 

Professor  Huxley 71 

Lord  Blachford 84 

Hon.  Roden  Noel 98 

Lord  Selborne 109 

Canon  Barry 113 

Mr.  W.  R.  Greg    126 

Rev.  Baldwin  Brown   136 

Dr.  W.  G.  Ward  147 

Mr.  Frederic  Harrison    155. 

THE  INFLUENCE  UPON  MORALITY  OF  A  DECLINE  IN  RELIGIOUS 
BELIEF  : — 

Sir  James  Stephen  .' .  187 

Lord  Selborne   191 

Rev.  Dr.  Martineau 205 

Mr.  Frederic  Harrison    214 

The  Dean  of  St.  Paul's 221 

The  Duke  of  Argyll 224 

Professor  Clifford 229 

'    Dr.  Ward  237 

Professor  Huxley 247 

Mr.  R.  H.  Button   253 

Sir  James  Stephen  263 


256253 


PREFACE  TO  THIS  EDITION. 


A  PROFOUND  change,  the  signs  of  which  are  so  legible 
that  he  who  runs  may  read,  but  the  end  whereof  it  is 
hard  to  foresee,  is  coming  over  the  religious  belief  of 
Christendom.  One  of  the  elements  of  this  metamor- 
phosis is  a  growing  tendency  towards  logical  consistency. 
It  is  becoming  more  and  more  generally  seen  that  in  re- 
ligion man  has  but  two  guides,  Reason  and  Authority ; 
that  the  two  are  fundamentally  antagonistic,  but  that 
either  may  be  adopted  without  landing  us  in  irrecon- 
cilable contradictions:  in  other  words,  that  a  searcher 
after  religious  truth  must  do  one  of  two  things — either 
submit  himself  unreservedly  to  the  control  of  an  Au- 
thority claiming  to  be  divine  and  infallible,  or  follow 
Reason  whithersoever  it  leads,  regardless  of  consequences, 
which  may  be  safely  left  to  take  care  of  themselves.  The 
intellectual  leaders  of  the  age — the  John  Stuart  Mills  and 
the  Herbert  Spencers — are  naturally  found  on  the  one 
side ;  while  the  submissive  flocks  who  in  all  times  and 
countries  have  rejoiced  the  hearts  of  all  priesthoods, 
whether  Brahmin,  Buddhist,  Christian,  or  Mohammedan, 
as  inevitably  gravitate  to  the  other.  These  two  opposite 
tendencies  are  evidenced,  on  the  one  hand,  by  a  very  no- 


V      .  V  :  •/•  -:J 

.;.•;.•,•••.       .     ,     « '  • 
» -   -     /  '  '  •  i <  •     ••.','       '    *  •         ' 
6    '          •••*••      ••«•'•  >'•'•  PREFACE. 


ticeable  growth  of  Roman  Catholicism  and  Ritualism  in 
England  and  the  United  States  ;  and,  on  the  other,  by  an 
even  more  remarkable  spread  of  infidelity,  and  by  the  in- 
creasing influence  of  rationalistic  parties  within  the 
orthodox  Churches  themselves.  People  are  year  by  year 
becoming  more  alive  to  the  fact  that  Reason  and  Au- 
thority are  radically  opposed,  that  the  conflict  between 
them  is  a  life  and  death  struggle,  that  an  absolute  choice 
must  be  made  of  one  or  the  other,  and  that  all  attempts 
at  compromise,  such  as  that  sought  by  Evangelical  Prot- 
estantism, which  in  one  breath  proclaims  the  thoroughly 
rationalistic  doctrine  of  the  right  of  private  judgment, 
and  in  the  next  seeks  to  fetter  the  free  action  of  the 
human  mind  by  confining  it  within  the  shackles  of  iron- 
clad creeds  and  confessions  of  faith,  made  three  or  four 
hundred  years  ago  by  fallible  mortals  like  ourselves,  are 
essentially  irrational  and  doomed  to  inevitable  failure. 
In  the  English  Church  the  three  parties  are  represented 
by  the  High  Church,  with  the  Ritualists  at  the  extreme 
wing ;  the  Broad  Church,  or  Rationalisers  ;  and  the  Low 
Church,  or  Evangelicals  :  or,  as  some  irreverent  wit  has 
christened  them,  the  Attitudinarians,  the  Latitudinarians, 
and  the  Platitudinarians. 

The  Churches  of  Authority,  whether  Roman,  Ritualist, 
or  High  Anglican,  and  the  Churches  of  Compromise, 
whether  Lutheran,  Low  Anglican,  Presbyterian,  Metho- 
dist, or  Baptist,  need  no  more  than  a  passing  allusion  here. 
They  are  merely  seeking  to  walk  in  the  old  paths.  Semper 
eadem  might  be  chosen  as  their  motto  by  all,  as  it  has  been 


PREFACE.  7 

by  one  of  them.  It  is  when  we  come  to  the  other  section 
of  the  religious  world, — to  those  who,  with  a  single  eye 
to  TRUTH,  choose  Reason  as  their  guide,  and  follow  it  to 
its  logical  outcome, — that  we  see  how  vast  is  the  change 
that  is  coming  over  the  belief  of  Christendom.  It  is  not 
merely  that  such  subjects  as  the  inspiration  of  the  Bible, 
the  divinity  of  Christ,  the  existence  of  Hell,  and  the  doc- 
trines of  the  Atonement  and  Eternal  Damnation  are  being 
questioned  with  a  vigour  and  pertinacity  to  which  the 
past  affords  no  parallel.  These  dogmas  were  questioned 
by  Voltaire  and  Paine  and  the  other  Deists  of  the  eigh- 
teenth century.  The  change  is  even  more  fundamental : 
it  is,  in  the  extremest  sense,  radical ;  so  that  a  book  which 
caused  so  great  a  ferment  when  it  originally  appeared  as 
"  The  Age  of  Reason,"  would,  were  it  now  published  for 
the  first  time,  create  so  little  remark  as  almost  to  fall 
still-born  from  the  press.  Intellectual  Christendom  has 
travelled  a  long  way  since  that  work  was  written. 
Among  the  subjects  now  being  discussed  with  a  keenness 
and  searching  rigour  unknown  in  former  times  are  ques- 
tions so  fundamental  as  the  existence  and  personality  of 
God,  and  the  existence  and  immortality  of  the  human 
soul.  Reason  is  doing  its  work  thoroughly  ;  it  is  digging 
down  to  the  very  foundations  of  religion,  with  the  full 
and  passionate  determination  that  the  faith  of  the  future 
—be  it  Neo-Christianity  or  any  other — shall  be  founded 
on  a  rock,  not  on  a  quicksand.  The  Reformation  of  the 
nineteenth  century  is  an  infinitely  more  portentous  phe- 
nomenon than  its  forerunner  of  the  sixteenth.  It  is  no 


8  PREFACE. 

mere  reform.  The  question  now  is,  whether  Christianity 
shall  continue  to  exist,  even  with  such  radical  changes 
as  will  make  it  virtually  a  new  thing ;  or  whether  it 
shall  be  replaced  by  an  altogether  new  edifice  built  upon 
a  scientific  foundation  of  positive,  verifiable  truth. 

The  leading  subject  dealt  with  in  this  volume  is  one  of 
those  root  questions  above  referred  to,  which  lie  at  the 
bottom  of  all  religion — the  existence  and  immortality  of 
the  human  soul.     The  present  discussion  is   perhaps  the 
noblest,  as   it   is   certainly   the   weightiest   contribution 
towards  the  solution  of  the  momentous  question  at  issue 
that  has  ever  appeared  in  print,  not  even  excepting  the 
immortal   "  Phsedo "  of  Plato ;  and  the  numerous  inci- 
dental direct  or  indirect  allusions  to  it  which  have  been 
made  on  this  continent  as  well  as  in  England,  are  proofs 
of  the  profound  impression  which  it  has  created.     Nor  is 
this  widespread  interest  a  matter  for  wonder.     To  every 
human  being  who  can  at  times  lift  himself  above  the 
cares  and  trivialities  of  this  life,  the  question,  "  If  a  man 
die,  shall  he  live  again  ?  "  must  ever  be  the  most  solemn 
and  heart-searching.     It  would,  of  course,  be  absurd  to 
pretend  that  "the  Great  Enigma"  is 'at  last  solved.    Prob- 
ably it  is  insoluble  ;  or,  at  least,  will  remain  so  until  the 
alleged  facts  of  Spiritualism  are  proved  beyond  cavil,  of 
which  there  appears  to  be  no   immediate  prospect;  or 
until  some  "traveller"  from  that"  undiscovered  country" 
of  which  Hamlet  speaks  so  mournfully,  returns  and  tells 
us  of  his   wanderings,  and  of  the  glories  and  joys,  and 
mayhap  also  the  sorrows,  of  that  unknown  land.     But  if 


PREFACE.  9 

the  problem  be  insoluble  it  is  well  to  know  even  so  much  ; 
it  is  well  to  recognise  that  man  is  not  a  god,  that  his  ca- 
pacities are  not  infinite,  and  that  it  is  mere  childish- 
ness perversely  to  war  against  the  established  limits  of 
his  intelligence.  We  shall  then  concern  ourselves  with 
matters  within  the  scope  of  our  powers,  and  cease  to 
waste  our  energies  in  vain  repinings  because  we  cannot 
pierce  behind  a  veil,  which,  if  it  be  impenetrable,  we  can 
at  least  believe  has  been  made  so  for  some  wise  and  holy 
.  purpose.  If  the  discussion  which  is  here  reprinted  leads 
only  to  this  result,  it  will  not  have  been  had  in  vain. 

The  other  subject  touched  upon  in  this  volume — the 
influence  upon  morality  of  a  decline  in  religious  belief — is 
one  which  would  inevitably  come  up  for  discussion  in 
a  time  of  religious  transition.  Such  periods  have 
always  been  marked  by  a  certain  amount  of  moral 
laxity.  The  age  of  the  Reformation  was  so,  as  witness 
the  excesses  of  the  Anabaptists  and  other  fanatics  and 
enthusiasts  of  that  day ;  and  something  of  the  same  sort 
may  be  in  store  for  us  now.  It  seems  self-evident  that  a 
weakening  in  the  foundation  must  lead  to  a  weakening 
in  the  superstructure  ;  and  where  morality  is  based  upon 
religion,  as  to  a  large  extent  it  is  with  Christianity,  any- 
thing which  affects  the  latter  must  inevitably  react  upon 
the  former.  But  the  evil  will  be  only  temporary,  and 
will  be  more  than  compensated  by  a  greater  good.  Mo- 
rality must  gain  in  the  end  by  being  placed  upon  a  true 
foundation  instead  of  a  false  one.  If  the  result  of  the 
present  yeasty  ferment  be  the  evolution  of  a  new  religion, 


10  PREFACE. 

that  religion  will,  we  may  be  sure,  be  truer  and  better 
than  the  old  one ;  and  the  morality  based  upon  it  must 
share  in  the  benefit.  But  the  question  among  scientific 
moralists  now  is,  whether  morality  shall  not  be  altogether 
removed  from  off  its  old  religious  foundation,  and  placed 
upon  one  of  its  own,  to  wit,  the  human  conscience,  with 
the  well-being  of  man  and  all  other  sentient  creatures  for 
its  aim.  To  the  scientific  moralist  it  seems  better  that  a 
man  should  refrain  from  doing  an  evil  act  because  he  him- 
self knows  or  feels  it  to  be  evil,  rather  than  because  some 
one  else  tells  him  it  is  evil ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that 
it  will  be  a  gain  to  get  rid  of  the  false  idea — if  it  be  a 
false  one — that  the  human  conscience  is,  in  some  peculiar 
and  special  sense,  the  voice  of  God  and  therefore  infallible, 
and  replace  it  by  the  true  idea — if  it  be  a  true  one — that 
the  conscience  is  a  mere  human  faculty,  imperfect  like 
the  rest  of  man's  faculties,  In  infallibility  there  are  no 
degrees,  so  that,  if  the  former  theory  be  true,  the  con- 
science of  a  Feejee  Island  savage  or^a  Bushman  is  on  a 
level  with  that  of  a  Buddha  or  a  Plato.  Both  are  equally 
divine,  both  equally  infallible.  .  If,  however,  the  rival 
theory  be  true,  that  the  conscience  is  a  human  faculty  in 
precisely  the  same  sense  that  the  intellect  and  the  aesthetic 
instinct  are  human  faculties,  it  follows  that  the  moral 
sense — or  that  power,  by  whatever  name  it  is  called,  by 
which  we  judge  an  act  to  be  right  or  wrong—  is  more 
developed  in  the  civilized  man  than  in  the  savage,  just  as 
it  is  more  developed  in  the  man  than  in  the  child ;  and 
that  even  in  the  civilized  man  it  is  finite,  imperfect,  fal- 


PREFACE.  11 

lible,  and  consequently  susceptible  of  education,  improve- 
ment, progress,  evolution.  It  is  obvious  that  a  searching 
enquiry  into  the  relation  of  morality  to  religion  must  be 
of  the  gravest  practical  importance  in  a  time  of  such  vital 
change  as  that  in  which  we  live. 

Both  questions  treated  of  in  these  pages  are  discussed 
from  widely  different  standpoints,  ranging  from  Roman 
Catholicism  at  the  one  extreme  to  Positivism  at  the  other. 
One  feature  of  the  controversy  might  well  be  imitated 
on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic — that  is,  the  noble  tolerance, 
gentleness,  and  courtesy  shown  towards  the  most  oppo- 
site views,  however  manifestly  distasteful.  The  nearest 
approach  to  warmth  of  temper  occurs,  curiously  enough, 
in  the  vigorous  passage-at-arms  between  Mr.  Harrison  and 
Professor  Huxley,  who,  on  the  general  question,  are  almost 
at  one.  The  discussions,  or  "  Symposia,"  originally  appeared 
in  the  Nineteenth  Century, &  monthly  review  recently  start- 
ed in  London,  under  the  editorship  of  Mr.  James  Knowles, 
formerly  editor  of  the  Contemporary.  A  brief  sketch  of 
the  different  contributors  or  disputants  may  not  be  with- 
out interest  to  readers  in  this  country. 

Mr.  Frederic  Harrison  is  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  Eng- 
lish Positivists  or  Comtists,  and  one  of  the  ablest  review- 
writers  now  living.  He  has  been  for  years  a  prominent 
contributor  to  the  Fortnightly  and  other  reviews,  on  poli- 
tical, economical,  and  theological  questions.  A  number 
of  his  essays  were  recently  collected  and  published  in 
book  form.  He  has  also  published  a  translation  of 


12  PREFACE. 

"  Social  Statics,"  being  the  second  volume  of  Comte's 
"  Positive  Polity." 

Mr.  Richard  Holt  Hutton  is  the  editor  of  the  London 
Spectator,  and  the  author  of  a  number  of  literary  and 
theological  essays  which  were  published  in  1871  in  two 
volumes.  He  is  one  of  the  subtlest  literary  critics  of  the 
day,  his  masterly  essay  on  Goethe,  in  particular,  having 
been  pronounced  by  high  authority  to  be  the  finest  piece 
of  biographical  criticism  that  exists  in  any  language.  In 
theology  he  is  Broad-Church,  of  the  school  of  the  late 
F.  D.  Maurice. 

Professor  Huxley  is  well-known  as  one  of  the  greatest 
of  living  biologists  and  one  of  the  ablest  expounders  of 
popular  science.  Of  his  numerous  works  the  best  known 
are  his  "  Lay  Sermons,  Addresses,  and  Reviews,"  published 
in  1870,  and  his  •"  Critiques  and  Addresses,"  published  in 
1873.  In  science  he  is  an  uncompromising  advocate  of 
the  Darwinian  theory,  and  of  Evolution  in  general ;  in 
philosophy  he  is  a  sensationalist  of  the  school  of  Locke, 
Descartes,  Mill,  and  Spencer ;  and  in  religion  apparently 
holds  the  new  and  growing  creed  of  Agnosticism. 

Lord  Blachford,  better  known  as  Sir  Frederick  Rogers, 
is  a  lawyer  by  profession,  having  been  called  to  the  Eng- 
lish bar  in  1836.  He  was  Permanent  Under-Secretary  of 
State  for  the  Colonies,  from  1860  till  1871,  when  he  was 
appointed  Privy  Councillor,  and  raised  to  the  peerage 
under  the  title  of  Baron  Blachford. 

The  Hon.  Jloden  Noel  is  a  son  of  the  first  Earl  of 


PREFACE.  13 

Gainsborough,  was  born  in  1834,  and  educated  at  Trinity 
College,  Cambridge,  where  he  took  his  degree  in  1858. 
He  was  groom  to  the  Privy  Chamber  of  Her  Majesty 
from  1867  to  1871.  He  is  a  voluminous  writer,  and  his 
poetry  is  highly  spoken  of. 

Lord  Selborne,  formerly  Sir  Roundell  Palmer,  acquired 
his  present  title  when  made  Lord-Chancellor  in  1872. 
He  was  one  of  the  counsel  on  behalf  of  the  English  Gov- 
ernment in  the  arbitration  at  Geneva,  on  the  Alabama 
claims.  He  edited  the  well-known  "  Book  of  Praise,  from 
the  best  English  Hymn  writers,"  published  in  1862. 

Canon  Barry  is  the  author  of  numerous  works,  includ- 
ing an  "  Introduction  to  the  Old  Testament;"  "Notes  on 
the  Gospels;"  "  Life  of  Sir  C.  Barry;"  "  Cheltenham  Col- 
lege Sermons;"  "Notes  on  the  Catechism;"  and  "Religion 
for  Every  Day  :  Lectures  to  Men."  He  was  Head  Mas- 
ter of  Leeds  Grammar  School  for  eight  years ;  in  1862 
was  appointed  Principal  of  Cheltenham  College,  in 
1868  Principal  of  Bang's  College,  London,  and  in  1871  a 
Canon  of  Worcester.  He  is  a  son  of  Sir  Charles  Barry,  the 
eminent  architect. 

Mr.  William  Rathbone  Greg  is  one  of  the  best  known 
and  most  eloquent  theological  writers  of  the  day.  His 
"Creed  of  Christendom,"  though  written  over  thirty 
years  ago,  still  ranks  as  the  ablest  work  of  its  kind  in  the 
language  ;  so  able  indeed  that  no  satisfactory  reply  to  it 
has  ever  been  forthcoming ;  a  fact  which,  as  Mr.  F.  W. 
Newman  has  remarked,  goes  far  to  show  that  it  is  un- 


14-  PREFACE. 

answerable.  His  other  works  are  "  Enigmas  of  Life  ; " 
"  Literary  and  Social  Judgments ; "  "  Political  Problems ; " 
" Essays  on  Political  and  Social  Science;"  and  "Rocks 
Ahead."  Mr.  Greg  was  a  member  of  the  English  Civil 
Service,  having  been  appointed  a  Commissioner  of  Cus- 
toms in  1856 ;  and  Controller  of  Her  Majesty's  Sta- 
tionery Office,  in  1864,  an  office  from  which  he  retired 
last  year. 

The  Rev.  James  Baldwin  Brown  is  a  leading  Indepen- 
dent clergyman,  of  Brixton,  London ;  and  a  voluminous 
author.  His  principal  works  are  "The  Home  Life  in  the 
.Light  of  its  Divine  Idea,"  which  has  passed  through  five 
editions  ;  "  The  Divine  Life  in  Man  ;  "  "  The  Soul's  Exo- 
dus and  Pilgrimage;"  "The  Christian  Policy  of  Life;" 
"  The  Higher  Life :  its  Reality,  Experience,  and  Destiny;" 
and  "  The  Doctrine  of  Annihilation,  in  the  Light  of  the 
Gospel  of  Love."  In  theology  he  belongs  to  the  liberal 
or  "  broad  "  school. 

Dr.  W.  G.  Ward  is  a  leading  Roman  Catholic  writer, 
and  the  editor  of  the  Dublin  Review,  a  quarterly,  and  the 
ablest  Roman  Catholic  periodical  published  in  the  English 
language. 

Sir  James  Fitzjames  Stephen  is  one  of  the  ablest  jurists 
in  England,  and  the  author  of  "  The  Law  of  Evidence ;  " 
"  The  Indian  Evidence  Act ;  "  and  other  legal  works  ;  also 
of  a  notable  work  on  "  Liberty,  Equality,  and  Frater- 
nity," intended  as  an  answer  to  Mill's  famous  essay  on 
Liberty. 


PKEFACE.  15 

The  Rev.  James  Martineau  is  a  leading  clergyman  of  the 
Unitarian  denomination,  and  was  appointed  Principal  of 
Manchester  New  College,  London,  in  1868.  He  is  the 
author  of  numerous  works,  including,  among  many  others, 
"  The  Rationale  of  Religiouf  Enquiry  ; "  "  Studies  of 
Christianity;"  "  Essays,  Philosophical  and  Theological;" 
and  "  Religion  as  affected  by  Modern  Materialism."  He 
was  one  of  the  founders  of  the  National  Review.  In 
1875  the  University  of  Ley  den  conferred  upon  him  the 
honorary  degree  of  D.D,  He  is  a  brother  of  the  late 
Harriet  Martineau. 

The  Dean  of  St.  Paul's  (the  Very  Rev.  Richard  William 
Church)  was  born  in  1815,  educated  at  Oxford,  and  took 
his  degree  in  1836.  In  1854  he  published  a  volume  of 
essays  which  at  once  established  his  reputation  as  a 
scholarly  and  graceful  writer.  Two  of  these  essays  were 
afterwards  expanded  into  a  separate  volume,  and  pub- 
lished under  the  title  of  "  The  Life  of  St.  Anselm."  In 
1869  he  published  a  volume  of  Sermons  on  the  relation 
of  Christianity  to  Civilization;  and  he  is  also  the  author 
of  the  "Sacred  Poetry  of  Early  Religions."  He  was 
appointed  Dean  of  St.  Paul's  in  1871. 

The  Duke  of  Argyll  is  a  prominent  Scottish  Liberal 
statesman,  having  been  a  member  of  several  administra ^ 
tions,  the  last  office  held  by  him  being  Secretary  of  State 
for  India,  in  Mr.  Gladstone's  Cabinet.  He  is  also  well 
known  as  the  author  of  an  able  work  on  "  The  Reign  of 
Law,"  which  ;  has  passed  through  many  editions ;  and  a 


16  PREFACE. 

small  work  on  "  Primeval  Man."  In  1861  he  was  elected 
President  of  the  Royal  Society  of  Edinburgh.  In  1871  his 
eldest  son,  the  Marquis  of  Lome,  married  the  Princess 
Louise. 

Prof.  Clifford  is  a  mathematician  by  profession,  and 
a  frequent  contributor  to  the  Fortnightly  and  other 
reviews.  In  theology  he  may  perhaps  fairly  be  classed 
with  the  Positivist  school. 

F.  T.  J. 

TORONTO,  2nd  April,  /.CN. 


A  MODEEN   SYMPOSIUM. 


THE  SOUL  AND  FUTURE  LIFE. 


FREDERIC  HARRISON. 

HOW  many  men  and  women  continue  to  give  a 
mechanical  acquiescence  to  the  creeds,  long  after 
they  have  parted  with  all  definite  theology,  out  of 
mere  clinging  to  some  hope  of  a  future  life,  in  however  dim 
and  inarticulate  a  way  !  And  how  many,  whose  own 
faith  is  too  evanescent  to  be  put  into  words,  profess  a 
sovereign  pity  for  the  practical  philosophy  wherein  there 
is  no  place  for  their  particular  yearning  for  a  heaven  to 
come  !  They  imagine  themselves  to  be,  by  virtue  of  this 
very  yearning,  beings  of  a  superior  order,  and,  as  if  they 
inhabited  some  higher  zone  amid  the  clouds,  they  flout 
sober  thought  as  it  toils  in  the  plain  below  ;  they  counsel 
it  to  drown  itself  in  sheer  despair  or  take  to  evil  living, 
they  rebuke  it  with  some  sonorous  household  word  from 
the  Bible  or  the  poets — "  Eat,  drink,  for  to-morrow  ye 
die" — "Were  it  not  better  not  to  be?"  And  they  as- 
sume the  question  closed  when  they  have  murmured  tri- 
umphantly, "  Behind  the  veil — begird  the  veil." 


18  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

They  are  right,  and  they  are  wrong :  right  to  cling  to  a 
hope  of  something  that  shall  endure  beyond  the  grave ; 
wrong  in  their  rebukes  to  men  who  in  a  different  spirit 
cling  to  this  hope  as  earnestly  as  they.  We  too  turn  our 
thoughts  to  that  which  is  behind  the  veil.  We  strive  to 
pierce  its  secret  with  eyes,  we  trust,  as  eager  and  as  fearless  ; 
and  even  it  may  be  more  patient  in  searching  for  the 
realities  beyond  the  gloom.  That  which  shall  come  after 
is  no  less  solemn  to  us  than  to  you.  We  ask  you,  there- 
fore :  What  do  you  "know  of  it  ?  Tell  us ;  we  will  tell 
you  what  we  hope.  Let  us  reason  together  in  sober  and 
precise  prose.  Why  should  this  great  end,  staring  at  all 
of  us  along  the  vista  of  each  human  life,  be  forever  a 
matter  for  dithyrambic  hypotheses  and  evasive  tropes  ? 
What  in  the  language  of  clear  sense  does  any  one  of  us 
hope  for  after  death  :  what  precise  kind  of  life,  and  on 
what  grounds  ?  It  is  too  great  a  thing  to  be  trusted  to 
poetic  ejaculations,  to  be  made  a  field  for  Pharisaic  scorn. 
At  least  be  it  acknowledged  that  a  man  may  think  of  the 
soul  and  of  death  and  of  future  life  in  ways  strictly  posi- 
tive (that  is,  without  ever  quitting  the  region  of  evi- 
nce), and  yet  may  make  the  world  beyond  the  grave 
the  centre  to  himself  of  moral  life.  He  will  give  the 
ial  life  a  place  as  high,  and  will  dwell  upon  the 
proffiises  of  that  which  is  after  death  as  confidently  as 
the  believers  in  a  celestial  resurrection.  And  he  can  do 
>ut  trusting  his  all  to  a  perhaps  so  vague  that 
-m  of  doubt  Qan  wreck  it,  but  trusting,  rather,  to  a 
of  solid  knowledge,  which  no  man  of  any  school 
denies  to  be  true  so  fav  as  it  goes. 


THE   SOUL   AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  19 


THERE  ought4  to  be  no  misunderstanding  at  the"  outset 
as  to  what  we  who  trust  in  positive  methods  mean  by  the 
word  "soul,"  or  by  the  words  "  spiritual,"  "materialist,"  and 
"  future  life."  We  certainly  would  use  that  ancient  and 
beautiful  word  soul,  provided  there  be  no  misconception 
involved  in  its  use.  We  assert  as  fully  as  any  theologian 
the  supreme  importance  of  spiritual  life.  We  agree  with 
the  theologians  that  there  is  current  a  great  deal  of  real 
materialism,  deadening  to  our  higher  feeling.  And  we 
deplore  the  too  common  interference  to  the  world  beyond 
the  grave.  And  yet  we  find  the  centre  of  our  religion 
and  our  philosophy  in  man  and  man's  earth. 

To  follow  out  this  use  of  old  words,  and  to  see  that 
there  is  no  paradox  in  thus  using  them,  we  must  go  back 
a  little  to  general  principles.  The  matter  turns  altogether 
upon  habits  of  thought.  What  seems  to  you  so  shocking 
will  often  seem  to  us  so  ennobling,  and  what  seems  to  us 
flimsy  will  often  seem  to  you  sublime,  simply  because  our 
minds  have  been  trained  in  different  logical  methods ; 
and  hence  you  will  call  that  a  beautiful  truth  which 
strikes  us  as  nothing,  but  a  random  guess.  It  is  idle,  of 
course,  to  dispute  about  our  respective  logical  methods, 
or  to  pit  this  habit  of  mind  in  a  combat  with  that.  But 
we  may  understand  each  other  better  if  we  can  agree  to 
follow  out  the  moral  and  religious  temper,  and  learn  that 
it  is  quite  compatible  with  this  or  that  mental  procedure. 


20  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM.^ 

It  may  teach  us  again  that  ancient  truth,  how  much 
human  nature  there  is  in  men ;  what  fellowship  there  is 
in  our  common  aspirations  and  moral  forces ;  how  we  all 
live  the  same  spiritual  life ;  while  the  philosophies  are 
but  the  ceaseless  toil  of  the  intellect  seeking  again  and 
again  to  explain  more  clearly  that  spiritual  life,  and  to 
furnish  it  with  reasons  for  the  faith  that  is  in  it. 

This  would  be  no  place  to  expound  or  to  defend  the 
positive  method  of  thought.  The  question  before  us  is 
simply,  if  this  positive  method  has  a  place  in  the  spiritual 
world  or  has  anything  to  say  about  a  future  beyond  the 
grave.  Suffice  it  that  we  mean  by  the  positive  method 
of  thought  (and  we  will  now  use  the  term  in  a  sense  not 
limited  to  the  social  construction  of  Comte)  that  method 
which  would  base  life  and  conduct,  as  well  as  knowledge, 
upon  such  evidence  as  can  be  referred  to  logical  canons 
of  proof ,  which  would  place  all  that  occupies  man  in  a 
homogenous  system  of  law.  On  the  other  hand,  this 
method  turns  aside  from  hypotheses  not  to  be  tested  by 
any  known  logical  canon  familiar  to  science,  whether  the 
hypothesis  claims  support  from  intuition,  aspiration  or 
general  plausibility.  And,  again,  this  method  turns  aside 
from  ideal  standards  which  avow  themselves  to  be  lawless, 
which  profess  to  transcend  the  field  of  law.  We  say,  life 
and  conduct  shall  stand  for  us  wholly  on  a  basis  of  law, 
and  must  rest  entirely  in  that  region  of  science  (not 
physical  but  moral  and  social  science)  where  we  are  free 
to  use  our  intelligence  in  the  methods  known  to  us  as 
intelligible  logic,  methods  which  the  intellect  can  analyze. 


THE  SOUL  AND   FUTURE  LIFE.  21 

When  you  confront  us  with  hypotheses,  however  sublime 
and  however  affecting,  if  they  cannot  be  stated  in  terras 
of  the  rest  of  our  knowledge,  if  they  are  disparate  to  that 
world  of  sequence  and  sensation  which  to  us  is  the  ulti- 
mate base  of  all  our  real  knowledge,  then  we  shake  our 
heads  and  turn  aside.  I  say,  turn  aside  ;  and  I  do  not 
say,  dispute.  We  cannot  disprove  the  suggestion  that 
there  are  higher  channels  to  knowledge  in  our  aspirations 
or  our  presentiments,  as  there  might  be  in  our  dreams 
by  night  as  well  as  by  day ;  we  courteously  salute  the 
hypotheses,  as  we  might  love  our  pleasant  dreams ;  we 
seek  to  prove  no  negatives.  We  do  not  pretend  there  are 
no  mysteries ;  we  do  not  frown  on  the  poetic  splendours  of 
the  fancy.  There  is  a  world  of  beauty  and  of  pathos  in 
the  vast  ether  of  the  Unknown  in  which  this  solid  ball 
hangs  like  a  speck.  Let  all  who  list,  who  have  true 
imagination  and  not  mere  paltering  with  a  loose  fancy 
—let  them  indulge  their  gift,  and  tell  us  what  their 
soaring  has  unfolded.  Only  let  us  not  waste  life  in  crude 
dreaming,  or  loosen  the  knees  of  action.  For  life  and 
conduct,  and  the  great  emotions  which  react  on  life  and 
conduct,  we  can  place  nowhere  but  in  the  same  sphere  of 
knowledge,  under  the  same  canons  of  proof,  to  which  we 
intrust  all  parts  of  our  life.  We  will  ask  the  same 
philosophy  which  teaches  us  the  lessons  of  civilization  to 
guide  our  lives  as  responsible  men  ;  and  we  go  again  to 
the  same  philosophy  which  orders  our  lives  to  explain  to 
us  the  lessons  of  death.  We  crave  to  have  the  supreme 
hours  of  our  existence  lighted  up  by  thoughts  and  motives, 


A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

such  as  we  can  measure  beside  the  common  acts  of  our 
daily  existence,  so  that  each  hour  of  our  life  up  to  the 
grave  may  be  linked  to  the  life  beyond  the  grave  as  one 
continuous  whole,  "  bound  each  to  each  by  natural  piety." 
And  so,  wasting  no  sighs  over  the  incommensurable 
possibilities  of  the  fancy,  we  will  march  on  with  a  firm 
step  till  we  knock  at  the  gates  of  death  ;  bearing  always 
the  same  human  temper,  in  the  same  reasonable  beliefs, 
and  with  the  same  earthly  hopes  of  prolonged  activity 
among  our  fellows,  with  which  we  set  out  gayly  in  the 
morning  of  life. 

When  we  come  to  the  problem  of  the  human  soul,  we 
simply  treat  man  as  man,  and  we  study  him  in  accordance 
with  our  human  experience.  Man  is  a  marvellous  and 
complex  being,  we  may  fairly  say  of  complexity  past  any 
hope  of  final  analysis  of  ours,  fearfully  and  wonderfully 
made  to  the  point  of  being  mysterious.  But  incredible 
progress  has  been  won  in  reading  this  complexity,  in  re- 
ducing thi?  mystery  to  order.  Who  can  say  that  man 
shall  ever  be  anything  but  an  object  of  awe  and  of  un- 
fathomable pondering  to.  himself  1  Yet  he  would  be  false 
to  all  that  is  great  in  him,  if  he  decried  what  he  already  has 
achieved  toward  self-knowledge.  Man  has  probed  his  own 
corporeal  and  animal  life,  and  is  each  day  arranging  it  in 
more  acciirate  adjustment  with  the  immense  procession 
of  animal  life  around  him.  He  has  grouped  the  intel- 
lectual powers,  he  has  traced  to  their  relations  the  func- 
tions of  mind,  and  ordered  the  laws  of  thought  into  a 
logic  of  a  regular  kind.  He  has  analyzed  and  grouped 


THE   SOUL  AND   FUTURE  LIFE.  23 

the  capacities  of  action,  the  moral  faculties,  the  instincts 
and  emotions.  And  not  only  is  the  analysis  of  these 
tolerably  clear,  but  the  associations  and  correlations  of 
each  with  the  other  are  fairly  made  manifest.  At  the 
lowest,  we  are  all  assured  that  every  single  faculty  of  man 
is  capable  of  scientific  study.  Philosophy  simply  means, 
that  every  part  of  human  nature  acts  upon  a  method,  and 
does  not  act  chaotically,  inscrutably,  or  in  mere  caprice. 

But  then  we  find  throughout  man's  knowledge  of  him- 
self signs  of  a  common  type.  There  is  organic  unity  in 
the  whole.  These  laws  of  the  separate  functions,  of  body, 
mind,  or  feeling,  have  visible  relations  to  each  other,  are 
inextricably  woven  in  with  each  other,  act  and  react, 
depend  and  interdepend,  one  on  the  other.  There  is  no 
such  thing  as  an  isolated  phenomenon,  nothing  sui 
generis,  in  our  entire  scrutiny  of  human  nature.  What- 
ever the  complexities  of  it,  there  is  through  the  whole  a 
solidarity  of  a  single  unit.  Touch  the  smallest  fibre  of 
the  corporeal  man,  and  in  some  infinitesimal  way  we  may 
watch  the  effect  in  the  moral  man,  and  we  may  trace  this 
effect  up  into  the  highest  pinnacles  of  the  spiritual  life. 
On  the  other  hand,  when  we  rouse  chords  of  the  most 
glorious  ecstasy  of  the  soul,  we  may  see  the  vibration  of 
them,  visibly  thrilling  upon  the  skin.  The  very  animals 
about  us  can  perceive  the  emotion.  Suppose  a  martyr 
nerved  to  the  last  sacrifice,  or  a  saint  in  the  act  of  reliev- 
ing a  sufferer,  the  sacred  passion  within  him  is  stamped 
in  the  eye,  or  plays  about  the  mouth,  with  a  connection 
as  visible  as  when  we  see  a  muscle  acting  on  a  bone,  or 


24  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

the  brain  affected  by  the  supply  of  blood.  Thus  from 
the  summit  of  spiritual  life  to  the  base  of  corporeal  life, 
whether  we  pass  up  or  down  the  gamut  of  human  forces, 
there  runs  one  organic  correlation  and  sympathy  of  parts. 
Man  is  one,  however  compound.  Fire  his  conscience  and  he 
blushes.  Check  his  circulation,  and  he  thinks  wildly,  or 
he  thinks  not  at  all.  Impair  his  secretions,  and  moral 
sense  is  dulled,  discoloured,  or  depraved  ;  his  aspirations 
flag,  his  hope,  love,  faith  reel.  Impair  them  still  more, 
and  he  becomes  a  brute.  A  cup  of  drink  degrades  his 
moral  nature  below  that  of  a  swine.  Again,  a  violent 
emotion  of  pity  or  horror  makes  him  vomit.  A  lancet 
will  restore  him  from  delirium  to  clear  thought.  Excess 
of  thought  will  waste  his  sinews.  Excess  of  muscular 
exercise  will  deaden  thought.  An  emotion  will  double 
the  strength  of  his  muscles.  And  at  last  the  prick  of  a 
needle  or  a  grain  of  mineral  will  in  an  instant  lay  to  rest 
forever  his  body  and  its  unity,  and  all  the  spontaneous 
activities  of  intelligence,  feeling,  and  action,  with  which 
that  compound  organism  was  charged. 

These  are  the  obvious  and  ancient  observations  about 
the  human  organism.  But  modern  philosophy  and 
science  have  carried  these  hints  into  complete  explana- 
tions. By  a  vast  accumulation  of  proof  positive,  thought 
at  last  has  established  a  distinct  correspondence  between 
every  process  of  thought  or  of  feeling  and  some  corporeal 
phenomenon.  Even  when  we  cannot  explain  the  precise 
relation,  we  can  show  that  definite  correlations  exist. 
To  positive  methods,  every  fact  of  thinking  reveals  itself 


THE   SOUL   AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  25 

as  having  functional  relations  with  molecular  change. 
Every  fact  of  will  or  of  feeling  is  in  similar  relation  with 
kindred  molecular  facts.  And  all  these  facts,  again,  have 
some  relation  to  each  other.  Hence  we  have  established 
an  organic  correspondence  in  alFmanifestations  of  human 
life.  To  think  implies  a  corresponding  adjustment  of  mo- 
lecular activity.  To  feel  emotion  implies  nervous  organs 
of  feeling.  To  will  implies  vital  cerebral  hemispheres. 
Observation,  reflection,  memory,  imagination,  judgment 
have  all  been  analyzed  out,  till  they  .stand  forth  as  func- 
tions of  living  organs  in  given  conditions  of  the  organ- 
ism, that  is  in  a  particular,  environment.  The  whole 
range  of  man's  powers,  from  the  finest  spiritual  sensibility 
down  to  a  mere  automatic  contraction,  falls  into  one  co- 
herent scheme  ;  being  all  the  multiform  functions  of  a 
living  organism  in  presence  of  its  encircling  conditions. 

But,  complex  as  it  is,  there  is  no  confusion  in  this 
whole  when  conceived  by  positive  methods.  No  rational 
thinker  now  pretends  that  imagination  is  simply  the 
vibration  of  a  particular  fibre.  No  man  can  explain 
volition  by  purely  anatomical  study.  While  keeping  in 
view  the  due  relations  between  moral  and  corporeal  facts, 
we  distinguish  moral  from  biologic  facts,  moral  science 
from  biology.  Moral  science  is  based  upon  biological 
science ;  but  it  is  not  comprised  in  it ;  it  has  its  own 
special  facts  and  its  own  special  methods,  though  always 
in  the  sphere  of  law.  Just  so  the  mechanism  of  the  body 
is  based  upon  mechanics,  would  be  unintelligible  but  for 
mechanics,  but  could  not  be  explained  by  mechanics  alone , 


26  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

or  by  anything  but  a  complete  anatomy  and  biology.  To 
explain  the  activity  of  the  intellect  as  included  in  the  activ- 
ity of  the  body,  is  as  idle  as  to  explain  the  activity  of  the 
body  as  included  in  the  motion  of  solid  bodies.  And  it  is 
equally  idle  to  explain  the  activity  of  the  will,  or  the 
emotions,  as  included  in  the  theory  of  the  intellect.  All 
the  spheres  of  human  life  are  logically  separable,  though 
they  are  organically  interdependent.  Now  the  combined 
'activity  of  the  human  powers  organized  around  the  high- 
est of  them  we  call  the  soul.  The  combination  of  intel- 
lectual and  moral  energy  which  is  the  source  of  religion, 
we  call  the  spiritual  life.  The  explaining  the  spiritual 
side  of  life  by  physical  instead  of  moral  and  spiritual 
reasoning,  we  call  materialism. 

The  consensus  of  the  human  faculties,  which  we  call 
the  soul,  comprises  all  sides  of  human  nature  according  to 
one  homogeneous  theory.  But  the  intuitional  methods 
ask  us  to  insert  into  the  midst  of  this  harmonious  system 
of  parts,  as  an  underlying  explanation  of  it,  an  indes- 
cribable entity ;  and  to  this  hypothesis,  since  the  days  of 
Descartes  (or  possibly  of  Aquinas),  the  good  old  word 
soul  has  been  usually  restricted.  How  and  when  this 
entity  ever  got  into  the  organism,  how  it  abides  in  it, 
what  are  its  relations  to  it,  how  it  acts  on  it,  why  and 
when  it  goes  out  of  it — all  is  mystery.  We  ask  for  some 
evidence  of  the  existence  of  any  such  entity  ;  the  answer 
is,  we  must  imagine  it  in  order  to  explain  the  organism. 
We  ask  what  are  its  methods,  its  laws,  its  affinities ;  we 
are  told  that  it  simply  has  none,  or  none  knowable.  We 


THE   SOUL   AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  27 

ask  for  some  description  of  it,  of  its  course  of  develop- 
ment, for  some  single  fact  about  it,  statable  in  terms  of 
the  rest  of  our  knowledge;  the  reply  is — mystery, 
absence  of  everything  so  statable  or  cognizable,  a  line  of 
poetry,  or  an  ejaculation.  It  has  no  place,  no  matter,  no 
modes,  neither  evolution  nor  decay :  it  is  without  body, 
parts  or  passions ;  a  spiritual  essence,  incommensurable, 
incomparable,  indescribable.  Yet,  with  all  this,  it  is,  we 
are  told,  an  entity,  the  most  real  and  perfect  of  all  en- 
tities short  of  the  divine. 

If  we  ask  why  we  are  to  assume  the  existence  of  some- 
thing of  which  we  have  certainly  no  direct  evidence,  and 
which  is  so  wrapped  in  mystery  that  for  practical  pur- 
poses it  becomes  a  nonentity,  we  are  told  that  we  need  to 
conceive  it,  because  a  mere  organism  cannot  act  as  we  see 
the  human  organism  act.  Why  not  ?  They  say  there 
must  be  a  principle  within  as  the  cause  of  this  life.  But 
what  do  we  gain  by  supposing  a  "  principle  ? "  The  "  prin- 
ciple "  only  adds  a  fresh  difficulty.  Why  should  a  "  prin- 
ciple," or  an  entity,  be  more  capable  of  possessing  these 
marvelous  human  powers  than  the  human  organism? 
Besides  we  shall  have  to  imagine  a  "  principle "  to  ex- 
plain not  only  why  a  man  can  feel  affection,  but  also  why 
a  dog  can  feel  affection.  If  a  mother  cannot  love  her 
child — merely  qua  human  organism — unless  her  love  be  a 
manifestation  of  an  eternal  soul,  how  can  a*  cat  love  her 
kittens — merely  qua  feline  organism — without  an  imma- 
terial principle  or  soul  ?  Nay,  we  shall  have  to  go  on  to 
invent  a  principle  to  account  for  a  vtree  growing,  or  a 


28  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

thunder-storm  roaring,  and  for  every  force  of  Nature. 
Now  this  very  supposition  was  made  in  a  way  by  the 
Greeks,  and  to  some  extent  by  Aquinas,  the  author  of 
the  vast  substructure  of  anima  underlying  all  Nature, 
of  which  our  human  soul  is  the  fragment  that  alone  sur- 
vives. One  by  one  the  steps  in  this  series  of  hypothesis 
have  faded  away.  Greek  and  mediaeval  philosophy  im- 
agined that  every  activity  resulted  not  from  the  body 
which  exhibited  the  activity,  but  from  some  mysterious 
entity  inside  it.  If  marble  was  hard,  it  had  a  "  form  " 
in  forming  its  hardness  ;  if  a  blade  of  grass  sprang  up,  it 
had  a  vegetative  spirit  mysteriously  impelling  it ;  if  a  dog 
obeyed  his  master,  it  had  an  animal  spirit  mysteriously 
controlling  its  organs.  The  mediaeval  physicists,  as 
Moliere  reminds  us,  thought  that  opium  induced  sleep 
quia  est  in  eo  virtus  dormitiva.  Nothing  was  allowed 
to  act  as  it  did  by  its  own  force  or  vitality.  In  every 
explanation  of  science  we  were  told  to  postulate  an  inter- 
calary hypothesis.  Of  this  huge  mountain  of  figment, 
the  notion  of  man's  immaterial  soul  is  the  one  feeble 
residuum. 

Orthodoxy  has  so  long  been  accustomed  to  take  itself 
for  granted,  that  we  are  apt  to  forget  how  very  short  a 
period  of  human  history  this  sublimated  essence  has  been 
current.  From  Plato  to  Hegel  the  idea  has  been  continu- 
ally taking  fresh  shapes.  There  is  not  a  trace  of  it  in  the 
Bible  in  its  present  sense,  and  nothing  in  the  least  akin 
to  it  in  the  Old  Testament.  Till  the  time  of  Aquinas 
theories  of  a  material  soul,  as  a  sort  of  gas,  were 


THE   SOUL   AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  29 

never  eliminated ;  and  until  the  time  of  Descartes,  our 
present  ideas  of  the  antithesis  of  soul  and  body  were 
never  clearly  defined.  Thus  the  Bible,  the  Fathers,  and 
the  mediaeval  Church,  as  was  natural  when  philosophy 
was  in  a  state  of  flux,  all  represented  the  soul  in  very 
different  ways  ;  and  none  of  these  ways  were  those  of  a 
modern  divine.  It  is  a  curious  instance  of  the  power  of 
words  that  the  practical  weight  of  the  popular  religion  is 
now  hung  on  a  metaphysical  hypothesis,  which  itself 
has  been  in  vogue  for  only  a  few  centuries  in  the  history 
of  speculation,  and  which  is  now  become  to  those  trained 
in  positive  habits  of  thought  a  mere  juggle  of  ideas. 

We  have  in  all  this  sought  only  to  state  what  we  mean 
by  man's  soul,  and  what  we  do  not  mean.  But  we  make 
no  attempt  to  prove  a  negative,  or  to  demonstrate  the  non- 
existence  of  the  supposed  entity.  Our  purpose  now  is  a  very 
different  one.  We  start  out  from  this — that  this  positive 
mode  of  treating  man  is  in  this,  as  in  other  things,  morally 
sufficient ;  that  it  leaves  no  voids  and  chasms  in  human 
life ;  that  the  moral  and  religious  sequelae  which  are 
sometimes  assigned  to  its  teaching  have  no  foundation  in 
fact.  We  say  that,  on  this  basis,  not  only  have  we  an  en 
trance  into  the  spiritual  realm,  but  that  we  have  a  firmer 
hold  on  the  spiritual  life  than  on  the  basis  of  hypotheses. 
On  this  theory,  the  world  beyond  the  grave  is  in  closer 
and  truer  relation  to  conduct  than  on  the  spiritualist  the- 
ory. We  look  on  man  as  man,  not  as  man  plus  a  hetero- 
geneous entity.  And  we  think  that  we  lose  nothing,  but 
gain  much  thereby,  in  the  religious  as  well  as  in  the  moral 


30  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

world.  We  do  not  deny  the  conceivable  existence  of  the 
heterogeneous  entity.  But  we  believe  that  human  nature 
is  adequately  equipped  on  human  and  natural  grounds 
without  this  disparate  nondescript. 

Let  us  be  careful  to  describe  the  method  we  employ  as 
that  which  looks  on  man  as  man,  and  repudiate  the  vari- 
ous labels,  such  as  materialists,  physical,  imspiritual 
methods,  and  the  like,  which  are  used  as  equivalent  for 
the  rational  or  positive  method  of  treating  man.  The  meth- 
od of  treating  man  as  man  insists,  at  least  as  much  as  any 
other  method,  that  man  has  a  moral,  emotional,  religious 
life,  different  in  kind  from  his  material  and  practical  life, 
but  perfectly  coordinate  with  that  physical  life,  and  to  be 
studied  on  similar  scientific  methods.  The  spiritual  sym- 
pathies of  man  are  undoubtedly  the  highest  part  of  human 
nature ;  and  our  method  condemns  as  loudly  as  any  system 
physical  explanations  of  spiritual  life.  We  claim  the  right 
to  use  the  term  "  soul,"  "  spiritual,"  and  the  like,  in  their 
natural  meaning.  In  the  same  way,  we  think  that  there 
are  theories  which  are  justly  called  "  materialist,"  that 
there  are  physical  conceptions  of  human  nature  which  are 
truly  dangerous  to  morality,  to  goodness,  and  religion.  It 
is  sometimes  thought  to  be  a  sufficient  proof  of  the  reality 
of  this  heterogeneous  entity  of  the  soul,  that  otherwise  we 
must  assume  the  most  spiritual  emotions  of  man  to  be  a 
secretion  of  cerebral  matter,  and  that,  whatever  the  diffi- 
culties of  conceiving  the  union  of  soul  and  body,  it  is 
something  less  difficult  than  the  conceiving  that  the 
nerves  think,  or  the  tissues  love.  We  repudiate  such 


THE  SOCJL   AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  31 

language  as  much  as  any  one  can,  but  there  is 
another  alternative.  It  is  possible  to  invest  with 
the  highest  dignity  the  spiritual  life  of  mankind  by 
treating  it  as  an  ultimate  fact,  without  trying  to  find 
an  explanation  for  it  either  in  a  perfectly  unthinkable 
hypothesis  or  in  an  irrational  and  debasing  physicism. 

We  certainly  do  reject,  as  earnestly  as  any  school  can, 
that  which  is  most  fairly  called  materialism,  and  we  will 
second  every  word  of  those  who  cry  out  that  civilization  is. 
in  danger  if  the  workings  of  the  human  spirit  are  to  become" 
questions  of  physiology,  and  if  death  is  the  end  of  a  man, 
as  it  is  the,  end  of  a  sparrow.  We  not  only  assent  to  such 
protests,  but  we  see  very  pressing  need  for  making  them. 
It  is  a  corrupting  doctrine  to  open  a  brain,  and  to  tell  us  that 
devotion  is  a  definite  molecular  change  in  this  and  that 
convolution  of  gray  pulp,  and  that  if  man  is  the  first  of 
living  animals,  he  passes  away  after  a  short  space  like  the 
beasts  that  perish.  And  all  doctrines,  more  or  less,  do  tend 
to  this,  which  offer  physical  theories  as  explaining  moral 
phenomena,  which  deny  man  a  spiritual  in  addition  to  a 
moral  nature,  which  limit  his  moral  life  to  the  span  of  his 
bodily  organism,  and  which  have  no  place  for  "  religion  " 
in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word. 

It  is  true  that  in  this  age,  or  rather  in  this  country,  we 
seldom  hear  the  stupid  and  brutal  materialism  which  pre- 
tends that  subtilties  of  thought  and  emotion  are  simply 
this  or  that  agitation  in  some  gray  matter,  to  be  ulti- 
mately expounded  by  the  professors  of  gray  matter.  But 
this  is  hardly  the  danger  which  besets  our  time.  The  true 


32  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

materialism  to  fear  is  the  prevailing  tendency  of  anatomical 
habits  of  mind  or  specialist  habits  of  mind  to  intrude  into 
the  regions  of  religion  and  philosophy.  A  man  whose 
whole  thoughts  are  absorbed  in  cutting  up  dead  monkeys 
and  live  frogs  has  no  more  business  to  dogmatize  about 
religion  than  a  mere  chemist  to  improvise  a  zoology.  Bio- 
logical reasoning  about  spiritual  things  is  as  presumptuous 
as  the  theories  of  an  electrician  about  the  organic  facts  of 
nervous  life.  We  live  amid  a  constant  and  growing  usur- 
pation of  science  in  the  province  of  philosophy  ;  of  biology 
in  the  province  of  sociology ;  of  physics  in  that  of  religion. 
Nothing  is  more  common  than  the  use  of  the  term  science, 
when  what  is  meant  is  merely  physical  and  physiological 
science,  not  social  and  moral  science.  The  arrogant  attempt 
to  dispose  of  the  deepest  moral  truths  of  human  nature  on 
a  bare  physical  or  physiological  basis  is  almost  enough  to 
justify  the  insurrection  of  some  impatient  theologians 
against  science  itself.  It  is  impossible  not  to  sympathize 
with  men  who  at  least  are  defending  the  paramount  claim 
of  the  moral  laws  and  the  religious  sentiment.  The  solu- 
tion of  the  dispute  is,  of  course,  that  physicists  and  theo- 
logians have  each  hold  of  a  partial  truth.  As  the  latter 
insist,  the  grand  problem  of  man's  life  must  be  ever  re- 
ferred to  moral  and  social  argument ;  but  then,  as  the 
physicist  insists,  this  moral  and  social  argument  can  only 
be  built  up  on  a  physical  and  physiological  foundation. 
The  physical  part  of  science  is,  indeed,  merely  the  vestibule 
to  social,  and  thence  to  moral  science  ;  and  of  science  in 
all  its  forms  the  philosophy  of  religion  alone  holds  the  key. 


THE   SOUL   AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  33 

The  true  materialism  lies  in  the  habit  of  scientific  specialists 
to  neglect  all  philosophical  and  religious  synthesis.  It  is 
marked  by  the  ignoring  of  religion,  the  passing  by  on  the 
other  side,  and  shutting  the  eyes  to  the  spiritual  history 
of  mankind.  The  spiritual  traditions  of  mankind,  a  su- 
preme philosophy  of  life  and  thought,  religion  in  the  proper 
sense  of  the  word,  all  these  have  to  play  a  larger  and  ever 
larger  part  in  human  knowledge  ;  not  as  we  are  so  often 
told,  and  so  commonly  is  assumed,  a  waning  and  vanishing 
part.  And  it  is  in  this  field,  the  field  which  has  so  long 
been  abandoned  to  theology,  that  Positivism  is  prepared 
to  meet  the  theologians.  We  at  any  rate  do  not  ask  them 
to  submit  religion  to  the  test  of  the  scalpel  or  the  electric 
battery.  It  is  true  that  we  base  our  theory  of  society  and 
our  theory  of  morals,  and  hence  our  religion  itself,  on  a 
curriculum  of  physical  and  especially  of  biological  science. 
It  is  true  that  our  moral  and  social  science  is  but  a  pro- 
longation of  these  other  sciences.  But,  then,  we  insist 
that  it  is  not  science  in  the  narrow  sense  which  can  order 
our  beliefs,  but  philosophy  ;  not  science  which  can  solve 
our  problems  of  life,  but  religion.  And  religion  demands 
for  its  understanding  the  religious  mind  and  the  spiritual 
experience.  * 

Does  it  seem  to  any  one  a  paradox  to  hold  such  language, 
and  yet  to  have  nothing  to  say  about  the  immaterial  en- 
tity which  may  assume  to  be  the  cause  behind  this  spirit- 
ual life  ?  The  answer  is,  that  we  occupy  ourselves  with 
this  spiritual  life  as  an  ultimate  fact ;  and,  consistently 
with  the  whole  of  our  philosophy,  we  decline  to  assign  a 
3 


34  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

cause  at  all.  We  argue,  with  the  theologians,  that  it  is 
ridiculous  to  go  to  the  scalpel  for  an  adequate  account  of 
a  mother's  love  ;  but  we  do  not  think  it  is  explained  (any 
more  than  it  is  by  the  scalpel)  by  an  hypothesis  for  which 
not  only  is  there  no  shadow  of  evidence,  but  which  cannot 
even  be  stated  in  philosophic  language.  We  find  the  same 
absurdity  in  the  notion  that  maternal  love  is  a  branch  of 
the  anatomy  of  the  raaramce,  and  in  the  notion  that  the 
phenomena  of  lactation  are  produced  by  an  immaterial 
entity.  Both  are  forms  of  the  same  fallacy,  that  of  trying 
to  reach  ultimate  causes  instead  of  studying  laws.  We 
certainly  do  find  that  maternal  love  and  lactation  have 
close  correspondences,  and  that  both  are  phenomena  of 
certain  female  organisms.  And  we  say  that  to  talk  of 
maternal  love  being  exhibited  by  an  entity  which  not  only 
is  not  a  female  organism,  but  is  not  an  organism  at  all,  is 
to  use  language  which  to  us,  at  least,  is  unintelligible. 

The  philosophy  which  treats  man  as  man  simply  affirms 
that  man  loves,  thinks,  acts,  not  that  the  ganglia,  or  the 
sinuses,  or  any  organ  of  man,  loves  and  thinks  and  acts. 
The  thoughts,  aspirations,  and  impulses,  are  not  secretions, 
and  the  science  which  teaches  us  about  secretions  will  not 
teach  us  much  about  them  ;  our  thoughts,  aspirations,  and 
impulses,  are  faculties  of  a  man.  Now,  as  a  man  implies 
a  body,  so  we  say  these  also  imply  a  body.  And  to  talk 
to  us  about  a  bodiless  being  thinking  and  loving  is  simply 
to  talk  about  the  thoughts  and  feelings  of  nothing. 

This  fundamental  position  each  one  determines  accord- 
ing to  the  whole  bias  of  his  intellectual  and  moral  nature- 


THE  SOUL  AND   FUTUKE  LIFE.  35 

But  on  the  positive,  as  on  the  theological,  method  there  is 
ample  scope  for  the  spiritual  life,  for  moral  responsibility, 
for  the  world  beyond  the  grave,  its  hopes  and  its  duties  ; 
which  remain  to  us  perfectly  real  without  the  unintelligible 
hypothesis.  However  much  men  cling  to  the  hypothesis 
from  old  association,  if  they  reflect,  they  will  find  that 
they  do  not  use  it  to  give  them  any  actual  knowledge 
about  man's  spiritual  life ;  that  all  their  methodical  reas- 
oning about  the  moral  world  is  exclusively  based  on  the 
phenomena  of  this  world,  and  not  on  the  phenomena  of  any 
other  world.  And  thus  the  absence  of  the  hypothesis  alto- 
gether does  not  make  the  serious  difference  which  theolo- 
logians  suppose. 

To  follow  out  this  into  particulars  :  Analysis  of  human 
nature  shows  us  man  with  a  great  variety  of  faculties  ; 
his  moral  powers  are  just  as  distinguishable  as  his  intel- 
lectual powers  ;  and  both  are  mentally  separable  from  his 
physical  powers.  Moral  and  mental  laws  are  reduced 
to  something  like  system  by  moral  and  mental  science, 
with  or  without  the  theological  hypothesis.  The  most 
extreme  form  of  materialism  does  not  dispute  that 
moral  and  mental  science  is  for  logical  purposes  some, 
thing  more  than  physical  science.  So  the  most  extreme 
form  of  spiritualism  gets  its  mental  and  moral  science  by 
observation  and  argument  from  phenomena ;  it  does  not, 
or  it  does  not  any  longer,  build  such  science  by  abstract  de- 
duction from  any  proposition  as  to  an  immaterial  entity. 
There  have  been,  in  ages  past,  attempts  to  do  this.  Plato, 
for  instance,  attempted  to  found,  not  only  his  mental  and 


36  A   MODERN    SYMPOSIUM. 

moral  philosophy,  but  his  general  philosophy  of  the  uni- 
verse, by  deduction  from  a  mere  hypothesis.  He  imagined 
immaterial  entities,  the  ideas  of  things  inorganic,  as  much 
as  organic.  But  then  Plato  was  consistent  and  had  the 
courage  of  his  opinions.  If  he  imagined  an  idea,  or  soul, 
of  a  man,  he  imagined  one  also  for  a  dog,  for  a  tree,  for  a 
statue,  for  a  chair.  He  thought  that  a  statue  and  a  chair 
were  what  they  are,  by  virtue  of  an  immaterial  entity 
which  gave  them  form.  The  hypothesis  did  not  add  much 
to  the  art  of  statuary,  or  to  that  of  the  carpenter ;  nor  to 
do  him  justice,  did  Plato  look  for  much  practical  result 
in  these  spheres.  One  form  of  the  doctrine  alone  survives 
— that  man  is  what  he  is  by  virtue  of  an  immaterial  en- 
tity temporally  indwelling  in  his  body.  But,  though  the 
hypothesis  survives,  it  is  in  no  sense  any  longer  the  basis 
of  the  science  of  human  nature  with  any  school.  No 
school  is  now  content  to  sit  in  its  study  and  evolve  its 
knowledge  of  the  moral  qualities  of  man  out  of  abstract 
deductions  from  the  conception  of  an  immaterial  entity. 
All,  without  exception,  profess  to  get  their  knowledge  of 
the  moral  qualities  by  observing  the  qualities  which  men 
actually  do  exhibit,  or  have  exhibited.  And  those  who 
are  persuaded  that  man  has,  over  and  above  his  man's  na- 
ture, an  immaterial  entity,  find  themselves  discussing  the 
laws  of  thought  and  of  character  on  a  common  ground  with 
those  who  regard  man  as  man — i.  e.,  who  regard  man's 
nature  as  capable  of  being  referred  to  an  homogeneous 
system  of  law.  Spiritualists  and  materialists,  however 
much  they  may  ^differ  in  their  explanations  of  moral  phe- 


THE  SOUL   AND   FUTURE  LIFE.  37 

nomena,  describe  their  relations  in  the  same  language,  the 
language  of  law,  not  of  illuminism. 

Those,  therefore,  who  dispense  with  a  transcendental 
explanation  are  just  as  free  as  those  who  maintain  it,  to 
handle  the  spiritual  and  religious  phenomena  of  human 
nature,  treating  them  simply  as  phenomena.  No  one  has 
ever  suggested  that  the  former  philosophy  is  not  quite  as 
well  entitled  to  analyze  the  intellectual  faculties  of  man, 
as  the  stoutest  believer  in  the  immaterial  entity.  It 
would  raise  a  smile  now-a-days  to  hear  it  said  that  such 
a  one  must  be  incompetent  to  treat  of  the  canons  of  in- 
ductive reasoning,  because  he  was  unorthodox  as  to  the 
immortality  of  the  soul.  A.nd  if,'  notwithstanding  this 
unorthodoxy,  he  is  thought  competent  to  investigate  the 
laws  of  thought,  why  not  the  moral  laws,  the  sentiments  T 
and  the  emotions  ?  As  a  fact,  every  moral  faculty  of  man 
is  recognized  by  him  just  as  much  as  by  any  transcenden- 
talist.  He  does  not  limit  himself,  any  more  than  the 
theologian  does,  to  mere  morality.  He  is  fully  alive  to 
the  spiritual  emotions  in  all  their  depth,  purity,  and 
beauty.  He  recognizes  in  man  the  yearning  for  a  power 
outside  his  individual  self,  which  he  may  venerate,  a  love 
for  the  author  of  <his  chief  good,  the  need  for  sympathy 
with  something  greater  than  himself.  All  these  are  posi- 
tive facts  which  rest  on  observation,  quite  apart  from  any 
explanation  of  the  hypothetical  cause  of  these  tendencies 
in  man.  There,  at  any  rate,  the  scientific  observer  finds 
them ;  and  he  is  at  liberty  to  give  them  quite  as  high  a 
place  in  his  scheme  of  human  nature  as  the  most  complete 


A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

theologian.  He  may  possibly  give  them  a  far  higher 
place,  and  bind  them  far  more  truly  into  the  entire  tissue 
of  his  whole  view  of  life,  because  they  are  built  up  for 
him  on  precisely  the  same  ground  of  experience  as  all  the 
rest  of  his  knowledge,  and  have  no  element  at  all  hetero- 
geneous from  the  rest  of  life.  With  the  language  of 
spiritual  emotion  he  is  perfectly  in  unison.  The  spirit  of 
devotion,  of  spiritual  communion  with  an  ever-present 
power,  of  sympathy  and  fellowship  with  the  living  world, 
of  awe  and  submission  toward  the  material  world,  the 
sense  of  adoration,  love,  resignation,  mystery,  are  at  least 
as  potent  with  the  one  system  as  with  the  other.  He  can 
share  the  religious  emotion  of  every  age,  and  can  enter 
into  the  language  of  every  truly  religious  heart.  For 
myself,  I  believe  that  this  is  only  done  on  a  complete  as 
well  as  a  real  basis  in  the  religion  of  humanity,  but  we 
need  not  confine  the  present  argument  to  that  ground.  I 
venture  to  believe  that  this  spirit  is  truly  shared  by  all, 
whatever  their  hypothesis  about  the  human  soul,  who 
treat  these  highest  emotions  of  man's  nature  as  facts  of 
primary  value,  and  who  have  any  intelligible  theory 
whereby  these  emotions  can  be  aroused. 

All  positive  methods  of  treating  man  of  a  comprehen- 
sive kind,  adopt  to  the  full  all  that  has  ever  been  said 
about  the  dignity  of  man's  moral  and  spiritual  life,  and 
treat  these  phenomena  as  distinct  from  the  intellectual 
and  the  physical  life.  These  methods  also  recognize  the 
unity  of  consciousness,  the  facts  of  conscience,  the  sense 
of  identity,  and  the  longing  for  perpetuation  of  that  iden- 


THE  SOUL  AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  39 

tity.  They  decline  to  explain  these  phenomena  by  the 
popular  hypotheses ;  but  they  neither  deny  their  existence 
nor  lessen  their  importance.  Man,  they  argue,  has  a 
complex  existence,  made  up  of  the  phenomena  of  his  phy- 
sical organs,  of  his  intellectual  powers,  of  his  moral 
faculties,  crowned  and  harmonized  ultimately  by  his  re- 
ligious sympathies — love,  gratitude,  veneration,  submis- 
sion, toward  the  dominant  force  by  which  he  finds  himself 
surrounded.  I  use  words  which  are  not  limited  to  a 
particular  philosophy  or  religion — I  do  not  now  confine 
my  language  to  the  philosophy  or  religion  of  Comte — for 
this  same  conception  of  man  is  common  to  many  philoso- 
phies and  many  religions.  It  characterizes  such  systems 
as  those  of  Spinoza  or  Shelley  or  Fichte  as  much  as  those 
of  Confucius  or  Buddha.  In  a  word,  the  reality  and  the 
supremacy  of  the  spiritual  life  have  never  been  carried 
further  than  by  men  who  have  departed  most  widely  from 
the  popular  hypotheses  of  the  immaterial  entity. 

Many  of  these  men,  no  doubt,  have  indulged  in  hypo- 
theses of  their  own,  quite  as  arbitrary  as  those  of  theology. 
It  is  characteristic  of  the  positive  thought  of  our  age  that 
it  stands  upon  a  firmer  basis.  Though  not  confounding 
the  moral  facts  with  the  physical,  it  will  never  lose  sight 
of  the  correspondence  and  consensus  between  all  sides  of 
human  life.  Led  by  an  enormous  and  complete  array  of 
evidence,  it  associates  every  fact  of  thought  or  of  emotion 
with  a  fact  of  physiology,  with  molecular  change  in  the 
body.  Without  pretending  to  explain  the  first  by  the 
second,  it  denies  that  the  first  can  be  explained  without 


40  A   MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

the  second.  But  with  this  solid  basis  of  reality  to  work 
on,  it  gives  their  place  of  supremacy  to  the  highest  sensi- 
bilities of  man,  through  the  heights  and  depths  of  the 
spiritual  life. 

Nothing  is  more  idle  than  a  discussion  about  words. 
But  when  some  deny  the  use  of  the  word  "  soul  "  to  those 
who  mean  by  it  this  consensus,  and  not  any  immaterial 
entity,  we  may  remind  them  that  our  use  of  the  word 
agrees  with  its  etymology  and  its  history.  It  is  the  mode 
in  which  it  is  used  in  the  Bible,  the  well-spring  of  our 
true  English  speech.  It  may,  indeed,  be  contended  that 
there  is  no  instance  in  the  Bible  in  which  soul  does 
mean  an  immaterial  entity,  the  idea  not  having  been 
familiar  to  any  of  the  writers,  with  the  doubtful  exception 
of  St.  Paul.  But  without  entering  upon  Biblical  philology, 
it  may  be  said  that  for  one  passage  in  the  Bible  in  which 
the  word  "  soul "  can  be  forced  to  bear  the  meaning  of 
immaterial  entity,  there  are  ten  texts  in  which  it  cannot 
possibly  refer  to  anything  but  breath,  life,  moral  sense,  or 
spiritual  emotion.  When  the  Psalmist  says,  "  Deliver  my 
soul  from  death,"  "Heal  my  soul,. for  I  have  sinned,"  "My 
soul  is  cast  down  within  me,"  "Return  unto  my  rest,  O  my 
soul,"  he  means  by  "  soul "  what  we  mean — the  conscious 
unity  of  our  being  culminating  in  its  religious  emotions  ; 
and  until  we  find  some  English  word  that  better  expresses 
this  idea,  we  shall  continue  to  use  the  phraseology  of 
David. 

It  is  not  merely  that  we  are  denied  the  language  of 
religion,  but  we  sometimes  find  attempts  to  exclude  us 


THE   SOUL  AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  41 

from  the  thing.  There  are  some  who  say  that  worship, 
spiritual  life,  and  that  exaltation  of  the  sentiments  which 
we  call  devotion,  have  no  possible  meaning  unless  applied 
to  the  special  theology  of  the  particular  speaker.  A  little 
attention  to  history,  a  single  reflection  on  religion  as  a 
whole,  suffice  to  show  the  hollowness  of  this  assumption. 
If  devotion  mean  the  surrender  of  self  to  an  adored 
Power,  there  has  been  devotion  in  creeds  with  many  gods> 
with  one  God,  with  no  gods  ;  if  spiritual  life  mean  the  cul- 
tivation of  this  temper  toward  moral  purification,  there 
was  spiritual  life  long  before  the  notion  of  an  immaterial 
entity  inside  the  human  being  was  excogitated ;  and  as 
to  worship,  men  have  worshipped,  with  intense  and  over- 
whelming passion,  all  kinds  of  objects, — organic  and  inor- 
ganic, material  and  spiritual,  abstract  ideas  as  well  as 
visible  forces.  Is  it  implied  that  Confucius,  and  the 
countless  millions  who  have  followed  him,  had  no  idea  of 
religion,  as  it  is  certain  that  they  had  none  of  theology ; 
that  Buddha  and  the  Buddhists  were  incapable  of  spiritual 
emotion;  that  the  Fire-worshippers  and  the  Sun- wor- 
shippers never  practised  worship;  that  the  pantheists 
and  the  humanists,  from  Marcus  Aurelius  to  Fichte,  had 
the  springs  of  spiritual  life  dried  up  in  them  for  want  of 
an  Old  or  New  Testament  ?  If  this  is  intended,  one  can 
only  wonder  at  the  power  of  a  self-complacent  conformity 
to  close  men's  eyes  to  the  native  dignity  of  man.  Religion, 
and  its  elements  in  emotion — attachment,  veneration, 
love, — are  as  old  exactly  as  human  nature.  They  moved 
the  first  men  and  the  first  women ;  they  have  found  a 


42  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

hundred  objects  to  inspire  them,  and  have  bowed  to  a 
great  variety  of  powers.  They  were  in  full  force  long 
U'toro  theology  was.  and  before  the  rise  of  Christi- 
anity ;  and  it  would  be  strange  indeed  if  it  should  cease 
with  the  decline  of  either.  It  is  not  the  emotional  ele- 
ments of  religion  which  fail  us;  for  these,  with  the 
growing  goodness  of  mankind,  are  gaining  in  purity  and 
st  ivn- th.  Rather  it  is  the  intellectual  elements  of  religion 
which  an-  conspicuously  at  fault.  We  need  to-day,  not 
the  faculty  of  worship  (that  is  ever  fresh  in  the  heart), 
but  a  clearer  vision  of  the  power  we  should  worship. 
Nay,  it  is  not  we  who  are  borrowing  the  privileges  of 
theology :  rather  it  is  theology  which  seeks  to  appropri- 
ate to  itself  the  most  universal  privilege  of  man. 

II. 

THE  rational  view  of  the  soul  (we  insisted  in  a  previous 
paper)  would  remove  us  as  far  from  cynical  materialism 
as  from  a  fantastic  spiritualism.  It  restores  to  their  true 
supremacy  in  human  life  those  religious  emotions  which 
materialism  forgets;  while  it  frees  us  from  the  idle 
figment  which  spiritualism  would  foist  upon  human  nature. 
We  entirely  agree  with  the  theologians  that  our  age 
is  beset  with  a  grievous  danger  of  materialism.  There  is 
a  school  of  teachers  abroad,  and  they  have  found  an  echo 
here,  who  dream  that  victorious  vivisection  will  ultimately 
win  them  anatomical  solutions  of  man's  moral  and 
spiritual  mysteries.  Such  unholy  nightmares,  it  is  true, 


THE  SOUL  AND   FUTURE  LIFE.  43 

are  not  likely  to  beguile  many  minds  in  a  country  like 
this,  where  social  and  moral  problems  are  still  in  their 
natural  ascendant.  But  there  is  a  subtiler  kind  of 
materialism,  of  which  the  dangers  are  real.  It  does  not, 
indeed,  put  forth  the  bestial  sophism  that  the  apex  of 
philosophy  is  to  be  won  by  improved  microscopes  and 
new  batteries.  But,  then,  it  has  nothing  to  say  about  the 
spiritual  life  of  man ;  it  has  no  particular  religion ;  it 
ignores  the  soul.  It  fills  the  air  with  paeans  to  science  ; 
it  is  never  weary  of  vaunting  the  scientific  methods,  the 
scientific  triumphs.  But  it  always  means  physical,  not 
moral  science;  intellectual,  not  religious  conquests.  It 
shirks  the  question  of  questions— to  what  human  end  is 
this  knowledge  ? — how  shall  man  thereby  order  his  life 
as  a  whole  ? — where  is  he  to  find  the  object  of  his  yearn- 
ings of  spirit  ?  Of  the  spiritual  history  of  mankind  it 
knows  as  little,  and  thinks  as  little,  as  of  any  other  sort 
of  Asiatic  devil-worship.  At  the  spiritual  aspirations  of 
the  men  and  women  around  us,  ill  at  ease  for  want  of 
some  answer,  it  stares  blankly,  as  it  does  at  some  spirit- 
rapping  epidemic.  "  What  is  that  to  us  ? — see  thou  to 
that " — is  all  that  it  can  answer  when  men  ask  it  for  a 
religion.  It  is  of  the  religion  of  all  sensible  men,  the 
religion  which  all  sensible  men  never  tell.  With  a  smile 
or  a  shrug  of  the  shoulders  it  passes  by  into  the  whirring 
workshops  of  science  (that  is,  the  physical  prelude  of 
science)  ;  and  it  leaves  the  spiritual  life  of  the  soul  to  the 
spiritualists,  theological  or  nonsensical  as  the  case  may 
be,  wishing  them  both  in  heaven.  This  is  the  materialism 
to  fear. 


44  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

The  theologians  and  the  vast  sober  mass  of  serious 
men  and  women,  who  want  simply  to  live  rightly,  are 
quite  right  when  they  shun  and  fear  a  school  that  is 
so  eager  about  cosmology  and  biology,  while  it  leaves 
morality  and  religion  to  take  care  of  themselves.  And 
yet  they  know  all  the  while  that  before  the  advancing 
line  of  positive  thought  they  are  fighting  a  forlorn  hope ; 
and  they  see  their  own  line  daily  more  and  more  demor- 
alized by  the  consciousness  that  they  have  no  rational  plan 
of  campaign.  They  know  that  their  own  account  of  the 
soul,  of  the  spiritual  life,  of  Providence,  of  heaven,  is 
daily  shifting— is  growing  more  vague,  more  inconsistent, 
more  various.  They  hurry  wildly  from  one  untenable 
position  to  another,  like  a  routed  and  disorganized  army. 
In  a  religious  discussion  years  ago  we  once  asked  one  of 
the  Broad  Church,  •  a  disciple  of  one  of  its  eminent 
founders,  what  he  understood  by  the  Third  Person  of  the 
Trinity ;  and  he  said,  doubtfully,  that  "  he  fancied  there 
was  a  sort  of  a  something."  Since  those  days  the  process 
of  disintegration  and  vaporization  of  belief  has  gone  on 
rapidly  ;  and  now  very  religious  minds,  and  men  who 
think  themselves  to  be  religious,  are  ready  to  apply  this 
"  sort  of  a  something"  to  all  the  verities  in  turn.  They 
half  hope  that  there  is  "  a  sort  of  something  "  fluttering 
about,  or  inside,  their  human  frames,  that  there  may  turn 
out  to  be  a  "  something"  somewhere  after  death,  and  that 
there  must  be  a  sort  of  a  somebody  or  (as  the  theology  of 
culture  will  have  it)  a  sort  of  a  something  controlling  and 
and  comprehending  human  life.  But  the  more  thought- 


THE  SOUL  AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  45 

ful  spirits,  not  being  professionally  engaged  in  a  doctrine, 
mostly  limit  themselves  to  a  pious  hope  that  there  may 
be  something  in  it,  and  that  we  shall  know  some  day 

what  it  is. 

• 

Now,  theologians  and  religious  people  unattached  must 
know  that  this  will  never  serve — that  this  is  paltering 
with  the  greatest  of  all  things.  What,  then,  is  the  only 
solution  which  can  ultimately  satisfy  both  the  devotees  of 
science  and  the  believers  in  religion  ?  Surely  but 
this,  to  make  religion  scientific  by  placing  religion  under 
the  methods  of  science.  Let  science  come  to  see  that 
religion,  morality,  life,  are  within  its  field,  or,  rather,  are 
the  main  part  of  its  field.  Let  religion  come  to  see  that 
it  can  be  nothing  but  a  prolongation  of  science,  a  rational 
and  homogeneous  result  of  cosmology  and  biology,  not  a 
matter  of  fantastic  guessing.  Then  there  will  be  no  true 
science  which  does  not  aim  at,  and  is  not  guided  by,  sys- 
tematic religion.  And  there  will  be  no  religion  which 
pretends  to  any  other  basis  but  positive  knowledge  and 
scientific  logic.  But  for  this  science  must  consent  to  add 
spiritual  phenomena  to  its  curriculum,  and  religion  must 
consent  to  give  up  its  vapid  figments. 

Positivism  in  dealing  with  the  soul  discards  the 
exploded  errors  of  the  materialists  and  spiritualists  alike. 
On  the  one  hand,  it  not  only  admits  into  its  studies  the 
spiritual  life  of  men,  but  it  raises  this  life  to  be  the 
essential  business  of  all  human  knowledge.  All  the 
spiritual  sentiments  of  man,  the  aspirations  of  the  consci- 
ous soul  in  all  their  purity  and  pathos,  the  vast  religious 


46  A  MODEKN  SYMPOSIUM. 

experience  and  potentialities  of  the  human  heart  seen  in 
the  history  of  our  spiritual  life  as  a  race — this  is,  we  say, 
the  principal  subject  of  science  and  of  philosophy.  No 
philosophy,  no  morality,  no  polity,  can  rest  on  stable 
foundations  if  this  be  not  its  grand  aim  ;  if  it  have  not  a 
systematic  creed,  a  rational  object  of  worship,  and  a 
definite  discipline  of  life.  But,  then,  we  treat  these 
spiritual  functions  of  the  soul,  not  as  mystical  enigmas, 
but  as  positive  phenomena,  and  we  satisfy  them  by  philo- 
sophic and  historic  answers  and  not  by  naked  figments.  And 
we  think  that  the  teaching  of  history  and  a  true  synthesis 
of  science  bring  us  far  closer  to  the  heart  of  this  spiritual 
life  than  do  any  spiritualist  guesses,  and  do  better  equip 
us  to  read  aright  the  higher  secrets  of  the  soul  :  meaning 
always  by  soul  the  consensus  of  the  faculties  which 
observation  discovers  in  the  human  organism. 

On  the  other  hand,  without  entering  into  an  idle  dis- 
pute with  the  spiritualist  orthodoxy,  we  insist  on  regard- 
ing this  organism  as  a  perfectly  homogeneous  unit,  to  be 
studied  from  one  end  of  it  to  the  other  by  rational  scien- 
tific methods.  We  pretend  to  give  no  sort  of  cause  as 
lying'behind  the  manifold  powers  of  the  organism.  We 
say  the  immaterial  entity  is  something  which  we  cannot 
grasp,  which  explains  nothing,  for  which  we  cannot  have 
a  shadow  of  evidence.  We  are  determined  to  treat  man 
as  a  human  organism,  just  as  we  treat  a  dog  as  a  canine 
organism ;  and  we  know  no  ground  for  saying,  and  no 
good  to  be  got  by  pretending,  that  man  is  a  human 
organism  plus  an  indescribable  entity.  We  say  the  human 


THE   SOUL   AND   FUTURE  LIFE.  47 

organism  is  a  marvellous  thing,  sublime  if  you  will,  of 
subtilest  faculty  and  sensibility ;  but  we,  at  any  rate,  can 
find  nothing  in  man  which  is  not  an  organic  part  of  this 
organism  ;  we  find  the  faculties  of  mind,  feeling,  and  will, 
directly  dependent  on  physical  organs  ;  and  to  talk  to  us 
of  mind,  feeling,  and  will,  continuing  their  functions  in 
the  absence  of  physical  organs  and  visible  organisms,  is  to 
use  language  which,  to  us  at  least,  is  pure  nonsense. 

And  now  to  turn  to  the  grand  phenomenon  of  material 
organisms  which  we  call  Death.  The  human  organism, 
like  every  other  organism,  ultimately  loses  that  unstable 
equilibrium  of  its  correlated  forces  which  we  name  Life, 
and  ceases  to  be  an  organism  or  system  of  organs,  adjust- 
ing its  internal  relations  to  its  external  conditions.  There- 
upon the  existence  of  the  complex  independent  entity  to 
which  w<P  attribute  consciousness  undoubtedly — i.  e.,  for 
aught  we  know  to  the  contrary — comes  to  an  end.  But  the 
activities  of  this  organism  do  not  come  to  an  end,  except 
so  far  as  these  activities  need  fresh  sensations  and 
material  organs.  And  a  great  part  of  these  activities,  and 
far  the  noblest  part,  only  need  fresh  sensations  and 
material  organs  in  other  similar  organisms.  While  there 
is  an  abundance  of  these  in  due  relation,  the  activities  go 
on  ad  infinitum,  with  increasing  energy.  We  have  not 
the  slightest  reason  to  suppose  that  the  consciousness 
of  the  organism  continues,  for  we  mean  by  consciousness 
the  sum  of  sensations  of  a  particular  organism,  and  the 
particular  organism  being  dissolved,  we  have  nothing 
left  whereto  to  attribute  consciousness,  and  the  proposal 


48  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

strikes  us  like  a  proposal  to  regard  infinity  as  conscious. 
So,  of  course,  with  the  sensations  separately,  and  with 
them  the  power  of  accumulating  knowledge,  of  feeling, 
thinking,  or  of  modifying  the  existence  in  correspondence 
with  the  outward  environment.  Life,  in  the  technical 
sense  of  the  word,  is  at  an  end,  but  the  activities  of  which 
that  life  is  the  soui^e  were  never  so  potent.  Our  age  is 
familiar  enough  with  the  truth  of  the  persistence  of  energy, 
and  no  one  supposes  that  with  the  dissolution  of  the  body 
the  forces  of  its  material  elements  are  lost.  They  only 
pass  into  new  combinations  and  continue  to  work  else- 
where. Far  less  is  the  energy  of  the  activities  lost.  The 
earth,  and  every  country,  every  farmstead,  and  every  city 
on  it,  are  standing  witnesses  that  the  physical  activities 
are  not  lost.  As  century  rolls  after  century,  we  see  in 
every  age  more  potent  fruits  of  the  labour  whict  raised  the 
pyramids,  or  won  Holland  from  the  sea,  or  carved  the 
Theseus  out  of  marble.  The  bodily  organisms  which 
wrought  them  have  passed  into  gases  and  earths,  but  the 
activity  they  displayed  is  producing  the  precise  results 
designed  on  a  far  grander  scale  in  each  generation.  Much 
more  do  the  intellectual  and  moral  energies  work 
unceasingly.  Not  a  single  manifestation  of  thought  or 
feeling  is  without  some  result  so  soon  as  it  is  communi- 
cated to  a  similar  organism.  It  passes  into  the  sum  of 
his  mental  and  moral  being. 

But  there  is  about  the  persistence  of  the  moral  energies 
this  special  phenomenon.  It  marks  the  vast  interval  be- 
tween physical  and  moral  science.  The  energies  of  ma- 


THE  SOUL  AND   FUTURE  LIFE.  49 

terial  elements,  so  far  as  we  see,  disperse,  or  for  the  most 
part  disperse.  The  energies  of  an  intellectual  and  moral 
kind  are  very  largely  continued  in  their  organic  unities. 
The  consensus  of  the  mental,  of  the  moral,  of  the  emo- 
tional powers  may  go  on,  working  as  a  whole,  producing 
precisely  the  same  results,  with  the  same  individuality, 
whether  the  material  organism,  the  source  and  original 
base  of  these. powers,  be  in  physical  function  or  not.  The 
mental  and  moral  powers  do  not,  it  is  true,  increase  and 
grow,  develop  or  vary,  within  themselves.  Nor  do  they 
in  their  special  individuality  produce  visible  results,  for 
they  are  no  longer  in  direct  relations  with  their  special 
material  organisms.  But  the  mental  and  moral  powers 
are.  not  dispersed  like  gases.  They  retain  their  unity, 
they  retain  their  organic  character,  and  they  retain  the 
whole  of  their  power  of  passing  into  and  stimulating  the 
brains  of  living  men  ;  and  in  these  they  carry  on  their 
activity  precisely  as  they  did,  while  the  bodies  in  which 
they  were  formed  absorbed  and  exhaled  material  sub- 
stance. 

Nay,  more  :  the  individuality  and  true  activity  of  these 
mental  and  moral  forces  is  often  not  manifest,  and  some- 
times is  not  complete,  so  long  as  the  organism  continues 
its  physical  functions.  Newton,  we  may  suppose,  has  ac- 
complished his  great  researches.  They  are  destined  to 
transform  half  the  philosophy  of  mankind.  But  he  is 
old,  and  incapable  of  fresh  achievements.  We  will  say 
he  is  feeble,  secluded,  silent,  and  lives  shut  up  in  his 

rooms.     The  activity  of  his  mighty  intellectual  nature  is 
4 


50  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

being  borne  over  the  world  on  the  wings  of  Thought,  and 
works  a  revolution  at  every  stroke.  But  otherwise  the 
man  Newton  is  not  essentially  distinguishable  from  the 
nearest  infirm  pauper,  and  has  as  few  and  as  feeble  rela- 
tions with  mankind.  At  last  the  man  Newton  dies — that 
is,  the  body  is  dispersed  into  gas  and  dust.  But  the 
world,  which  is  affected  enormously  by  his  intellect,  is  not 
in  the  smallest  degree  affected  by  his  death..  His  activity 
continues  the  same ;  if  it  were  worth  while  to  conceal  the 
fact  of  his  death,  no  one  of  the  millions  who  are  so  greatly 
affected  by  his  thoughts  would  perceive  it  or  know  it.  If 
he  had  discovered  some  means  of  prolonging  a  torpid  ex- 
istence till  this  hour,  he  might  be  living  now,  and  it  would 
not  signify  to  us  in  the  slightest  degree  whether  his  body 
breathed  in  the  walls  of  his  lodgings  or  mouldered  in  the 
vaults  of  the  Abbey. 

It  may  be  said  that,  if  it  does  not  signify  much  to  us, 
it  signifies  a  great  deal  to  Isaac  Newton.  But  is  this 
true  ?  He  no  longer  eats  and  sleeps,  a  burden  to  himself ; 
he  no  longer  is  destroying  his  great  name  by  feeble  theo- 
logy or  querulous  pettiness.  But  if  the  small  weaknesses 
and  wants  of  the  flesh  are  ended  for  him,  all  that  makes 
Newton  (and  he  had  always  lived  for  his  posthumous,  not 
his  immediate,  fame)  rises  into  greater  activity  and  purer 
uses.  We  make  no  mystical  or  fanciful  divinity  of  Death ; 
we  do  not  deny  its  terrors  or  its  evils.  We  are  not  res- 
ponsible for  it,  and  should  welcome  any  reasonable  pros- 
pect of  eliminating  or  postponing  this  fatality,  that  waits 
upon  all  organic  Nature.  But  it  is  no  answer  to  philoso- 


THE  SOUL  AND   FUTURE  LIFE.  51 

phy  or  science  to  retort  that  Death  is  so  terrible,  therefore 
man  must  be  designed  to  escape  it.  There  are  savages 
who  persistently  deny  that  men  do  die  at  all,  either  their 
bodies  or.  their  souls,  asserting  that  the  visible  consequen- 
ces of  death  are  either  an  illusion  or  an  artfully-contrived 
piece  of  acting  on  the  part  of  their  friends,  who  have 
really  decamped  to  the  happy  hunting-fields.  This  seems 
on  the  whole  a  more  rational  theory  than  that  of  imma- 
terial souls  flying  about  space,  as  the  spontaneous  fancies 
of  savages  are  sometimes  more  .rational  than  the  elabor- 
ate hypotheses  of  metaphysics. 

But  though  we  do  not  presume  to  apologize  for  death, 
it  is  easy  to  see  that  many  of  the  greatest  moral  and  in- 
tellectual results  of  life  are  only  possible,  can  only  begin, 
when  the  claims  of  the  animal  life  are  satisfied  ;  when  the 
stormy,  complex,  and  checkered  career  is  over,  and  the 
higher  tops  of  the  intellectual  or  moral  nature  alone  stand 
forth  in  the  distance  of  time.  What  was  the  blind  old 
harper  of  Scio  to  his  contemporaries,  or  the  querulous 
refugee  from  Florence,  or  even  the  boon-companion  and 
retired  playwright  of  Stratford,  or  the  blind  and  stern  old 
malignant  of  Bunhill  Field  ?  The  true  work  of  Socrates 
and  his  life  only  began  with  his  resplendent  death,  to  say 
nothing  of  yet  greater  religious  teachers,  whose  names  I 
refrain  from  citing ;  and  as  to  those  whose  lives  have  been 
cast  in  conflicts — the  Caesars, the  Alfreds, the  Hilde brands, 
the  Cromwells,  the  Fredericks — it  is  only  after  death, 
oftenest  in  ages  after  death,  that  they  cease  to  be  com 
batants,  and  become  creators.  It  is  not  merely  that  they 


52  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

are  only  recognized  in  after  ages  ;  the  truth  is,  that  their 
activity  only  begins  when  the  surging  of  passion  and  sense 
ends,  and  turmoil  dies  away.  Great  intellects  and  great 
characters  are  necessarily  in  advance  of  their  age ;  the 
care  of  the  father  and  the  mother  begins  to  tell  most 
truly  in  the  ripe  manhood  of  their  children,  when  the 
parents  are  often  in  the  grave,  and  not  in  the  infancy 
which  they  see  and  are  confronted  with.  The  great  must 
always  feel  with  Kepler,  "  It  is  enough,  as  yet,  if  I  have 
a  hearer  now  and  then  in  a  century."  John  Brown's  body 
lies  a-mouldering  in  the  grave,  but  his  soul  is  marching 
along. 

We  can  trace  this  truth  best  in  the  case  of  great  men  ; 
but  it  is  not  confined  to  the  great.  Not  a  single  act  of 
thought  or  character  ends  with  itself.  Nay  more  ;  not  a 
single  nature  in  its  entirety  but  leaves  its  influence  for 
good  or  for  evil.  As  a  fact  the  good  prevail ;  but  all  act, 
all  continue  to  act  indefinitely,  often  in  ever- widening 
circles.  Physicists  amuse  us  by  tracing  for  us  the  infinite 
fortunes  of  some  wave  set  in  motion  by  force,  its  circles 
and  its  repercussions  perpetually  transmitted  in  new  com- 
plications. But  the  career  of  a  single  intellect  and  charac- 
ter is  a  far  more  real  force  when  it  meets  with  suitable 
intellects  and  characters  into  whose  action  it  is  incorpo- 
rated. Every  life  more  or  less  forms  another  life,  and 
lives  in  another  life.  Civilization,  nation,  city,  imply  this 
fact.  There  is  neither  mysticism  noi  hyperbole,  but  sim- 
ple observation  in  the  belief,  that  the  career  of  every  hu- 
man being  in  society  does  not  end  with  the  death  of  its 


THE  SOUL  AND   FUTURE  LIFE.  53 

body.  In  some  sort  its  higher  activities  and  potency  can 
only  begin  truly  when  change  is  no  longer  possible  for  it. 
The  worthy  gain  in  influence  and  in  range  at  each  gene- 
ration, just  as  the  founders  of  some  populous  race  gain  a 
greater  fatherhood  at  each  succeeding  growth  of  their 
descendants.  And,  in  some  infinitesimal  degree,  the 
humblest  life  that  ever  turned  a  sod  sends  a  wave — no, 
more  than  a  wave,  a  life — through  the  ever-growing  har- 
mony of  human  society.  Not  a  soldier  died  at  Marathon 
or  Salamis,  but  did  a  stroke  by  which  our  ^thought  is  en- 
larged and  our  standard  of  duty  formed  to  this  day. 

Be  it  remembered  that  this  is  not  hypothesis,  but  some- 
thing perfectly  real — we  may  fairly  say  undeniable.  We 
are  not  inventing  an  imaginary  world,  and  saying  it  must 
be  real  because  it  is  so  pleasant  to  think  of ;  we  are  only 
repeating  truths  on  which  our  notion  of  history  and  so- 
ciety is  based.  The  idea,  no  doubt,  is  usually  limited  to 
the  famous,  and  to  the  great  revolutions  in  civilization. 
But  no  one  who  thinks  it  out  carefully  can  deny  that  it 
is  true  of  every  human  being  in  society  in  some  lesser 
degree.  The  idea  has  not  been,  or  is  no  longer,  systema- 
tically enforced,  invested  with  poetry  and  dignity,  and 
deepened  by  the  solemnity  of  religion.  But  why  is  that  ? 
Because  theological  hypotheses  of  a  new  and  heterogene- 
ous existence  have  deadened  our  interest  in  the  realities? 
the  grandeur,  and  the  perpetuity  of  our  earthly  life.  In 
the  best  days  of  Rome,  even  without  a  theory  of  history 
or  a  science  of  society,  it  was  a  living  faith,  the  true  re- 
ligion of  that  majestic  race.  It  is  the  real  sentiment  of 


54  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

all  societies  where  the  theological  hypothesis  has  disap- 
peared. It  is  no  doubt  now  in  England  the  great  motive 
of  virtue  and  energy.  There  have  been  few  seasons  in 
the  world's  history  when  the  sense  of  moral  responsibility 
and  moral  survival  after  death  was  more  exalted  and 
more  vigorous  than  with  the  companions  of  Vergniaud 
and  Danton,  to  whom  the  dreams  of  theology  were  hardly 
intelligible.  As  we  read  the  calm  and  humane  words  of 
Condorcet  on  the  very  edge  of  his  yawning  grave,  we 
learn  how  the  conviction  of  posthumous  activity  (not  of 
posthumous  fame),  how  the  consciousness  of  a  coming  in- 
corporation with  the  glorious  future  of  his  race,  can  give 
a  patience  and  a  happiness  equal  to  that  of  any  martyr 
of  theology. 

It  would  be  an  endless  inquiry  to  trace  the  means 
whereby  this  sense  of  posthumous  participation  in  the  life 
of  our  fellows  can  be  extended  to  the  mass,  as  it  certainly 
affects  already  the  thoughtful  and  the  refined,  Withou^ 
an  education,  a  new  social  opinion,  without  a  religion — I 
mean  an  organized  religion,  not  a  vague  metaphysic — it  is 
doubtless  impossible  that  it  should  become  universal  and 
capable  of  overcoming  selfishness.  But  make  it  at  once 
the  basis  of  philosophy,  the  standard  of  right  and  wrong, 
and  the  centre  of  a  religion,  and  this  will  prove,  perhaps, 
an  easier  task  than  that  of  teaching  Greeks  and  Romans, 
Syrians  and  Moors,  to  look  forward  to  a  future  life  of 
ceaseless  psalmody  in  an  immaterial  heaven.  The  aston- 
ishing feat  was  performed ;  and,  perhaps,  it  may  be  easier 
to  fashion  a  new  public  opinion,  requiring  merely  that  an 


THE  SOUL  AND  FUTUKE  LIFE.  55 

accepted  truth  of  philosophy  should  be  popularized,  which 
is  already  the  deepest  hope  of  some  thoughtful  spirits 
and  which  does  not  take  the  suicidal  course  of  trying  to 
cast  out  the  devil  of  selfishness  by  a  direct  appeal  to  the 
personal  self. 

It  is  here  that  the  strength  of  the  human  future  over 
the  celestial  future  is  so  clearly  pre-eminent.  Make  the 
future  hope  a  social  activity,  and  we  give  to  the  present 
life  a  social  ideal.  Make  the  future  hope  personal  beati- 
tude, and  personality  is  stamped  deeper  on  every  act  of 
of  our  daily  life.  Now  we  make  the  future  hope,  in  the 
truest  sense,  social,  inasmuch  as  our  future  is  simply  an 
active  existence  prolonged  by  society.  And  our  future 
hope  rests  not  in  any  vague  yearning,  of  which  we  have 
as  little  evidence  as  we  have  definite  conception  :  it  rests 
on  a  perfectly  certain  truth,  accepted  by  all  thoughtful 
minds,  the  truth  that  the  actions,  feelings,  thoughts,  of 
every  one  of  us — our  minds,  our  characters,  our  souls,  as 
organic  wholes — do  marvellously  influence  and  mould  each 
other ;  that  the  highest  part  of  ourselves,  the  abiding  part 
of  us,  passes  into  other  lives  and  continues  to  live  in  other 
lives.  Can  we  conceive  a  more  potent  stimulus  to  recti- 
tude, to  daily  and  hourly  striving  after  true  life,  than 
this  ever-present  sense  that  we  are  indeed  immortal ;  not 
that  we  have  an  immortal  something  within  us,  but  that 
in  very  truth  we  ourselves,  our  thinking,  feeling,  acting 
personalities,  are  immortal;  nay,  cannot  die,  but  must 
ever  continue  what  we  make  them,  working  and  doing,  if 
no  longer  receiving  and  enjoying  ?  And  not  merely  we 


•56  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

ourselves,  in  our  personal  identity,  are  immortal,  but  each 
act,  thought,  and  feeling,  is  immortal ;  and  this  immortal- 
ity is  not  some  ecstatic  and  indescribable  condition  in 
space,  but  activity  on  earth  in  the  real  and  known  work 
of  life,  in  the  welfare  of  those  whom  we  have  loved,  and 
in  the  happiness  of  those  who  come  after  us. 

And  can  it  be  difficult  to  idealize  and  give  currency  to 
a  faith  which  is  a  certain  and  undisputed  fact  of  common 
sense  as  well  as  of  philosophy  ?  As  we  live  for  others  in 
life,  so  we  live  in  others  after  death,  as  others  have  lived 
in  us,  and  all  for  the  common  race.  How  deeply  does 
such  a  belief  as  this  bring  home  to  each  moment  of  life 
the  mysterious  perpetuity  of  ourselves !  For  good,  for  evil, 
we  cannot  die ;  we  cannot  shake  ourselves  free  from  this 
eternity  of  our  faculties.  There  is  here  no  promise,  it  is 
true,  of  eternal  sensations,  enj  oyments,  meditations.  There 
is  no  promise,  be  it  plainly  said,  of  anything  but  an  im- 
mortality of  influence,  of  spiritual  work,  of  glorified  activ- 
ity. We  cannot  even  say  that  we  shall  continue  to  love ; 
but  we  know  that  we  shall  be  loved.  It  may  well  be 
that  we  shall  consciously  know  no  hope  ourselves ;  but  we 
shall  inspire  hopes.  It  may  be  that  we  shall  not  think  ; 
but  others  will  think  our  thoughts,  and  enshrine  our  minds. 
If  no  sympathies  shall  thrill  along  our  nerves,  we  shall  be 
the  spring  of  sympathy  in  distant  generations ;  and  that, 
though  we  be  the  humblest  and  the  least  of  all  the  soldiers 
in  the  human  host,  the  least  celebrated  and  the  worst  re- 
membered. For  our  lives  live  when  we  are  most  forgot- 
ten ;  and  not  a  cup  of  water  that  we  may  have  given  to 


THE  SOUL   AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  57 

an  unknown  sufferer,  or  a  wise  word  spoken  in  season  to 
a  child,  but  has  added  (whether  we  remember  it,  whether 
others  remember  it  or  not)  a  streak  of  happiness  and 
strength  to  the  world.  Our  earthly  frames,  like  the  grain 
of  wheat,  may  be  laid  in  the  earth — and  this  image  of  our 
great  spiritual  Master  is  more  fit  for  the  social  than  for  the 
celestial  future — but  the  grain  shall  bear  spiritual  fruit, 
and  multiply  in  kindred  natures  and  in  other  selves. 

It  is  a  merely  verbal  question  if  this  be  the  life  of  the 
Soul  when  the  Soul  means  the  sum  of  the  activities,  or  if 
there  be  any  immortality  where  there  is  no  consciousness. 
It  is  enough  for  us  that  we  can  trust  to  a  real  prolongation 
of  our  highest  activity  in  the  sensible  lives  of  others,  even 
though  our  own  forces  can  gain  nothing  new,  and  are  not 
reflected  in  a  sensitive  body.  We  do  not  get  rid  of  Death, 
but  we  transfigure  Death.  Does  any  religion  profess  to 
do  more  ?  It  is  enough  for  any  creed  that  it  can  teach 
non  omnis  moriar ;  it  would  be  gross  extravagance  to  say 
omnis  non  moriar,  no  part  of  me  shall  die.  Death  is  the 
one  inevitable  law  of  Life.  The  business  of  religion  is  to 
show  us  what  are  its  compensations.  The  spiritualist  or- 
thodoxy, like  every  other  creed,  is  willing  to  allow  that 
Death  robs  us  of  a  great  deal,  that  very  much  of  us  does 
die  ;  nay,  it  teaches  that  this  dies  utterly,  forever,  leaving 
no  trace  but  dust.  And  thus  the  spiritualist  orthodoxy 
exaggerates  death,  and  adds  a  fresh  terror  to  its  power. 
We,  on  the  contrary,  would  seek  to  show  that  much  of  us, 
and  that  the  best  of  us,  does  not  die,  or  at  least  does  not 
end.  And  the  difference  between  our  faith  and  that  of 


58  A   MODEKN   SYMPOSIUM. 

the  orthodox  is  this  :  we  look  to  the  permanence  of  the 
activities  which  give  others  happiness ;  they  look  to  the 
permanence  of  the  consciousness  which  can  enjoy  happi- 
ness. Which  is  the  nobler  ? 

What  need  we  then  to  promise  or  to  hope  more  than  an 
eternity  of  spiritual  influence?     Yet,  after  all,  'tis  no 
question  as  to  what  kind  of  eternity  man  would  prefer  to 
select.     We  have  no  evidence  that  he  has  any  choice  be- 
fore him.     If  we  are  creating  a  universe  of  our  own  and 
a  human  race  on  an  ideal  mould,  it  might  be  rational  to 
discuss  what  kind  of  eternity  was  the  most  desirable,  and 
it  might  then  become  a  question  if  we  should  not  begin  by 
eliminating  death.    But  as  we  are,  with  death  in  the  world, 
and  man  as  we  know  him  submitting  to  the  fatality  of  his 
nature,  the  rational  inquiry  is  this — how  best  to  order  his 
life,  and  to  use  the  eternity  that  he  has.     And  an  immor- 
tality of  prolonged  activity  on  earth  he  has  as  certainly 
as  he  has  civilization,  or  progress,  or  society.     And  the  wise 
man  in  the  evening  of  life  may  be  well  content  to  say  : 
"  I  have  worked  and  thought,  and  have  been  conscious  in 
the  flesh ;  I  have  done  with  the  flesh,  and  therewith  with 
the  toil  of  thought  and  the  troubles  of  sensation ;  I  am 
ready  to  pass  into  the  spiritual  community  of  human 
souls,  and  when  this  man's  flesh  wastes  away  from  me, 
may  I  be  found  worthy  to  become  part  of  the  influence  of 
humanity  itself,  and  so 

'  .     .    .     .    join  the  choir  invisible 
Whose  music  is  the  gladness  of  the  world.'  " 

That  the  doctrine  of  the  celestial  future  appeals  toHhe 


THE  SOUL   AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  59 

essence  of  self  appears  very  strongly  in  its  special  rebuke 
to  the  doctrine  of  the  social  future.     It  repeats :  "  We 
agree  with  all  you  say  about  the  prolonged  activity  of 
man  after  death,  we  see  of  course  that  the  solid  achieve- 
ments of  life  are  carried  on,  and  we  grant  you  that  it  sig- 
nifies nothing  to  those  who  profit  by   his  work  that  the 
man  no  longer  breathes  in  the  flesh  ;  but  what  is  all  that 
to  the  man,  to  you,  and  to  me  ?     We  shall  not  feel  our 
work  ;  we  shall  not  have  the  indescribable  satisfaction 
which  our  souls  now  have  in  living,  in  effecting  our  work, 
and  profiting  by  others.      What  is  the  good  of  mankind 
to  me,  when  I  am  mouldering  unconscious  ?"     This  is  the 
true  materialism ;  here  is  the  physical  theory  of  another 
life  ;  this  is  the  unspiritual  denial  of  the  soul,  the  binding 
it  down  to  the  clay  of  the  body.     We  say,  "  All  that  is 
great  in  you  shall  not  end,  but  carry  on  its  activity  per- 
petually and  in  a  purer  way  ;  "    and  you  reply  :    "  What 
care  I  for  what  is  great  in  me,  and  its  possible  work  in  this 
vale  of  tears  ?     I  want  to  feel  life,  I  want  to  enjoy,  I  want 
my  personality" — in  other  words,  "  I  want  my  senses,  I 
want  my  body."     Keep  your  body  and  keep  your  senses 
in   any   way  that   you   know.      We   can   only   wonder 
and  say,  with  Frederick  to  his  runaway  soldiers,   "  Wollt 
ihr  immer  leben  ? "     But  we,  who  know  that  a  higher 
form  of  activity  is  only  to  be  reached  by  a  subjective  life 
in  society,  will  continue  to  regard  a  perpetuity  of  sensation 
as  the  true  hell,  for  we  feel  that  the  perpetual  worth  of  our 
lives  is  the  one  thing  precious  to  care  for,  and  not  a  vacu- 
ous eternity  of  consciousness. 


60  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

It  is  not  merely  that  this  eternity  of  the  tabor  is  so 
gross,  so  sensual,  so  indolent,  so  selfish  a  creed ;  but  its 
worst  evil  is  that  it  paralyzes  practical  life,  and  throws  it 
into  discord.  A  life  of  vanity  in  a  vale  of  tears  to  be  fol- 
lowed by  an  infinity  of  celestial  rapture,  is  necessarily  a 
life  which  is  of  infinitesimal  importance.  The  incongruity 
of  the  attempts  to  connect  the  two,  and  to  make  the  vale 
of  tears  the  antechamber  of  the  judgment-dock  of  heaven, 
grows  greater  and  not  less  as  ages  roll  on.  The  more  we 
think  and  learn,  and  the  higher  rises  our  social  philosophy 
and  our  insight  into  human  destiny,  the  more  the  reality 
and  importance  of  the  social  future  impresses  us,  while  the 
fancy  of  the  celestial  future  grows  unreal  and  incongru- 
ous. As  we  get  to  know  what  thinking  means,  and  feel- 
ing means,  and  the  more  truly  we  understand  what  life 
means,  the  more  completely  do  the  promises  of  the  celes- 
tial transcendentalism  fail  to  interest  us.  We  have  come  to 
see  that  to  continue  to  live  is  to  carry  on  a  series  of  corre- 
lated sensations,  and  to  set  in  motion  a  series  of  corres- 
ponding forces  ;  to  think  is  to  marshal  a  set  of  observed 
perceptions  with  a  view  to  certain  observed  phenomena 
to  feel  implies  something  of  which  we  have  a  real  assur- 
ance affecting  our  own  consensus  within.  The  whole 
set  of  positive  thoughts  compels  us  to  believe  that  it  is  an 
infinite  apathy  to  which  your  heaven  would  consign  us, 
without  objects,  without  relations,  without  change,  with- 
out growth,  without  action,  an  absolute  nothingness,  a 
nirvana,  of  impotence — this  is  not  life;  it  is  not  conscious- 
ness ;  it  is  not  happiness.  So  far  as  we  can  grasp  the  hy- 


THE   SOUL   AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  61 

pothesis,  it  seems  equally  ludicrous  and  repulsive.  You 
may  call  it  paradise  ;  but  we  call  it  conscious  annihilation. 
You  may  long  for  it,  if  you  have  been  so  taught ;  just  as 
if  you  had  been  taught  to  cherish  such  hopes,  you  might 
be  now  yearning  for  the  moment  when  you  might  become 
the  immaterial  principle  of  a  comet,  or  as  you  might  tell 
me  that  you  really  were  the  ether,  and  were  about  to  take 
your  place  in  space.  This  is  how  these  sublimities  affect 
us.  But  we  know  that  to  many  this  future  is  one  of 
spiritual  development,  a  life  of  growth  and  continual  up- 
soaring  of  still  higher  affection.  It  may  be  so  ;  but  to  our 
mind  these  are  contradictions  in  terms.  We  cannot  un- 
derstand what  life  and  affection  can  mean,  where  you  pos- 
tulate the  absence  of  every  condition  by  which  life  and 
affection  are  possible.  Can  there  be  development  where 
there  is  no  law,  thought  or  affection  where  object  and 
subject  are  confused  into  one  essence  ?  How  can  that 
be  existence,  where  everything  of  which  we  have  experi- 
ence, and  everything  which  we  can  define,  is  presumed  to 
be  unable  to  enter  ?  To  us  these  things  are  all  incoher- 
ences ;  and  in  the  midst  of  practical  realities  and  the  solid 
duties  of  life,  sheer  impertinences.  The  field  is  full :  each 
human  life  has  a  perfectly  real  and  a  vast  future  to  look 
lorward  to ;  these  hyperbolic  enigmas  disturb  our  grave 
duties  and  our  solid  hopes.  No  wonder,  then,  while  they 
are  still  so  rife,  that  men  are  dull  to  the  moral  responsi- 
bility which,  in  its  awfulness,  begins  only  at  the  grave ; 
that  they  are  so  little  influenced  by  the  futurity  which 
will  judge  them  ;  that  they  are  blind  to  the  dignity  and 
beauty  of  death,  and  shuffle  off  the  dead  life  and  the  dead 


62  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

body  with  such  cruel  disrespect.  The  fumes  of  the  celes- 
tial immortality  still  confuse  them.  It  is  only  when  an 
earthly  future  is  the  fulfilment  of  a  w'orthy,  earthly  life, 
that  we  can  see  all  the  majesty  as  well  as  the  glory  of  the 
world  beyond  the  grave  ;  and  then  only  will  it  fulfil  its 
moral  and  religious  purpose  as  the  great  guide  of  human 
conduct. 


R.  H.  BUTTON. 

THE  imaginative  glow  and  rhetorical  vivacity  which 
are  visible  throughout  Mr.  Harrison's  essays  on  "The 
Soul  and  Future  Life"  are  very  remarkable,  and  should  guard 
those  of  us  who  recoil  in  amazement  from  its  creed  or  no- 
creed  from  falling  into  the  very  common  mistake  of  as- 
suming that  the  effect  which  such  ideas  as  these  produce 
on  ourselves  is  the  effect,  which,  apart  from  all  questions  of 
the  other  mental  conditions  surrounding  the  natures  into 
which  they  are  received,  they  naturally  produce.  It  is 
clear,  at  least,  that  if  they  ever  tended  to  produce  on  the 
author  of  these  papers  the  same  effect  which  they  not  only 
tend  to  produce,  but  do  produce  on  myself,  that  tendency 
must  have  been  so  completely  neutralized  by  the  redun- 
dant moral  energy  inherent  in  his  nature,  that  the  char- 
acteristic effect  which  I  should  have  ascribed  to  them  is 
absolutely  unverifiable,  and,  for  anything  we  have  the 
right  to  assert,  non-existent.  There  is  at  least  but  one 
instance  in  which  I  should  have  traced  any  shade  of  what 


«  THE   SOUL  AND   FUTUEE   LIFE.  63 

I  may  call  the  natural  view  of  death  as  presented  in  the 
light  of  this  creed,  and  that  is  the  sentence  in  which  Mr. 
Harrison  somewhat  superfluously  disclaims — and,  more- 
over, with  an  accent  of  hauteur,  as  though  he  resented 
the  necessity  of  admitting  that  death  is  a  disagreeable 
certainty — his  own  or  his  creed's  responsibility  for  the 
fact  of  death.  "  We  make  no  mystical  or  fanciful  divinity 
of  death,"  he  says :  "  we  do  not  deny  its  terrors  or  its 
evils.  We  are  not  responsible  for  it,  and  should  welcome 
any  reasonable  prospect  of  eliminating  or  postponing  this 
fatality  that  waits  upon  all  organic  nature."  After  read- 
ing that  admission,  I  was  puzzled  when  I  came  to  the 
assertion  that  "  we  who  know  that  a  higher  form  of 
activity  is  only  to  be  reached  by  a  subjective  life  in 
society,  will  continue  to  regard  a  perpetuity  of  sensation 
as  the  true  hell,"  a  sentence  in  which  Mr.  Harrison  would 
commonly  be  understood  to  mean  that  he  and  all  his 
friends,  if  they  had  a  vote  in  the  matter,  would  give  a 
unanimous  suffrage  against  this  "perpetuity  of  sensation," 
and,  so  far  from  trying  to  eliminate  and  postpone  death, 
would  be  inclined  to  cling  to  and  even  hasten  it.  For,  in 
this  place  at  least,  it  is  not  the  perpetuation  of  deteriora- 
ted energies  of  which  Mr.  Harrison  speaks,  but  the 
perpetuation  of  life  pure  and  simple.  Indeed,  nothing 
puzzles  me  more  in  this  paper  than  the  diametrical  con- 
tradictions, both  of  feeling  and  thought,  which  appear  to 
me  to  be  embodied  in  it.  Its  main  criticism  on  the  com- 
mon view  of  immortality  seems  to  be  that  the  desire  for  it 
is  a  grossly  selfish  desire.  Nay,  nicknaming  the  conception 


64  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

of  a  future  of  eternal  praise,  "the  eternity  of  the  tabor," 
he  calls  it  a  conception  "  so  gross,  so  sensual,  so  indolent, 
so  selfish,"  as  to  be  worthy  of  nothing  but  scorn.  I  think 
he  can  never  have  taken  the  trouble  to  realize  with  any 
care  what  he  is  talking  of.  Whatever  the  conception 
embodied  in  what  Mr.  Harrison  calls  "ceaseless  psalmody," 
may  be — and  certainly  it  is  not  my  idea  of  immortal  life 
—it  is  the  very  opposite  of  selfish.  No  conception  of  life 
can  be  selfish  of  which  the  very  essence  is  adoration,  that 
is,  wonder,  veneration,  gratitude  to  another.  And  gross 
as  the  conception  necessarily  suggested  by  psalm-singing  is 
to  those  who  interpret  it,  as  we  generally  do,  by  the  sten- 
torian shoutings  of  congregations  who  are.  often  thinking 
a  great  deal  more  of  their  own  performances  than  of  the 
object  of  their  praise,  it  is  the  commonest  candour  to 
admit  that  this  conception  of  immortality  owes  its  origin 
entirely  to  men  who  were  thinking  of  a  life  absorbed  in 
the  interior  contemplation  of  a  God  full  of  all  perfections 
— a  contemplation  breaking  out  into  thanksgiving  only 
in  the  intensity  of  their  love  and  adoration.  Whatever 
else  this  conception  of  immortality  may  be,  the  very  last 
phrase  which  can  be  justly  applied  to  it  is  "  gross  "  or 
"  selfish."  I  fear  that  the  positivists  have  left  the 
Christian  objects  of  their  criticism  so  far  behind  that  they 
have  ceased  not  merely  to  realize  what  Christians  mean, 
but  have  sincerely  and  completely  forgotten  that  Chris- 
tians ever  had  a  meaning  at  all.  That  positivists  should 
regard  any  belief  in  the  "  beatific  vision  "  as  a  wild  piece  of 
fanaticism,  I  can  understand,  but  that,  entering  into  the 


THE  SOUL  AND  FUTUKE  LIFE.  65 

meaning  of  that  fanaticism,  they  should  describe  the 
desire  for  it  as  a  gross  piece  of  selfishness,  I  cannot  under- 
stand ;  and  I  think  it  more  reasonable,  therefore,  to  assume 
that  they  have  simply  lost  the  key  to  the  language  of 
adoration.  Moreover,  when  I  come  to  note  Mr.  Harrison's 
own  conception  of  the  future  life,  it  appears  to  me  that  it 
differs  only  from  the  Christian's  conception  by  its  infinite 
deficiencies,  and  in  no  respect  by  superior  moral  qualities 
of  any  kind.  That  conception,  is  in  a  word,  posthumous 
energy.  He  holds  that  if  we  could  get  rid  of  the  vulgar 
notion  of  a  survival  of  personal  sensations  and  of  growing 
mental  and  moral  faculties  after  death,  we  should  conse- 
crate the  notion  of  posthumous  activity,  and  anticipate 
with  delight  our  "  coming  incorporation  with  the  glorious 
future  of  our  race,"  as  we  cannot  possibly  consecrate 
those  great  hopes  now. 

But,  in  the  first  place,  what  is  this  "  glorious  future  of 
our  race  "  which  I  am  invited  to  contemplate  ?  It  is  the 
life  in  a  better  organized  society  of  a  vast  number  of  these 
merely  temporary  creatures  whose  personal  sensations,  if 
they  ever  could  be  "  perpetuated,"  Mr.  Harrison  regards 
as  giving  us  the  best  conception  of  a  "  true  hell."  Now 
if  an  improved  and  better  organized  future  of  ephemerals 
be  so  glorious  to  anticipate,  what  elements  of  glory  are 
there  in  it  which  would  not  belong  to  the  immortality 
looked  forward  to  by  the  Christian — a  far  more  improved 
future  of  endlessly  growing  natures  ?  Is  it  the  mere  fact 
that  I  shall  myself  belong  to  the  one  future  which  renders 
it  unworthy,  while  the  absence  of  any  "  perpetuity"  of  my 
5 


66  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

personal  "  sensations  "  from  the  other  renders  it  unselfish  ? 
I  always  supposed  selfishness  to  consist,  not  in  the  desire 
for  any  noble  kind  of  life  in  which  I  might  share,  but  in 
the  preference  for  my  own  happiness  at  the  expense  of 
some  one  else's.  If  it  is  selfish  to  desire  the  perpetuation 
of  a  growing  life,  which  not  only  does  not,  as  far  as  I  know, 
interfere  with  the  volume  of  moral  growth  in  others,  but 
certainly  contributes  to  it,  then  it  must  be  the  true  un- 
selfishness to  commit  suicide  at  once,  supposing  suicide  to 
be  the  finis  to  personal  "  sensation."  But  then  universal 
suicide  would  be  inconsistent  with  the  glorious  future  of 
our  race,  so  I  suppose  it  must  at  least  be  postponed  till  our 
own  sensations  have  been  so  far  "  perpetuated  "  as  to  leave 
heirs  behind  them.  If  Condorcet  is  to  be  held  up  to  our 
admiration  for  anticipating  on  the  edge  of  the  grave  his 
"  coming  incorporation  with  the  glorious  future  of  his 
race,"  i.  e.,  with  ourselves  and  our  posterity,  may  we  not 
infer  that  there  is  something  in  ourselves,  i.  e.}  in  human 
society  as  it  now  exists,  which  is  worthy  of  his  vision — 
something  in  which  we  need  not  think  it  "  selfish  "  to 
participate,  even  though  our  personal  "sensations"  do 
form  a  part  of  it  ?  Where,  then,  does  the  selfishness  of 
desiring  to  share  in  a  glorious  future  even  through  per- 
sonal "sensations"  begin?  The  only  reasonable  or 
even  intelligible  answer,  as  far  as  I  can  see,  is  this :  as 
soon  as  that  personal  "  sensation  "  for  ourselves  excludes  a 
larger  and  wider  growth  for  others,  but  no  sooner.  But 
then  no  Christian  ever  supposed  for  a  moment  that  his 
personal  immortality  could  or  would  interfere  with  any 


THE  SOUL  AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  67 

other  being's  growth.  And,  if  so,  where  is  the  selfishness  ? 
What  a  Christian  desires  is  a  higher,  truer,  deeper  union 
with  God  for  all,  himself  included.  If  his  own  life  drop 
out  of  that  future,  he  supposes  that  there  will  be  so  much 
less  that  really  does  glorify  the  true  righteousness,  and  no 
compensating  equivalent.  If  it  be  Mr.  Harrison's  mission 
to  disclose  to  us  that  any  perpetuity  of  sensation  on  our  own 
parts  will  positively  exclude  something  much  higher 
which  would  exist  if  we  consented  to  disappear,  he  may, 
I  think,  prove  his  case.  But  in  the  absence  of  any 
attempt  "to  do  so,  his  conception  that  it  is  noble  and 
unselfish  to  be  more  than  content — grateful — for  ceasing 
to  live  any  but  a  posthumous  life  seems  to  me  simply 
irrational. 

But,  further,  the  equivalent  which  Mr.  Harrison  offers 
me  for  becoming,  as  I  had  hoped  to  become  in  another 
world,  an  altogether  better  member  of  a  better  society, 
does  not  seem  to  me  more  than  a  very  doubtful  good. 
My  posthumous  activity  will  be  of  all  kinds,  some  of 
which  I  am  glad  to  anticipate,  most  of  which  I  am  very 
sorry  to  anticipate,  and  much  of  which  I  anticipate  with 
absolute  indifference.  Even  our  best  actions  have  bad 
effects,  as  well'as  good.  Macaulay  and  most  other  historians 
held  that  the  Puritan  earnestness  expended  a  good  deal 
of  posthumous  activity  in  producing  the  license  of  the 
world  of  the  Restoration.  Our  activity,  indeed,  is  strictly 
posthumous  in  kind,  even  before  our  death  from  the  very 
moment  in  which  it  leaves  our  living  mind  and  has  begun 
to  work  beyond  ourselves.  What  I  did  as  a  child  is,  in 


68  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

this  sense,  as  much  producing  posthumous  effects,  i.  e., 
effects  over  which  I  can  no  longer  exert  any  control,  now, 
as  what  I  do  before  death  will  be  producing  posthumous 
effects  after  my  death.  Now,  a  considerable  proportion 
of  these  posthumous  activities  of  ours,  even  when  we  can 
justify  the  original  activity  as  all  that  it  ought  to  have 
been,  are  unfortunate.  Mr.  Harrison's  papers,  for  instance, 
have  already  exerted  a  very  vivid  and  very  repulsive 
effect  on  my  mind — an  activity  which  I  am  sure  he  will 
not  look  upon  with  gratification,  and  I  do  not  doubt  that 
what  I  am  now  writing  will  produce  the  same  effect  on 
him,  and  in  that  effect  I  shall  take  no  delight  at  all.  A 
certain  proportion,  therefore,  of  my  posthumous  activity  is 
activity  for  evil,  even  when  the  activity  itself  is  on  the 
whole  good.  But  when  we  come  to  throw  in  the  posthu- 
mous activity  for  evil  exerted  by  our  evil  actions  and  the 
occasional  posthumous  activity  for  good  which  evil  also 
fortunately  exerts,  but  for  the  good  results  of  which  we 
can  take  no  credit  to  ourselves,  the  whole  constitutes  a 
melange  to  which,  as  far  as  I  am  concerned,  I  look  with 
exceedingly  mixed  feelings,  the  chief  element  being  humi- 
liation, though  there  are  faint  lights  mingled  with  it  here 
and  there.  But  as  for  any  rapture  of  satisfaction  in 
contemplating  my  "coming  incorporation  with  the  glorious 
future  of  our  race,"  I  must  wholly  and  entirely  disclaim 
it.  What  I  see  in  that  incorporation  of  mine  with  the 
future  of  our  race — glorious  or  the  reverse,  and  I  do  not 
quite  see  why  the  positivist  thinks  it  so  glorious,  since 
he  probably  holds  that  an  absolute  term  must  be  put  to 


THE   SOUL  AND   FUTUKE   LIFE.  69 

it,  if  by  no  other  cause,  by  the  gradual  cooling  of  the  sun 
— is   a   very  patchwork  sort    of  affair  indeed,  a   mere 
miscellany  of  bad,  good,  and  indifferent,  without  organiza- 
tion and  without  unity.     What  I  shall  be,  for  instance, 
when   incorporated,  in   Mr.  Harrison's  phrase,  with   the 
future  of  our  race,  I  have  very  little  satisfaction  in  con- 
templating except   so  far,   perhaps,  as  my "  posthumous 
activity "  may   retard  the  acceptance  of  Mr.  Harrison's 
glorious  anticipations   for  the   human  race.     One  great 
reason  for  my  personal  wish  for  a  perpetuity  of  volition 
and  personal  energy  is,  that  I  may  have  a  better  oppor- 
tunity, as  far  as  may  lie  in  me,  to  undo  the  mischief  I  shall 
have  done  before  death  comes  to  my  aid.     The  vision  of 
"  posthumous  activity  "  ought  indeed,  I  fancy,  to  give  even 
the  best  of  us  very  little  satisfaction.     It  may  not  be,  and 
perhaps  is  not,  so  mischievous  as  the  vision  of  "  posthu- 
mous fame,"  but  yet  it  is  not  the  kind  of  vision  which,  to 
my  mind,  can  properly  occupy  very  much  of  our  attention 
in  this  life.     Surely,  the  right  thing  for  us  to  do  is  to  con- 
centrate attention  on  the  life  of  the  living  moment — to 
make  that  the  best  we  can — and  then  to  leave  its  posthu- 
mous effects,  after  the  life  of  the  present  has  gone  out  of 
it,  to  that  power  which,  far  more  than  anything  in  it,  trans- 
mutes at  times  even  our  evil  into  good,  though  sometimes, 
too,  to  superficial  appearance  at  all  events,  even  our  good 
into  evil.     The  desire  for  an  immortal  life — that  is,  for  a 
perpetuation  of  the  personal  affections  and  of  the  will — 
seems  to  me  a  far  nobler  thing  than  any  sort  of  anticipa- 
tion as  to  our  posthumous  activity  ;  for  high  affections 


70  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

and  a  right  will  are  good  in  themselves,  and  constitute, 
indeed,  the  only  elements  in  Mr.  Harrison's  "  glorious 
future  of  our  race  "  to  which  I  can  attach  much  value — 
while  posthumous  activity  may  be  either  good  or  evil,  and 
depends  on  conditions  over  which  he  who  first  puts  the 
activity  in  motion  often  has  no  adequate  control. 

And  this  reminds  me  of  a  phrase  in  Mr.  Harrison's 
paper,  which  I  have  studied  over  and  over  again  without 
making  out  his  meaning.  I  mean  his  statement  that  on 
his  own  hypothesis  •"  there  is  ample  scope  for  the  spiri- 
tual life,  for  moral  responsibility,  for  the  world  beyond 
the  grave,  its  hopes  and  its  duties,  which  remain  to  us 
perfectly  real  without  the  unintelligible  hypothesis." 
Now,  I  suppose,  by  "  the  hopes  "  of  the  "  world  beyond 
the  grave,"  Mr.  Harrison  means  the  hopes  we  form  for  the 
"  future  of  our  race,"  and  that  I  understand.  But  what 
does  he  mean  by  its  "  duties  ? "  Not,  surely,  our  duties 
beyond  the  grave,  but  the  duties  of  those  who  survive  us ; 
for  he  expressly  tells  us  that  our  mental  and  moral  powers 
do  not  increase  and  grow,  develop  or  vary  within  them- 
selves— do  not,  in  fact,  survive  at  all  except  in  their  effects 
— and  hence  duties  for  us  in  the  world  beyond  the  grave 
are,  I  suppose,  in  his  creed  impossible.  But  if  he  only 
means  that  there  will  be  duties  for  those  who  survive  us 
after  we  are  gone,  I  cannot  see  how  that  is  in  any  respect 
a  theme  on  which  it  is  either  profitable  or  consolatory  for 
us  to  dwell  by  anticipation.  One  remark  more  :  When 
Mr.  Harrison  says  that  it  is  quite  as  easy  to  learn  to 
long  for  the  moment  when  you  shall  become  "  the  imma- 
terial principle  of  a  comet,"  or  that  you  "  really  were  the 


THE  SOUL  AND   FUTURE  LIFE.  71 

ether,  and  were  about  to  take  your  place  in  space,"  as  to 
long  for  personal  immortality — he  is  merely  talking  at 
random  on  a  subject  on  which  it  is  hardly  seemly  to  talk 
at  random.  He  knows  that  what  we  mean  by  the  soul  is 
that  which  lies  at  the  bottom  of  the  sense  of  personal 
identity — the  thread  of  the  continuity  running  through 
all  our  checkered  life ;  and  how  it  can  be  equally  un- 
meaning to  believe  that  this  hitherto  unbroken  continuity 
will  continue  unbroken,  and  to  believe  that  it  is  to  be 
transformed  into  something  else  of  a  totally  different 
kind,  I  am  not  only  unable  to  understand,  but  even  to 
understand  how  he  could  seriously  so  conceive  us.  My 
notion  of  myself  never  had  the  least  connection  with  the 
principle  of  any  part  of  any  comet,  but  it  has  the  closest 
possible  connection  with  thoughts,  affections,  and  voli- 
tions, which,  as  far  as  I  know,  are  not  likely  to  perish 
with  my  body.  I  am  sorry  that  Mr.  Harrison  should 
have  disfigured  his  paper  by  sarcasms  so  inapplicable  and 
apparently  so  bitter  as  these. 


PROF.  HUXLEY. 

MR.  HARRISON'S  striking  discourse  on  "  The  Soul 
and  Future  Life  "  has  a  certain  resemblance  to  the 
famous  essay  on  the  snakes  of  Iceland.  For  its  purport  is  to 
show  that  there  is  no  soul,  nor  any  future  life,  in  the  ordinary 
sense  of  the  terms.  With  death,  the  personal  activity  of  which 


72  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

the  soul  is  the  popular  hypostasis  is  put  into  commission 
among  posterity,  and  the  future  life  is  an  immortality  by 
deputy. 

Neither  in  these  views  nor  in  the  arguments  by  which 
they  are  supported  is  there  much  novelty.  But  that 
which  appears  both  novel  and  interesting  to  me  is  the 
author's  evidently  sincere  and  heart-felt  conviction 
that  his  powerful  advocacy  of  soulless  spirituality  and 
mortal  immortality  is  consistent  with  the  intellectual 
scorn  and  moral  reprobation  which  he  freely  pours  forth 
upon  the  "  irrational  and  debasing  physicism  "  of  mate- 
rialism and  materialists,  and  with  the  wrath  with  which 
he  visits  what  he  is  pleased  to  call  the  intrusion  of  phy- 
sical science,  especially  of  biology,  into  the  domain  of 
social  phenomena. 

Listen  to  the  storm  : 

"We  certainly  do  reject,  as  earnestly  as  any  school  can,  that 
which  is  most  fairly  called  materialism,  and  we  will  second  every 
word  of  those  who  cry  out  that  civilization  is  in  danger  if  the  work- 
ings of  the  human  spirit  are  to  become  questions  of  physiology,  and 
if  death  is  the  end  of  a  man,  as  it  is  the  end  of  a  sparrow.  We  not 
only  assent  to  such  protests,  but  we  see  very  pressing  need  for  mak- 
ing them.  It  is  a  corrupting  doctrine  to  open  a  brain,  and  to  tell  us 
that  devotion  is  a  definite  molecular  change  in  this  and  that  convo- 
lution of  gray  pulp,  and  that,  if  man  is  the  first  of  living  animals, 
he  passes  away  after  a  short  space  like  the  beasts  that  perish.  And 
all  doctrines,  more  or  less,  do  tend  to  this,  which  offer  physical 
theories  as  explaining  moral  phenomena,  which  deny  man  a  spiri- 
tual in  addition  to  a  moral  nature,  which  limit  his  moral  life  to  the 
span  of  his  bodily  organism,  and  which  have  no  place  for  '  religion  ' 
in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word." 


THE  SOUL  AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  73 

Now,  Mr.  Harrison  can  hardly  think  it  worth  while  to 
attack  imaginary  opponents,  so  that  I  am  led  to  believe 
that  there  must  be  somebody  who  holds  the  "  corrupting 
doctrine,"  "  that  devotion  is  a  definite  molecular  change 
in  this  and  that  convolution  of  gray  pulp."  Nevertheless, 
my  conviction  is  shaken  by  this  passage  :  "  No  rational 
thinker  now  pretends  that  imagination  is  simply  the 
vibration  of  a  particular  fibre."  If  no  rational  thinker 
pretends  this  of  imagination,  why  should  any  pretend  it 
of  devotion  ?  And  yet  I  cannot  bring  myself  to  think 
that  all  Mr.  Harrison's  passionate  rhetoric  is  hurled  at 
irrational  thinkers :  surely  he  might  leave  such  to  the 
soft  influences  of  time  and  due  medical  treatment  of 
their  "  gray  pulp  "  in  Colney  Hatch  or  elsewhere. 

On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Harrison  cannot  possibly  be 
attacking  those  who  hold  that  the  feeling  of  devotion  is 
the  concomitant,  or  even  the  consequent,  of  a  molecular 
change  in  the  brain ;  for  he  tells  us,  in  language  the  expli- 
citness  of  which  leaves  nothing  to  be  desired,  that 

"To  positive  methods  every  fact  of  thinking  reveals  itself  as 
having  functional  relation  with  molecular  change.  Every  factor 
of  will  or  feeling  is  in  similar  relation  with  kindred  molecular 
facts.  ' 

On  mature  consideration,  I  feel  shut  up  to  one  or  two 
alternative  hypotheses.  Either  the  "  corrupting  doctrine  " 
to  which  Mr.  Harrison  refers  is  held  by  no  rational 
thinker — in  which  case,  surely,  neither  he  nor  I  need 
trouble  ourselves  about  it — or  the  phrase  "  Devotion  is  a 
definite  molecular  change  in  this  and  that  convolution  of 


r*  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

gray  pulp/'  means  that  devotion  has  a  functional  relation 
with  such  molecular  change :  in  which  case  it  is  Mr.  Har- 
rison's own  view,  and  therefore,  let  us  hope,  cannot  be  a 
"  corrupting  doctrine." 

I  am  not  helped  out  of  the  difficulty  I  have  thus 
candidly  stated,  when  I  try  to  get  at  the  meaning  of 
another  hard  saying  of  Mr.  Harrison's,  which  follows 
after  the  "  corrupting  doctrine ''  paragraph  :  "  And  all 
doctrines,  more  or  less,  do  tend  to  this  [corrupting  doc- 
trine], which  offer  physical  theories  as  explaining  moral 
phenomena." 

Nevertheless,  Mr.  Harrison  says,  with  great  force  and 
tolerable  accuracy : 

' '  Man  is  one,  however  compound.  Fire  his  conscience  and  he 
blushes.  Check  his  circulation  and  he  thinks  wildly,  or  thinks  not 
at  all.  Impair  his  secretions,  and  moral  sense  is  dulled,  discoloured, 
or  depraved  ;  his  aspirations  flag  ;  his  hope,  love,  faith,  reel.  Impair 
them  still  more,  and  he  becomes  a  brute.  A.  cup  of  drink  degrades 
his  moral  nature  below  that  of  a  swine.  Again,  a  violent  emotion 
of  pity  or  horror  makes  him  vomit.  A  lancet  will  restore  him  from 
delirium  to  clear  thought.  Excess  of  thought  will  waste  his  sinews  ; 
excess  of  muscular  exercise  will  deaden  thought.  An  emotion  will 
double  the  strength  of  his  muscles  ;  and  at  last  the  prick  of  a  needle 
or  a  grain  of  mineral  will  in  an  instant  lay  to  rest  forever  his  body 
and  its  unity,  and  all  the  spontaneous  activities  of  intelligence, 
feeling,  and  action,  with  which  that  compound  organism  was 
charged. 

1 '  These  are  the  obvious  and  ancient  observations  about  the  human 
organism.  But  modern  philosophy  and  science  have  carried  these 
hints  into  complete  explanations.  By  a  vast  accumulation  of  proof 
positive,  thought  at  last  has  established  a  distinct  correspondence 


THE   SOUL  AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  75 

between  every  process  of  thought  or  of  feeling,  and  some  corporeal 
phenomenon." 

I  cry  with  Shylock : 

"  "Tis  very  true,  O  wise  and  upright  judge." 

But,  if  the  establishment  of  the  correspondence  between 
physical  phenomena  on  the  one  side,  and  moral  and  intell- 
ectual phenomena  on  the  other,  is  properly  to  be  called  an 
explanation  (let  alone  a  complete  explanation),  of  the 
human  organism,  surely  Mr.  Harrison's  teachings  come 
dangerously  near  that  tender  of  physical  theories  in  ex- 
planation of  moral  phenomena  which  he  warns  us  leads 
straight  to  corruption. 

But  perhaps  I  have  misinterpreted  Mr.  Harrison  ;  for  a 
few  lines  further  on  we  are  told,  with  due  italic  emphasis, 
that  no  man  can  explain  volition  by  purely  anatomical 
study."  I  should  have  thought  that  Mr.  Harrison  might 
have  gone  much  further  than  this.  No  man  ever  ex- 
plained any  physiological  fact  by  purely  anatomical  study. 
Digestion  cannot  be  so  explained,  nor  respiration,  nor 
reflex  action.  It  would  have  been  as  relevant  to  affirm 
that  volition  could  not  be  explained  by  measuring  an  arc 
of  the  meridian. 

I  am  obliged  to  note  the  fact  that  Mr.  Harrison's  bio- 
logical studies  have  not  proceeded  so  far  as  to  enable  him 
to  discriminate  between  the  province  of  anatomy  and 
that  of  physiology,  because  it  furnishes  the  key  to  an 
otherwise  mysterious  utterance  which  occurs  thus  : 

"  A  man  whose  whole  thoughts  are  absorbed  in  cutting  up  dead 


7C  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

monkeys  and  live  frogs,  has  no  more  business  to  dogmatize  about 
religion  than  a  mere  chemist  to  improvise  a  zoology." 

Qu  is,  negavit  ?  But  if,  as,  on  Mr.  Harrison's  own  show- 
ing, is  the  case,  the  progress  of  science  (not  anatomical, 
but  physiological)  has  "  established  a  distinct  correspond- 
ence between  every  process  of  thought  or  of  feeling,  and 
some  corporeal  phenomenon,"  and  if  it  is  true  that  "  im- 
paired secretions  "  deprave  the  moral  sense,  and  make 
"hope,  love,  and  faith  reel,"  surely  the  religious  feelings 
are  brought  within  the  range  of  physiological  inquiry.  If 
impaired  secretions  deprave  the  moral  sense,  it  becomes 
an  interesting  and  important  problem  to  ascertain  what 
diseased  viscus  may  have  been  responsible  for  the  priest 
in  absolution ;  and  what  condition  of  the  gray  pulp  may 
have  conferred  on  it  such  a  pathological  steadiness  of 
faith  as  to  create  the  hope  of  personal  immortality,  which 
Mr.  Harrison  stigmatizes  as  so  selfishly  immoral. 

I  should  not  like  to  undertake  the  responsibility  of 
advising  anybody  to  dogmatize  about  anything ;  but 
surely  if,  as  Mr.  Harrison  so  strongly  urges,  "  the  whole 
range  of  man's  powers,  from  the  finest  spiritual  sensibility 
down  to  a  mere  automatic  contraction,  falls  into  one  co- 
herent scheme,  being  all  the  multiform  functions  of  a 
living  organism  in  presence  of  its  encircling  conditions," 
then  the  man  who  endeavours  to  ascertain  the  exact 
nature  of  these  functions,  and  to  determine  the  influence 
of  conditions  upon  them,  is  more  likely  to  be  in  a  position 
to  tell  us  something  worth  hearing  about  them,  than  one 
who  is  turned  from  such  study  by  cheap*  pulpit  thunder 


•      THE  SOUL  AND   FUTURE  LIFE.  77 

touching  the  presumption  of  "  biological  reasoning  about 
spiritual  things." 

Mr.  Harrison,  as  we  have  seen,  is  not  quite  so  clear  as 
is  desirable  respecting  the  limits  of  the  provinces  of  ana- 
tomy and  physiology.  Perhaps  he  will  permit  me  to 
inform  him  that  physiology  is  the  science  which  treats  of 
the  functions  of  the  living  organism,  ascertains  their 
coordinations  and  their  correlations  in  the  general  chain 
of  causes  and  effects,  and  traces  out  their  dependence  up- 
on the  physical  state  of  the  organs  by  which  these  func- 
tions are  exercised.  The  explanation  of  a  physiological 
function  is  the  demonstration  of  the  connection  of  that 
function  with  the  molecular  state  of  the  organ  which 
exerts  the  function.  Thus  the  function  of  motion  is  ex- 
plained when  the  movements  of  the  living  body  are  found 
to  have  certain  molecular  changes  for  their  invariable 
antecedents ;  the  function  of  sensation  is  explained  when 
the  molecular  changes,  which  are  the  invariable  anteced- 
ents of  sensations,  are  discovered. 

The  fact  that  it  is  impossible  to  comprehend  how  it  is 
that  a  physical  state  gives  rise  to  a  mental  state,  no  more 
lessens  the  value  of  the  explanation  in  the  latter  case, 
than  the  fact  that  it  is  utterly  impossible  to  comprehend 
how  motion  is  communicated  from  one  body  to  another 
weakens  the  force  of  the  explanation  of  the  motion  of  one 
billiard-ball  by  showing  that  another  has  hit  it. 

"  The  finest  spiritual  sensibility,"  says  Mr.  Harrison 
(and  I  think  that  there  is  a  fair  presumption  that  he  is 
right),  is  a  function  of  a  living  organism — is  iri  relation 


7N  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

with  molecular  facts.  In  that  case  the  physiologist  may 
reply  :  "It  is  my  business  to  find  out  what  these  molecular 
facts  are,  and  whether  the  relation  between  them  and  the 
said  spiritual  sensibility  is  one  of  antecedence  in  the 
molecular  fact,  and  sequence  in  the  spiritual  fact,  or  vice 
versa.  If  the  latter  result  comes  out  of  my  inquiries,  I 
shall  have  made  a  contribution  toward  a  moral  theory  of 
physical  phenomena;  if  the  former,  I  shall  have  done 
somewhat  toward  building  up  a  physical  theory  of  moral 
phenomena.  But  in  any  case  I  am  not  outstepping  the 
limits  of  my  proper  province  ;  my  business  is  to  get  at  the 
truth  respecting  such  questions  at  all  risks  ;  and  if  you 
tell  me  that  one  of  these  two  results  is  a  corrupting  doc- 
trine, I  can  only  say  that  I  perceive  the  intended  reproach 
conveyed  by  the  observation,  but  that  I  fail  to  recognize 
its  relevance.  If  the  doctrine  is  true,  its  social  septic  or 
antiseptic  properties  are  not  my  affair.  My  business  as  a 
biologist  is  with  physiology,  not  with  morals." 

This  plea  of  justification  strikes  me  as  complete;  whence, 
then,  the  following  outbreak  of  angry  eloquence  ? — 

"  The  arrogant  attempt  to  dispose  of  the  deepest  moral  truths  of 
human  nature,  on  a  bare  physical  or  physiological  basis,  is  almost 
enough  to  justify  the  insurrection  of  some  impatient  theologians 
against  science  itself." 

"  That  strain  again :  it  has  a  dying  fall ;"  nowise  similar 
to  the  sweet  south  upon  a  bank  of  violets,  however,  but 
like  the  death-wail  of  innumerable  "  impatient  theolo- 
gians," as  from  the  high  "  drum  ecclesiastic  "  they  view 
the  waters  of  science  flooding  the  Church  on  all  hands. 


THE  SOUL  AND  FUTUEE  LIFE.  79 

The  beadles  have  long  been  washed  away  ;  escape  by  pul- 
pit stairs  is  even  becoming  doubtful,  without  kirtling 
those  outward  investments  which  distinguish  the  priest 
from  the  man  so  high,  that  no  one  will  see  that  there  is 
anything  but  the  man  left.  But  Mr.  Harrison  is  not  an 
impatient  theologian — indeed,  no  theologian  at  all,  unless, 
as  he  speaks  of  "  soul "  when  he  means  certain  bodily 
functions,  and  of  "  future  life  "  when  he  means  personal 
annihilation,  he  may  make  his  master's  grand  §tre  supreme 
the  subject  of  a  theology ;  and  one  stumbles  upon  this 
well-worn  fragment  of  too-familiar  declamation  among  his 
vigorous  periods  with  the  unpleasant  surprise  of  one  who 
finds  a  fly  in  a  precious  ointment. 

There  are  people  from  whom  one  does  not  expect  well- 
founded  statement  and  thoughtful,  however  keen,  argu- 
mentation, embodied  in  precise  language ;  from  Mr. 
Harrison  one  does.  But  I  think  he  will  be  at  a  loss  to 
answer  the  question,  if  I  pray  him  to  tell  me  of  any 
representative  of  physical  science  who,  either  arrogantly 
or  otherwise,  has  ever  attempted  to  dispose  of  moral  truths 
on  a  physical  or  physiological  basis.  If  I  am  to  take  the 
sense  of  the  words  literally,  I  shall  not  dispute  the  arrog- 
ance of  the  attempt  to  dispose  of  a  moral  truth  on  a  bare, 
or  even  on  a  covered,  physical  or  physiological  basis ;  for, 
whether  the  truth  is  deep  or  shallow,  I  cannot  conceive 
how  the  feat  is  to  be  performed.  Columbus's  difficulty 
with  the  egg  is  as  nothing  to  it.  But  I  suppose  what  is 
meant  is,  that  some  arrogant  people  have  tried  to  upset 
morality  by  the  help  of  physics  and  physiology.  I  am 


80  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

sorry  if  such  people  exist,  because  I  shall  have  to  be  much 
ruder  to  them  than  Mr.  Harrison  is.  I  should  not  call  them 
arrogant,  any  more  than  I  should  apply  that  epithet  to  a 
person  who  attempted  to  upset  Euclid  by  the  help  of  the 
Rig- Veda.  Accuracy  might  be  satisfied,  if  not  propriety, 
by  calling  such  a  person  a  fool ;  but  it  appears  to  me  that 
it  would  be  the  height  of  injustice  to  term  him  arrogant. 

Whatever  else  they  may  be,  the  laws  of  morality,  under 
their  scientific  aspect,  are  generalizations  based  upon  the 
observed  phenomena  of  society ;  and,  whatever  may  be 
the  nature  of  moral  approbation  and  disapprobation,  these 
feelings  are,  as  matter  of  experience,  associated  with  cer- 
tain acts. 

The  consequences  of  men's  actions  will  remain  the  same, 
however  far  our  analysis  of  the  causes  which  lead  to  them 
may  be  pushed ;  theft  and  murder  would  be  none  the  less 
objectionable  if  it  were  possible  to  prove  that  they  were  the 
result  of  the  activity  of  special  theft  and  murder  cells  in 
that  "gray  pulp"  of  which  Mr.  Harrison  speaks  so  scorn- 
fully. Does  any  sane  man  imagine  that  any  quantity  of 
physiological  analysis  will  lead  people  to  think  breaking 
their  legs  or  putting  their  hands  into  the  fire  desirable  ? 
And  when  men  really  believe  that  breaches  of  the  moral 
law  involve  their  penalties  as  surely  as  do  breaches  of  the 
physical  law,  is  it  to  be  supposed  that  even  the  very 
firmest  disposal  of  their  moral  truths  upon  "  a  bare  phy- 
sical or  physiological  basis  "  will  tempt  them  to  incur 
those  penalties  ? 

I  would  gladly  learn  from  Mr.  Harrison  where,  in  the 


THE   SOUL  AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  81 

course  of  his  studies,  he  has  found  anything  inconsistent 
with  what  I  have  just  said  in  the  writings  of  physicists 
or  biologists.  I  would  entreat  him  to  tell  us  who  are  the 
true  materialists,  "the scientific  specialists"  who  "neglect 
all  philosophical  and  religious  synthesis,"  and  who  "  sub- 
mit religion  to  the  test  of  the  scalpel  or  the  electric  bat- 
tery ;"  where  the  materialism  which  is  "  marked  by  the 
ignoring  of  religion,  the  passing  by  on  the  other  side  and 
shutting  the  eyes  to  the  spiritual  history  of  mankind,"  is 
to  be  found. 

I  will  not  believe  that  these  phrases  are  meant  to  apply 
to  any  scientific  men  of  whom  I  have  cognizance,  or  to  any 
recognized  system  of  scientific  thought — they  would  be 
too  absurdly  inappropriate — and  I  cannot  believe  that  Mr. 
Harrison  indulges  in  empty  rhetoric.  But  I  am  disposed 
to  think  that  they  would  not  have  been  used  at  all,  ex- 
cept for  that  deep-seated  sympathy  with  the  "  impatient 
theologian"  which  characterizes  the  positivist  school,  and 
crops  out,  characteristically  enough,  in  more  than  one  part 
of  Mr.  Harrison's  essay. 

Mr.  Harrison  tells  us  that  "positivism  is  prepared  to 
meet  the  theologians."  I  agree  with  him,  though  not 
exactly  in  his  sense  of  the  words — indeed,  I  have  formerly 
expressed  the  opinion  that  the  meeting  took  place  long 
ago,  and  that  the  faithful  lovers,  impelled  by  the  instinct  of 
a  true  affinity  of  nature,  have  met  to  part  no  more.  Eccle- 
siastical to  the  core  from  the  beginning,  positivism  is  now 
exemplifying  the  law  that  the  outward  garment  adjusts 
itself,  sooner  or  later,  to  the  inward  man.  From  its 
6 


82  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

founder  onward,  striken  with  metaphysical  incompetence, 
and  equally  incapable  of  appreciating  the  true  spirit  of 
scientific  method,  it  is  now  essaying  to  cover  the  naked- 
ness of  its  philosophical  materialism  with  the  rags  of  a 
spiritualistic  phraseology  out  of  which  the  original  sense 
has  wholly  departed.  I  understand  and  I  respect  the 
meaning  of  the  word  "soul,"  as  used  by  Pagan  and  Chris- 
tian philosophers  for  what  they  believe  to  be  the  impe- 
rishable seat  of  human  personality,  bearing  throughout 
eternity  its  burden  of  woe,  or  its  capacity  for  adoration 
and  love.  I  confess  that  my  dull  moral  sense  does  not 
enable  me  to  see  anything  base  or  selfish  in  the  desire  for 
a  future  life  among  the  spirits  of  the  just  made  perfect : 
or  even  among  a  few  such  poor  fallible  souls  as  one  has 
known  here  below. 

And  if  I  am  not  satisfied  with  the  evidence  that  is 
offered  me  that  such  a  soul  and  such  a  future  life  exists, 
I  am  content  to  take  what  is  to  be  had  and  to  make  the 
best  of  the  brief  span  of  existence  that  is  within  my  reach, 
without  reviling  those  whose  faith  is  more  robust  and 
whose  hopes  are  richer  and  fuller.  But  in  the  interest  of 
scientific  clearness,  I  object  to  say  that  I  have  a  soul,  when 
I  mean,  all  the  while,  that  my  organism  has  certain  mental 
functions  which,  like  the  rest,  are  dependent  upon  its 
molecular  composition,  and  come  to  an  end  when  I  die  ; 
and  I  object  still  more  to  affirm  that  I  look  to  a  future 
life,  when  all  that  I  mean  is,  that  the  influence  of  my  say- 
ings and  doings  will  be  more  or  less  felt  by  a  number  of 


THE   SOUL  AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  83 

people  after  the  physical  components  of  that  organism  are 
scattered  to  the  four  winds. 

Throw  a  stone  into  the  sea,  and  there  is  a  sense  in  which 
it  is  true  that  the  wavelets  which  spread  around  it  have  an 
effect  through  all  space  and  all  time.  Shall  we  say  that 
the  stone  has  a  future  life  ? 

It  is  not  worth  while  to  have  broken  awray,  not  without 
pain  and  grief,  from  beliefs  which,  true  or  false,  embody 
great  and  fruitful  conceptions,  to  fall  back  into  the  arms 
of  a  half-breed,  between  science  and  theology,  endowed, 
like  most  half-breeds,  with  the  faults  of  both  parents  and 
the  virtues  of  neither.  And  it  is  unwise  by  such  a  lapse 
to  expose  one's  self  to  the  temptation  of  holding  with  the 
hare  and  hunting  with  the  hounds — of  using  the  weapons 
of  one  progenitor  to  damage  the  other.  I  cannot  but  think 
that  the  members  of  the  positivist  school  in  this  country 
stand  in  some  danger  of  falling  into  that  fatal  error ;  and 
I  put  it  to  them  to  consider  whether  it  is  either  consistent 
or  becoming  for  those  who  hold  that  the  "  finest  spiritual 
sensibility"  is  a  mere  bodily  function,  to  join  in  the  view-' 
halloo,  when  the  hunt  is  up  against  biological  science — 
to  use  their  voices  in  swelling  the  senseless  cry  that  "civi- 
lization is  in  danger  if  the  workings  of  the  human  spirit 
are  to  become  questions  of  physiology." 


84  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 


LORD  BLACHFORD. 

MR.  HARRISON  is  of  opinion  that  the  difference  be- 
tween l  'Imstians  and  himself  on  this  question  of 
the  soul  and  the  future  life, "  turns  altogether  on  habits  of 
thought."  What  appears  to  the  positivist  flimsy  will,  he 
says,  seem  to  the  Christian  sublime,  and  vice  versa"  simply 
because  our  minds  have  been  trained  in  different  logical 
methods,"  and  this  apparently  because  positivism  "pretends 
to  no  other  basis  than  positive  knowledge  and  scientific 
logic."  But  if  this  is  so,  it  is  not,  I  think,  quite  consistent 
to  conclude,  as  he  does,  that  "  it  is  idle  to  dispute  about  our 
respective  logical  methods,  or  to  put  this  or  that  habit  of 
mind  in  a  combat  with  that."  As  to  the  combatants  this 
may  be  true.  But  it  surely  is  not  idle,  but  very  much  to  the 
purpose,  for  the  information  of  those  judges  to  whom  the 
very  act  of  publication  appeals,  to  discuss  habits  and  mej 
thods  on  which,  it  is  declared,  the  difference  altogether 
turns. 

I  note,  therefore,  in  limine  what,  as  I  go  on,  I  shall 
have  occasion  to  illustrate,  one  or  two  differences  between 
the  methods  of  Mr.  Harrison  and  those  in  which  I  have 
been  trained. 

I  have  been  taught  to  consider  that  certain  words  or 
ideas  represent  what  are  called  by  logicians  substances,  by 
Mr.  Harrison,  I  think,  entities,  and  by  others,  as  the  case 
may  be,  persons,  beings,  objects,  or  articles.  Such  are  air, 
earth,  man,  horses,  chairs,  and  tables.  Their  peculiarity 


THE  SOUL  AND   FUTURE  LIFE.  85 

is  that  they  have  each  of  them  a  separate,  independent, 
substantive  existence.     They  are. 

There  are  other  words  or  ideas  which  do  not  represent 
existing  things,  but  qualities,  relations,  consequences,  pro- 
cesses, or  occurrences,  like  victory,  virtue,  life,  order,  or 
destruction,  which  do  but  belong  to  substances,  or  result 
from  them  without  any  distinct  existence  of  their  own.  A 
thing  signified  by  a  word  of  the  former  class  cannot  pos- 
sibly be  identical  or  even  homogeneous  with  a  thing  sig- 
nified by  a  word  of  the  second  class.  A  fiddle  is  not  only 
a  different  thing  from  a  tune,  but  it'  belongs  to  another 
and  totally  distinct  order  of  ideas.  To  this  distinction  the 
English  mind  at  some  period  of  its  history  must  have  been 
imperfectly  alive.  If  a  Greek  confounded  KTIO-IS  with  KTur/xa, 
an  act  with  a  thing,  it  was  the  fault  of  the  individual. 
But  the  English  language,  instead  of  precluding  such  a 
confusion,  almost,  one  would  say,  labours  to  propagate 
it.  Such  words  as  "building,"  "announcement,"  "prepa- 
ration," or  "  power,"  are  equally  available  to  signify  either 
the  act  of  construction  or  an  edifice — either  the  act  of 
proclaiming  or  a  placard — either  the  act  of  preparing  or  a 
surgical  specimen — either  the  ability  to  do  something  or 
the  being  in  which  that  ability  resides.  Such  imperfections 
of  language  infuse  themselves  into  thought.  And  I  ven- 
ture to  think  that  the  slight  superciliousness  with  which 
Mr.  Harrison  treats  the  doctrines,  which  such  persons  as 
myself  entertain  respecting  the  soul  is  in  some  degree  due 
to  the  fact  that  positive  "  habits  of  thought "  and  "  logical 
methods,"  <i<>  not  recognize  so  completely  as  ours  the  dis- 


86  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

tinction  which  I  have  described  as  that  between  a  fiddle 
and  a  tune. 

Again,  my  own  habit  of  mind  is  to  distinguish  more 
pointedly  than  Mr.  Harrison  does  between  a  unit  and  a 
complex  whole.  When  I  speak  of  an  act  of  individual 
will,  I  seem  to  myself  to  speak  of  an  indivisible  act  pro- 
ceeding from  a  single  being.  The  unity  is  not  merely  in 
my  mode  of  representation,  but  in  the  thing  signified.  If 
I  speak  of  an  act  of  the  national  will — say  a  determination 
to  declare  war — I  speak  of  the  concurrence  of  a  number  of 
individual  wills,  each  acting  for  itself,  and  under  an  infi- 
nite variety  of  influences,  but  so  related  to  each  other  and 
so  acting  in  concert  that  it  is  convenient  to  represent  them 
under  the  aggregate  term  "  nation."  I  use  a  term  which 
signifies  unity  of  being,  but  I  really  mean  nothing  more 
than  cooperation,  or  correlated  action  and  feeling.  So, 
when  I  speak  of  the  happiness  of  humanity,  I  mean  noth- 
ing whatever  but  a  number  of  particular  happinesses  of 
individual  persons.  Humanity  is  not  a  unit,  but  a  word 
which  enables  me  to  bring  a  number  of  units  under  view 
at  once.  In  the  case  of  material  objects,  I  apprehend, 
unity  is  simply  relative  and  artificial — a  grain  of  corn  is 
a  unit  relatively  tc  a  bushel,  and  an  aggregate  relatively 
to  an  atom.  But  I,  believing  myself  to  be  a  spiritual 
being,  call  myself  actually  and  without  metaphor — one. 

Mr.  Harrison,  who  acknowledges  the  existence  of  no 
being  but  matter,  appears  either  to  deny  the  existence  of 
any  real  unity  whatever,  or  to  ascribe  the  real  unity  to  an 
aggregate  of  things  or  beings  who  resemble  each  other, 


THE   SOUL   AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  87 

like  the  members  of  the  human  race,  or  cooperate  toward 
a  common  result,  like  the  parts  of  a  picture,  a  melody,  or 
the  human  frame,  and  which  may  thus  be  conveniently 
viewed  in  combination,  and  represented  by  a  single  word 
or  phrase. 

I  think  that  the  little  which  I  have  to  say  will  be  the 
clearer  for  these  preliminary  protests. 

The  questions  in  hand  relate  first  to  the  claim  of  the 
soul  of  man  to  be  treated  as  an  existing  thing  not  bound 
by  the  laws  of  matter :  secondly  to  the  immortality  of 
that  existing  thing. 

The  claim  of  the  soul  to  be  considered  as  an  existing 
and  immaterial  being  presents  itself  to  my  mind  as 
follows  : 

My  positive  experience  informs  me  of  one  thing  per- 
cipient— myself;  and  of  a  multitude  of  things  per- 
ceptible— perceptible,  that  is,  not  by  way  of  consciousness, 
as  I  am  to  myself,  but  by  way  of  impression  on  other 
things — capable  of  making  themselves  felt  through  the 
channels  and  organs  of  sensation.  These  things  thus  per- 
ceptible constitute  the  material  world. 

I  take  no  account  of  percipients  other  than  myself,  for 
I  can  only  conjecture  about  them  what  I  know  about 
myself.  I  take  no  account  of  things  neither  percipient 
nor  perceptible,  for  it  is  impossible  to  do  so.  I  know  of 
nothing  outside  me  of  which  I  can  say  it  is  at  once  per- 
cipient and  perceptible.  But  I  enquire  whether  I  am 
myself  so — whether  the  existing  being  to  which  my  sense 
of  identity  refers,  in  which  my  sensations  reside,  and 


A   MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

which  for  these  two  reasons  I  call  "  myself,"  is  capable  also 
of  being  perceived  by  beings  outside  myself,  as  the  ma- 
terial world  is  perceived  by  me. 

I  first  obs<-rv«>  that  things  perceptible  comprise  not  on- 
ly objects,  but  instruments  and  media  of  perception — an 
immense  vaijpty  of  contrivances,  natural  or  artificial,  for 
transmitting  information  to  the  sensitive  being.  Such 
are  telescopes,  microscopes,  ear-trumpets,  the  atmosphere, 
and  various  other  media  which,  if  not  at  present  the  ob- 
jects of  direct  sensation,  may  conceivably  become  so — 
and  such,  above  all,  are  various  parts  of  the  human  body 
—the  lenses  which  collect  the  vibrations  which  are  the 
conditions  of  light ;  the  tympanum  which  collects  the 
vibrations  which  are  the  conditions  of  sound ;  the  muscles 
which  adjust  these  and  other  instruments  of  sensation  to 
the  precise  performance  of  their  work ;  the  nerves  which 
convey  to  and  fro  molecular  movements  of  the  most  in- 
comprehensible significance  and  efficacy.  Of  all  these  it 
is,  I  understand,  more  and  more  evident,  as  science  ad- 
vances, that  they  are  perceptible,  but  do  not  perceive. 
Ear,  hand,  eye,  and  nerves,  are  alike  machinery — mere 
machinery  for  transmitting  the  movement  of  atoms  to 
certain  nervous  centres — ascertained  localities  which  (it 
is  proper  to  observe  in  passing),  though  small  relatively 
to  ourselves  and  our  powers  of  investigation,  may — since 
size  is  entirely  relative — be  absolutely  large  enough  to 
contain  little  worlds  in  themselves. 

Here  the  investigation  of  things  perceptible  is  stopped, 
abruptly  and  completely.  Our  inquiries  into  the  size, 


THE   SOUL  AND   FUTURE  LIFE.  89 

composition  and  movement  of  particles,  have  been  push- 
ed, for  the  present  at  any  rate,  as  far  as  they  will  go. 
But  at  this  point  we  come  across  a  field  of  phenomena  to 
which  the  attributes  of  atoms,  size,  movement,  and  physi- 
cal composition,  are  wholly  inapplicable — the  phenomena 
of  sensation  or  animal  life. 

Science  informs  me  that  the  movements  of  these  per- 
ceptible atoms  within  my  body  bear  a  correspondence, 
strange,  subtle,  and  precise,  to  the  sensations  of  which  I, 
as  a  percipient,  am  conscious  ;  a  correspondence  (it  is  again 
proper  to  observe  in  passing)  which  extends  not  only  to 
perceptions,  as  in  sight  or  hearing,  but  to  reflection  and 
volition,  as  in  sleep  and  drunkenness.  The  relation  is 
not  one  of  similarity.  The  vibrations  of  a  white,  black, 
or  gray  pulp  are  not  in  any  sensible  way  similar  to  the 
perception  of  colour  or  sound,  or  the  imagination  of  a  noble 
act.  There  is  no  visible — may  I  not  say  no  conceivable  ? 
— reason  why  one  should  depend  on  the  other.  Motion 
and  sensation  interact,  but  they  do  not  overlap.  There 
is  no  homogeneity  between  them.  They  stand  apart. 
Physical  science  conducts  us  to  the  brink  of  the  chasm 
which  separates  them,  and  by  so  doing  only  shews  us  its 
depth. 

I  return  then  to  the  question,  "What  am  I?"  My 
own  habits  of  mind  and  logical  methods  certainly  require 
me  to  believe  that  I  am  something — something  percipient 
— bu  t  am  I  perceptible  ?  I  find  no  reason  for  supposing  it. 
I  believe  myself  to  be  surrounded  by  things  percipient. 
An-  they  perceptible?  Not  to  my  knowledge.  Their 


90 


A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 


existence  is  to  me  a  matter  of  inference  from  their  per- 
ceptible appendages.  Them — their  very  selves — I  cer- 
tainly cannot  perceive.  As  far  as  I  can  understand 
things  perceptible,  I  detect  in  them  no  quality — no  capac- 
ity for  any  quality  tike  that  of  percipiency,  which,  with 
its  homogeneous  faculties,  intellect,  affections,  and  so  on, 
is  the  basis  of  my  own  nature.  Physical  science,  while 
it  develops  the  relation,  seems  absolutely  to  emphasize 
and  illuminate  the  ineradicable  difference  between  the 
motions  of  a  material  and  the  sensations  of  a  living  being. 
Of  the  attributes  of  a  percipient  we  have,  each  for  him- 
self, profound  and  immediate  experience.  Of  the  attri- 
butes of  the  perceptible  we  have,  I  suppose,  distinct 
scientific  conceptions.  Our  notions  of  the  one  and  our 
notions  of  the  other  appear  to  attach  to  a  different  order 
of  being. 

It  appears  therefore  to  me  that  there  is  no  reason  to 
believe,  and  much  reason  for  not  believing,  that  the  per- 
cipient is  perceptible  under  our  present  conditions  of 
existence,  or  indeed  under  any  conditions  that  our  pre- 
sent faculties  enable  us  to  imagine. 

And  this  is  my  case,  which  of  course  covers  the  whole 
animal  creation.  Perception  must  be  an  attribute  of 
something;  and  there  is  reason  for  believing  that  this 
something  is  imperceptible.  This  is  what  I  mean  when  I 
say  that  I  have,  or  more  properly  that  I  am,  a  soul  Or 
a  spirit,  or  rather  it  is  the  point  on  which  I  join  issue 
with  those  who  say  that  I  am  not. 

I  am  not,  as  Mr.  Harrison  seems  to  suppose,  running 


THE   SOUL   AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  91 

about  in  search  of  a  "  cause."  I  am  inquiring  into  the 
nature  of  a  being,  and  that  being  myself.  I  am  sure  I 
am  something.  I  am  certainly  not  the  mere  tangible 
structure  of  atoms  which  I  affect,  and  by  which  I  am  af- 
fected after  a  wonderful  fashion.  In  reflecting  on  the 
nature  of  my  own  operations  I  find  nothing  to  suggest 
that  my  own  being  is  subject  to  the  same  class  of  physi- 
cal laws  as  the  objects  from  which  my  sensations  are  de- 
rived, and  I  conclude  that  I  am  not  subject  to  those  laws. 
The  most  substantial  objection  to  this  conclusion  is  con- 
veyed, I  conceive,  in  a  sentence  of  Mr.  Harrison's:  "To 
talk  to  us  of  mind,  feeling  and  will,  continuing  their 
functions  in  the  ab§ence  of  physical  organs  and  visible 
organisms,  is  to  use  language  which,  to  us  at  least,  is  pure 
nonsense." 

It  is  probably  to  those  who  talk  thus  that  Mr.  Harrison 
refers  when  he  says  that  argument  is  useless.  And  in 
point  of  fact  I  have  no  answer  but  to  call  his  notions 
anthropomorphic,  and  to  charge  him  with  want  of  a  cer- 
tain kind  of  imagination.  By  imagination  we  commonly 
mean  the  creative  faculty  which  enables  a  man  to  give  a 
palpable  shape  to  what  he  believes  or  thinks  possible ; 
and  this,  I  do  not  doubt,  Mr.  Harrison  possesses  in  a  high 
degree.  But  there  is  another  kind  of  imagination  which 
enables  a  man  to  embrace  the  idea  of  a  possibility  to 
which  no  such  palpable  shape  can  be  given,  or  rather  of 
a  world  of  possibilities  beyond  the  range  of  his  experi- 
ence or  the  grasp  of  his  faculties;  as  Mr.  John  Mill  em- 
braced the  idea  of  a  possible  world  in  which  the  coiinec- 


92  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

tion  of  cause  and  effect  should  not  exist.  The  want  of 
this  necvssary  though  dangerous  faculty  makes  a  man 
the  victim  of  vivid  impressions,  and  disables  him  from 
believing  what  his  impressions  do  not  enable  him  to  rea- 
lize. Questions  respecting  metaphysical  possibility  turn 
much  on  the  presence,  or  absence,  or  exaggeration,  of  this 
kind  of  imagination.  And  when  one  man  has  said,  "  I 
can  perceive  it  possible,"  and  another  has  said,  "I  can- 
not," it  is  certainly  difficult  to  get  any  further. 

To  me  it  is  not  in  the  slightest  degree  difficult  to 
conceive  the  possible  existence  of  a  being  capable  of  love 
and  knowledge  without  the  physical  organs  through 
which  human  beings  derive  their  knowledge,  nor  in  sup- 
posing myself  to  be  such  a  being.  Irideed,  I  seem  actually 
to  exercise  such  a  capacity  (however  I  got  it)  when  I  shut 
my  eyes  and  try  to  think  out  a  moral  or  mathematical 
puzzle.  If  it  is  true  that  a  particular  corner  of  my  brain 
is  concerned  in  the  matter,  I  accept  the  fact  not  as  a  self- 
evident  truth  (which  would  seem  to  be  Mr.  Harrison's 
position),  but  as  a  curious  discovery  of  the  anatomists. 
But  having  said  this  I  have  said  everything,  and,  as  Mr. 
Harrison  must*  suppose  that  I  deceive  myself,  so  I  sup- 
pose that  in  his  case  the  imagination  which  founds  itself 
on  experience  is  so  active  and  vivid  as  to  cloud  or  dwarf 
the  imagination  which  proceeds  beyond  or  beside  exper- 
ience. 

Mr.  Harrison's  own  theory  I  do  not  quite  understand. 
He  derides  the  idea,  though  he  does  not  absolutely  deny 
the  possibility,  of  an  immaterial  entity  which  feels.  And 


THE  SOUL  AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  .        93 

he  appears  to  be  sensible  of  the  difficulty  of  supposing 
that  atoms  of  matter  which  assume  the  form  of  a  gray 
pulp  can  feel.  He  holds  accordingly,  as  I  understand, 
that  feeling,  and  all  that  follows  from  it,  are  the  results 
of  an  "  organism." 

If  he  had  used  the  word  "  organization,"  I  should  have 
concluded  unhesitatingly  that  he  was  the  victim  of  the 
Anglican  confusion  which  I  have  above  noticed,  and  that 
in  his  own  mind,  he  escaped  the  alternative  difficulties  of 
the  case  by  the  common  expedient  of  shifting  as  occasion 
required  from  one  sense  of  that  word  to  the  other.  If 
pressed  by  the  difficulty  of  imagining  sensation  not  resi- 
dent in  any  specific  sensitive  thing,  the  word  organiz- 
ation would  supply  to  his  mind  the  idea  of  a  thing,  a 
sensitive  aggregate  of  organized  atoms.  If,  on  the  con- 
trary, pressed  by  the  difficulty  of  supposing  that  these 
atoms,  one  or  all,  thought,  the  word  would  shift  its 
meaning  and  present  the  aspect  not  of  an  aggregate  bulk, 
but  of  orderly  arrangement — not  of  a  thing,  or  a  collec- 
tion of  things,  but  of  a  state  of  things.  • 

But  the  word  "  organism  "  is  generally  taken  to  indi- 
cate a  thing  organized.  And  the  choice  of  that  word 
would  seem  to  indicate  that  he  ascribed  the  spiritual  acts 
(so  to  call  them)  which  constitute  life  to  the  aggregate 
bulk  of  the  atoms  organized,  or  the  appropriate  part  of 
them.  But  this  he  elsewhere  seems  to  disclaim.  "  The 
philosophy  which  treats  man  as  man  simply  affirms  that 
man  loves,  thinks,  acts,  not  that  ganglia,  or  the  sinews, 
or  any  organ  of  man  loves,  and  thinks,  and  acts."  Yes, 


94-  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

but  we  recur  to  the  question,  "  What  is  man  ?  "  If  the 
ganglia  do  not  think,  what  is  it  that  does  ?  Mr.  Harri- 
son, as  I  understand,  answers  that  it  is  a  consensus  of 
faculties,  an  harmonious  system  of  parts,  and  he  denoun- 
ces an  attempt  to  introduce  into  this  collocation  of  parts 
or  faculties  an  underlying  entity  or  being  which  shall 
possess  those  faculties  or  employ  those  parts.  It  is  then 
not  after  all  to  a  being  or  aggregate  of  beings,  but  to  a 
relation  or  condition  of  beings,  that  will  and  thought  and 
love  belong.  If  this  is  Mr.  Harrison's  meaning,  I  certainly 
agree  with  him  that  it  is  indeed  impossible  to  compose  a 
difference  between  two  disputants  of  whom  one  holds,  and 
the  other  denies,  that  a  condition  can  think.  If  my  op- 
ponent does  not  admit  this  to  be  an  absurdity,  I  do  not 
pretend  to  drive  him  any  further. 

With  regard  to  immortality,  I  have  nothing  material  to 
add  to  what  has  been  said  by  those  who  have  preceded 
me.  I  agree  with  Prof.  Huxley  that  the  natural  world 
supplies  nothing  which  can  be  called  evidence  of  a  future 
life.  Believing  in  God,  I  see  in  the  constitution  of  the 
world  which  he  has  made,  and  in  £the  yearnings  and  as- 
pirations of  that  spiritual  nature  which  he  has  given  to 
man,  much  that  commends  to  my  belief  the  revelation  of 
a  future  life  which  I  believe  him  to  have  made.  But  it 
is  in  virtue  of  his  clear  promise,  not  in  virtue  of  these 
doubtful  intimations,  that  I  rely  on  the  prospect  of  a 
future  life.  Believing  that  he  is  the  author  of  that  moral 
insight  which  in  its  ruder  forms  controls  the  multitude, 
and  in  its  higher  inspires  the  saint,  I  revere  those  great 


THE  SOUL  AND   FUTURE  LIFE.  95 

men  who  were  able  to  forecast  this  great  announcement, 
but  I  cannot  and  do  not  care  to  reduce  that  forecast  to 
any  logical  process,  or  base  it  on  any  conclusive  reason- 
ing. Rather  I  admire  their  power  of  divination  the  more 
on  account  of  the  narrowness  of  their  logical  data.  For 
myself,  I  believe  because  I  am  told. 

But  whether  the  doctrine  of  immortality  be  true  or 
false,  I  protest,  with  Mr.  Hutton,  against  the  attempt  to 
substitute  for  what,  at  any  rate,  is  a  substantial  idea, 
something  which  can  hardly  be  called  even  a  shadow  or 
echo  of  it. 

The  Christian  conception  of  the  world  is  this  :  It  is  a 
world  of  moral  as  of  physical  waste.  Much  seed  is  sown 
which  will  not  ripen,  but  some  is  sown  that  will.  This 
planet  is  a  seat,  among  other  things,  of  present  goodness 
and  happiness.  And  this  our  goodness  and  happiness, 
like  our  crime  and  misery,  propagate  or  fail  to  propagate 
themselves  during  our  lives  and  after  our  deaths.  But, 
apart  from  these  earthly  consequences,  which  are  much  to 
us  and  all  to  the  positivist,  the  little  fragment  of  the  uni- 
verse on  which  we  appear  and  disappear  is,  we  believe, 
a  nursery  for  something  greater.  The  capacities  for  love 
and  knowledge,  which  in  some  of  us  attain  a  certain  de- 
velopment here,  we  must  all  feel  to  be  capable,  with 
greater  opportunities, of  an  infinitely  greater  development; 
and  Christians  believe  that  such  a  development  is  in  fact 
reserved  for  those  who,  in  this  short  time  of  apprentice- 
ship, take  the  proper  steps  for  approaching  it. 

This  conception  of  a  glorious  and  increasing  company, 


96  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

into  which  the  best  of  men  are  continually  to  be  gathered 
to  be  associated  with  each  other  (to  say  no  more)  in  all 
that  can  make  existence  happy  and  noble,  may  be  a  dream, 
and  Mr.  Harrison  may  be  right  in  calling  it  so.  In  de- 
riding it  he  cannot  be  right.  "  The  eternity  of  the  tabor  " 
he  calls  it !  Has  he  never  felt,  or,  at  any  rate,  is  he  not 
able  to  conceive,  a  thrill  of  pleasure  at  a  sympathetic  in- 
terchange of  look,  or  word,  or  touch,  with  a  fellow-crea- 
ture kind  and  noble  and  brilliant,  and  engaged  in  the 
exhibition  of  those  qualities  of  heart  and  intellect  which 
make  him  what  he  is  ?  Multiply  and  sustain  this — sup- 
pose yourself  surrounded  by  beings  with  whom  this  in- 
terchange of  sympathy  is  warm  and  perpetual.  Intensify 
it.  Increase  indefinitely  the  excellence  of  one  of  those 
beings,  the  wonderful  and  attractive  character  of  his 
operations,  our  own  capacities  of  affection  and  intellect, 
the  vividness  of  our  conception,  the  breadth  and  firmness  of 
of  our  mental  grasp,  the  sharp  vigour  of  our  admiration ;  and, 
to  .exclude  satiety,  imagine  if  you  like  that  the  operations 
which  we  contemplate  and  our  relations  to  our  companions 
are  infinitely  varied — a  supposition  for  which  the  size  of 
the  known  and  unknown  universe  affords  indefinite  scope 
— or  otherwise  suppose  that  sameness  ceases  to  tire,  as  the 
old  Greek  philosopher  thought  it  might  do  if  we  were 

better  than  we  are  (//-era/JoA.^  TTOLVTW  yXvKvrarov  BLOL  TTovypiav 

nva),  or  as  it  would  do,  I  suppose,  if  we  had  no  memory 
of  the  immediate  past.  Imagine  all  this  as  the  very  least 
that  may  be  hoped,  if  our  own  powers  of  conception  are 
as  slight  in  respect  to  the  nature  of  what  is  to  be  as  our 


THE   SOUL   AND   FUTURE    LIFE.  97 

bodies  are  in  relation  to  the  physical  universe.  And  re- 
member that,  if  practical  duties  are  necessary  for  the  per- 
fection of  life,  the  universe  is  not  so  small  but  that  in 
some  corner  of  it  its  Creator  might  always  find  something 
to  do  for  the  army  of  intelligences  whom  he  has  thus 
formed  and  exalted. 

All  this,  I  repeat,  may  be  a  dream,  but  to  characterize 
it  as  "  the  eternity  of  the  tabor  "  shows  surely  a  feeble- 
ness of  conception  or  carelessness  of  representation  more 
worthy  of  a  ready  writer  than  of  a  serious  thinker.  And 
to  place  before  us  as  a  rival  conception  the  fact  that  some 
of  our  good  deeds  will  have  indefinite  consequences — to 
call  this  scanty  and  fading  chain  of  effects,  which  we  shall 
be  as  unable  to  perceive  or  control  as  we  have  been  un- 
able to  anticipate — to  call  this  a  "  posthumous  activity," 
"  an  eternity  of  spiritual  influence,"  and  a  "  life  beyond 
the  grave,"  and  finally,  under  the  appellation  of  "  incor- 
poration into  the  glorious  future  of  our  race,"  to  claim  for 
it  a  dignity  and  value  parallel  to  that  which  would  attach 
to  the  Christian's  expectation  (if  solid)  of  a  sensible  life 
of  exalted  happiness  for  himself  and  all  good  men,  is  surely 
nothing  more  or  less  than  extravagance  founded  on  mis- 
nomer. 

With  regard  to  the  ^promised  incorporation,  I  should 
really  like  to  know  what  is  the  exact  process,  or  event,  or 
condition,  which  Mr.  Harrison  considers  himself  to  under- 
stand by  the  incorporation  of  a  consensus  of  faculties  with 
a  glorious  future ;  and  whether  he  arrived  at  its  appre- 


98  A    MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

hension  by  way  of  "  positive  knowledge,"  or  by  way  of 
"  scientific  logic." 

Mr.  Harrison's  future  life  is  disposed  of  by  Professor 
Huxley  in  a  few  words :  "  Throw  a  stone  into  the  sea, 
and  there  is  a  sense  in  which  it  is  true  that  the  wavelets 
which  spread  around  it  have  an  effect  through  all  space 
an«l  time.  Shall  we  say  that  the  stone  has  a  future  life?" 

To  this  I  only  add  the  question  whether  I  am  not  jus- 
tified in  saying  that  Mr.  Harrison  does  not  adequately 
distinguish  between  the  nature  of  a  fiddle  and  the  nature 
of  a  tune,  and  would  contend  (if  consistent)  that  a  violin 
which  had  been  burnt  to  ashes  would,  notwithstanding, 
continue  to  exist,  at  least  as  long  as  a  tune  which  had 
been  played  upon  it  survived  in  the  memory  of  any  one 
who  had  heard  it — the  consensus  of  its  capacities  being, 
it  would  seem,  incorporated  into  the  glorious  future  of 
music. 


HON.  RODEN  NOEL. 

DEATH  is  a  phenomenon  ;  but  are  we  phenomena  ? 
The  question  of  immortality  seems,  philosophically 
speaking,  very  much  to  resolve  itself  into  that  of  person- 
ality. Are  we  persons,  spirits,  or  are  we  things  ?  Perhaps 
we  are  a  loose  collection  of  successive  qualities  ?  That 
seems  to  be  the  latest  conclusion  of  positive  and  Agnostic 
biological  philosophy.  The  happy  thought  'which,  as  Dr. 


THE   SOUL   AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  99 

Stirling  suggests,  was  probably  thrown  out  in  a  spirit  of 
persiflage  by  Hume  has  been  adopted  in  all  seriousness  by 
his  followers.  Mr.  Harrison  is  very  bitter  with  those  who 
want  to  explain  mental  and  moral  phenomena  by  physi- 
ology. But,  as  Prof.  Huxley  remarks,  he  seems  in  many 
parts  of  his  essay  to  do  the  same  thing  himself.  What 
could  Biichner,  or  Carl  Vogt,  say  stronger  than  this  ?  "At 
last,  the  priek  of  a  needle,  or  a  grain  of  mineral,  will  in 
an  instant  lay  to  rest  forever  man's  body  and  its  unity, 
and  all  the  spontaneous  activities  of  intelligence,  feeling, 
and  action,  with  which  that  compound  organism  was 
charged."  Again,  he  says^  the  spiritual  faculties  are  "  di- 
rectly dependent  on  physical  organs " — "stand  forth  as 
functions  of  living  organs  in  given  conditions  of  the  or- 
ganism." Again  :  "  At  last  the  man  Newton  dies,  that  is, 
the  body  is  dispersed  into  gas  and  dust."  Mr.  Harrison, 
then,  though  a  positivist,  bound  to  know  only  successive 
phenomena,  seems  to  know  the  body  as  a  material  entity 
possessed  of  such  functions  as  conscience,  reason,  imagina- 
tion, perception — to  know  that  Newton's  body  thought  out 
the  "  Principia,"  and  Shakespeare's  conceived  "  Hamlet." 
Indeed,  Agnosticism  generally,  though  with  a  show  of 
humility,  seems  rather  arbitrary  in  its  selection  of  what  we 
shall  know,  and  what  we  shall  not ;  we  must  know  something ; 
so  we  shall  know  that  we  have  ideas  and  feelings,  but  not- 
the  personal  identity  that  alone  makes  them  intelligible,  or 
we  shall  use  the  word,  and  yet  speak  as  if  the  idea  were 
a  figment ;  we  shall  know  qualities,  but  not  substance  ; 
"  functions  "  and  "  forces,"  but  not  the  some  one  or  some- 


100  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

thing  of  which  they  must  be  functions  and  forces  to  be 
conceivable  at  all.  Yet  naturam  ixpellas  furca,  etc. 
Common-sense  insists  on  retaining  the  fundamental  laws 
of  human  thought,  not  being  able  to  get  rid  of  them  ;  and 
hence  the  hap-hazard,  instead  of  systematic  and  orderly, 
fashion  in  which  the  new  philosophy  deals  with  universal 
convictions,  denying  even  that  they  exist  out  of  theology 
and  me't<  ij>li  // x  /  q  lie. 

Thus  (in  apparent  contradiction  to  the  statements 
quoted),  we  are  told  that  it  is  "  man  who  loves, 
thinks,  acts ;  not  the  ganglia,  or  sinuses,  or  any 
organ"  that  does  so.  But  perhaps  the  essayist  means 
that  all  the  body  together  does  so.  He  says  a  man  is  "  the 
consensus,  or  combined  activity  of  his  faculties."  What 
is  meant  by  this  phraseology  ?  It  is  just  this  "  his"  this 
••  consensus,"  or  "combined  acting,"  that  is  inconceivable 
without  the  focus  of  unity,  in  which  many  contemporane- 
ous phenomena,  and  many  past  and  present,  meet  to  be 
compared,  remembered,  identified,  as  belonging  to  the 
same  self ;  so  only  can  they  be  known  phenomena  at  all. 
Well,  do  we  find  in  examining  the  physical  structure  of 
man's  body  as  solid,  heavy,  extended,  devisible,  or  its 
living  organs  and  their  physical  functions,  or  the  rear- 
rangement of  molecules  of  carbon,  nitrogen,  hydrogen, 
etc.,  into  living  tissue,  or  its  oxidation,  anything  corres- 
ponding to  the  consciousness  of  personal  moral  agency, 
and  personal  identity  ?  We  put  the  two  classes  of  con- 
ception side  by  side,  and  they  seem  to  refuse  to  be 
identified — man  as  one  and  the  same  conscious  moral 


THE  SOUL   AND   FUTUBTC   LlVfi.  161 

agent — and  his  body,  or  the  bumps  on  his  skull ;  or  is 
man  indeed  a  function  of  his  own  body  ?  Are  we  right 
in  talking  of  our  bodies  as  material  things,  and  of  our- 
selves as  if  we  were  not  things,  but  persons  with  mights, 
rights,  and  duties  ?  We  ought,  perhaps,  to  talk — theolo- 
gies and  philosophies  being  now  exploded — not  of  our 
having  bodies,  but  of  bodies  having  us,  and  of  bodies 
having  rights  or  duties.  Perhaps  Dundreary  was  mis- 
taken, and  the  tail  may  wag  the  dog  after  all. 

Mr.  Harrison  says :  "  Orthodoxy  has  so  long  been 
accustomed  to  take  itself  for  granted,  that  we  are  apt  to 
forget  how  very  short  a  period  of  human  history  this 
sublimated  essence"  (the  immaterial  soul)  "  has  been  cur- 
rent. There  is  not  a  trace  of  it  in  the  Bible  in  its 
present  sense."  This  reminds  one  rather  of  Mr.  Matthew 
Arnold's  contention  that  the  Jews  did  not  believe  in  God. 
But  really  it  does  not  much  signify  what  particular  intel- 
lectual theories  have  been  entertained  by  different  men 
at  different  times  about  the  nature  of  God  or  of  the  soul : 
the  question  is  whether  you  do  not  find  on  the  whole 
among  them  all  a  consciousness  or  conviction  that  there 
is  a  Higher  Being  above  them,  together  with  a  power  of 
distinguishing  themselves  from  their  own  bodies,  and  the 
world  around  them — in  consequence  of  this,  too,  a  belief 
in  personal  immortality.  Many  in  all  ages  believe  that 
the  dead  have  spoken  to  us  from  beyond  the  grave.  But 
into  that  I  will  not  enter.  Are  we  our  bodies  ?  that  seems 
to  be  the  point.  Now,  I  do  not  think  positivism  has 
any  right  to  assume  that  we  are,  even  on  its  own  princi- 
ples and  professions. 


A     >HM>:;|;\;   SYMPOSIUM. 

Mr.  ILirri-ui  ha^  a  \vry  i'oiviMr  passage,  in  which 
he  enlarges  upon  this  theme  :  that  "the  laws  of  the 
separate  functions  of  body,  mind,  or  feeling,  have 
visible  relations  to  each  other;  are  inextricably  woven  in 
with  each  other,  act  and  react.  .  .  .  From  the  summit  of 
spiritual  life  TO  the  1  »ase  of  corporeal  life,  whether  we  pass 
ii}»  m-  down  the  gamut  of  human  forces,  there  runs  one 
organic  corn-hit  inn  and  sympathy  of  parts.  Touch  the 
smallest  film-  in  the  corporeal  man,  and  in  some  infini- 
tesimal way  we  may  watch  the  effect  in  the  moral  man. 
When  we  rouse  chords  of  the  most  glorious  ecstasy  of  the 
soul,  we  may  see  the  vibrations  of  them  visibly  thrilling 
upon  the  skin."  Here  we  are  in  the  region  of  positive 
facts  as  specially  made  manifest  by  recent  investigation. 
And  the  orthodox  schools  need  to  recognize  the  signifi- 
cance of  such  facts.  The  close  interdependence  of  body 
and  soul  is  a  startling  verity  that  must  be  looked  in  the 
face  ;  and  the  discovery  has,  no  doubt,  gone  far  to  shake 
the  faith  of  many  in  human  immortality,  as  well  as  in 
other  momentous  kindred  truths.  It  has  been  so  with  myself. 
But  I  think  the  old  dictum  of  Bacon  about  the  effect  of 
a  little  and  more  knowledge  will  be  found  applicable 
after  all.  Let  us  look  these  facts  very  steadily  in  the 
face.  When  we  have  thought  for  a  long  time,  there  is  a 
feeling  of  pain  in  the  head.  That  is  a  feeling,  observe,  in 
our  own  conscious  selves.  Further,  by  observation  and 
experiment,  it  has  been  made  certain  that  some  molecular 
change  in  the  nervous  substance  of  the  brain  (to  the 
renewal  of  which  oxygenated  blood  is  necessary)  is  going 


THE   SOUL   AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  103 

on,  while  the  process  of  thinking  takes  place — though  we 
are  not  conscious  of  it  in  our  own  case,  except  as  a  matter 
of  inference.  The  thought  itself  seems,  when  we  renecJ 
on  it,  partly  due  to  the  action  of  an  external  world  or 
cosmos  upon  us ;  partly  to  our  own  "  forms  of  thought," 
or  fixed  ways  of  perceiving  and  thinking,  which  have 
been  ours  so  long  as  we  can  remember,  and  which  do  not 
belong  to  us  more  than  to  other  individual  members  of 
the  human  family ;  again  partly  to  our  own  past  experi- 
ence. But  what  is  this  material  process  accompanying 
thought,  which  conceivably  we  might  perceive  if  we  could 
see  the  inside  of  our  own  bodies  ?  Why  it  too  can  only 
seem  what  it  seems  by  virtue  of  our  own .  personal  past 
experience,  and  our  own  human  as  well  as  individual 
modes  of  conceiving.  Is  not  *that  "  positive  "  too  ?  Will 
not  men  of  sciertee  agree  with  me  that  such  is  the  fact  ? 
In  short,  our  bodies,  on  any  view  of  them,  Science  herself 
has  taught  us,  are  percepts  and  concepts  of  ours — I  don't 
say  of  the  "  soul,"  or  the  mind,  or  any  bete  noire  of  the 
sort,  but  of  ourselves,  who  surely  cannot  be  altogether 
betes  noires.  They  are  as  much  percepts  and  concepts  of 
ours  as  is  the  material  world  outside  them.  Are  they 
coloured  ?  Colour,  we  are  told,  is-  a  sensation.  Are  they 
hard  or  soft  ?  These  are  our  sensations,  and  relative  to 
us.  The  elements  of  our  food  enter  into  relations  we 
name  living  ;  their  molecules  enter  into  that  condition  of 
unstable  equilibrium  ;  there  is  motion  of  parts  fulfilling 
definite  intelligible  and  constant  uses,  in  some  cases  subject 
to  our  own  intelligent  direction.  But  all  this  is  what 


104  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

appeai-s  to  our  intelligence,  and  it  appears  different, 
According  to  the  stages  of  intelligence  at  which  we  arrive  ; 
a  good  deal  of  it  is  Irypothesis  of  our  own  minds. 
Readers  of  Berkeley  and  Kant  need  not  be  told  this  ;  it  is 
now  universally  acknowledged  by  the  competent.  The 
atomic  tin-on-  is  a  working  hypothesis  of  our  minds  only. 
Spa iv  and  tinu-  arc  relative  to  our  intelligence,  to  the 

—ion  of  our  thoughts,  to  our  own  faculties  of  motion, 
motion  being  also  a  conception  of  ours.  Our  bodies,  in 
fact,  as  positivists  often  tells  us,  and  as  we  now  venture 
to  remind  ///-//i,  are  phenomena,  that  is,  orderly  appear- 
ances to  U8.  They  further  tell  us  generally  that  there  is 
nothing  which  thus  appears,  or  that  we  cannot  know  that 
there  is  anything  beyond  the  appearance.  What,  then, 

ling  to  positivism  itseli*,  is  the  most  we  are  entitled 
to  attirm  with  regard  to  the  dead  ?  Simply  that  there 
arc  no  <>  /'/"  durances  f<>  'us  of  a  living  personality  in  con- 

>n  with  those  phenomena  which  we  call  a  dead 
body,  any  more  than  there  are  in  conneciion  with  the 
used-up  materials  of  burned  tissues  that  pass  by  osmosis 
into  the  capillaries,  and  away  by  excretory  ducts.  But 
are  we  entitled  to  affirm  that  the  person  is  extinct  is 
dissolved — the  one  conscious  self  in  whom  these  bodily 
phenomena  centred  (except  so  far  as  they  centred  in  us), 
who  was  the  focus  of  them,  gave  them  form,  made  them 
what  they  were  ;  whose  thoughts  wandered  up  and  down 
through  eternity ;  of  whom,  therefore,  the  bodily  as  well 
as  mental  and  spiritual  functions  were  functions,  so  far  as 
the  body  entered  into  the  conscious  self  at  all,  ?  We  can, 


THE  SOUL  AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  105 

on  the  contrary,  only  affirm  that  probably  the  person  no 
longer  perceives,  and  is  conscious,  in  connection  with 
this  form  we  look  upon,  wherein  so-called  chemical  affini- 
ties now  prevail  altogether  over  so-called  vital  power. 
But  even  in  life  the  body  is  always  changing  and  decom- 
posing— foreign  substances  are  always  becoming  a  new 
body,  and  the  old  body  becoming  a  foreign  substance.  Yet 
the  person  remains  one  and  the  same.  True,  positivism 
tries  to  eliminate  persons,  and  reduce  all  to  appearances  ; 
but  this  is  too  glaring  a  violation  of  common-sense,  and 
I  do  not  think  from  his  language  Mr.  Harrison  quite 
means  to  do  this.  Well,  by  spirit,  even  by  "  soul,"  most 
people,  let  me  assure  him,  only  mean  our  own  conscious 
personal  selves.  For  myself,  indeed,  I  believe  that  there 
cannot  be  appearances  without  something  to  appear.  But 
seeing  that  the  material  world  is  in  harmony  with  our 
intelligence,  and  presents  all  the  appearance  of  intelligent 
cooperation  of  parts  with  a  view  to  ends,  I  believe,  with 
a  great  English  thinker,  whose  loss  we  have  to  deplore 
(James  Hinton),  that  all  this  is  the  manifestation  of  life 
— of  living  spirits  or  persons,  not  of  dead,  inert  matter, 
though  from  our  own  spiritual  deadness  or  inertness  it 
appears  to  us  material.  Upon  our  own  moral  and 
spiritual  life,  in  fact,  depends  the  measure  of  our 
knowledge  and  perception.  I  can  indeed  admit  with 
Mr.  Harrison  that  probably  there  must  always  be  to 
us  the  phenomenon,  the  body,  the  external ;  but  it  may 
be  widely  different  from  what  it  seems  now.  We  may  be 
made  one  with  the  great  Elohim,  or  angels  of  Nature  who 


100  A    MODKRN    SYMPOSIUM. 


us,  01-  \\r  may  still  grovel  in  dead  material  bodily 
life.  We  now  appear  to  ourselves  and  to  others  as  bodily, 
as  material.  Body,  and  soul  or  mind,  are  two  opposite 
phenomenal  poles  of  one  reality,  which  is  self  or  spirit  ; 
but  though  these  phenomena  may  vary,  the  creative, 
informing  spirit,  which  underlies  all,  of  which  we  par- 
take, which  is  absolute,  divine,  this  can  never  be  destroyed. 
"  In  God  we  live,  move,  and  have  our  being."  It  is  held, 
indeed,  by  the  new  philosophy,  that  the  temporal,  the 
physical,  and  the  composite  (elements  of  matter  and 
"  feeling"),  are  the  basis  of  our  higher  consciousness  :  on 
the  contrary,  I  hold  that  this  is  absurd,  and  that  the  one 
eternal  consciousness  or  spirit  must  be  the  basis  of  the 
physical,  composite,  and  temporal  ;  is  needed  to  give  unity 
and  harmony  to  the  body.  One  is  a  little  ashamed  of 
agreeing  with  an  old-fashioned  thinker,  whom  an  old- 
fashioned  poet  pronounced  the  "  first  of  those  who  know," 
that  the  spirit  is  organizing  vital  principle  of  the  body, 
not  vice  versa.  The  great  difficulty,  no  doubt,  is  that 
apparent  irruption  of  the  external  into  the  personal,  when, 
as  the  essayist  says,  "  impair  a  man's  secretions,  and  moral 
sense  is  dulled,  discoloured,  depraved."  But  it  is  our  spiritual 
deadness  that  has  put  us  into  this  physical  condition  ;  and 
probably  it  is  we  who  are  responsible  in  a  fuller  sense 
than  we  can  realize  now  for  this  effect  upon  us,  which 
must  be  in  the  end  too  for  purposes  of  discipline;  it 
belongs  to  our  spiritual  history  and  purpose.  Moreover, 
this  external  world  is  not  so  foreign  to  us  as  we  imagine  ; 
it  is  spiritual,  and  between  all  spirit  there  is  solidarity. 


THE   SOUL   AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  107 

Mr.  Hinton  observes  (and  here  I  agree  with  him  rather 
than  with  Mr.  Harrison)  that  the  defect  and  falseness  of 
our  knowing  must  be  in  the  knowing  by  only  part  of 
ourselves.  Whereas  sense  had  to  be  supplemented  by 
intellect,  and  proved  misleading  without  it,  so  intellect, 
even  in  the  region  of  knowledge,  has  to  be  supplemented 
by  moral  sense,  which  is  the  highest  faculty  in  us.  We 
are  at  present  misled  by  a  false  view  of  the  world,  based 
on  sense  and  intellect  only.  Death  is  but  a  hideous  il- 
lusion of  our  deadness — 

"  Death  is  the  veil  which  those  who  live-call  life  : 
We  sleep  and  it  is  lifted." 

The  true  definition  of  the  actual  is  that  which  is  true  for, 
which  satisfies  the  whole  being  of  humanity.  We  must 
ask  of  a  doctrine,  "  Does  it  answer  in  the  moral  region  ?" 
if  so,  it  is  as  true  as  we  can  have  it  with  our  present 
knowledge ;  but,  if  the  moral  experiment  fails,  it  is  not 
true.  Conscience  has  the  highest  authority  about  know- 
ledge, as  it  has  about  conduct.  Now  apply  this  to  the 
negations  of  positivism,  and  the  belief  Comte  would  sub- 
stitute for  faith  in  God,  and  personal  immortality.  Kant 
sufficiently  proved  that  these  are  postulates  required  by 
Practical  Reason,  and  on  this  ground  he  believed  them. 
I  am  not  blind  to  the  beauty  and  nobleness  of  Comte's 
moral  ideal  (not  without  debt  to  Christ's  as  expounded) 
by  himself,  and  here  by  Mr.  Harrison.  Still  I  say,  The 
moral  experiment  fails.  Some  of  us  may  seek  to  benefit 
the  world,  and  then  desire  rest.  But  what  of  the 
maimed  and  broken  and  aimless  lives  around  us  ?  What 


108  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

of  those  we  have  lost,  who  were  dearer  to  us  than  our  own 
selves,  full  of  fairest  hope  and  promise,  unaware  annihi- 
lated in  earliest  dawn,  whose  dewy  bud  yet  slept  unfolded  ? 
If  they  were  things,  doubtless  we  might  count  them  as 
so  much  manure,  in  which  to  grow  those  still  more 
beautiful  though  still  brief-flowering  human  aloes,  which 
positivism,  though  knowing  nothing  but  present  pheno- 
mena, and  denying  God,  is  able  confidently  to  promise  us 
in  some  remote  future.  But  alas !  they  seemed  living 
spirits,  able  to  hope  for  infinite  love,  progressive  virtue, 
the  beautific  vision  of  God  himself !  And  they  really 
ivere — so  much  manure  !  Why,  as  has  already  been  asked, 
are  such  ephemerals  worth  living  for,  however  many  of 
them  there  may  be,  whose  lives  are  as  an  idle  flash  in  the 
pan,  always  promising,  yet  failing  to  attain  any  sub- 
stantial or  enduring  good  ?  What  of  these  agonizing 
women  and  children,  now  the  victims  of  Ottoman  blood- 
madness  ?  What  of  all  the  cramped,  unlovely,  debased, 
or  slow-tortured  yet  evanescent  lives  of  myriads  in  our 
great  cities  ?  These  cannot  have  the  philosophic  aspira- 
tions of  culture.  They  have  too  often  none  at  all.  Go 
proclaim  to  them  this  gospel,  supplementing  it  by  the 
warning  that  in  the  end  there  will  remain  only  a  huge 
block  of  ice  in  a  "  wide,  gray,  lampless,  deep,  unpeopled 
world!"  I  could  believe  in  the  pessimism  of  Schopen- 
hauer, not  in  this  jaunty  optimism  of  Comte. 

Are  we  then  indeed  orphans  ?  Will  the  tyrant  go  ever 
unpunished,  the  wrong  ever  unredressed,  the  poor  and 
helpless  remain  always  trampled  and  unhappy  ?  Must  the 


THE  SOUL   AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  109 

battle  of  good  and  evil  in  ourselves  and  others  hang  al- 
ways trembling  in  the  balance,  forever  undecided  ;  or  does 
it  all  mean  nothing  more  than  we  see  now,  and  is  the 
glorious  world  but  some  ghastly  illusion  of  insanity  ? 
When  "  the  fever  called  living  is  over  at  last,"  is  all  in- 
deed over  ?  Thank  God  that  through  this  Babel  of  dis- 
cordant voices  modern  men  can  still  hear  His  accents  who 
said,  "  Come  unto  me,  all  ye  that  are  weary  and  are  heavy 
laden,  and  I  will  give  you  rest." 


LORD  SELBORNE. 

I  AM  too  well  satisfied  with  Lord  Blachford's  paper 
to  think  that  I  can  add  anything  of  importance  to 
it.  The  little  I  would  say  has  reference  to  our  actual 
knowledge  of  the  soul  during  this  life — meaning  by  the 
soul  what  Lord  Blachford  means,  viz.,  the  conscious 
being  which  each  man  calls  "  himself." 

It  appears  to  me  that  what  we  know  and  can  observe 
tends  to  confirm  the  testimony  of  our  consciousness  to 
the  reality  of  the  distinction  between  the  body  and  the 
soul.  From  the  necessity  of  the  case,  we  cannpt  observe 
any  manifestations  of  the  soul  except  during  the  time  of 
its  association  with  the  body.  This  limit  of  our  experi- 
ence applies,  not  to  the  "  ego  "  of  which  alone  each  man 
has  any  direct  knowledge,  but  to  the  perceptible  indica- 


110  .          A    MODKHN    SYMPOSIUM. 

tion  of  consciousness  in  others.  It  is  impossible,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  that  any  man  can  ever  have  had  experi- 
ence of  the  total  cessation  of  his  own  consciousness ;  and 
the  idea  of  such  a  cessation  is  much  less  natural  and  much 
more  difficult  to  realize  than  that  of  its  continuance.  We 
observe  the  phenomena  of  death  in  others,  and  infer,  by 
irresistible  induction,  that  the  same  thing  will  also  hap- 
pen to  ourselves.  But  these  phenomena  carry  us  only  to 
the  dissociation  of  the  "  ego  "  from  the  body,  not  to  its 
extinction. 

Nothing  else  can  be  credible  if  our  consciousness  is  not ; 
and  I  have  said  that  this  bears  testimony  to  the  reality 
of  the  distinction  between  soul  and  body.  Each  man  is 
conscious  of  using  his  own  body  as  an  instrument,  in  the 
same  sense  in  which  he  would  use  any  other  machine. 
He  passes  a  different  moral  judgment  on  the  mechanical 
and  involuntary  actions  of  his  body,  from  that  which  he 
feels  to  be  due  to  its  actions  resulting  from  his  own  free- 
will. The  unity  and  identity  of  the  "  ego,"  from  the  be- 
ginning to  the  end  of  life,  is  of  the  essence  of  his  con- 
sciousness. 

In  accordance  with  this  testimony  are  such  facts  as  the 
following  :  that  the  body  has  no  proper  unity,  identity,  or 
continuity,  through  the  whole  of  life—  all  its  constituent 
parts  being  in  a  constant  state  of  flux  and  change ;  that 
many  parts  and  organs  of  the  body  may  be  removed  with 
no  greater  effect  upon  the  "  ego  "  than  when  we  take  off 
any  article  of  clothing ;  and  that  those  organs  which  can- 
not be  removed  or  stopped  in  their  action  without  death 


THE   SOUL   AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  Ill 

are  distributed  over  different  parts  of  the  body,  and  are 
homogeneous  in  their  material  and  structure  with  others 
which  we  can  lose  without  the  sense  that  any  change  has 
passed  over  our  proper  selves.  If,  on  the  one  hand,  a 
diseased  state  of  some  bodily  organs  interrupts  the  rea- 
sonable manifestations  of  the  soul  through  the  body,  the 
cases  are,  on  the  other,  not  rare  in  which  the  whole  body 
decays  and  fells  into  extreme  age,  weakness,  and  even 
decrepitude,  while  vigour,  freshness,  and  youthfulness,  are 
characteristic  of  the  mind. 

The  attempt,  in  Butler's  work,  to  reason  from  the  in- 
divisibility and  indestructibility,  of  the  soul  as  ascertained 
facts,  is  less  satisfactory  than  most  of  that  great  writer's 
arguments,  which  are  generally  rather  intended  to  be 
destructive  of  objections  than  demonstrative  of  positive 
truths.  But  the  modern  scientific  doctrine,  that  all 
matter  and  all  force  are  indestructible,  is  not  without 
interest  in  relation  to  that  argument.  There  must  at 
least  be  a  natural  presumption  from  that  doctrine  that,  if 
the  soul  during  life  has  a  real  existence  distinct  from  the 
body,  it  is  not  annihilated  by  death.  If,  indeed,  it  were 
a  mere  "  force  "  (such  as  heat,  light,  etc.,  are  supposed  by 
modern  philosophers  to  be — though  men  who  are  not 
philosophers  may  be  excused  if  they  find  some  difficulty 
in  understanding  exactly  what  is  meant  by  the  term  when 
so  used),  it  would  be  consistent  with  that  doctrine  that 
the  soul  might  be  transmuted  after  death  into  some  other 
form  of  force.  But  the  idea  of  "  force "  in  this  sense 
(whatever  may  be  its  exact  meaning)  seems  wholly 


11-  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

inapplicable  to  the  conscious  being  which  a  man  calls 
"  himself." 

The  resemblances  in  the  nature  and  organization  of 
animal  and  vegetable  bodies  seem  to  me  to  confirm,  in- 
stead of  weakening,  the  impression  that  the  body  of  man 
is  a  machine  under  the  government  of  the  soul,  and  quite 
•  listinct  from  it.  Plants  manifest  no  consciousness ;  all 
our  knowledge  of  them  tends  irresistibly  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  there  is  in  them  no  intelligent,  much  less  any 
reasonable,  principle  of  life.  Yet  they  are  machines  very 
like  the  human  body  ;  not,  indeed,  in  their  formal  devel- 
opment or  their  exact  chemical  processes,  but  in  the 
general  scheme  and  functions  of  their  organism — in  their 
laws  of  nutrition,  digestion,  assimilation,  respiration,  and 
especially  reproduction.  They  are  bodies  without  souls, 
living  a  physical  life,  and  subject  to  a  physical  death. 
The  inferior  animals  have  bodies  still  more  like  our  own ; 
indeed  in  their  higher  orders,  resembling  them  very  closely 
indeed  ;  and  they  have  also  a  principle  of  life  quite  differ- 
ent from  that  of  plants,  with  various  degrees  of  conscious- 
ness, intelligence,  and  volition.  Even  in  their  principle 
of  life,  arguments  founded  on  observation  and  comparison 
(though  not  on  individual  consciousness),  more  or  less 
similar  to  those  which  apply  to  man,  tend  to  show  that 
there  is  something  distinct  from,  and  more  than,  the  body. 
But,  of  all  these  inferior  animals,  the  intelligence  differs 
from  that  of  man,  not  in  degree  only,  but  in  kind.  Nature 
is  their  simple,  uniform,  and  sufficient  law ;  their  very 
arts  (which  are  often  wonderful)  come  to  them  by 


THE   SOUL  AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  113 

Nature,  except  when  they  are  trained  by  man ;  there  is 
in  them  no  sign  of  discourse,  of  reason,  of  morality,  or  of 
the  knowledge  of  good  and  evil.  The  very  similarity  of 
their  bodily  structure  to  that  of  man  tends,  when  these 
differences  are  noted,  to  add  weight  to  the  other  natural 
evidence  of  the  distinctness  of  man's  soul  from  his  body. 

The  immortality  of  the  soul  seems  to  me  to  be  one  of 
those  truths  for  the  belief  in  which,  when  authoritatively 
declared,  man  is  prepared  by  the  very  constitution  of  his 
nature. 


CANON  BARRY. 

ANY  one  who  from  the  ancient  position  of  Christianity 
looks  on  the  controversy  between  Mr.  Harrison  and 
Prof.  Huxley  on  "  The  Soul  and  Future  Life  "  (to  which  1 
propose  mainly  to  confine  myself)  will   be  tempted  with 
Faulconbridge  to  observe,  not  without  a  touch  of  grim 
satisfaction,  how,  "  from  north  to    south,   Austria  and 
France  shoot  in  each  other's  mouth."     The  fight  is  fierce 
enough  to  make  him  ask,  Tantatne  animis  sapientibus  irce? 
But  he  will  see  that  each  is  far  more  effective  in  battering 
the  lines  of  the  enemy  than  in  strengthening  his  own. 
Nor  will  he  be  greatly  concerned  if  both  from  time  to 
time  lodge  a  shot  or  two  in  the  battlements  on  which  he 
stands,  with  some  beating    of    that   "  drum  scientific " 
which  seems  to  me  to  be  in  these  days  always  as  resonant, 
8 


114  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

sometimes  with  as  much  result  of  merely  empty  sound,  as 
"  the  drum  ecclesiastic,"  against  which  Prof.  Huxley  is  so 
fond  of  warning  us.  Those  whom  Mr.  Harrison  calls 
"  theologians,"  and  whom  Prof.  Huxley  less  appropriately 
terms  "  priests  "  (for  of  priesthood  there  is  here  no  ques- 
tion), may  indeed  think  that,  if  the  formidable  character 
of  an  opponent's  position  is  to  be  measured  by  the  scorn 
and  fuiy  with  which  it  is  assailed,  their  ground  must  be 
strong  indeed ;  and  they  will  possibly  remember  an  old 
description  of  a  basis  less  artificial  than  "  pulpit-stairs," 
from  which  men  may  look  without  much  alarm,  while 
"  the  floods  come  and  the  winds  blow."  Gaining  from 
this  conviction  courage  to  look  more  closely,  they  will  per- 
ceive, as  I  have  said,  that  each  of  the  combatants  is  far 
stronger  on  the  destructive  than  on  the  constructive  side. 
Mr.  Harrison's  earnest  and  eloquent  plea  against  the 
materialism  which  virtually,  if  not  theoretically,  makes 
all  that  we  call  spirit  a  mere  function  of  material  organ- 
ization (like  the  dp/xovta  of  the  "  Phsedo  "),  and  against  the 
exclusive  "  scientism  "  which,  because  it  cannot  find  cer- 
tain entities  along  its  line  of  investigation,  asserts 
loudly  that  they  are  either  non-existent  or  "  unknowable," 
is  strong,  and  (pace  Prof.  Huxley)  needful;  not,  indeed, 
against  him  (for  he  knows  better  than  to  despise  the 
metaphysics  in  which  he  is  so  great  an  adept),  but  against 
many  adherents,  prominent  rather  than  eminent,  of  the 
school  in  which  he  is  a  master.  Nor  is  its  force  destroyed 
by  exposing,  however  keenly  and  sarcastically,  some  in- 
consistencies of  argument,  not  inaptly  corresponding  (as 


THE   SOUL   AND   FUTUKE   LIFE.  115 

it  seems  to  me)  with  similar  inconsistencies  in  the  popular 
exposition  of  the  views  which  it  attacks.  If  Prof.  Huxley 
is  right  (as  surely  he  is)  in  pleading  for  perfect  freedom 
and  boldness  in  the  investigation  of  the  phenomena  of 
humanity  from  the  physical  side,  the  counter-plea  is 
equally  irresistible  for  the  value  of  an  independent  philo- 
sophy of  mind,  starting  from  the  metaphysical  pole  of 
thought,  and  reasoning  positively  on  the  phenomena 
which,  though  they  may  have  many  connections  with 
physical  laws,  are  utterly  inexplicable  by  them.  We 
might,  indeed,  demur  to  his  inference  that  the  discovery 
of  "  antecedence  in  the  molecular  fact  "  necessarily  leads 
to  a  "  physical  theory  of  moral  phenomena,"  and  vice  versa, 
as  savouring  a  little  of  the  post  hoc,  ergo  propter  hoc.  In- 
separable connection  it  would  imply ;  but  the  ultimate 
causation  might  lie  in  something  far  deeper,  underlying 
both  "  the  molecular  "  and  "  the  spiritual  fact."  But  still 
to  establish  such  antecedence  would  be  an 'important 
scientific  step,  and  the  attempt  might  be  made  from 
either  side. 

On  the  other  hand,  Prof.  Huxley's  trenchant  attack  on 
the  unreality  of  the  positivist  assumption  of  a  right  to 
take  names  which  in  the  old  religion  at  least  mean  some- 
thing firm  and  solid,  and  to  sublime  them  into  the  cloudy 
forms  of  transcendental  theory,  and  on  the  arbitrary  ap- 
plication of  the  word  "  selfishness,"  with  all  its  degrading 
associations,  to  the  consciousness  of  personality  here  and 
the  hope  of  a  nobler  personality  in  the  future,  leaves 
nothing  to  be  desired.  I  fear  that  his  friends  the  priests 


11(>  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

would  be  accused  of  the  crowning  sin  of  "  ecclesiasticism" 
(whatever  that  may  be)  if  they  used  denunciations  half 
so  sharp.  Except  with  a  few  sarcasms  which  he  cannot 
resist  the  temptation  of  flinging  at  them  by  the  way,  they 
will  have  nothing  with  which  to  quarrel ;  and  possibly 
they  may  even  learn  from  him  to  consider  these  as  claps 
of  - "  cheap  thunder "  from  the  "  pulpit,"  in  that  old 
sense  of  the  word  in  which  it  designates  the  professorial 
chair. 

The  whole  of  Mr.  Harrison's  two  papers  may  be  resolved 
into  an  attack  on  the  true  individuality  of  man,  first  on 
the  speculative,  then  on  the  moral  side;  from  the  one 
point  of  view  denouncing  the  belief  in  it  as  a  delusion, 
from  the  other  branding  the  desire  of  it  as  a  moral 
degradation.  The  connection  of  the  two  arguments  is 
instructive  and  philosophical.  For  no  argument  merely 
speculative,  ignoring  all  moral  considerations,  will  really 
be  listened  to.  His  view  of  the  soul  as  "  a  consensus  of 
human  faculties  "  reminds  us  curiously  of  the  Buddhist 
"  groups ;"  his  description  of  a  "  perpetuity  of  sensation  as 
the  true  hell "  breathes  the  very  spirit  of  the  longing  for 
Nirvana.  Both  he  and  his  Asiatic  predecessors  are  cer- 
tainly right  in  considering  the  "  delusion  of  individual 
existence  "  as  the  chief  delusion  to  be  got  rid  of  on  the 
way  to  a  perfect  Agnosticism,  in  respect  of  all  that  is  nob 
merely  phenomenal.  It  is  true  that  he  protests  in  terms 
against  a  naked  materialism,  ignoring  all  spiritual  phen- 
omena as  having  a  distinctive  character  of  their  own ;  but 
yet,  when  he  tells  us  that  "  to  talk  about  a  bodiless  being 


THE   SOUL   AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  117 

thinking  and  loving  is  simply  to  talk  of  the  thoughts  and 
feelings  of  Nothing,"  he  certainly  appears  to  assume  sub- 
stantially the  position  of  the  materialism  he  denounces, 
which  (as  has  been  already  said)  holds  these  spiritual 
energies  to  be  merely  results  of  the  bodily  organization, 
as  the  excitation  of  an  electric  current  is  the  result  of  the 
juxtaposition  of  certain  material  substances.  If  a  bodiless 
being  is  Nothing,  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  an  intrinsic 
or  independent  spiritual  life;  and  it  is  difficult  for  ordinary 
minds  to  attach  any  distinct  meaning  to  the  declaration 
that  the  soul  is  "  a  conscious  unity  of  being,"  if  that  being 
depends  on  an  organization  which  is  unquestionably  dis- 
cerptible,  and  of  which  (as  Butler  remarks)  large  parts 
may.be  lost  without  affecting  this  consciousness  of  per- 
sonality. 

Now  this  is,  after  all,  the  only  point  worth  fighting 
about.  Mr.  Hutton  has  already  said  with  perfect  truth 
that  by  "  the  soul "  we  mean  that  "  which  lies  at  the 
bottom  of  the  sense  of  personal  identity — the  thread  of 
the  continuity  running  through  all  our  checkered  life," 
and  which  remains  unbroken  amidst  the  constant  flux  of 
change  both  in  our  material  body,  and  in  the  circum- 
stances of  our  material  life.  This  belief  is  wholly  inde- 
pendent of  any  "  metaphysical  hypothesis "  of  modern 
"  orthodoxy,"  whether  it  is,  or  is  not,  rightly  described  as 
a  "juggle  of  ideas,"  and  of  any  examination  of  the  ques- 
tion (on  which  Lord  Blachford  has  touched)  whether,  if 
it  seem  such  to  "those  trained  in  positive  habits  of 
though  t,"  the  fault  lies  in  it  or  in  them.  I  may  remark^ 


118  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

in  passing,  that  in  this  broad  and  simple  sense  it  certainly 
runs  through  the  whole  Bible,  and  has  much  that  is  "  akin 
to  it  in  the  Old  Testament."  For  even  in  the  darkest 
and  most  shadowy  ideas  of  the  Shedl  of  the  other  world, 
the  belief  in  a  true  personal  identity  is  taken  absolutely 
for  granted ;  and  it  is  not  a  little  curious  to  notice  how  in 
the  Book  of  Job  the  substitution  for  it  of  "  an  immor- 
tality in  the  race  "  (although  there,  not  in  the  whole  of 
humanity,  but  simply  in  the  tribe  or  family)  is  offered, 
and  rejected  as  utterly  insufficient  to  satisfy  either  the 
speculation  of  the  intellect  or  the  moral  demands  of  the 
conscience. *  Now  is  it  not  worth  while  to  protest  against 
the  caricature  of  this  belief,  as  a  belief  in  "  man  plus  a 
hetereogeneous  entity  "  called  the  soul,  which  can  be  only 
intended  as  a  sarcasm.  But  we  cannot  acquiesce  in  any 
statement  which  represents  the  belief  in  this  immaterial 
and  indivisible  personality  as  resting  simply  on  the  no- 
tion that  it  is  needed  to  explain  the  acts  of  the  human 
organism.  For,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  those  who  believe  in 
it  conceive  it  to  be  declared  by  a  direct  consciousness,  the 
most  simple  and  ultimate  of  all  acts  of  consciousness. 
They  hold  this  consciousness  of  a  personal  identity  and 
individuality,  unchanging  amid  material  change,  to  be 
embodied  in  all  the  language  and  literature  of  man ;  and 
they  point  to  the  inconsistencies  in  the  very  words  of 
those  who  argue  against  it,  as  proofs  that  man  cannot 
divest  himself  of  it.  No  doubt  they  believe  that  so  the 
acts  of  the  organism  are  best  explained,  but  it  is  not  on  the 

i  See  Job,  xiv.  21,  22. 


THE  SOUL  AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  119 

necessity  of  such  explanation  that  they  base  their  belief, 
and  this  fact  separates  altogether  their  belief  in  the  human 
soul,  as  an  immaterial  entity,  from  those  conceptions  of 
a  soul,  in  animal,  vegetable,  or  even  inorganic  substances, 
with  which  Mr.  Harrison  insists  on  confounding  it.  Of 
the  true  character  of  animal  nature  we  know  nothing 
(although  we  may  conjecture  much),  just  because  we 
have  not  in  regard  to  it  the  direct  consciousness  which 
we  have  in  regard  to  our  own  nature.  •  Accordingly,  we 
need  not  trouble  our  argument  for  a  soul  in  man  with 
any  speculation  as  to  a  true  soul  in  the  brute  creatures. 

In  what  relation  this  personality  stands  to  the  particles 
which  at  any  moment  compose  the  body,  and  which  are 
certainly  in  a  continual  state  of  flux,  or  to  the  law  of 
structure  which  in  living  beings,  by  some  power  to  us  un- 
known, assimilates  these  particles,  is  a  totally  different 
question.  I  fear  that  Mr.  Harrison  will  be  displeased 
with  me  if  I  call  it  "  a  mystery."  But,  whatever  future 
advances  of  science  may  do  for  us  in  the  matter — and  I 
hope  they  may  do  much — I  am  afraid  I  must  still  say 
that  this  relation  is  a  mystery  which  has  been  at  differ- 
ent times  imperfectly  represented,  both  by  formal  theories 
and  by  metaphors,  all  of  which  by  the  very  nature  of 
language  are  connected  with  original  physical  conceptions. 
Let  it  be  granted  freely  that  the  progress  of  modern  phy- 
siological science  has  rendered  obsolete  the  old  idea  that 
the  various  organs  of  the  body  stand  to  the  true  personal 
being  in  a  purely  instrumental  relation,  such  as  (for 
example)  is  described  by  Butler  in  his  "  Analogy,"  in  the 


120  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

celebrated  chapter  on  "  The  Future  Life."     The  power  of 
physical   influences  acting  upon  the  body  to   affect  the 
energies  of  thought  and  will  is  unquestionable.     The  be- 
lief that  the  action  of  all  these  energies  is  associated  with 
the  molecular  change  is,  to  say  the  least,  highly  probable. 
And  I  may  remark  that  Christianity  has  no  quarrel  with 
these  discoveries  of  modern  science ;  for  its  doctrine  is  that 
for  the  perfection  of  man's  being  a  bodily  organization  is 
necessary,  and  that  the  "  intermediate  state  "  is  a  state  of 
suspense  and  imperfection,  out  of  which  at  the  word  of 
the   Creator,  the  indestructible  personality  of  man  shall 
rise,  to  assimilate   to  itself  a  glorified  body.     The  doc- 
trine of  the  resurrection  of  the  body  boldly  faces  the  per- 
plexity as  to  the  connection  of  a  body  with  personality, 
which  so  greatly  troubled  ancient  speculation  on  the  im- 
mortality of   the  soul.      In  respect  of  the  intermediate 
"  state,"  it  only  extends  (I  grant  immeasurably)  the  expe- 
rience of  those  suspensions  of  the  will  and  the  full  con- 
sciousness of  personality  which  we  have  in  life,  in  sleep, 
swoon,  stupor,  dependent  on  normal  and  abnormal  con- 
ditions of  the  bodily  organization ;  and  in  respect  of  the 
resurrection,  it  similarly  extends  the  action  of  that  mys- 
terious creative  will  which  moulds  the  human  body  of  the 
present  life  slowly  and  gradually  out  of  the  mere  germ, 
and  forms  with  marvellous  rapidity   and  exuberance  of 
prolific   power,  lower  organisms  of  high  perfection  and 
beauty. 

But  while  modern  science  teaches  us  to  recognize  the 
influence  of  the  'bodily  organization  on  mental  energy,  it 


THE   SOUL   AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  121 

has,  with  at  least  equal  clearness,  brought  out  in  compen- 
sation the  distinct  power  of  that  mental  energy,  acting 
by  a  process  wholly  different  from  the  chain  of  physical 
causation,  to  alter  functionally,  and  even  organically,  the 
bodily  frame  itself.  The  Platonic  Socrates  (it  will  be  re- 
membered) dwells  on  the  power  of  the  spirit  to  control 
bodily  appetite  and  even  passion  (TO  0v/xo€i8eY),  as  also  on 
its  having  the  power  to  assume  qualities,  as  a  proof  that 
it  is  more  appovia.  Surely  modern  science  has  greatly 
strengthened  the  former  part  of  his  argument,  by  these  dis- 
coveries of  the  power  of  mind  over  even  the  material 
of  the  body.  This  is  strikingly  illustrated  (for  exam- 
ple to  the  physician,  both  by  the  morbid  phenomena 
of  what  is  called  "  hysteria,"  in  which  the  belief  in  the 
existence  of  physical  disease  actually  produces  the  most 
remarkable  physical  effects  on  the  body ;  and  also  by 
the  more  natural  action  of  the  mind  on  the  body,  when 
in  sickness  a  resolution  to  get  well  masters  the  force 
of  disease,  or  a  desire  to  die  slowly  fulfils  itself.  Per- 
haps even  more  extraordinary  is  the  fact  (I  believe 
sufficiently  ascertained)  that  during  pregnancy  the  pre- 
sentation of  ideas  to  the  mind  of  the  mother  actually 
affects  the  physical  organization  of  the  offspring.  Hence 
I  cannot  but  think  that,  at  least  as  distinctly  as  ever,  our 
fuller  experience  discloses  to  us  two  different  processes  of 
causation  acting  upon  our  complex  humanity — the  one 
wholly  physical,  acting  sometimes  by  the  coarser  mechani- 
cal agencies,  sometimes  by  the  subtiler  physiological 
agencies,  and  in  both  cases  connecting  man  through  the 


122  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

I "  H 1  y  with  the  great  laws  ruling  the  physical  universe — 
the  other  wholly  metaphysical,  acting  by  the  simple  pre- 
sentation of  ideas  to  the  mind  (which  may,  indeed,  be  so 
purely  subjective  that  they  correspond  to  no  objective 
reality  whatever),  and  through  them,  secondarily  acting 
upon  the  body,  producing,  no  doubt,  the  molecular 
changes  in  the  brain  and  the  affections  of  the  nervous 
tissue  which  accompany  and  exhibit  mental  emotion. 
In  the  normal  condition  of  the  earthly  life,  these  two 
powers  act  and  react  upon  each  other,  neither  being  abso- 
lutely independent  of  the  other.  In  the  perfect  state  of 
the  hereafter  we  believe  that  it  shall  be  so  still.  But  we 
do  know  of  cases  in  which  the  metaphysical  power  is 
apparently  dormant  or  destroyed,  in  which  accordingly 
all  emotions  can  be  produced  automatically  by  physical 
processes  only,  as  happens  occasionally  in  dreams 
(whether  of  the  day  or  night),  and  in  morbid  conditions, 
as  of  idiocy,  which  may  themselves  be  produced  either  by 
physical  injury  or  by  mental  shock.  I  cannot  myself  see 
any  difficulty  in  conceiving  that  the  metaphysical  power 
might  act,  though  no  doubt  in  a  way  of  which  we  have 
no  present  experience,  and  (according  to  the  Christian 
doctrine)  in  a  condition  of  some  imperfection,  when  the 
bodily  organization  is  either  suspended  or  removed.  For 
to  me  it  seems  clear  that  there  is  something  existent, 
which  is  neither  material  nor  even  dependent  on  mate- 
rial organization.  Whether  it  be  stigmatized  as  a  "  hetero- 
geneous entity,"  or  graciously  designated  by  the  "  good 
old  word  soul,"  is  a  matter  of  great  indifference.  There, 


THE   SOUL   AND    FUTURE  LIFE. 

it  is ;  and  if  it  is,  I  cannot  see  why  it  is  inconceivable 
that  it  should  survive  all  material  change.  For  here,  as 
in  other  cases,  there  seems  to  be  a  frequent  confusion 
between  conceiving  that  a  thing  may  be,  and  conceiving 
how  it  may  be.  Of  course,  we  cannot  figure  to  ourselves 
the  method  of  the  action  of  a  spiritual  energy  apart  from 
a  bodily  organization  ;  in  the  attempt  to  do  so  the  mind 
glides  into  quasi-corporeal  conceptions  and  expressions, 
which  are  a  fair  mark  for  satire.  But  that  there  may  be  such 
action  is  to  me  far  less  inconceivable  than  that  the  mere 
fact  of  the  dissolution  of  what  is  purely  physical  should 
draw  with  it  the  destruction  of  a  soul  that  can  think,  love 
and  pray. 

I  do  not  think  it  necessary  to  dwell  at  any  length  on 
the  second  of  Mr.  Harrison's  propositions,  denouncing  the 
desire  of  personal  and  individual  existence  as  "  selfish- 
ness," with  a  vigour  quite  worthy  of  his  royal  Prussian 
model.  But  history,  after  all,  has  recognized  that  the 
poor  grenadiers  had  something  to  say  for  themselves. 
Mr.  Hutton  has  already  suggested  that,  if  Mr.  Harrison 
had  studied  the  Christian  conception  of  the  future  life, 
he  could  not  have  written  some  of  his  most  startling  pas- 
sages, and  has  protested  against  the  misapplication  of  the 
word  "  selfishness,"  which  in  this,  as  in  other  controver- 
sies, quietly  begs  the  question  proposed  for  discussion. 
The  fact  is,  that  this  theory  of  "  altruism,"  so  eloquently 
set  forth  by  Mr.  Harrison  and  others  of  his  school,  simply 
contradicts  human  nature,  not  in  its  weaknesses  or  sins,  but 
in  its  essential  characteristics.  It  is  certainly  not  the 


124  A   Mt)DERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

weakest  or  ignoblest  of  human  souls  who  have  felt,  at  the 
times  of  deepest  thought  and  feeling,  conscious  of  but 
two  existences — their  own  and  the  Supreme  Existence, 
whether  they  call  it  Nature,  Law  or  God.  Surely^  this 
humanity  is  a  very  unworthy  deity,  at  once  a  vague  and 
shadowy  abstraction,  and  so  far  as  it  can  be  distinctly 
conceived,  like  some  many-headed  idol,  magnifying  the 
evil  and  hideousness  as  well  as  the  good  and  beauty  of  the 
individual  nature.  But  if  it  were  not  so  still  that  indivi- 
duality, as  well  as  unity,  is  the  law  of  human  nature,  is 
singularly  indicated  by  the  very  nature  of  our  mental 
operations.  In  the  study  and  perception  of  truth,  each 
man,  though  he  may  be  guided  to  it  by  others,  stands 
absolutely  alone;  in  love,  on  the  other  hand,  he 
loses  all  but  the  sense  of  unity ;  while  the  conscience 
holds  the  balance,  recognizing  at  once  individuality  and 
unity.  Indeed,  the  sacredness  of  individuality  is  so 
guarded  by  the  darkness  which  hides  each  soul  from  all 
perfect  knowledge  of  man,  so  deeply  impressed  on  the 
mind  by  the  consciousness  of  independent  thought  and 
will,  and  on  the  soul  by  the  sense  of  incommunicable 
responsibility,  that  it  cannot  merge  itself  in  the  life  of 
the  race.  Self-sacrifice  or  unselfishness  is  the  conscious 
sacrifice,  not  of  our  own  individuality,  but  of  that  which 
seems  to  minister  to  it,  for  the  sake  of  others.  The  law 
of  human  nature,  moreover,  is  such  that  the  very  attempt 
at  such  sacrifice  inevitably  strengthens  the  spiritual  indi- 
viduality in  all  that  makes  it  worth  having.  To  talk  of 
"  a  perpetuity  of  sensation  as  a  true  hell  "  in  a  being  sup- 


THE   SOUL  AND   FUTURE  LIFE.  125 

posed  capable  of  indefinite  growth  in  wisdom,  righteous- 
ness, and  love,  is  surely  to  use  words  which  have  no  intel- 
ligible meaning. 

No  doubt,  if  we  are  to  take  as  our  guiding  principle 
either  altruism  or  what  is  rightly  designated  "  selfish- 
ness," we  must  infinitely  prefer  the  former.  But  where 
is  the  necessity  ?  No  doubt  the  task  of  harmonizing  the 
two  is  difficult.  But  all  things  worth  doing  are  difficult ; 
and  it  might  be  worth  while  to  consider  whether  there  is 
not  something  in  the  old  belief  which  finds  the  key  to 
this  difficult  problem  in  the  consciousness  of  the  relation 
to  One  Supreme  Being,  and,  recognizing  both  the  love  of 
man  and  the  love  of  self,  bids  them  both  agree  in  conscious 
subordination  to  a  higher'  love  of  God.  What  makes  our 
life  here  will,  we  believe,  make  it  up  hereafter,  only  in  a 
purer  and  nobler  form.  On  earth  we  live  at  once  in  our 
own  individuality  and  in  the  life  of  others.  Our  heaven  is 
not  the  extinction  of  either  element  of  that  life — either 
of  individuality,  as  Mr.  Harrison  would  have  it,  or  of  the 
life  in  others,  as  in  that  idea  of  a  selfish  immortality 
which  he  has,  I  think,  set  up  in  order  to  denounce  it — 
but  the  continued  harmony  of  both  under  an  infinitely 
increased  power  of  that  supreme  principle. 


126  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 


MR.  W.  R.  GREG. 

IT  would  seem  impossible  for  Mr.  Harrison  to  write 
anything  that  is  not  stamped  with  a  vigour  and  racy 
eloquence  peculiarly  his  own ;  and  the  paper  which  has 
opened  the  present  discussion  is  probably  far  the  finest 
he  has  given  to  the  world.  There  is  a  lofty  tone  in  its 
imaginative  passages  which  strikes  us  as  unique  among 
negationists,  and  a  vein  of  what  is  almost  tenderness  per- 
vading them,  which  was  not  observed  in  his  previous 
writings.  The  two  combined  render  the  second  portion 
one  of  the  most  touching  and  impressive  speculations  we 
have  read.  Unfortunately,  however,  Mr.  Harrison's  in- 
nate energy  is  apt  to  boil  over  into  a  vehemence  approach- 
ing the  intemperate  ;  and  the  antagonistic  atmosphere  is 
so  native  to  his  spirit  that  he  can  scarcely  enter  the  lists 
of  controversy  without  an  irresistible  tendency  to  become 
aggressive  and  unjust ;  and  he  is  too  inclined  to  forget 
the  first  duty  of  the  chivalric  militant  logician — namely, 
to  select  the  adversary  you  assail  from  the  nobler  and 
not  the  lower  form  and  rank  of  the  doctrine  in  dispute. 
The  inconsistencies  and  weaknesses  into  which  this  ne- 
glect has  betrayed  him  in  the  instance  before  us  have, 
however,  been  so  severely  dealt  with  by  Mr.  Hutton  and 
Prof.  Huxley,  that  I  wish  rather  to  direct  attention  to 
two  or  three  points  of  his  argument  that  might  otherwise 
be  in  danger  of  escaping  the  appreciation  and  gratitude 
they  may  fairly  claim. 


THE   SOUL  AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  127 

We  owe  him  something,  it  appears  to  me,  for  having 
inaugurated  a  discussion  which  has  stirred  so  many  minds 
to  give  us  on  such  a  question  so  much  interesting  and 
profound,  and  more  especially  so  much  suggestive, 
thought.  We  owe  him  much,  too,  because,  in  dealing 
with  a  thesis  which  it  is  specially  the  temptation  and  the 
practice  to  handle  as  a  theme  for  declamation,  he  has  so 
written  as  to  force  his  antagonists  to  treat  it  argumenta- 
tively  and  searchingly  as  well.  Some  gratitude,  more- 
over, is  due  to  the  man  who  had  the  moral  courage 
boldly  to  avow  his  adhesion  to  the  negative  view  when 
that  view  is  not  only  in  the  highest  degree  unpopular, 
but  is  regarded  for  the  most  part  as  condemnable  into  the 
bargain,  and  when,  besides,  it  can  scarcely  fail  to  be  pain- 
ful to  every  man  of  vivid  imagination  and  of  strong  af- 
fections. It  is  to  his  credit  also,  I  venture  to  think,  that, 
holding  this  view,  he  has  put  it  forward,  not  as  an 
opinion  or  speculation,  but  as  a  settled  and  deliberate  con- 
viction, maintainable  by  distinct  and  reputable  reason- 
ings, and  to  be  controverted  only  by  pleas  analogous  in 
character.  For  if  there  be  a  topic  within  the  wide  range 
of  human  questioning  in  reference  to  which  tampering 
with  mental  integrity  might  seem  at  first  sight  pardon- 
able, it  is  that  of  a  future  and  continued  existence.  If 
belief  be  ever  permissible — perhaps  I  ought  to  say,  if  be- 
lief be  ever  possible — on  the  ground  that  "  there  is  peace 
and  joy  in  believing,"  it  is  here,  where  the  issues  are  so 
vast,  where  the  conception  in  its  highest  form  is  so  enno 
bling,  where  the  practical  influences  of  the  Creed  are,  in 


128  A    MODERN    SYMPOSIUM. 

appearance  at  least,  so  beneficent.  But  faith  thus  arrived 
at  has  ever  clinging  to  it  the  curse  belonging  to  all  ille- 
gitimate possessions.  It  is  precarious,  because  the  flaw 
in  its  title-deeds,  barely  suspected  perhaps  and  never 
acknowledged,  may  any  moment  be  discovered;  misgivings 
crop  up  most  surely  in  those  hard  and  gloomy  crises  of 
our  lives  when  unflinching  confidence  is  most  essential  to 
our  peace ;  and  the  fairy  fabric,  built  up  not  on  grounded 
conviction  but  on  craving  need,  crumbles  into  dust,  and 
leaves  the  spirit  with  no  solid  sustenance  to  rest  upon. 

Unconsciously,  and  by  implication,  Mr.  Harrison  bears 
a  testimony  he  little  intended,  not,  indeed,  to  the  future 
existence  he  denies,  but  to  the  irresistible  longing  and  ne- 
cessity for  the  very  belief  he  labours  to  destroy.  Perhaps 
no  writer  has  more  undesignedly  betrayed  his  conviction 
that  men  will  not  and  cannot  be  expected  to  surrender 
their  faith  and  hope  without  at  least  something  like  a 
compensation  ;  certainly  no  one  has  ever  toiled  with  more 
noble  rhetoric  to  gild  and  illuminate  the  substitute  with 
which  he  would  fain  persuade  us  to  rest  satisfied.  The 
nearly  universal  craving  for  posthumous  existence  and 
enduring  consciousness,  which  he  depreciates  with  so 
harsh  a  scorn,  and  which  he  will  not  accept  as  offering 
even  the  shadow  or  simulacrum  of  an  argument  for  the 
Creed,  he  yet  respects  enough  to  recognize  that  it  has  its 
foundation  deep  in  the  framework  of  our  being,  that  it 
cannot  be  silenced,  and  may  not  be  ignored.  Having  no 
precious  metal  to  pay  it  with,  he  issues  paper-money  in- 
stead, skilfully  engraved  and  gorgeously  gilded  to  look 


THE  SOUL   AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  129 

as  like  the  real  coin  as  may  be.  It  is  in  vain  to  deny 
that  there  is  something  touching  and  elevating  in  the 
glowing  eloquence  with  which  he  paints  the  picture  of 
lives  devoted  to  efforts  in  the  service  of  the  race,  spent  in 
labouring,  each  of  us  in  his  own  sphere,  to  bring  about 
the  grand  ideal  he  fancies  for  humanity,  and  drawing 
strength  and  reward  for  long  years  of  toil  in  the  antici- 
pation of  what  man  will  be  when  those  noble  dreams 
shall  have  been  realized  at  last — even  though  we  shall 
never  see  what  we  have  wrought  so  hard  to  win.  It  is 
vain  to  deny,  moreover,  that  these  dreams  appear  more 
solid  and  less  wild  or  vague  when  we  remember  how  close 
an  analogy  we  may  detect  in  the  labours  of  thousands 
around  us  who  spend  their  whole  career  on  earth  in 
building  up,  by  sacrifice  and  painful  struggles,  wealth, 
station,  fame,  and  character,  for  their  children,  whose  en- 
joyment of  these  possessions  they  will  never  live  to  wit- 
ness, without  their  passionate  zeal  in  the  pursuit  being 
in  any  way  cooled  by  the  discouraging  reflection.  Does 
not  this  oblige  us  to  confess  that  the  posthumous  exis- 
tence Mr.  Harrison  describes  is  not  altogether  an  airy  fic- 
tion ?  Still,  somehow,  after  a  few  moments  spent  in  the 
thin  atmosphere  into  which  his  brilliant  language  and 
unselfish  imagination  have  combined  to  raise  us,  we — 
ninety-nine  out  of  every  hundred  of  us  at  the  least — sink 
back  breathless  and  wearied  after  the  unaccustomed  soar- 
ing amid  light  so  dim,  and  craving,  as  of  yore,  after  some- 
thing more  personal,  more  solid,  and  more  certain. 

To  that  more  solid  certainty  I  am  obliged  to  confess, 
9 


130  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

sorrowfully  and  with  bitter  .disappointment,  that  I  can 
contribute  nothing — nothing,  I  mean,  that  resembles  evi- 
dence, that  can  properly  be  called  argument,  or  that  I 
can  hope  will  be  received  as  even  the  barest  confirmation. 
Alas  !  can  the  wisest  and  most  sanguine  of  us  all  bring 
anything  beyond  our  own  personal  sentiments  to  swell 
the  common  hope  ?     We  have  aspirations  to  multipty, 
but  who  has  any  knowledge  to  enrich  our  store  ?     I  have 
of  course  read  most  of  the  pleadings  in  favour  of  the  or- 
dinary doctrine  of  the  future  state ;   naturally  also,  in 
common  with  all  grayer  natures,   I  have   meditated  yet 
more  ;    but  these  pleadings,  for  the  most  part,  sound  to 
anxious  ears  little  else  than  the  passionate  outcries  of 
souls  that  cannot  endure  to  part  with  hopes  on  which  they 
have  been  nurtured,  and  which  are  entertwined  with  their 
tenderest  affections.    Logical  reasons  to  compel  conviction, 
I  have  met  with  none — even  from  the  interlocutors  in 
this   actual  Symposium.     Yet  few  can  have  sought  for 
such  more  yearningly.     I  may  say  I  share  in  the  antici- 
pations of  believers;    but   I   share  them   as  aspirations, 
sometimes  approaching  almost  to  a  faith,  occasionally,  and 
for  a  few  moments,  perhaps  rising  into  something  like  a 
trust,  but  never  able  to  settle  into  the  consistency  of  a 
definite  and  enduring  creed.     I  do  not  know  how  far  even 
this  incomplete  state  of  mind  may  not  be  merely  the  resi- 
duum of  early  upbringing  and  habitual  associations.    But 
I  must  be  true  to  my  darkness  as  courageously  as  to  my 
light.     I  cannot  rest  in  comfort  on  arguments  that  to  my 
spirit  have  no  cogency,  nor  can  I  pretend  to  respect  or  be 


THE  SOUL   AND   FUTURE  LIFE.  131 

content  with  reasons  which  carry  no  penetrating  convic- 
tion along  with  them.  I  will  not  make  buttresses  do  the 
work  or  assume  the  posture  of  foundations.  I  will  not 
cry  "  Peace,  peace,  when  there  is  no  peace."  I  have  said 
elsewhere,  and  at  various  epochs  of  life,  why  the  ordinary 
"  proofs  "  confidently  put  forward  and  gorgeously  arrayed 
"  have  no  help  in  them;  "  while,  nevertheless,  the  pictures 
which  imagination  depicts  are  so  inexpressibly  alluring. 
The  more  I  think  and  question,  the  more  do  doubts  and 
difficulties  crowd  around  my  horizon,  and  cloud  over  my 
sky.  Thus  it  is  that  I  am  unable  to  bring  aid  or  sustain- 
ment  to  minds  as  troubled  as  my  own,  and  perhaps  less 
willing  to  admit  that  the  great  enigma  is,  and  must  remain, 
insoluble.  Of  two  things,  however,  I  feel  satisfied — that 
the  negative  doctrine  is  no  more  susceptible  of  proof  than 
the  affirmative,  and  that  our  opinion,  be  it  only  honest 
can  have  no  influence  whatever  on  the  issue,  nor  upon  its 
bearing  on  ourselves. 

Two  considerations  that  have  been  borne  in  upon  my 
mind  while  following  this  controversy  may  be  worth  men- 
tioning, though  neither  can  be  called  exactly  helpful.  One 
is,  that  we  find  the  most  confident,  unquestioning,  dog- 
matic belief  in  heaven  (and  its  correlative)  in  those  whose 
heaven  is  the  most  unlikely  and  impossible,  the  most  en- 
tirely made  up  of  mundane  and  material  elements,  of  gor- 
geous glories  and  of  fading  splendours1 — just  such  things 

1  "  There  may  be  crowns  of  material  splendour,  there  may  be  trees  of  un- 
fading loveliness,  there  may  be  pavements  of  emerald,  and  canopies  of  the 
brightest  radiance,  and  gardens  of  deep  and  tranquil  security,  and  palaces 


132  A   MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

as  uncultured  and  undisciplined  natures  most  envied  or 
pined  after  on  earth,  such  as  the  lower  order  of  minds 
could  best  picture  and  would  naturally  be  most  dazzled 
by.  The  higher  intelligences  of  our  race,  who  need  a 
spiritual  heaven,  find  their  imaginations  fettered  by  the 
scientific  training  which,  imperfect  though  it  be,  clips 
their  wings  in  all  directions,  forbids  their  glowing  fancy, 
and  annuls  that  gorgeous  creation,  and  bars  the  way  to 
each  successive  local  habitation  that  is  instinctively  want- 
ed to  give  reality  to  the  ideal  they  aspire  to  ;  till,  in  the 
effort  to  franie  a  future  existence  without  a  future  world, 
to  build  up  a  state  of  being  that  shall  be  worthy  of  its 
denizens,  and  from  which  everything  material  shall  be  ex- 
cluded, they  at  last  discover  that  in  renouncing  the  "  phy- 
sical "  and  inadmissible  they  have  been  forced  to  renounce 
the  "  conceivable  "  as  well ;  and  a  dimness  and  fluctuating 
uncertainty  gathers  round  a  scene  from  which  all  that  is 
concrete  and  definable,  and  would  therefore  be  incongru- 
ous, has  been  shut  out.  The  next  world  cannot,  it  is  felt, 
be  a  material  one ;  and  a  truly  "  spiritual  "  one  even  the 
saint  cannot  conceive  so  as  to  bring  it  home  to  natures 
still  shrouded  in  the  garments  of  the  flesh. 

The  other  suggestion  that  has  occurred  to  me  is  this 

of  proud  and  stately  decoration  and  a  city  of  lofty  pinnacles,  through  which 
there  unceasingly  flows  a  river  of  gladness,  and  where  jubilee  is  ever  sung  by 
a  concord  of  seraphic  voices.  "—Dr.  Chalmers  Sermons. 

"  Poor  fragments  all  of  this  low  earth- 
Such  as  in  dreams  could  hardly  soothe 
A  soul  that  once  had  tasted  of  immortal  truth." 

Christian  Year. 


THE  SOUL   AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  133 

It  must  be  conceded  that  the  doctrine  of  a  future  life  is 
by  no  means  as  universally  diffused  as  it  is  the  habit 
loosely  to  assert.  It  is  not  always  discoverable  among 
primitive  and  savage  races.  It  existed  among  pagan  na- 
tions in  a  form  so  vague  and  hazy  as  to  be  describable 
rather  as  a  dream  than  a  religious  faith.  It  can  scarcely 
be  determined  whether  the  Chinese,  whose  cultivation  is 
perhaps  the  most  ancient  existing  in  the  world,  can  be 
ranked  among  distinct  believers  ;  while  the  conception  of 
Nirvana,  which  prevails  in  the  meditative  minds  of  other 
Orientals,  is  more  a  sort  of  conscious  non-existence  than  a 
future  life.  With  the  Jews,  moreover,  as  is  well  known, 
the  belief  was  not  indigenous,  but  imported,  and  by  no 
means  an  early  importation.  But  what  is  not  so  generally 
recognized  is  that,  even  among  ourselves  in  these  days,  the 
convictio|i  of  thoughtful  natures  varies  curiously  in  strength 
and  in  features  at  different  periods  of  life.  In  youth, 
when  all  our  sentiments  are  most  vivacious  and  dogmatic, 
most  of  us  not  only  cling  to  it  as  an  intellectual  creed,  but 
are  accustomed  to  say  and  feel  that,  without  it  as  a  solace 
and  a  hope  to  rest  upon,  this  world  would  be  stripped  of 
its  deepest  fascinations.  It  is  from  minds  of  this  age, 
whose  vigour  is  unimpaired  and  whose  relish  for  the  joys 
of  earth  is  most  expansive,  that  the  most  glowing  deline- 
ations of  heaven  usually  proceed,  and  on  whom  the  thirst 
for  felicity  and  knowledge,  which  can  be  slaked  at  no 
earthly  fountains,  has  the  most  exciting  power.  Then 
comes  the  busy  turmoil  of  our  mid-career,  when  the  pres- 
ent curtains  off  the  future  from  our  thoughts,  and  when  a 


134  A  MODEKN  SYMPOSIUM. 

renewed  existence  in  a  different  scene  is  recalled  to  our 
fancy  chiefly  in  crises  of  bereavement.  And,  finally,  is  it 
not  the  case  that  in  our  fading  years — when  something  of 
the  languor  and  placidity  of  age  is  creeping  over  us,  just 
when  futurity  is  coming  consciously  and  rapidly  more 
near,  and  when  one  might  naturally  expect  it  to  occupy 
us  more  incessantly  and  with  more  anxious  and  searching 
glances — we  think  of  it  less  frequently,  believe  in  it  less 
confidently,  desire  it  less  eagerly,  than  in  our  youth  ? 
Such,  at  least,  has  been  my  observation  and  experience, 
especially  among  the  more  reflective  and  inquiring  order 
of  men.  The  life  of  the  hour  absorbs  us  most  completely* 
as  the  hours  grow  fewer  and  less  full ;  the  pleasures,  the 
exemptions,  the  modest  interests,  the  afternoon  peace,  the 
gentle  affections,  of  the  present  scene,  obscure  the 
future  from  our  view,  and  render  it,  curiously  enough, 
even  less  interesting  than  the  past.  To-day,  which  may 
be  our  last,  engrosses  us  far  more  than  to-morrow,  which 
may  be  our  FOREVER;  and  the  grave  into  which  we  are  just 
stepping  down  troubles  us  far  less  than  in  youth,  when 
half  a  century  lay  between  us  and  it. 

What  is  the  explanation  of  this  strange  phenomenon  ? 
Is  it  a  merciful  dispensation  arranged  by  the  Ruler  of  our 
life  to  soften  and  to  ease  a  crisis  which  would  be  too  grand 
and  awful  to  be  faced  with  dignity  or  calm,  if  it  were 
actually  realized  at  all  ?  Is  it  that  thought — or  that  vague 
substitute  for  thought  which  we  call  time — has  brought 
us,  half  unconsciously,  to  the  conclusion  that  the  whole 
question  is  insoluble,  and  that  reflection  is  wasted  where 


THE   SOUL  AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  135 

reflection  can  bring  us  no  nearer  to  an  issue  ?     Or,  finally, 
as  I  know  is  true  far  oftener  than  we  fancy,  is  it  that  three- 
score years  and  ten  have  quenched  the  passionate  desire 
for  life  with  which  at  first  we  stepped  upon  the  scene  ?  We 
are  tired,  some  of  us,  with  unending  and  unprofitable  toil  ; 
we  are  satiated,  others  of  us,  with  such  ample  pleasures  as 
earth  can  yield  us;  we  have  had  enough  of  ambition,  alike  in 
its  successes  and  its  failures;  the  joys  and  blessings  of  hu- 
man affection  on  which,  whatever  their  crises  and  vicissi- 
tudes, no  righteous  or  truthful   man  will  cast  a  slur,  are 
yet  so  blended  with  pains  which  partake  of  their  intensity  ; 
the  thirst  for  knowledge  is  not  slaked,  indeed,  but  the 
capacity  for  the  labour  by  which  alone  it  can  be  gained 
has  consciously  died  out ;  the  appetite  for  life,  in  short,  is 
gone,  the  frame  is  worn  and  the  faculties  exhausted  ;  and 
— possibly  this  is  the  key  to  the  phenomenon  we  are  ex- 
amining— age  CANNOT,  from  the  ve*ry  law  of  its  nature, 
conceiveitself  endowed  with  the  bounding  energies  of  youth, 
and  without  that  vigour,  both  of  exertion  and  desire,  re- 
newed existence  can  offer  no  inspiring  charms.  .  Our  being 
upon  earth  has  been  enriched  by  vivid  interests  and  rm>- 
cious  joys,  and  we  are  deeply  grateful  for  the  gift ;  but 
we  are  wearied  with  one  life,  and  feel  scarcely  qualified 
to  enter  on  the  claims,  even  though  balanced  by  the  felici- 
ties and  glories,  of  another.     It  may  be  the  fatigue  which 
comes  with  age — fatigue  of  the  fancy  as  well  as  of  the 
frame  ;  but,  somehow,  what  we  yearn  for  most  instinctive- 
ly at  last  is  rest,  and  the  peace  which  we  can  imagine  the 
easiest  because  we  know  it  best  is  that  of  sleep. 


136  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 


REV.  BALDWIN  BROWN. 

^  I  ^  HE  theologians  appear  to  have  fallen  upon  evil  days. 
Like  some  of  old, they  are  filled  with  rebuke  from  all 
sides.  They  are  bidden  to  be  silent,  for  their  day  is  over. 
But  some  things,  like  nature,  are  hard  to  get  rid  of.  Expelled, 
they  "  recur  "  swiftly.  Foremost  among  these  is  theology. 
It  seems  as  if  nothing  could  long  restrain  man  from  this, 
the  loftiest  exercise  of  his  powers.  The  theologians  and 
the  Comtists  have  met  in  the  sense  which  Mr.  Huxley 
justly  indicates  ;  he  is  himself  working  at  the  foundations 
of  a  larger,  nobler,  and  more  complete  theology.  But,  for 
the  present,  theology  suffers  affliction,  and  the  theologians 
have  in  no  small  measure  themselves  to  thank  for  it.  The 
protest  rises  from  all  sides,  clear  and  strong,  a-gainst  the 
narrow,  formal,  and  in  these  last  days,  selfish  system  of 
thought  and  expectation,  which  they  have  presented  as 
their  kingdom  of  heaven  to  the  world. 

I  never  read  Mr.  Harrison's  brilliant  essays,  full  as  they 
always  are  of  high  aspiration  and  of  stimulus  to  noble  en- 
deavour, without  finding  the  judgment  which  I  cannot  but 
pass  in  my  own  mind  on  his  unbeliefs  and  denials,  largely 
tempered  by  thankfulness.  I  rejoice  in  the  passionate 
earnestness  with  which  he  lifts  the  hearts  of  his  readers 
to  ideals  which  it  seems  to  me  that  Christianity — that 
Christianity  which  as  a  living  force  in  the  apostles'  days 
turned  the  world  upside  down,  that  is,  right  side  up,  with 
ts  face  toward  heaven  and  God — alone  can  realize  fqr 
man. 


THE   SOUL   AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  137 

I  recall  a  noble  passage  written  by  Mr.  Harrison  some 
years  ago  :  "  A  religion  of  action,  a  religion  of  social  duty 
devotion  to  an  intelligible  and  sensible  Head,  a  real  sense 
of  incorporation  with  a  living  and  controlling  force,  the 
deliberate  effort  to  serve  an  immortal  Humanity  —  this, 
and  this  alone,  can  absorb  the  musings  and  the  cravings 
of  the  spiritual  man."1  It  seems  to  me  that  it  would  be 
difficult  for  any  one  to  set  forth  in  more  weighty  and  elo- 
quent words  the  kind  of  object  which  Christianity  pro- 
poses, and  the  kind  of  help  toward  the  attainment  of  the 
object  which  the  Incarnation  affords.  And  in  the  matter 
now  under  debate,  behind  the  stern  denunciation  of  the 
selfish  striving  toward  a  personal  immortality  which  Mr. 
Harrison  utters  with  his  accustomed  force,  there  seems  to 
lie  not  only  a  yearning  for,  but  a  definite  vision  of,  an  im- 
mortality which  shall  not  be  selfish,  but  largely  fruitful 
to  public  good.  It  is  true  that,  as  has  been  forcibly 
pointed  out,  the  form  which  it  wears  is  utterly  vain  and 
illusory,  and  wholly  incapable,  one  would  think,  of  ac- 
counting for  the  enthusiastic  eagerness  with  which  it  ap- 
pears to  be  sought.  May  not  the  eagerness  be  really 
kindled  by  a  larger  and  more  far-reaching  vision  —  the 
Christian  vision,  which  has  become  obscured  to  so  many 
faithful  servants  of  duty  by  the  selfishness  and  vanity 
with  which  much  that  goes  by  the  name  of  the  Christian 
life  in  these  days  has  enveloped  it  ;  but  which  has  not 
ceased  and  will  not  cease,  in  ways  which  even  conscious- 


,  vol.  xii..  p.  r,-j<» 


138  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

ness  cannot  always  trace,   to  cast  its  spell   on  human 
hearts  ? 

Mr.  Harrison  seems  to  start  in  his  argument  with  the 
conviction  that  there  is  a  certain  baseness  in  this  longing 
for  immortality,  and  he  falls  on  the  belief  with  a  fierce- 
ness which  the  sense  of  its  baseness  alone  could  justify. 
But  surely  he  must  stamp  much  more  with  the  same 
brand.  Each  day's  struggle  to  live  is  a  bit  of  the  base- 
ness, and  there  seems  to  be  no  answer  to  Mr.  Button's  re- 
mark that  the  truly  unselfish  action  under  such  conditions 
would  be  suicide.  But,  at  any  rate,  it  is  clear  from  his- 
tory that  the  men  who  formulated  the  doctrine  and  per- 
fected the  art  of  suicide  in  the  early  days  of  imperial 
Rome  belonged  to  the  most  basely  selfish  and  heartless 
generation  that  has  ever  cumbered  this  sorrowful  world. 
The  love  of  life  is,  on  the  whole,  a  noble  thing,  for  the 
staple  of  life  is  duty.  The  more  I  see  of  classes  in  which, 
at  first  sight,  selfishness  seems  to  reign,  the  more  am  I 
struck  with  the  measure  in  which  duty,  thought  for  others, 
and  work  for  others,  enters  into  their  lives.  The  desire 
to  live  on,  to  those  who  catch  the  Christian  idea,  and 
would  follow  him  who  "  came,  not  to  be  ministered  unto, 
but  to  minister,"  is  a  desire  to  work  on,  and  by  living  to 
bless  more  richly  a  larger  circle  in  a  wider  world. 

I  can  even  cherish  some  thankfulness  for  the  fling  at 
the  eternity  of  the  tabor,  in  which  Mr.  Harrison  indulges 
and  which  draws  on  him  a  rebuke  from  his  critics  the 
severity  of  which  one  can  also  well  understand.  It  is  a 
Jast  fling  at  the  Iwiis  perennis,  which  once  seemed  so  beau- 


THE   SOUL   AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  139 

tiful  to  monastic  hearts,  and  which,  looked  at  ideally,  to 
those  who  can  enter  into  Mr.  Hutton's  lofty  view  of  ado- 
ration, means  all  that  he  describes.  But  practically  it 
was  a  very  poor,  narrow,  mechanical  thing ;  and  base 
even  when  it  represented,  as  it  did  to  multitudes,  the 
loftiest  form  of  a  soul's  activity  in  such  a  sad,  suffering 
world  as  this.  I,  for  one,  can  understand,  though  I  could 
not  utter,  the  anathema  which  follows  it  as  it  vanishes 
from  sight.  And  it  bears  closely  on  the  matter  in  hand. 
It  is  no  dead,  mediaeval  idea.  It  tinctures  strongly  the 
popular  religious  notions  of  heaven.  The  favourite  hymns 
of  the  evangelical  school  are  set  in  the  same  key.  There 
is  an  easy,  self-satisfied,  self-indulgent  temper  in  the 
popular  way  of  thinking  and  praying,  and  above  all  of 
singing,  about  heaven,  which,  sternly  as  the  singers  would 
denounce  the  cloister,  is  really  caught  from  the  monastic 
choir.  There  is  a  very  favourite  verse  which  runs  thus : 

' '  There,  on  a  green  and  .flowery  mount, 

Our  weary  souls  shall  sit, 
And  with  transporting  joys  recount 
The  labours  of  our  feet."1 

It  is  a  fair  sample  of  the  staple  of  much  pious  forecast- 
ing of  the  occupations  and  enjoyments  of  heaven.  I  can- 
not but  welcome  very  heartily  any  such  shock  as  Mr. 
Harrison  administers  to  this  restful  and  self-centred 
vision  of  immortality.  Should  he  find  himself  at  last  en- 

1  Mr.  Martin's  picture  of  "  The  Plains  of  Heaven"  exactly  presents  it. 
and  it  is  a  picture  greatly  admired  in  the  circles  of  which  we  speak. 


140  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

dowed  with  the  inheritance  which  he  refuses,  and  be 
thrown  in  the  way  of  these  souls  mooning  on  the  mount* 
it  is  evident  that  he  would  feel  tempted  to  give  them  a 
vigorous  shake,  and  to  set  them  with  some  stinging  words 
about  some  good  work  for  God  and  for  their  world.  And 
as  many  of  us  want  the  shaking  now  badly  enough,  I  can 
thank  him  for  it,  although  it  is  administered  by  an  over- 
rough  and  contemptuous  hand. 

I  feel  some  hearty  sympathy,  too,  with  much  which  he 
says  about  the  unity  of  the  man.  The  passage  to  which 
I  refer  commences  with  the  words  "The  philosophy 
which  treats  man  as  man  simply  affirms  that  man  loves, 
thinks,  acts,  not  that  the  ganglia,  the  senses,  or  any 
organ  of  man,  loves,  thinks,  and  acts." 

So  far  as  Mr.  Harrison's  language  and  line  of  thought 
are  a  protest  against  the  vague,  bloodless,  bodiless  notion 
of  the  life  of  the  future,  which  has  more  affinity  with 
Hades  than  with  Heaven,  I  heartily  thank  him  for  it. 
Man  is  an  embodied  spirit,  and  wherever  his  lot  is  cast  he 
will  need  and  will  have  the  means  of  a  spirit's  manifesta- 
tion to  and  action  on  its  surrounding  world.  But  this  is 
precisely  what  is  substantiated  by  the  resurrection.  The 
priceless  value  of  the  truth  of  the  resurrection  lies  in  the 
close  interlacing  and  interlocking  of  the  two  worlds  which 
it  reveals.  It  is  the  life  which  is  lived  here,  the  life  of 
the  embodied  spirit,  which  is  carried  through  the  veil  and 
lived  there.  The  wonderful  powers  of  the  gospel  of 
"  Jesus  and  the  resurrection  "  lay  in  the  homely  human 
interest  which  it  lent  to  the  life  of  the  immortals.  The. 


THE   SOUL   AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  141 

risen  Lord  took  up  life  just  where  he  left  it.  The  things 
which  he  had  taught  His  disciples  to  care  about  here,  were 
the  things  which  those  who  had  passed  on  were  caring 
about  there,  the  reign  of  truth,  righteousness  and  love.  I 
hold  to  the  truth  of  the  resurrection,  not  only  because  it 
appears  to  be  firmly  established  on  the  most  valid  testi- 
mony, but  because  it  alone  seems  to  explain  man's  consti- 
tution as  a  spirit  embodied  in  flesh  which  he  is  sorely 
tempted  to  curse  as  a  clog.  It  furnishes  to  man  the  key 
to  the  mystery  of  the  flesh  on  the  one  hand,  while  on  the 
other  it  justifies  his  aspiration  and  realizes  his  hope. 

Belief  in  the  risen  and  reigning  Christ  was  at  the  heart 
of  that  wonderful  uprising  and  outburst  of  human  energy 
which  marked  the  age  of  the  Advent.  The  contrast  is 
most  striking  between  the  sad  and  even  despairing  tone 
which  breathes  through  the  noblest  heathen  literature 
which  utters  perhaps  its  deepest  wail  in  the  cry  of  Epic- 
tetus,  "  Show  me  a  Stoic — by  Heaven,  I  long  to  see  a 
Stoic !  "  and  the  sense  of  victorious  power,  of  buoyant,  ex- 
ulting hope,  which  breathes  through  the  word  and  shines 
from  the  life  of  the  infant  Church :  "  As  dying,  and  be- 
hold we  live;  as  sorrowful,  yet  always  rejoicing;  as  poor, 
yet  making  many  rich  ;  as  having  nothing,  and  yet  pos- 
sessing all  things."  The  Gospel  which  brought  life  and 
immortality  to  light  won  its  way  just  as  dawn  wins  its 
way,  when  "  jocund  day  stands  tiptoe  on  the  misty  moun- 
tain-tops," and  flashes  his  rays  over  a  sleeping  world. 
Everywhere  the  radiance  penetrates ;  it  shines  into  every 
nook  of  shade ;  and  all  living  creatures  stir,  awake,  and 


142  A   MODERN    SYMPOSIUM. 

come  forth  to  bask  in  its  beams.  Just  thus  the  flood  of 
kindling  light  streamed  forth  from  the  resurrection,  and 
spread  like  the  dawn  in  the  morning  sky  ;  it  touched  all 
forms  of  things  in  a  dark,  sad  world  with  its  splendour 
and  called  man  forth  from  the  tomb  in  which  his  higher 
life  seemed  to  be  buried,  to  a  new  career  of  fruitful,  sun- 
lit activity  ;  even  as  the  Saviour  prophesied,  "  The  hour 
is  coming,  and  now  is,  when  the  dead  shall  hear  the  voice 
of  the  Son  of  God,  and  they  that  hear  shall  live." 

The  exceeding  readiness  and  joyfulness  with  which  the 
truth  was  welcomed,  and  the  measure  in  which  Christen- 
dom— and  that  means  all  that  is  most  powerful  and  pro- 
gressive in  human  society — has  been  moulded  by  it,  are 
the  most  notable  facts  of  history.  Be  it  truth,  be  it  fic- 
tion, be  it  dream,  one  thing  is  clear :  it  was  a  fcaptism  of 
new  life  to  the  world  which  was  touched  by  it,  and  it  has 
been  near  the  heart  of  all  the  great  movements  of  human 
society  from  that  day  until  now.  I  do  not  even  exclude 
"  the  Revolution,"  whose  current  is  under  us  still.  Space 
is  precious,  or  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  show  how  deeply 
the  Revolution  was  indebted  to  the  ideas  which  this  gos- 
pel brought  into  the  world.  I  entirely  agree  with  Lord 
Blachford  that  revelation  is  the  ground  on  which  faith 
securely  rests.  But  the  history  of  the  quickening  and 
the  growth  of  Christian  society  is  a  factor  of  enormous 
moment  in  the  estimation  of  the  arguments  for  the  truth 
of  immortality.  We  are  assured  that  the  idea  had  the 
dullest  and  even  basest  origin.  Man  has  a  shadow,  it 
suggested  the  idea  of  a  second  self  to  him !  he  has  me- 


THE   SOUL   AND   FUTURE  LIFE.  143 

mories  of  departed  friends,  he  gave  them  a  body  and 
made  them  ghosts !  Very  wonderful,  surely,  that  mere 
figments  should  be  the  strongest  and  most  productive 
things  in  the  whole  sphere  of  human  activity,  and  should 
have  stirred  the  spirit  and  led  the  march  of  the  strongest, 
noblest,  and  most  cultivated  peoples ;  until  now,  in  this 
nineteenth  century,  we  think  that  we  have  discovered,  as 
Miss  Martineau  tersely  puts  it,  that  "  the  theological  be- 
lief of  almost  everybody  in  the  civilized  world  is  baseless." 
Let  who  will  believe  it,  I  cannot. 

It  may  be  urged  that  the  idea  has  strong  fascination, 
that  man  naturally  longs  for  immortality,  and  gladly 
catches  at  any  figment  which  seems  to  respond  to  his 
yearning  and  to  justify  his  hope.     But  this  belief  is  among 
the  clearest,  broadest,  and  strongest  features  of  his  ex- 
perience and  history.     It  must  flow  out  of  something  very 
deeply  imbedded  in  his  constitution.     If  the  force  that  is 
behind  all  the  phenomena  of  life  is  responsible  for  all  that 
is,  it  must  be  responsible  for  this  also.     Somehow  man, 
the  masterpiece  of  the  Creation,  has  got  himself  wedded 
to  the  belief  that  all  things  here  have  relations  to  issues 
which  lie  in  a  world  that  is  behind  the  shadow  of  death. 
This  belief  has  been  at  the  root  of  his  highest  endeavour 
arid  of  his  keenest  pain  ;  it  is  the  secret  of  his  chronic  un- 
rest.    Now  Nature,  through  all  her  orders,  appears  to  have 
made    all   creatures    contented    with  the  conditions  of 
their  life.     The  brute  seems  fully  satisfied  with  the  re- 
sources of  his  world.      He  shows  no  sign  of  being  tor- 
mented by  dreams ;  his  life  withers  under  no  blight  of  re- 


144  A   MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

gret.  All  things  rest,  and  are  glad  and  beautiful  in  their 
spheres.  Violate  the  order  of  their  nature,  rob  them  of 
their  fit  surroundings,  and  they  grow  restless,  sad,  and 
poor.  A  plant  shut  out  from  light  and  moisture  will 
twist  itself  into  the  most  fantastic  shapes,  and  strain  it- 
self to  ghastly  tenuity ;  nay,  it  will  work  its  delicate  tis- 
sues through  stone  walls  or  hard  rock,  to  find  what  its 
nature  had  made  needful  to  its  life.  Having  found  it, 
it  rests  and  is  glad  in  its  beauty  once  more.  Living  things, 
perverted  by  human  intelligent  effort,  revert  swiftly  the 
moment  that  the  pressure  is  removed.  This  marked 
tendency  to  reversion  seems  to  be  set  in  Nature  as  a  sign 
that  all  things  are  at  rest  in  their  natural  conditions,  con- 
tent with  their  life  and  its  sphere.  Only  in  ways  of 
which  they  are  wholly  unconscious,  and  which  rob  them 
of  no  contentment  with  their  present,  do  they  prepare  the 
way  for  the  higher  developments  of  life. 

What  then,  means  this  restless  longing  in  man  for  that 
which  lies  beyond  the  range  of  his  visible  world  ?  Has 
Nature  wantonly  and  cruelly  made  man,  her  masterpiece 
alone  of  all  the  creatures,  restless  and  sad  ?  Of  all  beings 
in  the  Creation  must  he  alone  be  made  wretched  by  an 
unattainable  longing,  by  futile  dreams  of  a  visionary 
world  ?  This  were  an  utter  breach  of  the  method  of  Na- 
ture in  all  her  operations.  It  is  impossible  to  believe 
that  the  harmony  that  runs  through  all  her  spheres  fails 
and  falls  int,o  discord  in  man.  The  very  order  of  Nature 
presses  us  to  the  conviction  that  this  insatiable  longing 
which  somehow  she  generates  and  sustains  in  man,  and 


THE  SOUL  AND  FUTUKE   LIFE.  14)5 

which  is  unquestionably  the  largest  feature  of  his  life,  is  not 
visionary  and  futile,  but  profoundly  significant ;  pointing 
with  firm  finger  to  the  reality  of  that  sphere  of  being  to 
which  she  has  taught  him  to  lift  his  thoughts  and  aspira- 
tions, and  in  which  he  will  find,  unless  the  prophetic  or- 
der of  the  Creation  has  lied  to  him,  the  harmonious  com- 
pleteness of  his  life. 

And  there  seems  to  be  no  fair  escape  from  the  conclu- 
sion by  giving  up  the  order,  and  writing  Babel  on  the 
world  and  its  life.  Whatever  it  is,  it  is  not  confusion. 
Out  of  its  disorder,  order  palpably  grows  ;  out  of  its  con- 
fusion arises  a  grand'  and  stately  progress.  Progress  is  a 
sacred  word  with  Mr.  Harrison.  In  the  progress  of  hu- 
manity he  finds  his  longed-for  immortality.  But,  if  I 
may  repeat  in  other  terms  a  remark  which  I  offered 
some  time  ago,  while  progress  is  the  human  law, 
law,  the  world,  the  sphere  of  the  progress,  is  tending 
slowly  but  inevitably  to  dissolution.  Is  there  discord 
again  in  this  highest  region  ?  Mr.  Harrison  writes  of  an 
immortal  humanity.  How  immortal,  if  the  glorious  pro- 
gress is  striving  to  accomplish  itself  in  a  world  of  wreck  ? 
Or  is  the  progress  that  of  a  race  born  with  sore  but  joyful 
travail  from  the  highest  level  of  the  material  creation  in- 
to a  higher  region  of  being,  whence  it  can  watch  with 
calmness  the  dissolution  of  all  the  perishable  worlds  ? 

The  belief  in  immortality  is  so  dear  to  man  because  he 
grasps  through  it  the  complement  of  his  else  unshaped 
and  imperfect  life.     It  seems  to  be  equally  the  comple- 
ment of  this  otherwise  hopelessly  jangled  and  disordered 
10 


14(5  A    MODERN    SYMPOSIUM. 

world.  It  is  asked  triumphantly,  "  Why,  of  all  the  hosts 
of  creatures,  does  man  alone  lay  claim  to  this  great  inheri- 
tance ?  "  Because  in  man  alone  we  see  the  experiences  > 
the  strain,  the  anguish,  that  demand  it,  as  the  sole  key  to 
what  he  does  and  endures.  There  is  to  me  something 
horrible  hi  the  thought  of  such  a  life  as  ours,  in  which 
for  all  of  us,  in  some  form  or  other,  the  cross  must  be  the 
most  sacred  symbol,  lived  out  in  that  bare,  heartless, 
hopeless  world  of  the  material,  to  which  Prof.  Clifford  so 
lightly  limits  it.  And  I  cannot  but  think  that  there  are 
strong  signs  in  many  quarters  of  an  almost  fierce  revul- 
sion from  the  ghastly  drearihood  of  such  a  vision  of 
life. 

There  seems  to  me  to  run  through  Mr.  Harrison's  utter- 
ances on  these  great  subjects — I  say  it  with  honest  diffi- 
dence of  one  whose  large  range  of  power  I  so  fully  recog- 
nize, but  one  must  speak  frankly  if  this  Symposium  is  to 
be  worth  anything — an  instinctive  yearning  toward 
Christian  ideas,  while  that  faith  is  denied  which  alone 
can  vivify  them,  and  make  them  a  living  power  in  our 
world.  There  is  everywhere  a  shadowy  image  of  a 
Christian  substance ;  but  it  reminds  one  of  that  formless 
form,  wherein  "  what  seemed  a .  head,  the  likeness  of  a 
kingly  crown  had  on."  And  it  is  characteristic  of  much 
of  the  finest  thinking  and  writing  of  our  times.  The  sa- 
viour Deronda,  the  prophet  Mordecai,  lack  just  that  living 
heart  of  faith  which  would  put  blood  into  their  pallid 
lineaments,  and  make  them  breathe  and  move  among  men. 
Again  I  say  that  we  have  largely  ourselves  to  thank  for 


THE   SOUL  AND   FUTURE  LIFE.  147 

this  saddening  feature  of  the  higher  life  of  our  times — we 
who  have  narrowed  God's  great  kingdom  to  the  dimen- 
sions of  our  little  theological  sphere.  I  am  no  theologian, 
though  intensely  interested  in  the  themes  with  which  the 
theologians  occupy  themselves.  Urania,  with  darkened 
brow,  may,  perhaps,  rebuke  my  prating.  But  I  seem  to 
see  quite  clearly  that  the  sad  strain  and  anguish  of  our 
life,  social,  intellectual,  and  spiritual,  is  but  the  pain  by 
which  great  stages  of  growth  accomplish  themselves.  We 
have  quite  outgrown  our  venerable,  and  in  its  time  large 
and  noble,  theological  shell.  We  must  wait,  not  fearful, 
far  less  hopeless,  while  by  the  help  of  those  who  are  work- 
ing with  such  admirable  energy,  courage,  and  fidelity,  out- 
side the  visible  Christian  sphere,  that  spirit  in  man  which 
searches  and  cannot  but  search  "  the  deep  things  of  God," 
creates  for.  itself  a  new  instrument  of  thought  which  will 
give  to  it  the  mastery  of  a  wider,  richer,  and  nobler 
world. 


PR.  W.  G.  WARD. 

MR.  HARRISON  considers  that  the  Christian's  con- 
ception of  a  future  life  is  "so  gross, so  sensual, so  in- 
dolent, so  selfish,"  as  to  be  unworthy  of  respectful  consider- 
ation. He  must  necessarily  be  intending  to  speak  of  this 
conception  in  the  shape  of  which  we  Christians  entertain  it; 
because  otherwise  his  words  of  reprehension  are  unmeaning. 
But  our  belief  as  to  the  future  life  is  intimately  and  indis- 


148  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

solubly  bound  up  with  our  belief  as  to  the  present ;  with 
our  belief  as  to  what  is  the  true  measure  and  standard  of 
human  action  in  this  world.  And  I  would  urge  that  no 
part  of  our  doctrine  can  be  rightly  apprehended,  unless  it 
be  viewed  in  its  connection  with  all  the  rest.  This  is  a 
fact  which  (I  think)  infidels  often  drop  out  of  sight,  and 
for  that  reason  fail  of  meeting  Christianity  on  its  really 
relevant  and  critical  issues. 

Of  course,  I  consider  Catholicity  to  be  exclusively  the 
one  authoritative  exhibition  of  revealed  Christianity. 
I  will  set  forth,  therefore,  the  doctrine  to  which  I  would 
call  attention,  in  that  particular  form  in  which  Catholic 
teachers  enounce  it ;  though  I  am  very  far  indeed  from 
intending  to  deny  that  there  are  multitudes  of  non-Cath- 
olic Christians  who  hold  it  also.  What,  then,  according 
to  Catholics,  is  the  true  measure  and  standard  of  human 
action  ?  This  is  in  effect  the  very  first  question  pro- 
pounded in  our  English  elementary  Catechism  :  "  Why 
did  God  make  you  ? "  The  prescribed  answer  is, "  To  know 
him,  serve  him,  and  love  him  in  this  world,  and  to  be 
happy  with  him  forever  in  the  next."  And  St.  Ignatius's 
"  Spiritual  Exercises  " — a  work  of  the  very  highest  author- 
ity among  us — having  laid  down  the  very  same  "  founda- 
tion," presently  adds  that  "  we  should  not  wish  on  our 
part  for  health  rather  than  for  sickness,  wealth  rather 
than  poverty,  honour  rather  than  ignominy ;  desiring 
and  choosing  those  things  alone  which  are  more  expedient 
to  us  for  the  end  for  which  we  were  created."  Now,  what 
will  be  the  course  of  a  Christian's  life  in  proportion  as  he 


THE  SOUL  AND   FUTURE  LIFE.  149 

is  profoundly  imbued  with  such  a  principle  as  this,  and 
vigorously  aims  at  putting  it  into  practice?  The 
number  of  believers,  who  apply  themselves  to  this  task 
with  reasonable  consistency,  is  no  doubt  comparatively 
small.  But  in  proportion  as  any  given  person  does  so,  he 
will  in  the  first  place  be  deeply  penetrated  with  a  sense  of 
his  moral  weakness ;  and  (were  it  for  that  reason  alone) 
his  life  will  more  and  more  be  a  life  of  prayer.  Then  he 
will  necessarily  give  his  mind  with  great  earnestness  and 
frequency  to  the  consideration  what  it  is  which  at  this 
or  that  period  God  desires  at  his  hands.  On  the  whole 
(not  to  dwell  with  unnecessary  detail  on  this  part  of  my 
subject),  he  will  be  ever  opening  his  heart  to  Almighty 
God ;  turning  to  him  for  light  and  strength  under  emer- 
gencies, for  comfort  under  affliction ;  pondering  on  his 
adorable  attributes ;  animated  toward  him  by  intense  love 
and  tenderness.  Nor  need  I  add  how  singularly — how 
beyond  words — this  personal  love  of  God  is  promoted  and 
facilitated  by  the  fact  that  a  Divine  Person  has  assumed 
human  nature,  and  that  God's  human  acts  and  words  are 
so  largely  offered  to  the  loving  contemplation  of  redeemed 
souls. 

In  proportion,  then,  as  a  Christian  is  faithful  to  his 
creed,  the  thought  of  God  becomes  the  chief  joy  of  «his 
life.  "The  thought  of  God,"  says  F.  Newman,  "and 
nothing  short  of  it,  is  the  happiness  of  man ;  for  though 
^ there  is  much  besides  to  serve  as  the  subject  of  knowledge, 
or  motive  for  action,  or  instrument  of  excitement,  yet  the 
affections  require  a  something  more  vast  and  more  en- 


150  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

during  than  anything  created.  He  alone  is  sufficient  for 
the  heart  who  made  it.  The  contemplation  of  him,  and 
nothing  but  it,  is  able  fully  to  open  and  relieve  the  mind, 
to  unlock,  occupy,  and  fix  our  affections.  We  may  indeed 
1  ove  things  created  with  great  intenseness ;  but  such  af- 
fection, when  disjoined  from  the  love  of  the  Creator,  is 
like  a  stream  running  in  a  narrow  channel,  impetuous, 
vehement,  turbid.  The  heart  runs  out,  as  it  were,  only 
at  one  door ;  it  is  not  an  expanding  of  the  whole  man. 
Created  natures  cannot  open  to  us,  or  elicit,  the  ten 
thousand  mental  senses  which  belong  to  us,  and  through 
which  we  really  love.  None  but  the  presence  of  our 
Maker  can  enter  us ;  for  to  none  besides  can  the  whole 
heart  in  all  its  thoughts  and  feelings  be  unlocked  and  sub- 
jected. It  is  this  feeling  of  simple  and  absolute  confidence 
and  communion  which  soothes  and  satisfies  those  to  whom 
it  is  vouchsafed.  We  know  that  even  our  nearest  friends 
enter  into  us  but  partially,  and  hold  intercourse  with  us 
only  at  times  ;  whereas  the  consciousness  of  a  perfect  and 
enduring  presence,  and  it  alone,  keeps  the  heart  open. 
Withdraw  the  object  on  which  it  rests,  and  it  will  relapse 
again  into  its  state  of  confinement  and  constraint;  and  in 
proportion  as  it  is  limited,  either  to  certain  seasons  or  to 
certain  affections,  the  heart  is  straitened  and  distressed." 

Now,  Christians  hold  that  God's  faithful  servants  will 
enjoy  hereafter  unspeakable  bliss,  through  the  most  inti- 
mate imaginable  contact  with  him  whom  they  have  here 
so  tenderly  loved.  They  will  see  face  to  face  him  whose 
beauty  is  dimly  and  faintly  adumbrated  by  the  most 


THE   SOUL  AND   FUTURE  LIFE.  151 

exquisitely  transporting  beauty  which  can  be  found  on 
earth  ;  him  whose  adorable  perfection  they  have  in  this 
life  imperfectly  contemplated,  and  for  the  fuller  appre- 
hension of  which  they  have  so  earnestly  longed  here 
below.  I  by  no  means  intend  to  imply  that  the  hope  of 
this  blessedness  is  the  sole  or  even  the  chief  inducement 
which  leads  saintly  men  to  be  diligent  in  serving  God. 
Their  immediate,  reason  for  doing  so  is  their  keen  sense 
of  his  claim  on  their  allegiance ;  and,  again,  the  misery 
which  they  would  experience,  through  their  love  of  him, 
at  being  guilty  of  any  failure  in  that  allegiance.  Still  the 
prospect  of  that  future  bliss,  which  I  have  so  imperfectly 
sketched,  is  doubtless  found  by  them  at  times  of  invalu- 
able service  in  stimulating  them  to  greater  effort,  and  in 
cheering  them  under  trial  and  desolation. 

Such  is  the  view  taken  by  Christians  of  life  in  heaven; 
and,  surely,  any  candid  infidel  will  at  once  admit  that  it 
is  profoundly  harmonious  and  consistent  with  their  view 
of  what  should  be  man's  life  on  earth.  To  say  that  their 
anticipation  of  the  futuie,  as  it  exists  in  them,  is  gross, 
sensual,  indolent,  and  selfish,  is  so  manifestly  beyond  the 
mark  that  I  am  sure  Mr.  Harrison  will,  on  reflection, 
retract  his  affirmation.  Apart,  however,  from  this  par- 
ticular comment,  my  criticism  of  Mr.  Harrison  would  be 
this  :  He  was  bound,  I  maintain,  to  consider  the  Christian 
theory  of  life  as  a  whole ;  and  not  to  dissociate  that  part 
of  it  which  concerns  eternity  from  that  part  of  it  which 
concerns  time. 

now  as  to  the  merits  of  this  Christian  theory.   For 


152  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

my  own  part,  I  am,  of  course,  profoundly  convinced  that, 
as  on  the  one  hand  it  is  guaranteed  by  revelation,  so  on 
the  other  hand  it  is  that  which  alone  harmonizes  with 
the  dicta  of  reason  and  the  facts  of  experience,  so  far  as 
it   comes   into   contact  with   these.     Yet  I  admit  that 
various  very  plausible  objections  may  be  adduced  against 
its  truth.     Objectors  may  allege  very  plausibly  that  by 
the  mass  of  men  it  cannot  be  carried  into  practice :  that 
it  disparages  most  unduly  the  importance  of  things  secu- 
lar ;    that   it  is   fatal   to    what    they   account   genuine 
patriotism ;  that  it  has  always  been,  and  will  always  be, 
injurious  to  the  progress  of  science ;   above  all,  that  it 
puts  men  (as  one  may  express  it)  on  an  entirely  wrong 
scent,  and  leads  them  to  neglect  many  pursuits  which,  as 
being  sources  of  true  enjoyment,  would  largely  enhance 
the  pleasurableness  of  life.     All  this,  and  much  more  may 
be  urged,  I  think,  by  antithesists  with  very  great  super- 
ficial plausibility  ;    and  the   Christian  controversialist  is 
bound  on  occasion  steadily  to  confront  it.     B.ut  there  is 
one   accusation   which   has   been   brought  against    this 
Christian  theory  of  life — and   that  the  one  mainly  (as 
would  seem)  felt  by  Mr.  Harrison — which  to  me  seems  so 
obviously  destitute  of  foundation  that  I  find  difficulty  in 
understanding  how  any  infidel  can  have  persuaded  him- 
self of  its  truth  :  I  mean  the  accusation  that  this  theory 
is  a  selfish  one.     There  is  no  need  of  here  attempting  a 
philosophical  discussion  on  the  respective  claims  of  what 
are  now  called  "  egoism  "  and  "  altruism  :"  a  discussion  in 
itself  (no  doubt)  one  of  much   interest  and  much   im- 


THE  SOUL  AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  153 

portance,  and  one,  moreover,  in  which  I  should  be  quite 
prepared  (were  it  necessary)  to  engage.  Here,  however, 
I  will  appeal,  not  to  philosophy,  but  to  history.  In  the 
records  of  the  past  we  find  a  certain  series  of  men,  who 
stand  out  from  the  mass  of  their  brethren,  as  having  pre- 
eminently concentrated  their  energy  on  the  love  and 
service  of  God,  and  preeminently  looked  away  from 
earthly  hopes  to  the  prospect  of  their  future  reward.  I 
refer  to  the  saints  of  the  Church.  And  it  is  a  plain 
matter  of  fact,  which  no  one  will  attempt  to  deny,  that 
these  very  men  stand  out  no  less  conspicuously  from  the 
rest  in  their  self-sacrificing  and  (as  we  ordinary  men  re- 
gard it)  astounding  labours  in  behalf  of  what  they  believe 
to  be  the  highest  interests  of  mankind. 

Before  I  conclude,  I  must  not  omit  a  brief  comment  on 
one  other  point,  because  it  is  the  only  one  on  which  I 
cannot  concur  with  Lord  Blachford's  masterly  paper.  I 
cannot  agree  with  him  that  the  doctrine  of  human 
immortality  fails  of  being  supported  by  "  conclusive 
reasoning."  I  do  not,  of  course,  mean  that  the  dogma  of 
the  Beatific  Vision  is  discoverable  apart  from  revelation  ; 
but  I  do  account  it  a  truth  cognizable  with  certitude  by 
reason,  that  the  human  soul  is  naturally  immortal,  and 
that  retribution  of  one  kind  or  an'other  will  be  awarded 
us  hereafter,  according  to  what  our  conduct  has  been  in 
this  our  state  of  probation.  Here,  however,  I  must 
explain  myself.  When  theists  make  this  statement, 
sometimes  they  are  thought  to  allege  that  human  immor- 
tality is  sufficiently  proved  by  phenomena ;  and  some- 


154  A  MODEKN   SYMPOSIUM. 

times  they  are  thought  to  allege  that  it  is  almost 
intuitively  evident.  For  myself,  however,  I  make  neither 
of  these  allegations.  I  hold  that  the  truth  in  question  is 
conclusively  established  by  help  of  certain  premises;  and 
that  these  premises  themselves  can  previously  be  known 
with  absolute  certitude,  on  grounds  of  reason  or  ex- 
perience. 

They  are  such  as  these  :  1.  There  exists  that  Personal 
Being,  infinite  in  all  perfections,  whom  we  call  God.  2. 
He  has  implanted  in  his  rational  creatures  the  sense  of 
right  and  wrong ;  the  knowledge  that  a  deliberate  perpe- 
tration of  certain  acts  intrinsically  merits  penal  retribu- 
tion. 3.  Correlatively,  he  has  conferred  freedom  on  the 
human  will ;  or  in  other  words,  has  made  acts  of  the 
human  will  exceptions  to  that  law  of  uniform  sequence 
which  otherwise  prevails  throughout  the  phenomenal 
world.1  4.  By  the  habit  of  prayer  to  God  we  can  obtain 
augmented  strength  for  moral  action,  in  a  degree  which 
would  have  been  quite  incredible  antecedently  to  ex- 
perience. 5.  Various  portions  of  our  divinely  given 
nature  clearly  point  to  an  eternal  destiny.  6.  The 
conscious  self  or  ego  is  entirely  heterogeneous  to  the 
material  world :  entirely  heterogeneous,  therefore,  to 
that  palpable  body  of  ours  which  is  dissolved  at  the 
period  of  death. 

I  do  not  think  any  one  will  account  it  extravagant  to 
hold  that  the  doctrine  of  human  immortality  is  legiti- 

1  I  shall  not,  of  course,  be  understood  to  deny  the  existence  and  fre- 
quency of  miracles. 


THE  SOUL  AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  155 

mately  deducible  from  a  combination  of  these  and  similar 
truths.  The  anti-theist  will  of  course  deny  that  they 
are  truths.  Mr.  Greg,  who  has  himself  "  arrived  at  no 
conviction"  on  the  subject  of  immortality,  yet  says  that 
considerations  of  the  same  kind  as  those  which  I  have 
enumerated  "  must  be  decisive  "  in  favour  of  immortality 
"  to  all  to  whose  spirits  communion  with  their  Father  is 
the  most  absolute  of  verities.."1  Nor  have  I  any  reason 
to  think  that  even  Mr.  Huxley  and  Mr.  Harrison,  if  they 
could  concede  my  premises,  would  demur  to  my  conclusion. 


MR.  FREDERIC  HARRISON. 

I  HAVE  now,  not  so  much  to  close  a  symposium,  or 
general  discussion,  as  to  reply  to  the  convergent  fire  of 
nine  separate  papers.  Neither  time,  nor  space,  nor  the  in- 
dulgence of  the  reader,  would  enable  me  to  do  justice  to  the 
weight  of  this  array  of  criticism,  which  reaches  me  in  frag- 
ments while  I  am  otherwise  occupied  abroad.  I  will  ask 
those  critics  whom  I  have  not  been  able  to  notice  to  believe 
that  I  have  duly  considered  the  powerful  appeals  they 
have  addressed  to  me.  And  I  will  ask  those  who  are 
interested  in  this  question  to  refer  to  the  original  papers 
in  which  my  views  were  stated.  And  I  will  only  add, 
by  way  of  reply,  the  following  remarks,  which  were,  for 

l  See  his  letter  in  the  London  Spectator  of  August  25th,  1877. 


156  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

the  most  part,  written  and  printed,  while  I  had  nothing 
before  me  but  the  first  three  papers  in  this  discussion. 
They  contain  what  I  have  to  say  on  the  theological,  the 
metaphysical,  and  the  materialist  aspect  of  this  question. 
For  the  rest,  I  could  only  repeat  what  I  have  already 
said  in  the  two  original  essays. 

Whether  the  preceding  discussion  has  given  much  new 
strength  to  the  doctrine  of  man's  immaterial  soul  and 
future  existence  I  will  not  pretend  to  decide.  But  I  can- 
not feel  that  it  has  shaken  the  reality  of  man's  posthumous 
influence,  my  chief  and  immediate  theme.  It  seemed  to 
me  that  the  time  had  come,  when,  seeing  how  vague  and 
hesitating  were  the  prevalent  beliefs  on  this  subject,  it 
was  most  important  to  remember  that,  from  a  purely 
earthly  point  of  view,  man  had  a  spiritual  nature,  and 
could  look  forward  after  death  to  something  that  marked 
him  off  from  the  beasts  that  perish.  I  cannot  see  that 
what  I  urged  has  been  in  substance  displaced ;  though 
much  criticism  (and  some  of  it  of  a  verbal  kind)  has  been 
directed  at  the  language  which  I  used  of  others.  My 
object  was  to  try  if  this  life  could  not  be  made  richer  ; 
not  to  destroy  the  dreams  of  another.  But  has  the  old 
doctrine  of  a  future  life  been  in  any  way  strengthened  ? 
Mr.  Hutton,  it  is  true,  has  a  "  personal  wish  "  for  a  per- 
petuity of  volition.  Lord  Blachford  "  believes  because  he 
is  told."  And  Prof.  Huxley  knows  of  no  evidence  that 
"  such  a  soul  and  a  future  life  exist ;"  and  he  seems  not  to 
believe  in  them  at  all. 

Philosophical  discussion  must  languish  a  little,  if, when 


THE  SOUL  AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  157 

we  ask  for  the  philosophical  grounds  for  a  certain  belief, 
we  find  one  philosopher  believing  because  he  has  a  "  per- 
sonal wish  "  for  it,  and  another  "  believing  because  he  is 
told."  Mr.  Hutton  says  that,  as  far  as  he  knows,  "  the 
thoughts,  affections,  and  volitions,  are  not  likely  to  perish 
with  his  body."  Prof.  Huxley  seems  to  think  it  just  as 
likely  that  they  should.  Arguments  are  called  for  to 
enable  us  to  decide  between  these  two  authorities.  And 
the  only  argument  we  have  hitherto  got  is  Mr.  Hutton's 
"  personal  wish,"  and  Lord  Blachford's  ita  scriptum  est. 
I  confess  myself  unable  to  continue  an  argument  which 
runs  into  believing  "  because  I  am  told."  It  is  for  this 
reason  that  the  lazzarone  at  Naples  believed  in  the  blood 
of  St.  Januarius. 

My  original  propositions  may  be  stated  thus': 

1.  Philosophy  as  a  whole  (I  do  not  say  specially  biolo- 
gical science)  has  established  a  functional  relation  to  ex- 
ist between  every  fact  of  thinking,  willing,  or  feeling,  on 
the  one  side,  and  some  molecular  change  in  the  body  on 
the  other  side. 

2.  This  relation  is  simply  one  of  correspondence  be-^ 
tween  moral  and  physical  facts,  not  one  of  assimilation. 
The  moral  fact  does  not  become  a  physical  fact,  is  not 
adequately  explained  by  it,  and  must  be  mainly  studied 
as  a  moral  fact,  by  methods  applicable  to  morals — not  as 
a  physical  fact,  by  methods  applicable  to  physics. 

3.  The  moral  facts  of  human  life,  the   laws  of   man's 
mental,  moral,  and  affective  nature,  must  consequently 
be  studied,  as  they  have  always  been  studied,  by  direct 


158  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

observation  of  these  facts  ;  yet  the  correspondence,  spe- 
cially discovered  by  biological  science,  between  man's 
mind  and  his  body,  must  always  be  kept  in  view.  They 
are  an  indispensible,  inseparable,  but  subordinate  part  of 
moral  philosophy. 

4.  We  do  not  diminish  the  supreme  place  of  the  spirit- 
ual facts  in  life  and  in  philosophy  by  admitting  these 
spiritual  facts  to  have  a  relation  with  molecular  and  or- 
ganic facts  in  the  human  organism — provided  that  we 
never  forget  how  small  and  dependent  is  the  part  which 
the  study  of  the  molecular  and  organic  phenomena  must 
play  in  moral  and  social  science. 

5.  Those  whose  minds  have  been  trained  in  the  modern 
philosophy  of  law  cannot  understand  what  is  meant  by 
sensation,'  thought,   and   energy,    existing  without  any 
basis  of  molecular  change  ;  and  to  talk  to  them  of  sensa- 
tion,  thought  and   energy,  continuing    in  the    absence 
of  any  molecules  whatever,  is  precisely  such  a  contradic- 
tion in  terms  as  to  suppose  that  civilization  will  continue 
in  the  absence  of  any  men  whatever. 

6.  Yet  man  is  so  constituted  as  a  social  being  that  the 
energies   which   he   puts  out  in  life  mould  the  minds, 
characters,  and  habits,  of  his  fellow-men ;    so  that  each 
man's  life  is,  in  effect,  indefinitely  prolonged  in  human  so- 
ciety.    This  is  a  phenomenon  quite  peculiar  to  man  and 
to  human  society,  and  of  course  depends  on  there  being 
men  in  active  association  with  each  other.     Physics  and 
biology  can  teach  us  nothing  about  it ;  and  physicists  and 
biologists  may  very  easily  forget  its  importance.     It  can 


THE   SOUL   AND    FUTURE   LIFE.  159 

be  learned  only  by  long  and  refined  observations  in  moral 
and  mental  philosophy  as  a  whole,  and  in  the  history  of 
civilization  as  a  whole. 

7.  Lastly,  as  a  corollary,  it  may  be  useful  to  retain  the 
words  soul  and  future  life  for  their  associations;  provided 
we  make  it  clear  that  we  mean  by  soul  the  combined  fa- 
culties of  the  living  organism,  and  by  future  life  the  sub- 
jective effect  of  each  man's  objective  life  on  the  actual 
lives  of  his  fellow-men. 

I.  Now,  I  find  in  Mr.  Hutton's  paper  hardly  any  at- 
tempt to  disprove  the  first  six  of  these  propositions.  He 
is-  employed  for  the  most  part  in  asserting  that  his  hypo- 
thesis of  a  future  state  is  a  more  agreeable  one  than  mine, 
and  in  earnest  complaints  that  I  should  call  his  view  of  a 
future  state  a  selfish  or  personal  hope.  As  to  the  first,  I 
will  only  remark  that  it  is  scarcely  a  question  whether 
his  notion  of  immortality  is  beautiful  or  not,  but  whether 
it  is  true.  If  there  is  no  rational  ground  for  expecting 
such  immortality  to  be  a  solid  fact,  it  is  to  little  purpose 
to  show  us  what  a  sublime  idea  it  would  be  if  there  were 
anything  in  it.  As  to  the  second,  I  will  only  say  that  I 
do  not  call  his  notion  of  a  future  existence  a  selfish  or 
personal  hope.  In  the  last  paragraph  of  my  second 
paper  I  speak  with  respect  of  the  opinion  of  those  who 
look  forward  to  a  future  of  moral  development  instead  of 
to  an  idle  eternity  of  psalm-singing.  My  language  as  to 
the  selfishness  of  the  vulgar  ideas  of  salvation  was  di- 
rected to  those  who  insist  that,  unless  they  are  to  feel  a 
continuance  of  pleasure,  they  do  not  care  for  any  continu- 


160  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

ance  of  their  influence  at  all.  The  vulgar  are  apt  to  say 
that  what  they  desire  is  the  sense  of  personal  satisfaction, 
and,  if  they  cannot  have  this,  they  care  for  nothing  else. 
This,  I  maintain,  is  a  selfish  and  debasing  idea.  It  is  the 
common  notion  of  the  popular  religion,  and  its  tendency 
to  concentrate  the  mind  on  a  merely  personal  salvation 
does  exert  an  evil  effect  on  practical  conduct.  I  once 
heard  a  Scotch  preacher,  dilating  on  the  narrowness  of  the 
gate,  etc.,  exclaim,  "  0  dear  brethren,  who  would  care  to 
be  saved  in  a  crowd  ? " 

I  do  not  say  this  of  the  life  of  grander  activity  in 
which  Mr.  Hutton  believes,  and  which  Lord  Blachford  so 
eloquently  describes.  This  is  no  doubt  a  fine  ideal,  and 
I  will  not  say  other  than  an  elevating  hope.  But  on  what 
does  it  rest  ?  Why  this  ideal  rather  than  any  other  ? 
Each  of  us  may  imagine,  as  I  said  at  the  outset,  his  own 
Elysian  fields,  or  his  own  mystic  rose.  But  is  this  phil- 
osophy? Is  it  even  religion?  Besides,  there  is  this 
other  objection  to  it :  It  is  not  Christianity,  but  Neo- 
Christianity.  It  is  a  fantasia  with  variations  on  the 
orthodox  creed.  There  is  not  a  word  of  the  kind  in  the 
Bible.  Lord  Blachford  says  he  believes  in  it  "  because  he 
is  told."  But  it  so  happens  that  he  is  not  told  this,  at 
any  rate  in  the  creeds  and  formularies  of  orthodox  faith. 
If  this  view  of  future  life  is  to  rest  entirely  on  revelation, 
it  is  a  very  singular  thing  that  the  Bible  is  silent  on  the 
matter.  Whatever  kind  of  future  ecstacy  may  be  sug- 
gested in  some  texts,  certain  it  is  that  such  a  glorified  en- 
ergy as  Lord  Blachford  paints  in  glowing  colours  is  no- 


THE   SOUL   AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  161 

where  described  in  the  Bible.  There  is  a  constant  prac- 
tice nowadays,  when  the  popular  religion  is  criticised, 
that  earnest  defenders  of  it  come  forward  exclaiming : 
"  Oh  !  that  is  only  the  vulgar  notion  of  our  religion.  My 
idea  of  the  doctrine  is  so  and  so,"  something  which  the 
speaker  has  invented  without  countenance  from  the  offi- 
cial authority.  For  my  part,  I  hold  Christianity  to  be 
what  is  taught  in  average  churches  and  chapels  to  the 
millions  of  professing  Christians.  And  I  say  it  is  a  very 
serious  fact  when  philosophical  defenders  of  religion  begin 
by  repudiating  that  which  is  taught  in  average  pulpits. 

Perhaps  a  little  more  attention  to  my  actual  words 
might  have  rendered  unnecessary  the  complaints  in  all 
these  papers  as  to  my  language  about  the  hopes  which 
men  cherish  for  the  future.  In  the  first  place  I  freely 
admit  that  the  hopes  of  a  grander  energy  in  heaven  are 
not  open  to  the  charge  of  vulgar  selfishness.  I  said  that 
they  are  unintelligible,  not  that  they  are  unworthy.  They 
are  unintelligible  to  those  who  are  continually  alive-  to  the 
fact  I  have  placed  as  my  first  proposition — that  every 
moral  phenomenon  is  in  functional  relation  with  some 
physical  phenomenon.  To  those  who  deny  or  ignore  this 
truth,  there  is,  doubtless,  no  incoherence  in  all  the  ideals 
so  eloquently  described  in  the  papers  of  Mr.  Hutton  and 
Lord  Blachford.  Bur,  once  get  this  conception  as  the 
substratum  of  your  entire  mental  and  moral  philosophy, 
and  it  is  as  incoherent  to  talk  to  us  of  your  immaterial 
development  as  it  Vould  be  to  talk  of  obtaining  redness 
without  any  red  thing. 
11 


162  A  MODERN. SYMPOSIUM. 

I  will  try  to  explain  more  fully  why  this  idea  of  a 
glorified  activity  implies  a  contradiction  in  terms  to  those 
who  are  imbued  with  the  sense  of  correspondence  be- 
tween physical  and  moral  facts.  When  we  conceive  any 
process  of  thinking,  we  call  up  before  us  a  complex  train 
of  conditions :  objective  facts  outside  of  us,  or  the  re- 
vived impression  of  such  facts ;  the  molecular  effect  of 
these  facts  upon  certain  parts  of  our  organism,  the  asso- 
ciation of  these  with  similar  facts  recalled  by  memory,  an 
elaborate  mechanism  to  correlate  these  impressions,  an 
unknown  to  be  made  known,  and  a  difficulty  to  be  over- 
come. All  systematic  thought  implies  relations  with  the 
external  world  present  or  recalled,  and  it  also  implies 
some  shortcoming  in  our  powers  of  perfecting  those  re- 
lations. When  we  meditate,  it  is  on  a  basis  of  facts  which 
we  are  observing,  or  have  observed  and  are  now  recalling, 
and  with  a  view  to  get  at  some  result  which  baffles  our 
direct  observation  and  hinders  some  practical  purpose. 

The  same  holds  good  of  our  moral  energy.  Ecstasy 
and  mere  adoration  exclude  energy  of  action.  Moral  de- 
velopment implies  difficulties  to  be  overcome,  qualities 
balanced  against  one  another  under  opposing  conditions, 
this  or  that  appetite  tempted,  this  or  that  instinct  tested 
by  proof.  Moral  development  does  not  grow  like  a  fun- 
gus ;  it  is  a  continual  struggle  in  surrounding  conditions 
of  a  specific  kind,  and  an  active  putting  forth  of  a  var- 
iety of  practical  faculties  in  the  midst  of  real  obstacles. 

So,  too,  of  the  affections :  they  Equally  imply  condi- 
tions. Sympathy  does  not  spurt  up  like  a  fountain  in 


THE   SOUL   AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  163 

the  air ;  it  implies  beings  in  need  of  help,  evils  to  be  alle- 
viated, a  fellowship  of  giving  and  taking,  the  sense  of 
protecting  and  being  protected,  a  pity  for  suffering,  an 
admiration  of  power,  goodness  and  truth.  All  of  these 
imply  an  external  world  to  act  in,  human  beings  and  ob- 
jects, and  human  life  under  human  conditions. 

Now,  all  these  conditions  are  eliminated  from  the  ortho- 
dox ideal  of  a  future  state.  There  are  to  be  no  physical 
impressions,  no  material  difficulties,  no  evil,  no  toil,  no 
struggle,  no  human  beings,  and  no  human  objects.  The 
only  condition  is  a  complete  absence  of  all  conditions,  or 
all  conditions  of  which  we  have  any  experience.  And  we 
•  say,  we  cannot  imagine  what  you  mean  by  your  intensi- 
fied sympathy,  your  broader  thought,  your  infinitely 
varied  activity,  when  you  begin  by  postulating  the  ab- 
sence of  all  that  makes  sympathy,  thought,  and  activity 
possible,  all  that  makes  life  really  noble. 

A  mystical  and  inane  ecstacy  is  an  appropriate  ideal 
for  this  paradise  of  negation,  and  this  is  the  orthodox 
view  ;  but  it  is  not  a  high  view.  A  glorified  existence  of 
greater  activity  and  development  may  be  a  high  view, 
but  it  is  a  contradiction  in  terms ;  exactly,  I  say,  as  if  you 
were  to  talk  of  a  higher  civilization  without  any  human 
beings.  But  this  is  simply  a  metaphysical  after-thought 
to  escape  from  a  moral  dilemma.  Mr.  Hutton  is  surely 
mistaken  in  saying  that  Positivists  have  forgotten  that 
Christians  ever  had  any  meaning  in  their  hopes  of  a 
"  beatific  vision."  He  must  know  that  Dante  and  Thomas 
a;  Kempis  form  the  religious  books  of  Positivists,  and  they 


164  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

are,  with  some  other  manuals  of  Catholic  theology,  among 
the  small  number  of  volumes  which  Comte  recommended 
for  constant  use.  We  can  see  in  the  celestial  "  visions  " 
of  a  mystical  and  unscientific  age,  much  that  was  beauti- 
ful in  its  time,  though  not  the  highest  product  even  of 
theology.  But  in  our  day,  these  visions  of  paradise  have 
lost  what  moral  value  they  had,  while  the  progress  of 
philosophy  has  made  them  incompatible  with  our  modern 
canons  of  thought. 

Mr.  Button  supposes  me  to  object  to  any  continuance 
of  sensation  as  an  evil  in  itself.  My  objection  was.  not 
that  consciousness  should  be. prolonged  in  immortality, 
but  that  nothing  else  but  consciousness  should  be  pro1 
longed.  All  real  human  life,  energy,  thought,  and  active 
affection,  are  to  be  made  impossible  in  your  celestial  para- 
'dise,  but  you  insist  on  retaining  consciousness.  To  retain 
the  power  of  feeling,  while  all  means  and  objects  are 
taken  away  from  thinking,  all  power  of  acting,  all  oppor- 
tunity of  cultivating  the  faculties  of  sympathy  are  stifled; 
this  seems  to  me  something  else  than  a  good.  It  would 
seem  to  me  that  simply  to  be  conscious, .  and  yet  to  lie 
thoughtless,  inactive,  irresponsive,  with  every  faculty  of 
a  man  paralyzed  within  you,  as  if  by  that  villainous  drug 
which  produces  torpor  while  it  intensifies  sensation — 
such  a  consciousness  as  this  must  be  a  very  place  of  tor- 
ment. 

I  think  some  contradictions,  which  Mr.  Hutton  supposes 
he  detects  in  my  paper,  are  not  very  hard  to  reconcile.  I 
admitted  that  death  is  an  evil,  it  seems ;  but  I  spoke  of 


THE   SOUL   AND    FUTURE   LIFE.  165 

our  posthumous  activity  as  a  higher  kind  of  influence. 
We  might  imagine,  of  course,  a  Utopia,  with  neither 
suffering,  waste,  nor  loss;  and  compared  with  such  a 
world,  the  world,  as  we  know  it,  is  full  of  evils,  of  which 
death  is  obviously  one.  But  relatively,  in  such  a  world 
as  alone  we  know,  death  becomes  simply  a  law  of  orga/iized 
Nature,  from  which  we  draw  some  of  our  guiding  motives 
of  conduct.  In  precisely  the  same  way  the  necessity  of 
toil  is  an  evil  in  itself ;  but,  with  man  and  his  life  as  we 
know  them,  we  dj:aw  from  it  some  of  our  highest  moral 
energies.  The  grandest  qualities  of  human  nature,  such 
as  we  know  it  at  least,  would  become  forever  impossible 
if  Labour  and  Death  were  not  the  law  of  life. 

Mr.  Hutton  again  takes  but  a  pessimist  view  of  life 
when  he  insists  how  much  of  our  activity  is  evil,  and  how 
questionable  is  the  future  of  the  race.  I  am  no  pessimist, 
and  I  believe  in  a  providential  control  over  all  human 
actions  by  the  great  Power  of  Humanity,  which  indeed 
brings  good  out  of  evil,  and  assures,  at  least  for  some 
thousands  of  centuries,  a  certain  progress  toward  the 
higher  state.  Pessimism,  as  to  the  essential  dignity  of 
man  and  the  steady  development  of  his  race,  is  one  of  the 
surest  marks  of  the  enervating  influence  of  this  dream  of 
a  celestial  glory.  If  I  called  it  as  wild  a  desire  as  to  go 
roving  through  space  in  a  comet,  it  is  because  I  can  attach 
no  meaning  to  a  human  life  to  be  prolonged  without  a 
human  frame  and  a  human  world ;  and  it  seems  to  me  as 
rational  to  talk  of  becoming  an  angel  as  to  talk  of  becom- 
ing an  ellipse. 


166  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

By  "  duties  "  of  the  world  beyond  the  grave,  I  meant 
the  duties  which  are  imposed  on  us  in  life,  by  the  certainty 
that  our  action  must  continue  to  have  an  indefinite  effect. 
The  phrase  may  be  inelegant,  but  I  do  not  think  the 
meaning  is  obscure. 

II..  I  cannot  agree  with  Lord  Blachford  that  I  have 
fallen  into  any  confusion  between  a  substance  and  an 
attribute.  I  am  quite  aware  that  the  word  li  soul  "  has 
been  hitherto  used  for  some  centuries  as  an  entity.  And 
I  proposed  to  retain  the  term  for  an  attribute.  It  is  a 
very  common  process  in  the  history  of  thought.  Electri- 
city, life,  heat,  were  once  supposed  to  be  substances;  We 
now  very  usefully  retain  these  words  for  a  set  of  observed 
conditions  or  qualities. 

I  agree  with  Mr.  Spencer  that  the  unity  of  the  social 
organism  is  quite  as  complete  as  that  of  the  individual 
organism.  I  do  not  confuse  the  two  kinds  of  unity  ;  but 
I  say  that  man  is  in  no  important  sense  a  unit  that  society 
is  not  also  a  unit. 

With  regard  to  the  "  percipient  "  and  the  "perceptible"  I 
cannot  follow  Lord  Blachford.  He  speaks  a  tongue  thatl  do 
not  understand.  1  have  no  means  of  dividing  the  universe 
into  "percipients'*  and  "perceptibles."  I  know  no  reason 
why  a  "percipient"  should  not  be  a  "perceptible,"  none  why 
I  should  not  be  "  perceptible,"  and  none  why  beings  about 
me  should  not  be  "  perceptible."  I  think  we  are  all  per- 
fectly "  perceptible  " — indeed,  some  of  us  are  more  "  per- 
ceptible "  than  "percipient" — though  I  cannot  say  that 
Lord  Blachford  is  always  "  perceptible  "  to  me.  And  how 


THE  SOUL  AND  FUTURE  LIFE          167 

does  my  being  "  perceptible  "  or  not  being  "  perceptible," 
prove  that  I  have  an  immortal  soul  ?  Is  a  dog  "  percep- 
tible ?"  is  he  "percipient?"  Has  he  not  some  of  the 
qualities  of  a  "percipient?"  and  if  so,  has  he  an  immortal 
soul  ?  Is  an  ant,  a  tree,  a  bacterium,  "  percipient  ?"  and 
has  any  of  these  an  immortal  soul  ?  for  I  find  Lord  Blach- 
ford  declaring  there  is  an  "  ineradicable  difference  between 
the  motions  of  a  material  and  the  sensations  of  a  living 
being,"  as  if  the  animal  world  were  "  percipient,"  and  the 
inorganic  "  perceptible."  But  surely  in  the  sensations  of 
a  living  being  the  animal  world  must  be  included.  Where 
does  the  vegetable  world  come  in  ? 

I  used  the  word  "  organism  "  advisedly,  when  I  said 
that  will,  thought,  and  affection,  are  functions  of  a  living 
organism.  I  decline  exactly  to  localize  the  organ  of  any 
function  of  mind  or  will.  When  I  am  asked,  What  are 
we  ?  I  reply,  We  are  men.  When  I  am  asked,  Are  we  our 
bodies  ?  I  say,  No,  nor  are  we  our  minds.  Have  we  no 
sense  of  personality,  of  unity  ?  I  am  asked.  I  say,  Cer- 
tainly ;  it  is  an  acquired  result  of  our  nervous  organiza- 
tion, liable  to  be  interrupted  by  derangements  of  that 
nervous  organization.  What  is  it  that  makes  us  think 
and  feel  ?  The  facts  of  our  human  nature  ;  I  cannot  get 
behind  this,  and  I  need  no  further  explanation.  We  are 
men,  and  can  do  what  men  can  do.  I  say  the  tangible 
collection  of  organs  known  as  a  "  man"  (not  the  consensus 
or  the  condition,  but  the  man),  thinks,  wills,  and  feels, 
just  as  much  as  that  visible  organism  lives  and  grows. 
We  do  not  say  that  this  or  that  ganglion  in  particular 


A    MnpKUN    SYMPOSIUM. 

lives  and  grows  ;  we  say  tho  rna it  grows.  It  is  as  easy  to 
nit1  to  imagine  that  we  shall  grow  fifteen  feet  high,  when 
we  have  no  body,  as  that  we  shall  grow  in  knowledge, 
goodness,  activity,  etc.,  etc.,  etc.,  when  we  have  no  organs. 
And  the  absence  of  all  molecular  attributes  would  be,  I 
should  think,  particularly  awkward  in  that  life  of  comet- 
ary  motion  in  the  interstellar  spaces  with  which  Lord 
Blachford  threatens  us.  But,  as  the  poet  says : 

"  Trasumanar  significar  per  verba 
Non  si  porria  "- 

"  If"  says  he,  "  practical  duties  are  necessary  for  the  per- 
fection of  life,"  we  can  take  a  little  interstellar  exercise. 
Why,  practical  duties  are  the  sum  and  substance  of  life  ; 
and  life  which  does  not  centre  in  practical  duties  is  not 
life,  but  a  trance. 

Lord  Blachford,  who  is  somewhat  punctilious  in  terms, 
asks  me  what  I  consider  myself  to  understand  "  by  the 
incorporation  of  a  consensus  of  faculties  with  a  glorious 
future."  Well,  it  so  happens  that  I  did  not  use  that  phrase. 
I  have  never  spoken  of  an  immortal  soul  anywhere,  nor 
do  I  use  the  word  soul  of  any  but  the  living  man.  I  said 
a  man  might  look  forward  to  incorporation  with  the 
future  of  his  race,  explaining  that  to  mean  his  "  posthum- 
ous activity."  And  I  think  at  any  rate  the  phrase  is 
quite  as  reasonable  as  to  say  that  I  look  forward,  as  Mr. 
Hutton  does,  to  a  "union  with  God."  What  does  Mr. 
Hutton  or  Lord  Blachford  understand  himself  to  mean  by 
that? 


THE   SOUL   AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  169 

Surely  Lord  Blachford's  epigram  about  the  fiddle  and 
the  tune  is  hardly  fortunate.  Indeed,  that  exactly  ex- 
presses what  I  find  faulty  in  the  view  of  himself  and  the 
theologians.  He  thinks  the  tune  will  go  on  playing  when 
the  fiddle  is  broken  up  and  burned.  I  say  nothing  of  the 
kind.  I  do  not  say  the  man  will  continue  to  exist  after 
death.  I  simply  say  that  his  influence  will ;  that  other 
men  will  do  and  think  what  he  taught  them  to  do  or  to 
think.  Just  so,  a  general  would  be  said  to  win  a  battle 
which  he  planned  and  directed,  even  if  he  had  been  killed 
in  an  early  part  of  it.  What  is  there  of  fiddle  and  tune 
about  this  ?  I  certainly  think  that  when  Mozart  and 
Beethoven  have  left  us  great  pieces  of  music,  it  signifies 
little  to  art  if  the  actual  fiddle,  or  even  the  actual  com- 
poser continue  to  exist  or  not.  I  never  said  the  tune 
would  exist.  I  said  that  men  would  remember  it  and 
repeat  it.  I  must  thank  Lord  Blachford  for  a  happy 
illustration  of  my  own  meaning.  But  it  is  he  who  ex- 
pects the  tune  to  exist  without  the  fiddle,  /say  you  can't 
have  a  tune  without  a  fiddle,  nor  a  fiddle  without  wood. 

III.  I  have  reserved  the  criticism  of  Prof.  Huxley,  be- 
cause it  lies  apart  from  the  principal  discussion,  and  turns 
mainly  on  some  incidental  remarks  of  mine  on  "  biologi- 
cal reasoning  about  spiritual  things." 

I  note  three  points  at  the  outset.  Prof.  Huxley  does 
not  himself  pretend  to  any  evidence  for  a  theological  soul 
and  future  life.  Again,  he  does  not  dispute  the  account 
I  give  of  the  functional  relation  of  physical  and  moral 
facts.  He  seems  surprised  that  I  should  understand  it, 


170  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

not  being  a  biologist ;  but  he  is  kind  enough  to  say  that 
my  statement  may  pass.  Lastly,  he  does  not  deny  the 
reality  of  man's  posthumous  activity.  Now,  these  three 
are  the  main  purposes  of  my  argument ;  and  in  these  I 
have  Prof.  Huxley  with  me.  He  is  no  more  of  a  theolo- 
gian than  I  am.  Indeed,  he  is  only  scandalized  that  I 
should  see  any  good  in  priests  at  all.  He  might  have  said 
more  plainly  that,  when  the  man  is  dead,  there  is  an  end 
of  the  matter.  But  this  clearly  is  his  opinion,  and  he  in- 
timates as  much  in  his  paper.  Only  he  would  say  no 
more  about  it,  bury  the  carcass,  and  end  the  tale,  leaving 
all  thoughts  about  the  future  to  those  whose  faith  is  more 
robust  and  whose  hopes  are  richer ;  by  which  I  under- 
stand him  to  mean  persons  weak  enough  to  listen  to  the 
priests. 

Now,  this  does  not  satisfy  me.  I  call  it  materialism, 
for  it  exaggerates  the  importance  of  the  physical  facts 
and  ignores  that  of  the  spiritual  facts ;  and  the  object  of 
my  paper  was  simply  this  that  as  the  physical  facts 
are  daily  growing  quite  irresistible,  it  is  of  urgent  impor- 
tance to  place  the  spiritual  facts  on  a  sound  scientific 
basis  at  once.  Prof.  Huxley  implies  that  his  business  is 
with  the  physical  facts,  and  the  spiritual  facts  must  take 
care  of  themselves.  I  cannot  agree  with  him.  That  is 
precisely  the  difference  between  us.  The  spiritual  facts 
of  man's  nature  are  the  business  of  all  who  undertake  to 
denounce  priestcraft,  and  especially  of  those  who  preach 
"  Lay  Sermons." 

Prof.  Huxley  complains  that  I  should  join  in  the  view- 


THE  SOUL  AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  171 

halloo  against  biological  science.  Now,  I  never  have  sup- 
posed that  biological  science  was  in  the  position  of  the 
hunted  fox.  I  thought  it  was  the  hunter,  booted  and 
spurred  and  riding  over  us  all,  with  Prof.  Huxley  leaping 
the  most  terrific  gates  and  cracking  his  whip  with  intense 
gusto.  As  to  biological  science,  it  is  the  last  thing  that  I 
should  try  to  run  down ;  and  I  must  protest,  with  all  sin- 
cerity, that  I  wrote  without  a  thought  of  Prof.  Huxley 
at  all.  He  insists  on  knowing,  in  the  most  peremptory 
way  of  whom  I  was  thinking,  as  if  I  were  thinking  of 
him.  Of  whom  else  could  I  be  thinking,  forsooth,  when 
I  spoke  of  biology  ?  Well !  I  did  not  bite  my  thumb  at 
him,  but  I  bit  my  thumb. 

Seriously,  I  was  not  writing  at  Prof.  Huxley,  or  I 
should  have  named  him.  I  have  a  very  great  admiration 
for  his  work  in  biology  ;  I  have  learned  much  from  him  ; 
I  have  followed  his  courses  of  lectures  years  and  years 
ago,  and  have  carefully  studied  his  books.  If,  in  questions 
which  belong  to  sociology,  morals,  and  to  general  philoso- 
phy, he  seems  to  me  hardly  an  authority,  why  need  we 
dispute  ?  Dog  should  not  bite  dog ;  and  he  and  I  have 
many  a  wolf  that  we  both  would  keep  from  the  fold. 

But,  if  I  did  not  mean  Prof.  Huxley,  whom  did  I  mean  ? 
Now,  my  paper,  I  think  clearly  enough,  alluded  to  two 
very  different  kinds  of  materialism.  There  is  systematic 
materialism,  and  there  is  the  vague  materialism.  The 
eminent  example  of  the  first  is  the  unlucky  remark  of 
Cabanis  that  the  brain  secretes  thought,  as  the  liver  sec- 
retes bile ;  and  there  is  much  of  the  same  sort  in  many 


IT'2  A    MODERN    SYMPOSIUM. 

foreign  theories — in  the  tone  of  Moleschott,  Biichiier,  and 
the  like.  The  most  distinct  examples  of  it  in  this  coun- 
try  are  found  among  phrenologists,  spiritualists,  some 
mental  pathologists,  and  a  few  communist  visionaries. 
The  far  wider,  vaguer,  and  more  dangerous  school  of  ma- 
terialism is  found  in  a  multitude  of  quarters — in  all  those 
who  insist  exclusively  on  the  physical  -side  of  moral 
phenomena — all,  in  short,  who,  to  use  Prof.  Huxley's 
phrase,  are  employed  in  "  building  up  a  physical  theory 
of  moral  phenomena."  Those  who  confuse  moral  and 
physical  phenomena  are  indeed  few.  Those  who  exag- 
gerate the  physical  side  of  phenomena  are  many. 

Now,  though  I  did  not  allude  to  Prof.  Huxley  in  what 
I  wrote,  his  criticism  convinces  me  that  he  is  sometimes 
at  least  found  among  these  last.  I' is  paper  is  an  excel- 
lent illustration  of  the  very  error  which  I  condemned. 
The  issue  between  us  is  this :  We  both  agree  that  every 
mental  and  moral  fact  is  in  functional  relation  with  some 
molecular  fact.  So  far  we  are  entirely  on  the  same  side, 
as  against  all  forms  of  theological  and  metaphysical  doc- 
trine which  conceive  the  possibility  of  human  feeling 
without  a  human  body.  But,  then,  says  Prof.  Huxley,  if 
I  can  trace  the  molecular  facts  which  are  the  antecedents 
of  the  mental  and  moral  facts,  I  have  explained  these 
mental  and  moral  facts.  That  I  deny  ;  just  as  much  as  I 
should  deny  that  a  chemical  analysis  of  the  body  could 
ever  lead  to  an  explanation  of  the  physical  organism. 
Then,  says  the  professor,  when  I  have  traced  out  the 
molecular  facts,  I  have  built  up  a  physical  theory  of  moral 


THE   SOUL   AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  173 

phenomena.  That  again  I  deny.  I  say  there  is  no  such 
thing,  or  no  rational  thing,  that  can  be  called  a  phy- 
sical theory  of  moral  phenomena,  any  more  than  there 
is  a  moral  theory  of  physical  phenomena.  What  sort 
of  a  thing  would  be  a  physical  theory  of  history- 
history  explained  by  the  influence  of  climate  or  the 
like  ?  The  issue  between  us  centres  in  this :  I  say 
that  the  physical  side  of  moral  phenomena  bears  about 
the  same  part  in  the  moral  sciences  that  the  facts 
about  climate  bear  in  the  sum  of  human  civilization.  And 
that  to  look  to  the  physical  facts  as  an  explanation  of  the 
moral,  or  even  as  an  independent  branch  of  the  study  of 
moral  facts,  is  perfectly  idle;  just  as  it  would  be  if  a 
mere  physical  geographer  pretended  to  give  us,  out  of  his 
geography,  a  climatic  philosophy  of  history.  Yet  Prof. 
Huxley  has  not  been  deterred  from  the  astounding  para- 
dox of  proposing  to  us  a  physiological  theory  of  religion. 
He  tells  us  how  "  the  religious  feelings  may  be  brought 
within  the  range  of  physiological  inquiry."  And  he  pro- 
poses as  a  problem — "  What  diseased  viscus  may  have 
been  responsible  for  the  '  priest  in  absolution  ? "  I  will 
drop  all  epithets  ;  but  -I  must  say  that  I  call  that  materi- 
alism, and  materialism  not  very  nice  of  its  kind.  One 
might  as  reasonably  propose  as  a  problem — What  barome- 
trical readings  are  responsible  for  the  British  Constitution  ? 
and  suggest  a  congress  of  meteorologists  to  do  the  work 
of  Hallam,  Stubbs,  and  Freeman.  Mo  doubt  there  is 
some  connection  between  the  House  of  Commons  and  the 
English  climate,  and  so  there  is  no  doubt  some  connection 


174-  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

between  religious  theories  and  physical  organs.  But  to 
talk  of  "  bringing  religion  within  the  range  of  physiolo- 
gical inquiry  "  is  simply  to  stare  through  the  wrong  end 
of  the  telescope,  and  to  turn  philosophy  and  science  up- 
side down.  Ah  !  Prof.  Huxley,  this  is  a  bad  day's  work 
for  scientific  progress  — 


Ilpia/xos,  Ilpta/xoio  re 

Pope  Pius1  and  his  people  will  be  glad  when  they  read  that 
fatal  sentence  of  yours.  When  I  complained  of  the  "at- 
tempt to  dispose  of  the  deepest  moral  truths  of  human 
nature  on  a  bare  physical  or  physiological  basis,"  I  could 
not  have  expected  to  read  such  an  illustration  of  my 
meaning  by  Prof.  Huxley. 

Perhaps  he  will  permit  me  to  inform  him  (since  that  is 
the  style  which  he  affects)  that  there  once  was  —  and,  in- 
deed, we  may  say  still  is  —  an  institution  called  the  Catho- 
lic Church  ;  that  it  has  had  a  long  and  strange  history, 
and  subtile  influences  of  all  kinds  ;  and  I  venture  to 
think  that  Prof.  Huxley  may  learn  more  about  the  priest 
in  absolution  by  a  few  weeks'  study  of  the  Catholic 
system  than  by  inspecting  the  diseased  'viscera  of  the 
whole  human  race.  When  Prof.  Huxley's  historical  and 
religious  studies  "  have  advanced  so  far  as  to  enable  him 
to  explain  "  the  history  of  Catholicism,  I  think  he  will 
admit  that  "  priestcraft  "  cannot  well  be  made  a  chapter 
in  a  physiological  manual.  It  may  be  cheap  pulpit  thunder, 
but  this  idea  of  his  of  inspecting  a  "  diseased  viscus  "  is 

1  This  was  written  previous  to  the  death  of  Pope  Pius  IX. 


THE   SOUL   AND   FUTURE  LIFE.  175 

precisely  what  I  meant  by  "  biological  reasoning  about 
spiritual  things."  And  I  stand  by  it,  that  it  is  just  as 
false  in  science  as  it  is  deleterious  in  morals.  It  is  an 
attempt  (I  will  not  say  arrogant,  I  am  inclined  to  use  an- 
other epithet)  to  explain,  by  physical  observations,  what 
can  only  be  explained  by  the  most  subtile  moral,  sociolo- 
gical, and  historical  observations.  It  is  to  think  you  can 
find  the  golden  eggs  by  cutting  up  the  goose,  instead  ol 
watching  the  goose  to  see  where  she  lays  the  eggs. 

I  am  quite  aware  that  Prof.  Huxley  has  elsewhere  for- 
mulated his  belief  that  biology  is  the  science  which  "  in- 
cludes man  and  all  his  ways  and  works."  If  history,  law, 
politics,  morals,  and  political  economy,  are  merely  branches 
of  biology,  we  shall  want  new  dictionaries  indeed ;  and 
biology  will  embrace  about  four-fifths  of  human  know- 
ledge. But  this  is  not  a  question  of  language ;  for  we 
here  have  Prof.  Huxley  actually  bringing  religion  within 
the  range  of  physiological  inquiry,  and  settling  its  pro- 
blems by  references  to  "  diseased  viscus."  But  the  differ- 
ences between  us  are  a  long  story ;  and  since  Prof.  Huxley 
has  sought  me  out,  and  in  somewhat  monitorial  tone  has 
proposed  to  set  me  right,  I  will  take  an  early  occasion  to 
try  and  set  forth  what  I  find  paradoxical  in  his  notions 
of  the  relations  of  biology  and  philosophy. 

I  note  a  few  special  points  between  us,  and  I  have  done. 
Prof.  Huxley  is  so  well  satisfied  with  his  idea  of  a  "  phy- 
sical theory  of  moral  phenomena,"  that  he  constantly  at- 
tributes that  sense  to  my  words,  though  I  carefully 
guarded  my  language  from  such  a  construction.  Thus 


176  A   MODERN    SYMPOSIUM. 

he  quotes  from  me  a  passage  beginning,  "  Man  is  one, 
however  compound,"  but  he  breaks  off  the  quotation  just 
as  I  go  on  to  speak  of  the  direct  analysis  of  mental  and 
moral  faculties  by  mental  and  moral  science,  not  by  phy- 
siological science.  I  say  :  "  philosophy  and  science  "  have 
accomplished  explanations ;  I  do  not  say  biology ;  and 
the  biological  part  of  the  explanation  is  a  small  and  sub- 
ordinate part  of  the  whole.  I  do  not  say  that  the  corres- 
pondence between  physical  and  moral  phenomena  is  an 
explanation  of  the  human  organism.  Prof.  Huxley  says 
that,  and  T  call  it  materialism.  Nor  do  I  say  that  "  spiri- 
tual sensibility  is  a  bodily  function."  I  say,  it  is  a  moral 
function ;  and  I  complain  that  Prof.  Huxley  ignores  the 
distinction  between  moral  and  physical  functions  of  the 
human  organism. 

As  to  the  distinction  between  anatomy  and  physiology, 
if  he  will  look  at  my  words  again,  he  will  see  that  I  use 
these  terms  with  perfect  accuracy.  Six  lines  below  the 
passage  he  quotes,  I  speak  of  the  human  mechanism  being 
only  explained  by  a  "  complete  anatomy  a  fid  biology," 
showing  that  anatomy  is  merely  one  of  the  instruments 
of  biology. 

He  might  be  surprised  to  hear  that  he  does  not  himself 
give  an  accurate  definition  of  physiology.  But  so  it  is. 
He  says,  "  Physiology  is  the  science  which  treats  of  the 
functions  of  the  living  organism."  Not  so,  for  the  finest 
spiritual  sensibility  is,  as  Prof.  Huxley  admits,  a  function 
of  living  organism  ;  and  physiology  is  not  the  science 
which  treats  of  spiritual  sensibilities.  They  belong  to 


THE   SOUL   AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  177 

• 

moral  science.  There  are  mental,  moral,  affective  func- 
tions of  the  living  organism  ;  and  they  are  not  within  the 
province  of  physiology.  Physiology  is  the  science  which 
treats  of  the  bodily  functions  of  the  living  organism ;  as 
Prof.  Huxley  says  in  his  admirable  "  Elementary  Lessons/' 
it  deals  with  the  facts  "  concerning  the  action  of  the  body'1 
I  complain  of  the  pseudo-science  which  drops  that  distinc- 
tion for  a  minute.  He  says,  "  The  explanation  of  a  phy- 
siological function  is  the  demonstration  of  the  connection 
of  that  function  with  the  molecular  state  of  the  organ 
which  exerts  the  function."  That  I  dispute.  It  is  only 
a  small  part  of  the  explanation.  The  explanation  sub- 
stantially is  the  demonstration  of  the  laws  and  all  the 
conditions  of  the  function.  The  explanation  of  the  cir- 
culation of  the  blood  is  the  demonstration  of  all  its  laws, 
modes,  and  conditions  ;  and  the  molecular  antecedents  of 
it  are  but  a  small  part  of  the  explanation.  The  principal 
part  relates  to  the  molar  (and  not  the  molecular)  action 
of  the  heart  and  other  organs.  "  The  function  of  motion 
is  explained,"  he  says,  "  when  the  movements  of  the  living 
body  are  found  to  have  certain  molecular  changes  for 
their  invariable  antecedents."  Nothing  of  the  kind.  The 
function  of  bodily  motion  is  explained  when  the  laws, 
modes,  and  conditions,  of  that  motion  are  demonstrated ; 
and  molecular  antecedents  are  but  a  part  of  these  condi- 
tions. The  main  part  of  the  explanation,  again,  deals 
with  molar,  not  molecular,  states  of  certain  organs.  "  The 
function  of  sensation  is  explained,"  says  Prof.  Huxley, 
"when  the  molecular  changes,  which  are  the  invariable 
12 


178  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

antecedents  of  sensations,  are  discovered."  Not  a  bit  of 
it.  The  function  of  sensation  is  only  explained  when  the 
laws  and  conditions  of  sensation  are  demonstrated.  And 
the  main  part  of  this  demonstration  will  come  from  direct 
observation  of  the  sensitive  organism  organically,  and  by 
no  molecular  discovery  whatever.  All  this  is  precisely 
the  materialism  which  I  condemn ;  the  fancying  that  one 
science  can  do  the  work  of  another,  and  that  any  molecu- 
lar discovery  can  dispense  with  direct  study  of  organisms 
in  their  organic,  social,  mental,  and  moral  aspects.  Will 
Prof.  Huxley  say  that  the  function  of  this  Symposium  is 
explained,  when  we  have  chemically  analyzed  the  solids 
and  liquids  which  are  now  effecting  molecular  change  in 
our  respective  digestive  apparatus  ?  If  so,  let  us  ask  the 
butler  if  he  cannot  produce  us  a  less  heady  and  more  mel- 
low vintage.  What  irritated  viscus  is  responsible  for  the 
materialist  'in  philosophy?  We  shall  all  philosophize 
aright,  if  our  friend  Tyndall  can  hit  for  us  the  exact 
chemical  formula  for  our  drinks. 

It  does  not  surprise  me,  so  much  as  it  might,  to  find 
Prof.  Huxley  slipping  into  really  inaccurate  definitions  in 
physiology,  when  I  remember  that  hallucination  of  his 
about  questions  of  science  all  becoming  questions  of  mole- 
cular physics.  The  molecular  facts  are  valuable  enough; 
but  we  are  getting  molecular-mad,  if  we  forget  that  mole- 
cular facts  have  only  a  special  part  in  physiology,  and 
hardly  any  part  at  all  in  sociology,  history,  morals,  and 
politics  ;  though  I  quite  agree  that  there  is  no  single  fact 
in  social,  moral,  or  mental  philosophy,  that  has  not  its 


THE  SOUL  AND   FUTURE   LIFE.  179 

correspondence  in  some  molecular  fact,  if  we  only  could 
know  it.  All  human  things  undoubtedly  depend  on,  and 
are  certainly  connected  with,  the  general  laws  of  the 
solar  system.  And  to  say  that  questions  of  human  organ- 
isms, much  less  of  human  society,  tend  to  become  ques- 
tions of  molecular  physics,  is  exactly  the  kind  of  confu- 
sion it  would  be,  if  I  said  that  questions  of  history  tend 
to  become  questions  of  astronomy,  and  that  the  more 
refined  calculations  of  planetary  movements  in  the  future 
will  explain  to  us  the  causes  of  English  Rebellion  and  the 
French  Revolution. 

There  is  an  odd  instance  of  this  confusion  of  thought 
at  the  close  of  Prof.  Huxley's  paper,  which  still  more 
oddly  Lord  Blachford,  who  is  so  strict  in  his  logic,  cites 
with  approval.  "  Has  a  stone  a  future  life,"  says  Prof. 
Huxley,  "  because  the  wavelets  it  may  cause  in  the  sea 
persist  through  space  and  time  ? "  Well !  has  a  stone  a 
life  at  all  ?  because  if  it  has  no  present  life,  I  cannot  see 
why  it  should  have  a  future  life.  How  is  any  reasoning 
about  the  inorganic  world  to  help  us  here  in  reasoning 
about  the  organic  world  ?  Prof.  Huxley  and  Lord  Blach- 
ford might  as  well  ask  if  a  stone  is  capable  of  civilization 
because  I  said  that  man  was.  I  think  that  man  is  wholly 
different  from  a  stone  ;  and  from  a  fiddle ;  and  even  from 
a  dog ;  and  that  to  say  that  a  man  cannot  exert  any 
influence  on  other  men  after  his  death,  because  a  dog  can- 
not, or  because  a  fiddle  or  because  a  stone  cannot,  may  be 
to  reproduce  with  rather  needless  affectation  the  verbal 
quibbles  and  pitfalls  which  Socrates  and  the  sophists 


180  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

prepared  for  each  other  in   some  wordy  symposium  of 
old. 

Lastly,  Prof.  Huxley  seems  to  think  that  he  has  dis- 
posed of  me  altogether,  so  soon  as  he  can  point  to  a  sym- 
pathy between  theologians  and  myself.  I  trust  there  are 
great  affinity  and  great  sympathy  between  us ;  and  pray 
let  him  not  think  that  I  am  in  the  least  ashamed  of  that 
coi  i  n  non  ground.  Positivism  has  quite  as  much  sympathy 
with  the  genuine  theologian  as  it  has  with  the  scientific 
specialist.  The  former  may  be  working  on  a  wrong 
intellectual  basis,  and  often  it  may  be  by  most  perverted 
methods ;  but,  in  the  best  types,  he  has  a  high  social  aim 
and  a  great  moral  cause  to  maintain  among  men.  The 
latter  is  usually  right  in  his  intellectual  basis  as  far  as  it 
goes  ;  but  it  does  not  go  very  far,  and  in  the  great  moral 
cause  of  the  spiritual  destinies  of  men  he  is  often  content 
with  utter  indifference  and  simple  nihilism.  Mere  raving 
at  priestcraft,  and  beadles,  and  outward  investments,  is 
indeed  a  poor  solution  of  the  mighty  problems  of  the 
human  soul  and  of  social  organization.  And  the  instinct 
of  the  mass  of  mankind  will  long  reject  a  biology  which 
has  nothing  for  these  but  a  sneer.  It  will  not  do  for 
Prof.  Huxley  to  say  that  he  is  only  a  poor  biologist  and 
careth  for  none  of  these  things.  His  biology,  however, 
"  includes  man  and  all  his  ways  and  works."  Besides,  he 
is  a  leader  in  Israel ;  he  has  preached  an  entire  volume  of 
"  Lay  Sermons ; "  and  he  has  waged  many  a  war  with 
theologians  and  philosophers  on  religious  and  philoso- 
phic problems.  What,  if  I  may.  ask  him,  are  his  own 


THE  SOUL  AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  181 

religion  and  his  own  philosophy  ?  He  says  that  he 
knows  no  scientific  men  who  "  neglect  all  philosophical 
and  religious  synthesis."  In  that  he  is  fortunate  in  his 
circle  of  acquaintances.  But  since  he  is  so  earnest  in 
asking  me  questions,  let  me  ask  him  to  tell  the  world 
what  is  his  own  synthesis  of  philosophy,  what  is  his  own 
idea  of  religion  ?  He  can  laugh  at  the  worship  of  priests 
and  positivists :  whom,  or  what,  does  he  worship?  If  he 
dislikes  the  word  soul,  does  he  think  that  man  has  any- 
thing that  can  be  called  a  spiritual  nature  ?  If  he  derides 
my  idea  of  a  future  life,  does  he  think  that  there  is  any- 
thing which  can  be  said  of  a  man,  when  his  carcass  is 
laid  beneath  the  sod,  beyond  a  simple  final  vole  ? 

P.S. — And  now  space  fails  me  to  reply  to  the  appeals 
of  so  many  critics.  I  cannot  enter  with  Mr.  Roden  Noel 
on  that  great  question  of  the  materialization  of  the  spirits 
of  the  dead ;  I  know  not  whether  we  shall  be  "  made  one 
with  the  great  Elohim,  or  angels  of  Nature,  or  if  we  shall 
grovel  in  dead  material  bodily  life."  I  know  nothing  of 
this  high  matter:  I  do  not  comprehend  this  language. 
Nor  can  I  add  anything  to  what  I  have  said  on  that 
sense  of  personality  which  Lord  Selborne  and  Canon 
Barry  so  eloquently  press  on  me.  To  me  that  sense  of 
personality  is  a  thing  of  somewhat  slow  growth,  resulting 
from  our  entire  nervous  organization  and  our  composite 
mental  constitution.  It  seems  to  me  that  we  can  often 
trace  it  building  up  and  trace  it  again  decaying  away. 
We  feel  ourselves  to  be  men,  because  we  have  human 


182  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

bodies  and  human  minds.  Is  that  not  enough  ?  Has  the 
baby  of  an  hour  this  sense  of  personality  ?  Are  you  sure 
that  a  dog  or  an  elephant  has  not  got  it  ?  Then  has  the 
baby  no  soul ;  has  the  dog  a  soul  ?  Do  you  know  more 
of  your  neighbour,  apart  from  inference,  than  you  know 
of  the  dog?  Again,  I  cannot  enter  upon  Mr.  Greg's 
beautiful  reflections,  save  to  point  out  how  largely  he 
supports  me.  He  shows,  I  think  with  masterly  logic, 
how  difficult  it  is  to  fit  this  new  notion  of  a  glorified 
activity  on  to  the  old  orthodoxy  of  beatific  ecstacy. 
Canon  Barry  reminds  us  how  this  orthodoxy  involved  the 
resurrection  of  the  body,  and  the  same  difficulty  has 
driven  Mr.  Roden  Noel  to  suggest  that  the  material  world 
itself  may  be  the  debris  of  the  just  made  perfect.  But 
Dr.  Ward,  as  might  be  expected,  falls  back  on  the  beatific 
ecstacy  as  conceived  by  the  mystics  of  the  thirteenth 
centuiy.  No  word  here  about  moral  activity  and  the 
social  converse,  as  in  the  Elysian  fields,  imagined  by 
philosophers  of  less  orthodox  severity. 

One  word  more.  If  my  language  has  given  any  belie- 
ver pain,  I  regret  it  sincerely.  It  may  have  been  some- 
what obscure,  since  it  has  been  so  widely  arraigned,  and 
I  think  misconceived.  My  position  is  this  :  The  idea  of 
a  glorified  energy  in  an  ampler  life  is  an  idea  utterly 
incompatible  with  exact  thought,  one  which  evaporates 
in  contradictions,  in  phrases  which  when  pressed  have  no 
meaning.  The  idea  of  beatific  ecstacy  is  the  old  and 
orthodox  idea  ;  it  does  not  involve  so  many  contradictions 
as  the  former  idea,  but  then  it  does  not  satisfy  our  moral 


THE  SOUL  AND  FUTURE  LIFE.  183 

judgment.  I  say  plainly  that  the  hope  of  such  an  infinite 
ecstacy  is  an  inane  and  unworthy  crown  of  a  human  life. 
And  when  Dr.  Ward  assures  me  that  it  is  merely  the 
prolongation  of  the  saintly  life,  then  I  say  the  saintly  life 
is  an  inane  and  unworthy  life.  The  words  I  used  about 
the  "  selfish  "  views  of  futurity,  I  applied  only  to  those  who 
say  they  care  for  nothing  but  personal  enjoyment,  and  to 
those  whose  only  aim  is  "to  save  their  own  souls."  Mr. 
Baldwin  Brown  has  nobly  condemned  this  creed  in  words 
far  stronger  than  mine.  And  here  let  us  close  with  the 
reflection  that  the  language  of  controversy  must  always 
be  held  to  apply  not  to  the  character  of  our  opponents, 
but  to  the  logical  consequences  of  their  doctrines,  if 
uncorrected  and  if  forced  to  their  extreme. 


THE  INFLUENCE   UPON  MORALITY 


OF    A 


DECLINE  IN  EELIGIOUS  BELIEF. 


THE 

INFLUENCE  UPOIN   MORALITY 


OF  A 


DECLINE  IN  RELIGIOUS  BELIEF. 


SIR  JAMES  STEPHEN. 

MANY  persons  regard  everything  which  tends  to 
discredit  theology  with  disapprobation,  because 
they  think  that  all  such  speculations  must  endanger 
morality  as  well.  Others  assert  that  morality  has  a  basis 
of  its  own  in  human  nature,  and  that,  even  if  all  theo- 
logical belief  were  exploded,  morality  would  remain 
unaffected. 

My  own  view  is,  that  each  party  is  to  a  considerable 
extent  right,  but  that  the  true  practical  inference  is  often 
neglected. 

Understanding  by  the  theology  of  an  age  or  country 
the  theory  of  the  universe  generally  accepted  then  and 
there,  and  by  its  morality  the  rules  of  life  then  and 
there  commonly  regarded  as  binding,  it  seems  to  me 
extravagant  to  say  that  the  one  does  not  influence  the 


188  .A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

other.  The  difference  between  living  in  a  country  where 
the  established  theory  is  that  existence  is  an  evil,  and  an- 
nihilation the  highest  good,  and  living  in  a  country  where 
the  established  theory  is  that  the  earth  is  the  Lord's  and  the 
fullness  thereof,  the  round  world  and  they  that  dwell  there- 
in, has  surely  a  good  deal  to  do  with  the  other  differences 
which  distinguish  Englishmen  from  Buddhists. 

Even  if  it  be  said  that  such  differences  are  merely  a 
way  of  expressing  the  result  of  a  difference  of  tempera- 
ment and  constitution  otherwise  caused,  this  does  not 
diminish  the  effect  of  a  belief  in  the  truth  of  the  theory. 
Kali,  Bhowanee,  and  other  malevolent  deities  worshipped 
in  India,  are  probably  phantoms  engendered  by  fear 
working  on  a  rank  fancy ;  but  this  does  not  make  the 
belief  in  their  real  existence  less  influential  in  those  who 
hold  it.  A  man  who  cuts  off  the  end  of  his  tongue  to 
propitiate  Kali  would  let  it  alone  if  he  ceased  to  believe 
in  her  existence,  though  the  temper  of  mind  which  created 
her  might  still  remain,  and  show  itself  in  other  ways. 

The  belief  that  the  course  of  the  world  is  ordered  by  a 
good  God,  that  right  and  wrong  are  in  the  nature  of  a 
divine  law,  that  this  world  is  a  place  of  trial,  and  part 
only  of  a  wider  existence — in  a  word,  the  belief  in  God 
and  a  future  state — may  be  accounted  for  in  various  ways. 
Now  that  in  this  country  (to  go  no  farther)  the  vast 
majority  of  people  believe  these  doctrines  to  be  true,  in 
fact,  just  as  they  believe  it  to  be  true,  in  fact,  that  ships 
and  carriages  can  be  driven  by  steam,  and  that  their  con- 
duct is  in  innumerable  instances  as  distinctly  influenced 


A   DECLINE   IN   RELIGIOUS  BELIEF.  189 

by  the  one  belief  as  by  the  other,  appear  to  me  to  be  pro 
positions  too  plain  to  be  proved. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  at  least  equally  evident 
that  morality  has  a  basis  of  its  own  quite  independent  of 
all  theology  whatever.  It  is  difficult  to  imagine  any 
doctrine  about  theology  which  has  not  prevailed  at  some 
time  or  place ;  but  no  one  ever  heard  of  men  living  to- 
gether without  some  rules  of  life — that  is,  without  some 
sort  of  morality.  Given  human  action  and  human  pas- 
sion, and  a  vast  number  of  people  all  acting  and  feeling, 
moral  rules  of  conduct  of  some  sort  are  a  necessary  con- 
sequence. The  destruction  of  religion  would,  I  think,  in- 
volve a  moral  revolution  ;  but  it  would  no  more  destroy 
morality  than  a  political  revolution  destroys  law.  It 
would  substitute  one  set  of  moral  rules  and  sentiments  for 
another,  just  as  the  establishment  of  Christianity  and 
Mohammedanism  did  when  they  superseded  various  forms 
of  paganism. 

It  would  be  scarcely  worth  while  to  write  down  these 
commonplaces,  if  it  were  not  for  the  sake  of  the  practical 
inference.  It  is  that  theology  and  morality  ought  to 
stand  to  each  other  in  precisely  the  same  relation  as  facts 
and  legislation. 

No  one  would  propose  to  support  by  artificial  means 
a  law  passed  under  a  mistake,  for  fear  it  should  have  to 
be  altered.  To  say  that  the  truth  of  a  theological  doctrine 
must  not  be  questioned,  lest  the  discovery  of  its  falsehood 
should  produce  a  bad  moral  effect,  is  in  principle  precisely 
the  same  thing.  It  is  at  least  as  unlikely  that  false 


190  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

theology  should  produce  good  morals  as  that  legislation 
based  on  a  mistaken  view  of  facts  should  work  well  in 
practice. 

I  will  give  two  illustrations  of  this — any  number  mi^ht 
be  given :  Suicide  is  commonly  regarded  as  wrong;  and 
this  moral  doctrine  is  defended  on  theological  grounds  > 
which  are  summed  up  in  the  old  saying  that  the  soldier 
must  not  leave  his  post  till  he  is  relieved.  I  will  not  in- 
quire whether  any  other  argument  can  be  produced  for- 
bidding suicide  to  a  person  labouring  under  a  disease  which 
converts  his  whole  life  into  one  long  scene  of  excruciating 
agony,  and  which  must  kill  him  in  the  course  of  a  few 
useless  months,  during  which  he  is  a  source  of  misery,  and 
perhaps  danger,  to  his  nearest  and  dearest  friends.  I  con- 
fine  myself  to  saying  that,  if  it  could  be  shown  that  there 
is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  God  has  in  fact  forbidden 
such  an  act,  its  morality  might  be  discussed  and  decided 
upon  on  different  grounds  from  those,  on  which  it  must 
be  considered  and  decided  upon  on  the  opposite  hypothesis. 

Take  again,  the  law  of  marriage.  Suppose  a  man's  wife 
is  hopelessly  insane — ought  he  be  allowed  to  marry  again  ? 
Ought  divorce  to  be  permitted  in  any  case  ?  These  ques- 
tions will  be  discussed  in  a  very  different  spirit,  though  it 
is  possible  that  they  might  be  answered  in  the  same  way 
by  persons  who  do  and  by  persons  who  do  not  believe  in 
sacraments,  and  that  marriage  is  a  sacrament. 

Now,  let  us  suppose  for  the  sake  of  argument  that  it 
could  be  shown  that,  if  all  theological  considerations  were 
set  aside,  it  would  be  desirable  that  a  person  dying  of 


A  DECLINE  IN  RELIGIOUS  BELIEF.  191 

cancer  should  be  permitted  to  commit  suicide,  and  that  a 
man  whose  wife  was  incurably  mad  should  be  allowed  to 
marry  again  ;  and  that,  on  the  other  hand,  if  theological 
considerations  were  taken  into  account,  the  opposite  was 
desirable.  Upon  these  suppositions  the  question  whether 
the  theological  beliefs  which  make  the  difference  are 
beneficial  or  not  will  depend  on  the  question  whether 
they  are  true  or  not.  Applied  generally,  this  shows  that 
the  support  which  an  existing  creed  gives  to  an  existing 
system  of  morals  is  irrelevant  to  its  truth,  and  that  the 
question  whether  a  given  system  of  morals  is  good  or  bad 
cannot  be  fully  determined  until  after  the  determination 
of  the  question  whether  the  theology  on  which  it  rests  is 
true  or  false.  The  morality  is  good  if  it  is  founded  on  a 
true  estimate  of  the  consequences  of  human  actions.  But 
if  it  is  founded  on  a  false  theology,  it  is  founded  on  a 
false  estimate  of  the  consequences  of  human  actions ;  and, 
so  far  as  that  is  the  case,  it  cannot  be  good  ;  and  the  cir- 
cumstance that  it  is  supported  by  the  theology  to  which 
it  refers  is  an  argument  against,  and  not  in  favour  of,  that 
theology. 


LORD  SELBORNE. 

I  BEGIN  by  observing  that  (putting  special  cases  aside, 
and  looking  at  the  question  in  a  general  way)  morality 
has  not  flourished,  among  either  civilized  or  uncivilized 
men,  when  religious  belief  has  been  generally  lost,  or 


192  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

utterly  debased.  Not  to  dwell  upon  the  case  of  savage 
races,  the  modern  Hindoos  and  Chinese  have  long  been 
civilized,  but  are  certainly  not  moral ;  nor  can  anything 
worse  be  conceived  than  the  morality  of  the  Greeks  and 
Romans,  at  the  height  of  their  civilization.  The  morality 
of  the  Romans,  in  the  old  republican  times  when  they 
knew  nothing  of  Greek  philosophy,  was  praised  by  Poly- 
bius,  who  connected  it,  directly  and  emphatically,  with 
the  influence  among  them  of  religious  belief.  After  their 
intellectual  cultivation  had  taken  its  tone  from  the  irre- 
religious  or  agnostic  materialism  of  Epicurus  (hardly  dis- 
tinguishable, I  think,  from  that  sort  of  philosophy  which 
some  persons  think  destined  to  supplant  religious  belief 
in  the  present  day),  their  morality  became  what  is  de- 
scribed in  the  first  chapter  of  the  Epistle  to  the  Romans 
and  in  the  Satires  of  Juvenal ;  nor  does  it  seern  to  have 
been  worse  than  that  of  the  other  civilized  races  on  the 
shores  of  the  Mediterranean,  over  whom,  at  the  same  time, 
religion  had  equally  lost  its  influence. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  to  me  certain,  as  an  his- 
torical fact,  that  the  place  which  the  principles  of  love  and 
benevolence,  humility  and  self-abnegation,  have  assumed 
in  the  morality  of  Christian  nations  (with  a  wide-spread- 
ing influence  which  has  been  advancing  till  the  present 
time  with  the  growth  of  civilization)  is  specifically  due 
to  Christianity.  To  Christianity  are  specially  due — 1. 
Our  respect  for  human  life,  which  condemns  suicide,  in- 
fanticide, political  assassination,  and  I  might  almost  say 
homicide  generally,  in  a  way  previously  unknown,  and 


A  DECLINE  IN   RELIGIOUS  BELIEF.  193 

still  unknown*  where  Christianity  does  not  prevail ;  2. 
recognition  of  such  moral  and  spiritual  relations  between 
man  and  man  as  are  inconsistent  with  the  degradation  of 
women,  and  with  the  practice  of  slavery ;  3.  Our  rever- 
ence for  the  bond  of  marriage  ;  and,  4.  Our  abhorrence  of 
some  particular  forms  of  vice.  I  do  not  mean  to  deny 
that  traces  of  a  state  of  opinion,  more  or  less  similar  upon 
some  of  these  points,  are  discoverable  in  what  we  know 
of  the  manners  of  some  non-Christian  nations  ;  but  it  is 
historically  true  to  say  that  the  prevalence  of  each  of 
these  principles,  as  manifested  among  ourselves,  is  speci- 
fically due  to  Christianity.  Of  Christianity  I  speak 
in  a  sense  inclusive  of  all  that  it  derives  from  the  ante- 
cedent Jewish  system ;  of  which  it  claims  to  be  the  true 
continuation  and  development. 

If  freedom  of  inquiry  is  not  to  be  stopped,  after  the  re- 
jection of  religious  belief,  it  must  gradually  extend  itself 
to  the  whole  circle  of  morality,  most,  if  not  all,  of  which 
is  as  little  capable  of  demonstrative  proof  through  the 
evidence  of  the  senses  as  any  of  the  doctrines  of  religion. 
Those  who  reject  religion  will  not  voluntarily  submit  to 
moral  restraints  founded  upon  the  religion  which  they 
reject,  unless  they  can  be  placed  upon  some  other  intel- 
lectual basis,  sufficiently  cogent  to  themselves  to  resist  the 
attractions  of  appetite  or  self-interest.  That  large  part  of 
mankind  who  are  always  too  much  under  the  government 
of  their  inclinations  and  passions  will  be  quicker  in  draw- 
ing moral  corollaries  from  irreligious  principles  than  the 
philosophers  by  whom  those  principles  are  propounded  ; 
13 


194  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

and  the  advanced  posts  of  morality,  in  which  the  influence 
of  religion  culminates,  and  of  which  the  necessity  may 
not  be  so  evident  on  natural  or  social  grounds,  are  not 
likely  to  be  very  strenuously  defended  by  those  philoso- 
phers themselves. 

If  the  religious  foundations  and  sanctions  of  morality 
are  given  up,  what  is  to  be  substituted  for  them  ? 

First :  will  the  modern  notion  of  a  duty  to  act  so  as  may 
conduce  to  the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number 
of  men  be  sufficient  ?  I  think,  certainly  not.  The  idea 
of  duty  is  not,  to  my  mind,  practical  or  intelligible  without 
religious  conceptions ;  and  this  particular  conception  of 
duty  depends  entirely  upon  a  test  extrinsic,  and  not  per- 
sonal, to  the  individual — a  test,  too,  which  it  is  difficult 
(not  to  say  impossible)  for  each  individual  to  verify  for 
himself ;  though  it  may  be  verified,  to  their  own  satis- 
faction, by  philosophical  students  of  casuistry  or  political 
economy.  Those  motives  are  of  necessity  strongest  which 
directly  concern  the  man  himself :  and  a  moral  principle 
which  attempts  to  counteract  influences  operating  directly 
and  immediately  upon  the  will  by  others  which  are 
speculative  and  remote,  without  any  higher  sanctions 
realized  by  and  reacting  upon  the  individual,  must  neces- 
sarily be  weak. 

But,  secondly :  will  this  idea  be  sufficient,  if  so  modified 
as  to  present  to  the  man  the  pursuit  of  his  own  happiness 
in  this  world  as  the  rule  of  life,  but  teach  him  to  discover 
it  by  observing  and  doing  those  things  which  most  con- 
duce to  the  happiness  of  men  in  general  ?  In  this  f orm  it 


A   DECLINE   IN   RELIGIOUS   BELIEF.  195 

is  older  and  more  plausible  ;  but  the  difficulties  of  making 
it  practical  are  really  very  much  the  same.  This  doctrine, 
as  Aristotle  observes,  depends  upon  a  general  induction  : 
it  deals  only  with  general  truths  and  general  conclusions, 
to  which  there  are  many  apparent  and  (if  there  were  no 
jaw  of  moral  retribution  and  adjustment  behind)  many 
real  exceptions.  The  foundations  of  a  man's  moral 
character  and  habits  must  .be  laid  in  his  youth  :  when  (as 
Aristotle  also  says)  he  is  inexperienced,  naturally  inclined 
to  follow  his  passions,  and  not  predisposed  to  accept  the 
disquisitions  of  philosophers  as  proof  that  his  own  happi- 
ness will  not  be  promoted  by  seeking  it  in  his  own  way. 
The  temperament  most  likely  to  act  consciously  on  such 
a  rule  of  life  is  not  the  most  generous  ;  it  is  rather  that 
which  is  cold  and  calculating,  and  which  values  the 
reputation  more  than  the  reality  of  virtue.  Upon  such 
men,  at  the  best,  its  influence  is  to  establish  a  low  stand- 
ard of  virtue :  perhaps  only  to  check  and  impose  limits 
on  their  tendency  to  vice.  Over  others  it  can  have  little 
or  no  power,  except  when  operating  in  combination  with, 
and  subordination  to,  higher  principles. 

Not  only  did  the  ethical  systems  of  the  ancients  which 
were  based  upon  this  principle  fail  to  make  men  moral, 
but  we  see  its  impotence  constantly  exemplified  among 
those  whom  we  call  "  men  of  the  world  " — a  class  of  per- 
sons who  are  by  no  means  indifferent  to  their  own  happi- 
ness, or  to  the  good  opinion  of  the  world,  but  by  whom 
the  influence  of  religious  belief  is  not  practically  felt ; 
exemplified,  too,  on  points  of  morality  of  which  the 


196  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

reasonaMciK-ss  st-cms  most  manifest.  There  are  no  virtues, 
I  suppose,  which  can  more  readily  be  shown  to  be  con- 
ducive to  happiness,  whether  particular  or  general,  than 
that  which  the  Greeks  called  eyK/aareta,  and  that  of  -benevo- 
lence. What  can  be  more  contrary,  to  both  at  once  of 
these,  than  the  irregular  indulgence  of  sensual  appetite  at 
the  cost  of  the  permanent  degradation,  and  almost  certain 
misery,  of  human  beings  who  are  its  instruments  and 
victims,  and  of  innumerable  physical  as  well  as  moral 
evils  to  individuals,  families,  and  mankind  at  large  ?  Yet 
how  very  common  is  this  sort  of  immorality,  even  among 
cultivated  men,  living  on  good  terms  with  society  !  How 
little  is  it  reproved,  how  seldom  restrained,  except  by  the 
authority,  or  through  the  influence,  direct  or  indirect,  of 
religion !  All  readers  of  Horace  remember  the  sententia 
dia  Catonis,  and  I  doubt  whether  non-religious  opinion 
among  ourselves  is  much  stricter  on  this  subject,  though 
.  it  may  be  less  freely  expressed.  If  it  is  otherwise  as  to 
some  of  the  more  abnormal  forms  of  d/cpao-ia,  I  have  al- 
ready said  that  is  specifically  due  to  Christianity.  The 
cultivated  Greeks  and  Romans  spoke  and  wrote  lightly 
and  familiarly  of  vices  of  which  we  do  not  speak  at  all :  they 
regarded  them,  indeed,  as  effeminate,  but  not  as  infamous, 
and  certainly  did  not  visit  them  with  grave  social  penal 
ties.  So  tainted  was  their  moral  atmosphere,  that  even 
such  really  religious  men  among  them  as  Socrates  and 
Plato  (to  whom,  however,  a  religion  teaching  morals  with 
definiteness  and  authority  was  unknown)  surprise  us  by 
their  want  of  sensitiveness  on  these  points,  as  manifested 
in  some  passages  of  the  Socratic  Dialogues. 


• 


A  DECLINE  IN   RELIGIOUS  BELIEF.  197 

-  I  will  next  inquire  whether  a  sufficient  rule  of  morality 
is  to  be  found,  when  religion  is  set  aside,  in  any  law  of  our 
nature  :  first,  regarding  the  constitution  of  our  nature 
apart  from,  and,  secondly,  taking  into  account,  the  exist- 
ence in  it,  of  a  moral  instinct  or  sense. 

If  any  one  calls  the  application  of  right  reason  to  human 
conduct  generally  a  law  of  our  nature,  from  which  such  a 
rule  is  to  be  derived,  without  taking  into  account  the 
moral  sense — this,  as  it  seems  to  me,  would  be  only  a 
different  and  more  indefinite  mode  of  expressing  substan- 
tially the  same  theories,  which  have  been  already  dealt 
with. 

But  it  may,  perhaps,  be  suggested  that  laws  of  our 
nature,  from  which  such  a  rule  may  be  derived,  are  to  be 
found  in  the  final  causes  and  purposes  of  the  several 
organs  and  powers  which  exist  in  that  nature ;  and 
that  the  use  of  any  of  those  organs  or  powers  in 
a  manner  aberrant  from  their  proper  causes  and  pur- 
poses is  a  breach  of  natural  morality.  I  do  not  pause 
to  inquire  whether  the  idea  of  "  cause "  and  "  pur- 
pose," which  is  involved  in  such  a  view,  can  be  veri- 
fied apart  from  religion.  But  such  a  rule  would,  at  best, 
be  far  from  co-extensive  with  the  whole  field  of  morality  ; 
some  most  necessary  parts  of  a  moral  code  (such,  e.  g.,  as 
the  regulation  of  the  relations  between  the  sexes)  being 
incapable  of  being  deduced,  with  any  approach  to  cer- 
tainity,  from  the  mere  constitution  of  our  nature.  As  to 
some  of  our  faculties,  the  determination,  with  sufficient 
accuracy,  to  furnish  a  rule  of  life,  of  their  final  causes  and 


198  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

purposes,  might  involve  difficult  philosophical  inquiries, 
As  to  others,  though  there  might  be  no  such  difficulty,  it 
is  to  be  remembered  that  we  have  a  complex  nature,  in 
which  the  forces  which  operate,  either  mechanically  or  in 
a  way  resembling  the  mechanical,  •  upon  the  will,  are 
constantly  in  practical  antagonism  to  the  regulative 
faculty.  The  faculties  of  which  the  final  causes  are  most 
obvious  exist,  not  apart  from,  but  in  combination  with, 
other  elements  of  our  nature  which  (either  generally  or 
often)  result  in  tendencies  to  their  use  without  any  direct 
view  to  the  fulfilment  of  their  proper  purposes.  The 
gratification  of  some  of  those  tendencies  (such,  e.  g.,  as 
eating  and  drinking  for  the  mere  pleasure  of  taste,  and  not 
for  nourishment)  can  hardly  be  condemned  as  immoral, 
on  natural  grounds,  unless  carried  so  far  as  to  overpower 
reason,  or  impair  strength  or  health.  When  it  is  carried 
to  that  excess  (as  in  the  case  of  intemperance),  it  is  still 
true  that  the  origin  of  the  vice  has  been  in  the  natural 
constitution  of  men's  bodies,  by  which  a  sensible  gratifi- 
cation has  been  found  in  its  indulgence  :  which  (as  it  seems 
to  me)  goes  far  to  prove  that  this  conception  of  a  physical 
law  cannot  be  relied  upon,  even  in  the  cases  to  which  it 
is  most  directly  applicable,  as  a  practical  basis  of  morality 
— a  view  which  is  confirmed  by  the  actual  prevalence 
among  men  of  that  class  of  vices,  even  when,  to  all  natural 
safeguards,  is  superadded  the  external  influence  of  re- 
ligion. 

When   we   proceed   to   take   into   account   the   moral 
instinct  or  sense,  we  come  upon  the  border-ground,  if  not 


A  DECLINE  IN  RELIGIOUS  BELIEF.  199 

into  the  proper  territory,  of  Religion.  To  a  man  who 
believes  in  a  moral  government  of  the  universe,  in  the 
distinctness  of  the  Ego,  the  real  man,  from  his  bodily 
organization,  and  in  the  doctrines  of  moral  responsibility 
and  moral  adjustment  in  a  future  state,  nothing  can  be 
more  real,  nothing  more  intelligible,  than  this  moral 
instinct  or  sense,  with  its  suggestions  of  right  and  wrong, 
of  duty,  guilt  and  sin,  and  its  judicial  conscience.  But,  if  all 
these  postulates  are  denied,  what  is  then  to  be  thought  of 
this  moral  instinct  or  sense  ?  Why  is  it,  on  that  hypo- 
thesis, less  a  mere  accident  of  the  nervous  system,  or  of 
some  other  part  of  the  bodily  organization,  than  the 
religious  instinct,  which  is  already  supposed  to  be  set 
aside,  as  resting  upon  no  demonstrable  ground  ?  As  a 
phenomenon,  and  in  some  sense  a  fact,  it  exists,  just  as 
the  religious  instinct  does  (if  they  be  not  really  the  same)  ; 
but  those  principles  of  thought  which  explain  away  the 
one,  as  having  no  proper  objective  cause,  and  as  indicative 
of  no  objective  truth,  may  as  easily  explain  away  the 
other  also.  The  one  is  not  more  susceptible  of  sensible 
and  experimental  demonstration  than  the  other.  If  man 
were  merely  a  higher  order  of  the  organization  of  matter, 
homogeneous  with,  and  produced  by  spontaneous  develop- 
ment from  inorganic  substances,  plants,  and  inferior 
animals,  and  under  no  responsibility  to  any  moral  intel- 
ligence greater  than  his  own,  what  reality  would  there  be 
in  the  conception  of  a  moral  law  of  obligation,  inappli- 
cable to  all  other  known  forms  of  matter,  and  applicable 
only  to  man, 


200  A   MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

These  questions  are  practical.  Experience,  on  the  large 
scale,  shows  that  men  who  disregard  the  religious,  cannot 
generally  be  trusted  to  pay  regard  to  the  moral,  sense.  A 
moral  sense,  not  believed  in,  can  never  supply  a  practical 
foundation  for  morality.  On  the  other  hand,  a  moral 
sense,  believed  in,  is  (in  reality)  itself  religion — possibly 
inarticulate,  but  religion  still.  Such  a  belief  cannot  exist, 
without  accepting  the  evidence  of  the  moral  sense  as 
equally  trustworthy  concerning  those  things  of  which  it 
informs  us,  as  the  evidence  of  the  bodily  senses  is  concern- 
ing those  things  of  which  they  inform  us.  It  is,  of 
course,  only  from  the  impressions  made  upon  our  own 
minds  that  we  can  know  anything  about  any  of  the 
subjects,  either  of  physical,  or  of  intellectual,  or  of  moral 
sensation  :  their  intrinsic  nature,  abstracted  from  those 
impressions,  is  to  us,  in  each  case  alike,an  inaccessible  mys- 
tery. But  belief  in  the  sense  is  belief  in  the  truth  of  the 
information  which  the  sense  gives  to  us ;  that  is,  that  this 
information,  if  rightly  apprehended,  is  trustworthy,  as  far 
as  it  goes  ;  that  there  are  objective  realities  corresponding 
with  it.  The  moral  sense,  believed  .in,  is  not  merely  a 
possible,  but  I  suppose  it  to  be  the  only  possible,  human 
foundation  of  morality.  An  intelligent  belief  in  the 
moral  sense  naturally  takes  the  man  beyond  himself,  to  a 
higher  source  of  his  moral  conceptions,  which  it  really 
presupposes ;  and  any  truths  correlative  to  it,  which  are 
either  ascertainable  by  the  processes  of  reason,  or  capable 
of  being  otherwise  made  known,  will  naturally,  when  they 
become  known,  be  recognized,  in  their  proper  relation  to 


A  DECLINE  IN   RELIGIOUS  BELIEF.  201 

it,  and  cannot  be  rejected  without  doing  it  violence.  Any 
such  correlative  knowledge  of  the  higher  truths  (to  the 
existence  of  which  the  moral  sense  testifies,  though  it  does 
not  fully  reveal  them)  must  enlighten,  inform,  and 
strengthen  it.  It  is  the  office  of  such  knowledge  to  ans- 
wer authoritatively  those  questions,  as  to  the  real  nature, 
the  proper  work,  the  true  happiness,  the  true  place  in  the 
universe  of  man,  which  philosophy  has  always  been  asking 
and  has  never,  by  itself,  been  able  to  solve.  It  harmonizes, 
accounts  for,  and  enforces  by  authoritative  sanctions,  the 
concurrent  testimonies  of  the  moral  sense,  the  religious 
1nstinct,  Nature  interpreted  by  reason,  and  reason  en- 
lightened by  experience.  On  the  other  hand,  the  want, 
and  still  more  the  rejection  of  such  knowledge  (supposing 
it  to  be  attainable  and  true)  must,  in  a  corresponding 
degree,  obscure,  perplex,  or  discredit,  the  moral  sense. 

I  am  well  aware  that  some  who  seem  to  reject  all  dog- 
matic theology  and  even  the  principles  of  natural  religion, 
do  nevertheless  live  up  to  a  high  moral  standard ;  just  as 
there  are  too  many  others,  professing  (not  always  insin- 
cerely) to  believe  in  religion,  who  do  the  reverse.  The 
moral  sense  never  has  been,  and  never  will  be,  extinguished 
among  mankind  ;  and  in  all  ages  and  countries,  of  which 
we  have  any  real  historical  knowledge,  there  have  been 
conspicuous  examples  of  men  who  have  made  it  their  rule 
of  life.  Doubtless  there  have  been  many  more  who  did  so3of 
whom  we  know  nothing  ;  nor  is  it  unreasonable  to  believe 
that  there  may  be  many  such  even  among  very  degraded 
races.  But  these  facts  do  not  invalidate  general  conclu- 


202  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

sions  as  to  the  general  moral  tendency  of  a  decline  of 
religious  belief.  Those  examples  of  exceptional  goodness 
have  not  been  sufficient  to  prevent  or  to  arrest  a  progres- 
sive deterioration  of  general  morality  when  the  light  of 
religion  has  been  absent  or  obscured ;  and  the  best  ancient 
schemes  of  philosophy,  which  were  founded  upon  the 
moral  sense,  failed  to  compete  practically  with  that  of 
materialism,  which  did  all  that  was  possible  to  destroy  it. 
"  Live  while  we  may  " — "  let  us  eat  and  drink,  for  to- 
morrow we  die  " — are  natural  corollaries  from  the  doctrine 
of  Epicurus ;  whatever  more  refined  conceptions  that 
philosophers  or  any  of  his  followers  may  have  propounded. 
Such  will  ever  be  the  effect,  in  the  world  generally,  of  a 
popular  disbelief  in  the  doctrines  of  immortality  and  re- 
tribution ;  not  because  the  hope  of  rewards  or  the  fear  of 
punishments  is  the  foundation  of  religious  morality  (which 
to  fulfil  the  requirements  either  of  religion  or  of  the 
moral  sense,  must  ascend  much  higher),  but  because  our 
nature  is  so  constituted  that  the  destiny  of  the  individual, 
for  good  or  evil,  for  happiness  or  the  reverse,  is  insepar- 
ably bound  up  with  the  moral  law  of  his  being ;  and 
because  those  aids  and  defences  which  result  from  the 
recognition  of  this  truth  are  necessary  for  the  ascendency 
of  the  higher  over  the  lower  elements  of  our  nature,  and 
for  the  education  of  man  to  virtue.  A  boy,  whose  main- 
springs of  right  action  are  conscience  and  love,  will  not 
endeavour  to  fulfil  the  objects  for  which  he  is  sent  to 
school  more  selfishly,  or  from  less  worthy  motives,  when 
he  is  informed  of  their  relation  to  his  future  life,  than  if 


A   DECLINE   IN    RELIGIOUS  BELIEF.  203 

he  were  left  in  ignorance  of  it;  but  the  knowledge  of 
that  relation,  by  making  him  understand  the  importance 
of  the  future  as  compared  with  the  present,  and  the  mean- 
ing and  reasonableness  of  his  present  duties,  may  enable 
him  better  to  fulfil  them. 

All  that  has  been  said  assumes,  of  course,  that  there  is 
such  a  thing  as  religious  truth :  nor  is  it  possible  to  deny 
that,  if  this  could  really  be  disproved,  the  morality  founded 
upon  it  would  fail.  But  it  cannot  be  without  importance, 
whenever  the  proper  evidences  of  the  truth  of  religion  are 
considered,  to  take  into  account,  as  one  of  them,  its  rela- 
tion to  morality :  the  certainty  that,  if  it  were  displaced, 
the  system  of  morality  now  received  among  men  would, 
to  a  great  extent,  fall  with  it ;  and  the  extreme  intellectual 
difficulty  of  maintaining,  in  that  event,  the  supremacy  of 
the  moral  sense,  or  placing  the  morality  of  the  future 
upon  a  new  basis,  likely  to  acquire  general  authority 
among  mankind.  If  it  should  be  suggested  that  a  suffi- 
cient moral  code,  for  practical  purposes,  might  be  main- 
tained by  increasing  the  stringency  of  human  laws  in 
proportion  to  the  failure  of  religious  sanctions,  J  should 
reply  that  the  power  of  human  laws  depends  upon  morality, 
and  not  morality  upon  human  laws ;  and  that  any  legis- 
lation, greatly  in  advance  of  the  moral  sentiment  of  the 
community,  would  certainly  not  be  effectual,  and  could 
not  long  be  maintained. 

It  has  been  no  part  of  my  purpose  to  enter  into  an 
examination  of  any  questions  as  to  particular  doctrines  of 
religion.  I  have  throughout  used  the  word  "  religion  "  in 


204  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

a  sense  exclusive  of  all  systems,  usurping  that  name, 
which  take  no  cognizance  of  morality,  or  which  are  repug- 
nant, in  their  practical  precepts,  to  the  general  moral  sense 
of  mankind;  and  I  have  not  dissembled  my  belief  that 
( 'hristianity  (regarded  in  its  general  aspect,  with  reference 
to  the  points  of  agreement  rather  than  those  of  difference 
among  Christians)  does  fulfil  the  conditions  necessary  for 
moral  efficacy.  Error,  inconsistency,  incompleteness,  or 
admixture  of  foreign  elements,  in  particular  modes  of  ap- 
prehending or  representing  it,  must,  no  doubt,  as  far  as 
they  prevail,  and  in  proportion  to  their  importance,  de- 
tract from  the  authority,  or  deteriorate  the  quality,  of  its 
influence.  So  also  must  the  mere  fact  of  disagreement. 
But,  notwithstanding  all  these  drawbacks,  Christianity  is 
the  great  moral  power  of  the  world.  It  has  often  been 
supposed  to  be  declining,  but  has,  as  often,  renewed  its 
strength ;  nor  has  any  other  power  been  found  to  take  its 
place,  where  it  has  seemed  to  lose  ground.  As  to  other 
forms  of  religion  it  may,  without  difficulty,  be  admitted 
that  such  elements  as  they  have  in  common  with  Christi- 
anity may  be  expected  (except  so  far  as  they  are  neutralized 
or  counteracted  by  other  contrary  elements)  to  tend,  in  their 
measure,  toward  the  same  standard  of  morality.  It  is  proper 
(as  I  suppose)  to  Christianity,  rightly  understood,  to  assert 
the  identity  of  its  own  essential  principles  with  those  of 
natural  religion,  while  teaching  that  the  moral  govern- 
ment of  the  world  has  been  so  conducted  as  not  to  leave 
mankind  dependent  upon  natural  religion  only ;  and  it 
refers  to  a  common  origin  with  itself  all  the  elements  of 


A   DECLINE   IN   RELIGIOUS   BELIEF.  205 

religious  belief,  consistent  with  its  own  doctrines,  which 
have  been,  at  any  time  or  place,  accepted  among  the  na- 
tions of  the  world  These  propositions,  and  also  that  of 
the  presence  of  the  religious  principle  in  any  -practical 
belief  of  the  moral  sense,  appear  to  be  in  accordance  with 
what  is  said  by  St.  Paul  in  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth 
verses  of  the  first,  and  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  verses 
of  the  second  chapter  of  the  Epistle  to  the  Romans. 


REV.  DR.  MARTINEAU. 

IN  order  to  estimate  aright  the  moral  influence  of  de- 
clining religious  belief,  the  relation  between  morals 
and  religion  must  be  accurately  conceived.  They  may  be 
regarded  as  independent,  or  as  identical,  or,  again,  either 
may  be  taken  to  be  the  foundation  of  the  other.  The 
following  positions  will  serve  as  a  sufficient  ground  for  the 
opinion  which  I  shall  offer : 

A  sense  of  duty  is  inherent  in  the  constitution  of  our 
nature,  and  cannot  be  escaped  till  we  can  escape  from 
ourselves.  It  does  not  wait  on  any  ontological  conditions, 
and  incur  the  risk  of  non-existence  should  no  assurance 
be  gained  with  regard  to  a  being  and  a  life  beyond  us. 
Even  though  we  came  out  of  nothing,  and  returned  to 
nothing,  we  should  be  subject  to  the  claim  of  righteous 
ness  so  long  as  we  are  what  we  are.  Morals  have  their 
own  base,  and  are  second  to  nothing. 


206  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

Apart  from  this  intrinsic  consciousness  of  ethical  dis- 
tinctions, no  ontological  discoveries  would  avail  to  set  up 
a  law  of  duty,  and  give  us  the  characteristics  of  moral 
beings.  A  Supreme  Power  might  dictate  an  external  rule, 
and  break  us  in  to  obedience  by  hopes  and  fears  of  un- 
limited extent.  But  by  this  sway  of  preponderant  interests 
we  are  not  carried  beyond  prudence ;  and  in  the  absence 
of  a  law  within,  responding  to  the  demands  from  without, 
we  do  not  reach  the  confines  of  moral  obligation ;  and,  in 
case  of  failure,  we  incur  the  sense  only  of  error,  not  of  sin. 
Theology  cannot  supply  a  base  for  morals  that  have  lost 
their  own. 

Does  it  follow  that,  because  morals  are  indigenous,  they 
are  therefore  self-sufficing  ?  By  no  means.  Though  re- 
ligion is  not  their  foundation,  it  is  assuredly  their  crown 
— related  to  them  as  Plato  says  dialectic  is  to  the  sciences, 
worrrep  OpiyKos  rot?  /xaflrj/xao-ii/1 — the  coping  that  consummates 
them.  Be  the  genesis  of  the  conscience  what  it' may,  we 
learn  from  it  at  last  that  there  is  a  better  and  a  worse  in 
the  springs  of  action  which  contend  for  us,  and  that,  while 
it  is  open  to  us  as  a  possibility,  it  is  closed  against  us  as  a 
right,  to  follow  the  lower  when  the  higher  calls.  The 
authority  which  stamps  the  one  as  a  temptation,  and 
other  as  a  peremptory  claim,  is  not,  we  are  well  aware,  of 
our  own  making ;  for  it  masters  us  with  compunction,  and 
defies  all  repeal.  Nor  is  it  the  mere  expression  of  public 
self-interest ;  for  it  extends  beyond  the  range  of  social 
action,  and  covers  the  whole  voluntary  field.  Speaking 

i  Rep.,  vii.,534E, 


A   DECLINE    IN    RELIGIOUS   BELIEF.  207 

with  a  voice  before  which  our  whole  personality  bows, 
and  which  equally  gives  law  to  other  men,  it  issues  from 
a  source  transcending  human  life,  and  infusing  into  it  a 
moral  order  from  a  more  comprehensive  sphere.  It  pos- 
tulates a  superior  will  in  communion  with  ours,  and 
administering  this  world  as  a  school  of  character. 

To  this  result  our  moral  experience  naturally  runs  up, 
and  stops  short  of  it  only  where  its  course  is  artificially 
arrested.  Till  it  is  reached,  the  ethical  demands  upon  us 
seem  to  address  us  in  tones  too  portentous  for  their  imme- 
diate significance ;  remorse  clings  to  us  with  a  tenacity, 
aspiration  returns  upon  us  with  a  power,  which  reason  can- 
not adequately  justify.  But  in  the  presence  of  an  object- 
ive moral  law  pervading  the  universe,  administered  by  a 
Mind  wherein  it  perfectly  lives,  and  continued  for  man  be- 
yond his  present  term  of  years,  the  scale  of  the  ethical 
passions,  and  the  intensity  of  admiration  and  reverence 
for  the  good,  fall  into  proportionate  place,  and  escape  the 
irony  of  being  at  once  the  ultimate  nobleness  and  the  su- 
preme extravagance  of  our  nature.  Religion,  on  this  side, 
is  but  the  open  blossom  of  the  moral  germs  implanted 
within  us — the  explicit  form,  developed  in  thought,  of 
faiths  implicitly  contained  in  the  sense  of  responsibility 
and  the  foreboding  of  guilt.  Its  eifect,  therefore,  is  to 
suffuse  with  a  divine  light  relations  and  duties  which  be- 
fore were  simply  personal  and  social. 

A  similar  transfiguration  befalls  the  pleasures  and  pains 
attending  voluntary  conduct,  and  constituting  its  natural 
'*  sanctions."  Treated  as  ultimate  facts,  they  can  never 


208  \   MODERN    SYMPOSIUM. 

acquire  more  than  a  prudential  significance.  Treated  as 
symbolical  lineaments  of  a  world  under  moral  government* 
they  are  invested  with  an  .expression  of  character,  and 
look  into  us  with  living  eyes.  Their  appeal  alights  no 
longer  on  self -regarding  hope  and  fear,  but  on  the  springs 
of  sympathy  and  shame :  they  pass  from  sensitive  to  ethi- 
cal phenomena.  The  new  and  ideal  meaning  thus  given  to 
a  large  portion  of  actual  human  experience  cannot  pause 
there ;  it  completes  itself  in  the  congenial  anticipation  of 
a  further  and  invisible  store  of  awards  consummating  the 
incipient  justice  of  this  world.  The  faith  in  a  future  life 
— where  it  is  more  than  a  belief  at  second  hand — has 
its  sheet-anchor  in  the  moral  affections.  But  for  the  felt 
interval  between  what  we  are  and  what  we  ought  to 
be,  for  the  indignation  at  wrong,  for  compassion  toward 
innocent  suffering,  and  reverence  for  high  excellence, 
vaticinations  of  renewed  existence  would  have  no  origin 
and  no  support. 

In  assigning  this  method  of  growth  to  religion,  I  do  not 
mean  to  deny  that  it  may  have  other  lines  of  formation. 
The  Nature-worship  which  plays  so  great  a  part  in  ancient 
civilization  has  a  different  history,  and  stands  in  much 
less  intimate  relations  with  the  moral  life  of  its  votaries. 
We  pay,  I  am  disposed  to  think,  too  great  a  compliment 
to  the  Greek  mythology  when  we  attribute  the  ethical 
decay  of  later  Athens  and  Corinth  to  the  growing  scepti- 
cism about  its  gods.  The  public  life  was  dead.  The  the- 
atre of  great  passion  and  great  action  was  closed.  The 
calls  for  sacrifice,  the  opportunities  for  national  expansion 
were  gone,  and  the  political  school  for  the  discipline  of 


A   DECLINE  IN   RELIGIOUS  BELIEF.  209 

character  was  no  longer  there.  With  the  loss  of  a  pro- 
gressive history  ,  the  springs  of  heroic  emulation  suffered 
atrophy,  a  sickly  hue  passed  over  literature,  philosophy 
and  art :  and  the  subsidence  of  human  loves  and  cares 
upon  low  Epicurean  levels  was  inevitable,  though  the  Olym- 
pian deities  had  never  been  dethroned.  In  the  absence  of 
any  moral  religion,  no  efficacious  resistance  could  be  set 
up,  with  or  without  a  pantheistic  polytheism,  against  the 
canker  of  social  degeneracy .r*"s 

In  dealing  with  the  present  problem,  however,  we  con- 
fine our  attention  to  the  Christian  type  of  religion,  which 
has  its  hold  upon  our  nature  from  the  moral  side.  The 
question  is,  what  practical  effect  might  be  expected  from 
a  decay  of  that  religion. 

Under  that  change  morality  would  lose,  not  its  base, 
but  its  summit.  The  ground  and  principles  of  duty  would 
remain ;  the  means  for  deducing  rules  of  action,  estimating 
the  worth  of  conflicting  impulses,  and  measuring  the 
grades  of  obligation,  would  in  the  main  be  unaffected  ;  so 
that  the  moral  code  which  would  emerge  from  the  labours 
of  a  mere  philosopher  need  not  materially  differ  from  that 
recognized  by  a  Christian.  This  is  only  an  inverse  method 
of  saying  that  the  Christian  ethics  are  true  to  human  life 
and  the  expression  of  right  reason.  I  do  not  think,  there- 
fore, that  the  form  and  contents  of  a  moral  system  would 
be  essentially  modified  by  the  decline  of  religious  belief. 
It  may,  no  doubt,  happen  that  particular  problems  of  con- 
duct, as  in  the  cases  of  suicide  and  of  marriage,  have  be- 
come the  subjects  of  ecclesiastical  legislation,  and  so  have 
14 


A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

passed  into  preoccupation  of  religious  feeling,  and,  on  the 
disappearance  of  that  feeling,  may  be  flung  back  into  an 
indeterminate  condition.  But  to  the  real  solution  of  such 
problems  it  would  be  difficult  to  show  that  religion  con- 
tributes any  new  elements,  so  as  to  turn  into  duty  that 
which  was  not  duty  before.  Its  ministers  and  temporary 
interpreters  can  give  an  historical  consecration  to  all  sorts 
of  ungrounded  opinions,  and  these  will  in  any  case 
have  to  look  out  for  an  adequate  base,  whether  or  not  the 
religious  view  of  life  is  still  upheld.  But  it  is  quite  pos- 
sible that  a  rule  of  life,  once  thoughtfully  constituted, 
should  be  acknowledged  in  common  over  the  whole  range 
of  social  duty  by  persons  simply  ethical  and  by  those  who 
are  also  religious. 

But  though  the  decay  of  religion  may  leave  the  insti- 
tutes of  morality  intact,  it  drains  off  their  inward  power. 
The  devout  faith  of  men  expresses  and  measures  the  in- 
tensity of  their  moral  nature,  and  it  cannot  be  lost  with- 
out a  remission  of  enthusiasm,  and  under  this  low  pressure, 
the  successful  reentrance  of  importunate  desires  and  clam- 
orous passions  which  had  been  driven  back.  To  believe 
in  an  ever-living  and  perfect  Mind,  supreme  over  the  uni- 
verse, is  to  invest  moral  distinctions  with  immensity  and 
eternity,  and  lift  them  from  the  provincial  stage  of  human 
society  to  the  imperishable  theatre  of  all  being.  When 
planted  thus  in  the  very  substance  of  things,  they  justify 
and  support  the  ideal  estimates  of  the  conscience ;  they 
deepen  every  guilty  shame  ;  they  guarantee  every  right- 
eous hope  ;  and  they  help  the  will  with  a  divine  casting- 


A  DECLINE  IN   RELIGIOUS   BELIEF.  211 

vote  in  every  balance  of  temptation.  The  sanctity  thus 
given  to  the  claims  of  duty,  and  the  interest  that  gathers 
around  the  play  of  character,  appear  to  me  more  important 
elements  in  the  power  of  religion  than  its  direct  sanctions 
of  hope  and  fear.  Yet  to  these  also  it  is  hardly  possible  to  deny 
great  weight,  not  only  as  extending  the  range  of  persona} 
interests,  but  as  the  answer  of  reality  to  the  retributory 
verdicts  of  the  moral  sense.  Cancel  these  beliefs,  and 
morality  will  be  left  reasonable  still,  but  paralyzed  ;  pos- 
sible to  temperaments  comparatively  passionless,  but  with 
no  grasp  on  vehement  and  poetic  natures ;  and  gravitating 
toward  the  simply  prudential  wherever  it  maintains  its 
ground. 

Historical  experience  appears  to  confirm  this  estimate. 
In  no  race  (notwithstanding  conspicuous  individual  ex- 
ceptions) have  the  excesses  of  sensual  passion  been  so  kept 
in  check  as  among  the  Jews.  There  is  no  more  striking 
feature  in  their  literature  during  the  moral  declension  of 
Greek  and  Roman  society  (e.  g,,  in  the  Sibylline  Oracles) 
than  the  horror  which  it  expresses  of  the  pervading  dis- 
soluteness of  the  pagan  world.  It  certainly  cannot  be  said 
that  the  problem  was  rendered  easy  by  the  coolness  of  the 
Jewish  temperament.  The  phenomena  of  Christendom 
presents  a  more  complicated  tissue.  But  a  just  analysis 
yields,  I  believe,  the  same  result,  and  attests  the  force  of 
religious  conviction  as  the  only  successful  antagonist,  on 
any  large  scale,  of  the  animal  impulses.  True  it  is  that, 
in  the  very  presence  of  the  Church,  and  even  among  its 
representatives,  gross  vices  have  at  times  prevailed.  But 


212  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

these  have  been  hollow  times, in  which/with  large  classes  of 
persons,  the  outer  shell  of  religion  sheltered  no  sincere  life, 
and  the  private  Kabits  betrayed  the  inward  disintegration 
which  policy  or  indifference  concealed.  To  test  the  power 
of  religion,  we  must  limit  ourselves  to  cases  where  that 
power  is  not  effete.  In  the  Puritan  families  of  the  seven- 
teenth century,  among  the  present  Catholic  peasantry  of 
Ireland,  throughout  the  Society  of  Friends,  and  in  the 
Wesleyan  classes,  it  can  hardly  be  denied  that  the  control 
of  irregular  desires  has  been  attained  with  an  exceptional 
ease  and  completeness. 

One  source  of  this  distinctive  power  yet  remains  to  be 
indicated.  A  simply  conscientious  man  may  surrender 
himself  unreservedly  to  the  sense  of  moral  obligation,  and 
be  so  possessed  by  it  as  to  feel  it  more  than  reasonable, 
and  own  a  certain  sacredness  in  its  appeal.  Duty,  honour, 
self-f orgetfulness  in  other's  good,  may  obtain  the  real  com- 
mand of  such  a  one.  But  the  persuasive  force  with  which 
the  right  speaks  to  him  is  beyond  all  intellectual  measure  ; 
it  stirs  him  in  depths  he  cannot  reach  ;  its  heat  is  in  excess 
of  its  light ;  it  is  something  mystic  which  must  have  him, 
but  of  which  he  can  render  no  account.  Here,  in  truth, 
js  religion  pressing  into  life,  only  with  form  still  indistinct, 
and  its  organism  of  thought  not  yet  differentiated  and  ar- 
ticulate. Let  it  complete  its  development,  and  what 
change  will  ensue  ?  Once  rendered  conscious  of  the  Su- 
preme Source  of  his  moral  perceptions,  the  responsible 
agent  no  longer  obeys  a  pressure  out  of  the  dark,  but 
rather  a  drawing  toward  higher  light ;  for  an  impersonal 


A   DECLINE   IN   RELIGIOUS   BELIEF.  213 

drift  of  Nature  is  substituted  a  profound  personal  venera- 
tion, and  enthusiasm  is  turned  from  a  blind  nobleness  in- 
to the  clear  allegiance  of  living  affection.  It  is  not  with- 
out reason  that  this  change  has  been  treated  as  an  emer- 
gence into  new  life.  Its  vast  influence  is  attested  by  the 
whole  literature  of  devotion,  and  especially  by  its  most 
popular  element,  the  hymns  of  every  age  from  the  Psalter 
to  the  "  Christian  Year." 

Though  in  theory  the  contents  of  morality  are  not  al- 
tered by  acquiring  divine  obligation,  the  efficacy  of  religion 
is  more  immediately  felt  in  some  parts  of  the  character 
than  in  others.  The  scene  to  which  it  introduces  the  mind 
is  one  which  throws  it  instantly  into  the  attitude  of  look- 
ing up  toward  an  Infinite  Perfection,  whose  presence  it 
never  quits,  and  thus  supplies  the  true  condition  of  hu- 
mility, of  aspiration,  and  of  felt  equality  of  moral  trust  for 
all  men  before  God.  These  moods  of  thought  are  specifi- 
cally induced  by  the  contract  of  higher  excellence  and  a 
most  capacious  rule  of  righteousness ;  and  they  are  but 
poorly  simulated  by  the  mere  sense  of  personal  insignifi- 
cance amid  the  immensity  of  Nature,  and  the  awe  of  the 
unknown,  and  the  conscious  partnership  of  us  all  in  the 
human  liabilities.  The  moral  characteristics  of  the  Chris- 
tian temper  are  nothing  but  the  natural  posture  of  a  mind 
standing  face  to  face  with  the  invisible  reality  of  the  high- 
est ideals  of  its  conscience  and  its  love.  If  that  presence 
departs,  they  cannot  survive. 


214  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 


MR.  FREDERIC  HARRISON. 

AND  all  this,  to  me,  describes  the  moral  characteristics, 
not  of  the  Christian,  but  of  the  religious  temper. 
With  what  has  been  so  finely  said  in  the  preceding  discourse 
we  ought,  I  think,  most  cordially  to  join.  Only  for  the 
words  "  theology  "  and  "  Christian  "  we  must  put  the 
wider  and  more  ancient  terms  "  religion  "  and  "human ;  " 
and  again,  for  the  intrinsic  consciousness  and  emotional 
intuitions,  whereby  these  are  said  to  prove  themselves, 
we  must  substitute  the  reasonable  proof  of  science,  phil- 
osophy, and  positive  psychology. 

We  have  had  before  us  three  distinctive  views,  as  to 
the  relations  of  religion  and  morality.  Each  of  the  three 
has  pressed  on  us  a  very  powerful  thought.  The  recon- 
ciliation is  obscure,  yet  I  hold  on  to  the  hope  that  it  may 
one  day  be  found  ;  that  we  shall  have  to  surrender  nei- 
ther religion  nor  science,  neither  demonstration  on  the 
one  hand,  nor  dogma,  worship,  and  discipline,  on  the 
other ;  that  we  shall  end  by  accepting  a  purely  human 
base  for  our  morality,  and  withal  come  to  see  our  moral- 
ity transfigured  into  a  true  religion. 

It  is  the  purport  of  the  first  of  the  arguments  before  us 
to  establish  :  that  morality  has  a  basis  of  its  own  quite 
independent  of  all  theology  whatever;  but  that,  since 
morality  must  be  deeply  affected  by  any  theology,  the 
morality  will  be  undermined  if  based  on  a  theology 
which  is  not  true.  We  must  all  agree,  I  think,  to  that. 


A  DECLINE   IN   RELIGIOUS  BELIEF.  215 

The  second  argument  insists  that,  if  the  religious 
foundations  and  sanctions  of  morality  be  given  up,  human 
life  runs  the  risk  of  sinking  into  depravity,  since  moral- 
ity without  religion  is  insufficient  for  general  civilization. 
For  my  part;  I  entirely  assent  to  that. 

The  third  argument  rejoins,  that  theology  cannot  sup- 
ply a  base  for  morals  that  have  lost  their  own ;  but  that 
morals,  though  they  have  their  own  base,  and  are  second 
to  nothing,  are  not  adequate  to  direct  human  life  until 
they  be  transfused  into  that  sense  of  resignation,  ador- 
ation, and  communion  with  an  overruling  Providence, 
which  is  the  true  mark  of  religion.  I  assent  entirely  to 
that. 

We,  who  follow  the  teaching  of  Comte,  humbly  look 
forward  to  an  ultimate  solution  of  all  such  difficulties  by 
the  force  of  one  common  principle.  That  we  acknow- 
ledge a  religion,  of  which  the  creed  shall  be  science  ;  of 
which  the  faith,  hope,  charity,  shall  be  real,  not  transcen- 
dental— earthly,  not  heavenly:  a  religion  in  a  word, 
which  is  entirely  human  in  its  evidences,  in  its  purposes, 
in  its  sanctions  and  appeals.  Write  the  word;  "  religion  " 
where  we  find  the  word  "  theology ; "  write  the  word 
"  human  "  where  we  find  the  word  "  Christian,"  or  the 
words  "  theist,"  "  Mussulman,"  or  "  Buddhist,"  and  these 
discussions  grow  practical  and  easily  reconciled ;  the  as- 
pirations and  sanctions  of  religion  burst  open  to  us  anew 
in  greater  intensity,  without  calling  on  us  to  surrender 
one  claim  of  reality  and  humanity ;  the  realm  of  faith 
and  adoration  becomes  again  conterminous  with  life, 


216  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

without  disturbing — nay,  while  sanctifying — the  invinci- 
ble resolve  of  modern  men  to  live  in  this  world,  for  this 
world,  ivith  their  fellow-men. 

And  this  brings  us  to  the  source  of  all  difficulties  about 
the  relations  of  morality  and  religion.  We  place  our 
morality — we  are  compelled  by  the  conditions  of  all  our 
positive  knowledge  to  place  it — in  a  strictly  human 
world.  But  it  is  the  mark  of  every  theology  (the  name  of 
theology  assumes  it)  to  place  our  religion  in  a  non-human 
world.  And  thus  our  human  system  of  morals  may  pos- 
sibly be  distorted— it  cannot  be  supported — by  a  non- 
human  religion.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  dwarfed 
and  atrophied  for  want  of  being  duly  expanded  into  a 
truly  human  religion.  Our  morality,  with  its  human 
realities,  our  theology,  with  its  non-human  hypotheses, 
will  not  amalgamate.  Their  methods  are  in  conflict.  In 
their  base,  in  their  logic,  in  their  aim,  they  are  heterogen- 
eous. They  do  not  lie  in  pari  inaterid.  Give,  us  a  re- 
ligion  as  truly  human,  as  really  scientific,^  is  our  moraL 
system,  ami  all  is  harmony.  Our  morals  based  as  they, 
must  be  on  our  knowledge  of  life  and  of  society,  are  then 
ordered  and  inspired  by  a  religion  which  belongs,  just  as 
truly  as  our  moral  science  does,  to  the  world  of  science 
and  of  man.  And  then  religion  will  be  no  longer  that 
quicksand  of  possibility  which  two  thousand  years  of 
debate  have  still  left  it  to  so  many  of  us.  It  becomes,  at 
last,  the  issue  of  our  knowledge,  the  meaning  of  our 
science,  the  soul  of  our  morality,  the  ideal  of  our  imagin- 
ation, the  fulfilment  of  our  aspirations,  the  law-giver,  in 


A   DECLINE   IN   RELIGIOUS  BELIEF.  217 

short,  of  our  whole  lives.  Can  it  ever  be  this  while  we 
still  pursue  religion  into  the  bubble-world  of  the  whence 
and  the  whither  ? 

That  morality  is  dependent  on  theology ;  that  moral- 
ity is  independent  of  religion  :  each  of  these  views  pre- 
sents insuperable  difficulties,  and  brings  us  to  an  alterna- 
tive from  which  we  recoil.  To  assert  that  there  is  no 
morality  but  what  is  based  on  theology,  is  to  assert 
what  experience,  history,  and  philosophy,  flatly  contradict 
— nay,  that  which  revolts  the  conscience  of  all  manly  pur- 
pose within  us.  History  teaches  us  that  some  of  the  best 
types  of  morality,  in  men  and  in  races,  have  been  found 
apart  from  anything  that  Christians  can  call  theology  at 
all.  Morality  has  been  advancing  for  centuries  in  modern 
Europe,  while  the  theology,  at  least  in  authority,  has  been 
visibly  declining.  The  morality  of  Confucius  and  of 
Sakya  Mouni,  of  Socrates  and  Marcus  Aurelius,  of  Vauve- 
nargues,  Turgot,  Condorcet,  Hume,  was  entirely  independ- 
ent of  any  theology.  The  moral  system  of  Aristotle  was 
framed  without  any  view  to  theology,  as  completely  as 
that  of  Comte  or  of  our  recent  moralists.  We  have  ex- 
perience of  men  with  the  loftiest  ideal  of  life  and  of  strict 
fidelity  to  their  ideal,  who  expressly  repudiate  theology, 
and  of  many  more  whom  theology  never  touched.  Lastly, 
there  is  a  spirit  within  us  which  will  not  believe  that  to 
know  and  to  do  the  right  we  must  wait  until  the  mysteries 
of  existence  and  the  universe  are  resolved1 — its  origin,  its 
government,  and  its  future.  To  make  right  conduct  a 
corollary  of  a  theological  creed,  is  not  only  contrary  to 


218  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

fact,  but  shocking  to  our  self-respect.  We  know  that 
the  just  spiiit  can  find  the  right  path,  even  while  the 
judgment  hangs  bewildered  amid  the  churches. 

To  hold,  as  would  seem  to  require  of  us  the  second  ar- 
gument, that,  though  theology  is  necessary  as  a  base  for 
morality,  yet  almost  any  theology  will  suffice — polytheist, 
Mussulman,  or  deist — so  long  as  some  imaginary  being  is 
postulated,  this  is,  indeed,  to  reduce  theology  to  a  mini- 
mum ;  since  in  this  case,  it  does  not  seem  to  matter  in 
which  God  you  may  believe.  To  say  that  morality  is 
dependent  on  one  particular  theology,  is  to  deny  that 
men  are  moral  outside  your  peculiar  orthodoxy ;  to  say 
that  morality  is  dependent  merely  on  some  form  of  the- 
ology, is  to  say  that  it  matters  little  to  practical  virtue 
which  of  a  hundred  creeds  you  may  profess.  And  when 
we  shrink  from  the  arrogance  of  the  first  and  the  loose- 
ness of  the  second  position,  we  have  no  alternative  but  to 
admit  that  our  morality  must  have  a  human,  and  not  a 
super-human,  base. 

It  does  not  follow  that  morality  can  suffice  for  life 
without  religion.  Morality,  if  we  mean  by  that  the 
science  of  duty,  after  all  can  supply  us  only  with  a  know- 
ledge of  what  we  should  do.  Of  itself  it  can  neither  touch 
the  imagination,  nor  satisfy  the  thirst  of  knowledge,  nor 
order  the  emotions.  It  tells  us  of  human  duty,  but  noth- 
ing of  the  world  without  us ;  .it  prescribes  to  us  our  duties, 
but  it  does  not  kindle  the  feelings  which  are  the  impulse 
to  duty.  Morality  has  nothing  to  tell  us  of  a  paramount 
power  outside  of  us,  to  struggle  with  which  is  confusion 


A   DECLINE  IN   RELIGIOUS  BELIEF.  219 

and  annihilation,  to  work  with  which  is  happiness  and 
strength  ;  it  has  nothing  to  teach  us  of  a  communion  with 
a  great  goodness,  nor  does  it  'touch  the  chords  of  vener- 
ation, sympathy  and  love,  within  us.  Morality  does  not 
profess  to  organize  our  knowledge  and  give  symmetry  to 
life.  It  does  not  deal  with  beauty,  affection,  adoration. 
If  it  order  conduct,  it  does  not  correlate  this  conduct 
with  the  sum  of  our  knowledge,  or  with  the  ideals  of  our 
imagination,  or  with  the  deepest  of  our  emotions.  To  do 
all  this  is  the  part  of  religion,  not  of  morality ;  and  inas- 
much as  the  sphere  of  this  function  is  both  wider  and 
higher,  so  does  religion  transcend  morality.  Morality 
has  to  do  with  conduct,  religion  with  life.  The  first  is  tlie" 
code  of  a  part  of  human  nature,  the  second  gives  its  har- 
mony to  the  whole  of  human  nature.  And  morality  can 
no  more  suffice  for  life  than  a  just  character  would  suffice 
for  any  one  of  us  without  intellect, imagination, or  affection, 
and  the  power  of  fusing  all  these  into  the  unity  of  a  man. 
The  lesson,  I  think,  is  twofold.  On  the  one  hand, 
morality  is  independent  of  theology, •  is  superior  to  it, 
is  growing. while  theology  is  declining,  is  steadfast  while 
theology  is  shifting,  unites  men  while  theology  separates 
them,  and  does  its  work  when  theology  disappears. 
There  is  something  like  a  civilized  morality,  a  standard 
of  morality,  a  convergence  about  morality.  There  is  no 
civilized  theology,  no  standard  of  theology,  no  converg- 
ence about  it.  Ori_the  other  hand,  morality  will  never 
suffice  for  life  ;  and  every  attempt  to  base  our  existence 
with  morality  alone,  or  to  crown  our  existence  with  mor* 


220  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

ality  alone,  must  certainly  fail ;  for  this  is  to  fling  away 
the  most  powerful  motives  of  human  nature.  To  reach 
these  is  the  privilege  of  religion  alone.  And  those  who 
trust  that  the  future  can  ever  be  built  upon  science  and 
civilization,  without  religion,  are  attempting  to  build  a 
pyramid  of  bricks  without  straw.  The  solution,  we  be- 
lieve, is  a  non-theloogical  religion. 

There  are  some  who  amuse  themselves  by  repeating 
that  this  is  a  contradiction  in  terms,  that  religion  implies 
theology.  Yet  no  one  refuses  the  name  of  religion  to  the 
systems  of  Confucius  and  Buddha,  though  neither  has  a 
trace  of  theology.  But  disputes  about  a  name  are  idle. 
If  they  could  debar  us  from  the  name  of  religion,  no  one 
could  disinherit  us  of  the  thing.  We  mean  by  religion  a 
scheme  which  shall  explain  to  us  the  relations  of  the 
faculties  of  the  human  soul  within,  of  man  to  his  fellow- 
men  beside  him,  to  the  world  and  its  order  around  him  ; 
next,  that  which  brings  him  face  to  face  with  a  Power  to 
which  he  must  bow,  with  a  Providence  which  he  must 
love  and  serve,  with  a  being  which  he  must  adore — that 
which,  in  fine,  gives  man  a  doctrine  to  believe,  a  discipline 
1  to  live  by,  and  an  object  to  worship.  This  is  the  ancient/ 
•  meaning  of  religion,  and  the  fact  of  religion  all  over  the 
world  in  every  age.  What  is  new  in  our  scheme  is  merely 
that  we  avoid  such  terms  as  infinite,  absolute,  immaterial, 
and  vague  negatives  altogether ;  resolutely  confining  our- 
selves to  the  sphere  of  what  can  be  shown  by  experience, 
of  what  is  relative  and  not  absolute,  and  wholly  an4 
frankly  human. 


A   DECLINE   IN   RELIGIOUS  BELIEF.  221 


THE  DEAtf  OF  ST.  PAUL'S. 

IT  seems  to  me  difficult  to  discuss  this  question  till  it  is 
settled,  at  least  generally,  what  morality  is  influenced, 
and  what  religious  belief  is  declining. 

The  morality  generally  acknowledged  in  Europe  differs 
in  most  important  points  from  that  of  the  Hebrews  in  the 
days  of  Moses,  of  the  Greeks  in  the  days  of  Socrates,  of 
the  Romans  under  the  Empire,  of  the  monks  of  Egypt,  of 
the  Puritans  of  the  seventeenth  century.  All  of  these 
had  among  them  high  types  of  character, — higher,  it  may 
be,  than  any  types  among  us  ;  but  who  among  us  would 
accept  their  morality  as  a  whole  ?  Our  morality  has  come 
to  be  recognized  as  it  is  by  a  definite  progress,  of  which 
the  steps  may  be  traced.  It  is  plain  that  one  form  of 
religious  thought  and  religious  faith  might  aid  this  pro- 
gress of  morality  by  its  decline,  and  another  might,  by  its 
decline,  impede  or  reverse  it.  On  such  a  morality  as  we 
acknowledge,  whencesoever  derived,  the  decline  of  Budd- 
hist belief  or  ancient  Roman  religious  belief  might  act  as 
a  stimulus  and  a  help.  The  decline  of  another  kind  of 
religious  belief  might,  on  the  other  hand,  act  most  in- 
juriously. 

It  seems  to  me,  therefore,  that  till  the  question  is 
presented  in  a  concrete  and  historical  form,  nothing  can 
be  made  of  it.  I  do  not  understand  the  two  terms  of  the 
comparison.  Before  I  can  attempt  to  answer  it,  I  must 
know,  at  least  approximately,  what  morality,  and  what 
religion. 


222  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

•If  by  morality  is  meant  the  morality  generally  recog 
nized  in  Europe,  on  the  points  of  truthfulness,  honesty, 
humanity,  purity,  self-devotion,  kindness,  justice,  fellow- 
feeling, — and  not  only  recognized,  but  judged  by  a  con- 
scious superiority  of  reason  and  experience  to  be  the  right 
standard  as  compared  with  other  moralities,  such  as  those 
of  the  Puritans,  the  monks,  the  Romans,  the  Hebrews, — 
then  I  observe  that  as  a  matter  of  fact  and  history,  which 
to  me  seems  incontrovertible,  this  morality  has  synchron- 
ized in  its  growth  and  progress  with  an  historical  religion, 
viz.,  Christianity.  We  are  come  to  the  end  of  eighteen  of 
the  most  eventful  and  fruitful  centuries  of  all,  at  least, 
that  are  known  to  us;  and  we  are  landed  in  what  we 
accept  as  a  purer  morality  than  any  which  has  been 
known  in  the  world  before,  and  one  which  admits  itself 
not  to  be  perfect,  but  contains  in  itself  principles  of  im 
provement  and  self -purification.  With  this  progress  from 
the  first — sometimes,  I  quite  admit,  with  gross  and  mis- 
chievous mistakes,  but  always  with  deliberate  aim  and 
intention  of  good, — Christianity  has  been  associated. 
And  in  proportion  as  Christian  religious  belief  has  thrown 
off  additions  not  properly  belonging  to  it,  and  has  aimed 
at  its  own  purification  and  at  a  greater  grasp  of  truth,  the 
standard  and  ideas  of  morality  have  risen  with  it.  The 
difficulty  at  this  moment  is  to  determine  how  much  of  our 
recognized  morality,  both  directly  and  much  more  indir- 
ectly, has  come  from  Christianity,  and  could  not  conceiv- 
ably have  come  at  all  supposing  Christianity  absent. 

I   do   not  here,   in  these  few   lines,   assume  that  in 


A  DECLINE   IN    RELIGIOUS   BELIEF.  223 

Christianity  and  its  long  association  with  human  morality, 
we  have  a  vera  causa  of  its  improved  and  improving 
character.  But  with  this  immense  fact  of  human  experi- 
ence before  me,  unique,  it  seems  to  me,  in  its  kind,  and  in 
its  broad  outlines  undeniable,  no  abstract  reasonings  can 
re-assure  me  as  to  the  probability  that  with  the  failing 
powers  of  what  has  hitherto  been,  directly  or  indirectly, 
the  source  of  much,  and  the  support  and  sanction  of  still 
more,  of  our  morality,  our  morality  will  fail  too.  It  seems 
to  me  quite  as  easy  to  be  sceptical  about  morality  as  it  is 
about  religion.  If  the  religion  has  been  proved  to  be  not 
true,  then  of  course  it  is  no  use  talking  about  the  matter. 
But  if  not,  a  declining  belief  in  it  may,  with  our  present 
experience,  be  thought,  at  least  by  those  who  believe  in 
it,  to  be  attacking  the  roots  of  morality,  if  not  in  our  own 
generation,  at  least  in  those  which  come  after. 

It  is  matter  of  history  that  in  what  we  now  generally 
accept  as  true  morality,  there  are  two  factors  :  1,  On  the 
one  hand,  human  experience,  human  reasonableness,  human 
good-feeling,  human  self-restraint ;  and  (2)  on  the  other, 
the  belief,  the  laws,  the  ideas,  the  power  of  Christianity. 
It  is  difficult  to  conceive  what  reason  there  is  to  expect 
that  if  one  factor  is  taken  away  the  result  will  continue 
the  same  ;  that  the  removal  or  weakening  of  such  an  im- 
portant one  as  Christianity  would  not  seriously  affect 
such  departments  of  morals  as  purity,  the  relations  of  the 
strong  to  the  weak,  respect  for  human  life,  slavery. 


224:  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 


THE  DUKE  OF  ARGYLL. 

CONSIDERING  that  these  papers  are  contributed 
by  men  belonging  to  very  different  schools  of 
thought,  and  that  they  deal  with  a  question  very  abstract 
and  very  ill-defined,  it  is  surely  very  remarkable  that  so 
much  agreement  should-  emerge  on  certain  fundamental 
points. 

Most  remarkable  of  all  in  this  respect,  is  the  paper 
emanating  from  one  of  those  who  "  follow  the  teaching  of 
Comte." 

In  that  paper  I  find  the  following  propositions  : 

I.  That  morality  is  independent  of  theology ;  but, 

II.  That  it  is  not  independent  of  religion,  inasmuch  as 
morality  without  religion  cannot  "  suffice  for  life." 

III.  That  religion  means  a  scheme  which  (among  other 
things),  "  brings  man  face  to  face  with  a  Power  to  which 
he  must  bow,  with  a  Providence  which  he  must  love  and 
serve,  with  a  Being  which  he  must  adore — that  which,  in 
fine,  gives  man  a  doctrine  to  believe,  a  discipline  to  live 
by,  and  an  object  to  worship." 

IV.  That  this  scheme  or  conception  of  religion  is  "new," 
and  differs  from  mere  theology  in  the  following  distinctive 
points  : 

1.  That  it  avoids  certain  words  or  phrases,  such  as  "in- 
finite," "  absolute,"  "  immaterial." 

2.  That  it  avoids  also  all  "  vague  negatives." 

3.  That  it  resolutely  confines  us  to  the  sphere  of  what 


A  DECLINE  IN   RELIGIOUS   BELIEF.  225 

can  be  shown  by  experience — "  of  what  is  relative  and 
not  absolute,"  and  "  of  what  is  wholly  and  frankly 
human." 

I  will  examine  these  propositions  in  their  order. 

Proposition  I.  clearly  depends  entirely  on  what  is  meant 
by  theology,  and  on  the  distinction  which  is  drawn  in  the 
propositions  which  follow  between  theology  and  religion. 
Two  things,  however,  may  be  said  of  this  proposition  : 
First,  that,  as  a  matter  of  historical  fact,  men's  concep- 
tions of  moral  obligation  have  been  deeply  influenced  by 
their  conceptions  and  beliefs  about  theology,  or  about  the 
"  whence  and  whither."  Secondly,  that  as  all  branches  of 
truth  are  and  must  be  closely  related  to  each  other,  it 
cannot  possibly  be  true  that  morality  is  independent  of 
theology,  except  upon  the  assumption  that  there  is  no 
truth  in  any  theology.  But  this  is  an  assumption  which 
cannot  be  taken  for  granted,  being  very  different  indeed 
from  the  assumption  (which  may  be  reasonable),  that  no 
existing  theology  is  unmixed  with  error.  The  absolute 
independence  of  morality  as  regards  theology  assumes 
much  more  than  this  ;  it  assumes  that  there  is  no  theology 
containing  even  any  important  element  of  truth. 

Proposition  II.  is,  I  think,  perfectly  true. 

Proposition  III.  contains  a  definition  of  religion  which 
might  probably  be  accepted  by  any  theological  professor 
in  any  of  our  schools  of  divinity  as  good  and  true,  if  not 
in  all  respects  adequate  or  complete. 

Proposition  IV.  defines  the  elements  in  all  theologies 
which  constitute  their  fundamental  errors,  and  which  dis- 
15 


•2'2(>  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

tinguish  them  from  religion  as  defined  in  Proposition  III. 
In  short,  Proposition  III.  defines  affirmatively  what  re- 
ligion is ;  and  Proposition  IV.  defines  negatively  what  it 
is  not.  It  adds  also  a  few  more  affirmative  touches  to 
complete  the  picture  of  what  it  is. 

Looking  now  at  the  erroneous  theological  elements 
which  are  to  be  thrown  away,  we  find  three  words  fixed 
upon  as  specimens  of  what  is  vicious.  One  of  them  is 
"  the  Absolute."  Most  heartily  do  I  wish  it  were  abol- 
ished. More  nonsense  has  been  talked  and  written  under 
cover  of  it  than  under  cover  of  any  other  of  the  volumin- 
ous vocabulary  of  unintelligible  metaphysics.  It  is 
admitted  that  the  Absolute  is  "  unthinkable,"  and  things 
which  are  unthinkable  had  better  be  considered  as  also 
unspeakable,  or  at  least  be  left  unspoken. 

Next  "  immaterial "  is  another  word  to  be  cast  away. 
The  worst  of  this  demand  is,  that  the  words  "  material " 
and  "  immaterial  "  express  a  distinction  of  which  we  can- 
not get  rid  in  thought.  I  do  know  that  the  pen  with 
which  I  now  write  is  made  of  that  which  to  me  is  known 
as  matter ;  but  I  do  not  know  that  the  ideas  which  are 
expressed  in  this  writing  are  made  of  any  like  substance, 
nor  even  of  any  substance  like  the  brain.  On  the  con- 
trary, it  seems  to  me  that  these  ideas  cannot  be  so  made, 
and  that  there  is  an  absolute  difference  between  thought 
and  the  external  substances  which  it  thinks  about.  This 
may  be  my  ignorance,  but  until  that  ignorance  is  removed 
I  must  accept  those  distinctions  which  are  founded  on 
the  experience  and  observation  of  my  own  nature,  and 


A  DECLINE  IN   KELIGIOUS  BELIEF.  227 

I  must  retain  words  which  are  necessary  to  express 
them. 

Then,  as  regards  the  word  "  infinite,"  in  like  manner,  I 
cannot  dispense  with  it,  for  the  simple  reason  that  the 
idea  of  infinity  is  one  of  which  I  cannot  get  rid,  and 
which  all  science  teaches  me  is  an  idea  inseparable  from 
our  highest  conception  of  the  realities  of  Nature.  Infinite 
time  and  infinite  space,  and  the  infinite  duration  of  mat- 
ter and  of  force,  are  conceptions  which  are  part  of  my 
intellectual  being,  and  I  cannot  "think  them  away." 
Metaphysicians  may  tell  me  that  they  are  "  forms  of 
thought."  But  if  so,  they  are  at  least  all  the  more 
"  frankly  human,"  and  I  accept  them  as  such. 

Next  we  are  to  avoid  "vague  negatives  altogether." 
Well,  but  surely  a  definition  of  religion  as  distinguished 
from  theology,  which  consists  in  "  avoiding "  certain 
terms  such  as  we  have  now  examined,  is  a  definition  con- 
sisting of  "  vague  negatives,"  and  of  nothing  else. 

But  then  we  come  next  to  an  affirmative  definition  : 
"  confining  ourselves  resolutely  to  the  sphere  of  what  can 
be  shown  by  experience."  To  this  I  assent,  provided 
experience  be  not  confined  to  the  sphere  of  sense,  and 
provided  everything  which  any  man  has  ever  felt,  or 
known,  or  conceived,  be  accepted  as  in  its  own  place 
and  rank  coming  within  the  sphere  which  is  thus  de- 
scribed. 

Again,  it  is  demanded  of  us  that  we  confine  ourselves 
resolutely  within  "  what  is  relative  and  not  absolute."  To 
this  I  assent.  All  knowledge  is  relative — both  to  the 


228  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

mind  which  knows,  and  relative  also  to  all  other  things 
which  remain  to  be  known.  Absolute  goodness,  and 
absolute  power,  and  absolute  knowledge,  are  all  conceiva- 
ble, but  they  are  all  relative ;  and  to  talk  of  any  object 
of  knowledge,  or  of  any  subject  of  knowledge,  as  non-rela- 
tive, is,  or  seems  to  me  to  be,  simply  nonsense. 

Lastly,  it  is  demanded  of  us  to  confine  ourselves  to 
what  is  "  wholly  and  frankly  human."  If  this  means 
that  we  are  not  to  think  of  any  power  or  any  being  who 
is  not  related  to  our  human  faculties  in  a  most  definite 
and  intelligible  sense,  I  accept  the  limitation.  But  if  it 
means  that  we  are  not  to  think  of  any  such  power  or 
being  except  under  all  the  imperfections,  weaknesses,  and 
vices  of  humanity,  then  the  limitation  is  one  which  I 
cannot  accept  either  as  conceivable  in  itself,  or  as  consis- 
tent with  what  I  can  see  or  understand  of  Nature. 

But  ought  we  not  to  be  agreed  in  this  ?  If  there  is 
a  Power  to  which  man  "  must  bow,"  "  a  Being  which  he 
must  adore,"  and  a  "  Providence  which  he  must  love  and 
serve,"  it  is  clearly  impossible  that  this  Being,  Power,  or 
Providence  can  be  "  wholly  human,"  in  the  sense  of  being 
no  greater,  no  wiser,  no  better,  than  man  himself. 

The  whole  of  this  language  is  the  language  of  theology 
and  of  nothing  else — language,  indeed,  which  may  be 
held  consistently  with  a  vast  variety  of  theological 
creeds,  but  which  is  inseparable  from  those  fundamental 
conceptions  which  all  such  creeds  involve,  which  is  bor- 
rowed from  them,  and  without  which  it  has  to  me  no 
intelligible  sense. 


A   DECLINE    IN   RELIGIOUS    BELIEF.  229 

With  these  explanations  I  accept  the  tenth  paragraph 
of  Paper  No.  IV. ,  and  that  part  of  the  last  paragraph 
which  has  been  already  quoted,  as  expressing  "with  ad- 
mirable force  and  truth  at  least  one  aspect  of  the  con- 
nection between  morals  and  religion. 


PROF.  CLIFFORD. 

IN  the  third  of  the  preceding  discourses  there  is  so 
much  which  I  can  fully  and  fervently  accept,  that  I 
should  find  it  far  more  grateful  to  rest  in  that  feeling  of 
admiration  and  sympathy,  then  to  attend  to  points  of 
difference  which  seem  to  me  to  be  of  altogether  secondary 
import.  But  for  the  truth's  sake  this  must  first  be  done, 
because  it  will  then  be  more  easy  to  point  out  some  of  the 
bearings  of  the  position  held  in  that  discourse  upon  the 
question  which  is  under  discussion. 

That  the  sense  of  duty  in  a  man  is  the  prompting  of  a 
self  other  than  his  own,  is  the  very  essence  of  it.  Not 
only  would  morals  not  be  self-sufficing  if  there  were  no 
such  prompting  of  a  wider  self,  but  they  could  not  exist ; 
one  might  as  well  suppose  a  fire  without  heat.  Not  only 
is  a  sense  of  duty  inherent  in  the  constitution  of  our 
nature,  but  the  prompting  of  a  wider  self  than  that  of 
the  individual  is  inherent  in  a  sense  of  duty.  It  is  no 
more  possible  to  have  the  right  without  unselfishness,  than 
to  have  man  without  a  feeling  for  the  right. 


230  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

We  may  explain  or  account  for  these  facts  in  various 
ways,  but  we  shall  not  thereby  alter  the  facts.  No 
theories  about  heat  and  light  will  ever  make  a  cold  fire. 
And  no  doubt  or  disproof  of  any  existing  theory  can  any 
more  extinguish  that  self  other  than  myself,  which  speaks 
to  me  in  the  voice  of  conscience,  than  doubt  or  disproof 
of  the  wave-theory  of  light  can  put  out  the  noonday  sun. 

One  such  theory  is  defended  in  the  discourse  here  dealt 
with,  and,  if  I  may  venture  to  say  so,  is  not  quite 
.sufficiently  distinguished  from  the  facts  which  it  is  meant 
to  explain.  The  theory  is  this :  that  the  voice  of  con- 
science in  my  mind  is  the  voice  of  a  conscious  being 
external  to  me  and  to  all  men,  who  has  made  us  and  all 
the  world.  When  this  theory  is  admitted,  the  observed 
discrepancy  between  our  moral  sense  and  the  government 
of  the  world,  as  a  whole,  makes  it  necessary  to  suppose 
another  world  and  another  life  in  it  for  men,  whereby 
this  discord  shall  be  resolved  in  a  final  harmony. 

I  fully  admit  that  the  theistic  hypothesis,  so  grounded, 
and  considered  apart  from  objections  otherwise  arising,  is 
a  reasonable  hypothesis  and  an  explanation  of  the  facts. 
The  idea  of  an  external  conscious  being  is  unavoidably 
suggested,  as  it  seems  to  me,  by  the  categorical  imperative 
of  the  moral  sense ;  and,  moreover,  in  a  way  quite  inde- 
pendent, by  the  aspect  of  Nature,  which  seems  to  answer 
to  our  questionings  with  an  intelligence  akin  to  our  own- 
It  is  more  reasonable  to  assume  one  consciousness  than 
two,  if  by  that  one  assumption  we  can  explain  two  dis- 
tinct facts ;  just  as  if  we  had  been  led  to  assume  an  ether 


A  DECLINE   IN   RELIGIOUS   BELIEF.  231 

to  explain  light  and  an  ether  to  explain  electricity,  we 
might  have  run  before  experiment  and  guessed  that  these 
two  ethers  were  but  one.  But  since  there  is  a  discordance 
between  Nature  and  conscience,  the  theory  of  their  com- 
mon origin  in  a  mind  external  to  humanity  has  not  met 
with  such  acceptance  as  that  of  the  divine  origin  of  each. 
A  large  number  of  theists  have  rejected  it,  and  taken 
refuge  in  Manichseism  and  the  doctrine  of  the  Demiurgus 
in  various  forms;  while  others  have  endeavoured,  as 
aforesaid,  to  redress  the  balance  of  the  old  world  by  call- 
ing into  existence  a  new  one. 

It  is,  however,  a  very  striking  and  significant  fact,  that 
the  very  great  majority  of  mankind  who  have  thought 
about  these  questions  at  all,  while  acknowledging  the 
existence  of  divine  beings  and  their  influence  in  the 
government  of  the  world,  have  sought  for  the  spring  and 
sanction  of  duty  in  something  above  and  beyond  the 
gods.  The  religions  of  Brahmanism  and  of  Buddhism, 
and  the  moral  system  of  Confucius,  have  together  ruled 
over  more  than  two-thirds  of  the  human  race  during  the 
historic  period :  and  in  all  of  these  the  moral  sense  is  re- 
garded as  arising  indeed  out  of  a  universal  principle,  but 
not  as  personified  in  any  conscious  being.  This  vast  body 
of  dissent  might  well,  it  should  seem,  make  us  ask  if 
there  is  anything  unsatisfying  in  the  theory  which  repre- 
sents the  voice  of  conscience  as  the  voice  of  a  god. 

Although,  as  I  have  said,  the  idea  of  an  external  con- 
scious being  is  unavoidably  suggested  by  the  moral  sense, 
yet,  if  this  idea  should  be  found  untrue,  it  does  not  follow 


232  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

that  Nature  has  been  fooling  us.  The  idea  is  not  in  the 
facts,  but  in  our  inference  from  the  facts.  A  mirror 
unavoidably  suggests  the  idea  of  a  room  behind  it ;  but  it 
is  not  our  eyes  that  deceive  us,  it  is  only  the  inference 
we  draw  from  their  testimony.  Further  consideration 
may  lead  to  a  different  inference  of  far  greater  practical 
value. 

Now,  whether  or  no  it  be  reasonable  and  satisfying  to 
the  conscience,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  theistic  belief  is 
a  comfort  and  a  solace  to  those  who  hold  it,  and  that  the 
loss  of  it  is  a  very  painful  loss.  It  cannot  be  doubted,  at 
least  by  many  of  us  in  this  generation,  who  either  profess 
it  now,  or  received  it  in  our  childhood  and  have  parted 
from  it  since  with  such  searching  trouble  as  only  cradle- 
faiths  can  cause.  We  have  seen  the  spring  sun  shine  out 
of  an  empty  heaven,  to  light  up  a  soulless  earth  ;  we  have 
felt  with  utter  loneliness  that  the  Great  Companion  is 
dead.  Our  children,  it  may  be  hoped,  will  know  that 
sorrow  only  by  the  reflex  light  of  a  wondering  compas- 
sion. But  to  say  that  theistic  belief  is  a  comfort  and  a 
solace,  and  to  say  that  it  is  the  crown  or  coping  of  morality, 
these  are  different  things. 

For  in  what  way  shall  belief  in  God  strengthen  my  sense 
of  duty  ?  He  is  a  great  one  working  for  the  right.  But  I 
already  know  so  many,  and  I  know  these  so  well.  His 
righteousness  is  unfathomable ;  it  transcends  all  ideals. 
But  I  have  not  yet  fathomed  the  goodness  of  living  men 
whom  I  know ;  still  less  of  those  who  have  lived,  and 
whom  I  know.  And  the  goodness  of  all  these  is  a  striving 


A   DECLINE   IN    RELIGIOUS   BELIEF.  233 

for  something  better ;  now  it  is  not  the  goal,  but  the 
striving  for  it,  that  matters  to  me.  The  essence  of  their 
goodness  is  the  losing  of  the  individual  self  in  another 
and  a  wider  self ;  but  God  cannot  do  this ;  his  goodness 
must  be  something  different.  He  is  infinitely  great  and 
powerful,  and  he  lives  forever.  I  do  not  understand  this 
mensuration  of  goodness  by  foot-pounds,  and  seconds,  and 
cubic  miles.  A  little  field-mouse,  which  busies  itself  in 
the  hedge,  and  does  not  mind  my  company,  is  more  to 
me  than  the  longest  ichthyosaurus  that  ever  lived,  even  if 
he  lived  a  thousand  years.  When  we  look  at  a  starry 
sky,  the  spectacle  whose  awfulness  Kant  compared  with 
that  of  the  moral  sense,  does  it  help  out  our  poetic  emo- 
tion to  reflect  that  these  specks  are  really  very  very  big, 
and  very  very  hot,  and  very  very  far  away  ?  Their  heat 
and  their  bigness  oppress  us  ;  we  should  like  them  to  be 
taken  still  farther  away,  the  great  blazing  lumps.  But 
when  we  think  of  the  unseen  planets  that  surround 
them,  of  the  wonders  of  life,  of  reason,  of  love,  that  may 
dwell  therein,  then  indeed  there  is  something  sublime  in 
the  sight.  Fitness  and  kinship :  these  are  the  truly  great 
things  for  us,  not  force  and  massiveness  and  length  of 
days. 

Length  of  days,  said  the  old  rabbi,  is  measured  not  by 
their  number,  but  by  the  work  that  is  done  in  them.  We 
are  all  to  be  swept  away  in  the  final  ruin  of  the  earth. 
The  thought  of  that  ending  is  a  sad  thought ;  there  is  no 
use  in  trying  to  deny  this.  But  it  has  nothing  to  do  with 
right  and  wrong ;  it  belongs  to  another  subject.  Like 


234  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

All-father  Odin,  we  must  ride  out  gayly  to  do  battle  with 
the  wolf  of  doom,  even  if  there  be  no  Balder  to  come  back 
and  continue  our  work.  At  any  rate  the  right  will  have 
been  done ;  and  the  past  is  safer  than  all  store-houses. 

The  conclusion  of  the  matter  is,  that  belief  in  God  and 
in  a  future  life  is  a  source  of  refined  and  elevated  pleasure 
to  those  who  can  hold  it.  But  the  foregoing  of  a  refined 
and  elevated  pleasure,  because  it  appears  that  we  have  no 
right  to  indulge  in  it,  is  not  in  itself,  and  cannot  produce  as 
its  consequence,  a  decline  of  morality. 

There  is  Another  theory  of  the  facts  of  the  moral  sense 
set  forth  in  the  succeeding  discourse,  and  this  seems  to  me 
to  be  the  true  one.  The  voice  •  of  conscience  is  the  voice 
of  our  father-man  who  is  within  us  ;  the  accumulated  in- 
stinct of  the-  race  is  poured  into  each  one  of  us,  and  over- 
flows us,  as  if  the  ocean  were  poured  into  a  cup.1  Our 
evidence  for  this  explanation  is  that  the  cause  assigned  is 
a  vera  causa ;  it  undoubtedly  exists  ;  there  is  no  perhaps 
about  that.  And  those  who  have  tried  tell  us  that  it  is 
sufficient ;  the  explanation,  like  the  fact,  "  covers  the  whole 
voluntary  field."  The  lightest  and  the  gravest  action  may 
be  consciously  done  in  and  for  man.  And  the  sym- 
pathetic aspect  of  Nature  is  explained  to  us  in  the  same 
way.  In  so  far  as  our  conception  of  Nature  is  akin  to 
our  minds  that  conceive  it,  man  made  it ;  and  man  made 
us,  with  the  necessity  to  conceive  it  in  this  way.2 

1  Schopenhauer.     There  is  a  most  remarkable  article  on  the  "Natural 
History  of  Morals  "  in  the  North  British  Review,  December,  1867. 

2  For  an  admirable  exposition  of  the  doctrine  of  the  social  origin  of  our 
conceptions,  see  Prof.  Croom  Robertson's  paper,    "How  we  come  by  our 
Knowledge,"  in  the  first  number  of  The  Nineteenth  Century. 


A   DECLINE   IN   RELIGIOUS   BELIEF.  235 

I  do  not,  however,  suppose  that  morality  would  practi- 
cally gain  much  from  the  wide  acceptance  of  true  views 
about  its  nature,  except  in  a  way  which  I  shall  presently 
suggest.  I  neither  admit  the  moral  influence  of  theism 
in  the  past,  nor  look  forward  to  the  moral  influence  of 
humanism  in  the  future.  Virtue  is  a  habit,  not  a  senti- 
ment or  an  -ism.  The  doctrine  of  total  depravity  seems 
to  have  been  succeeded  by  a  doctrine  of  partial  depravity, 
according  to  which  there  is  hope  for  human  affairs,  but 
still  men  cannot  go  straight  unless  some  tremendous,  all- 
embracing  theory  has  a  finger  in  the  pie.  Theories  are 
most  important  and  excellent  things  when  they  help  us 
to  see  the  matter  as  it  really  is,  and  so  to  judge  what  is 
the  right  thing  to  do  in  regard  to  it.  They  are  the  guides 
of  action,  but  not  the  springs  of  it.  Now  the  springs  of 
virtuous  action  is  the  social  instinct,  which  is  set  to  work 
by  the  practice  of  comradeship.  The  union  of  men  in  a 
common  effort  for  a  common  object — band-work,  if  I  may 
venture  to  translate  cooperation  into  English — this  is,  and 
always  has  been,  the  true  school  of  character.  Except  in 
times  of  severe  struggle  for  national  existence,  the  practice 
of  virtue  by  masses  of  men  has  always  been  coincident 
with  municipal  freedom,  and  with  the  vigour  of  such 
unions  as  are  not  large  enough  to  take  from  each  man  his 
conscious  share  in  the  work  and  in  the  direction  of  it. 

What  really  affects  morality  is  not  religious  belief,  but 
a  practice  which,  in  some  times  and  places,  is  thought  to 
be  religious — namely,  the  practice  of  submitting  human 
life  to  clerical  control.  The  apparent  destructive  tendency 


230  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

of  modern  times,  which  arouses  fear  and  foreboding  of 
evil  in  the  minds  of  many  of  the  best  of  men,  seems  to  me 
to  be  not  mainly  an  intellectual  movement.  It  has  its  in- 
tellectual side,  but  that  side  is  the  least  important,  and 
touches  comparatively  few  souls.  The  true  core  of  it  is 
a  firm  resolve  of  men  to  know  the  right  at  first  hand, 
which  has  grown  out  of  the  strong  impulse  given  to  the 
moral  sense  by  political  freedom.  Such  a  resolve  is  a 
necessary  condition  to  the  existence  of  a  pure  and  noble 
theism  like  that  of  the  third  discourse,  which  learns  what 
God  is  like  by  thinking  of  man's  love  for  man.  Although 
that  doctrine  has  been  prefigured  and  led  up  to  for  many 
ages  by  the  best  teaching  of  Englishmen,  and — what  is 
far  more  important — by  the  best  practice  of  Englishmen, 
yet  it  cannot  be  accepted  on  a  large  scale  without  what 
will  seem  to  many  a  decline  of  religious  belief.  For  as- 
suredly if  men  learn  the  nature  of  God  from  the  moral 
sense  of  man,  they  cannot  go  on  believing  the  doctrines 
of  popular  theology.  Such  change  of  belief  is  of  small 
account  in  itself,  for  any  consequences  it  can  bring  about ; 
but  it  is  of  vast  importance  a,s  a  symptom  of  the  increas- 
ing power  and  clearness  of  the  sense  of  duty. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  one  "  decline  of  religious 
belief,"  inseparable  from  a  revolution  in  human  conduct, 
which  would  indeed  be  a  frightful  disaster  to  mankind. 
A  revival  of  any  form  of  sacerdotal  Christianity  would 
be  a  matter  of  practice  and  not  a  matter  of  theory.  The 
system  which  sapped  the  foundation  of  patriotism  in  the 
old  world  ;  which  well  nigh  eradicted  the  sense  of  intel- 


A  DECLINE   IN  RELIGIOUS  BELIEF.  237 

lectual  honesty,  and  seriously  weakened  the  habit  of  truth  - 
speaking;  which  lowered  men's  reverence  for  the  marriage- 
bond  by  placing  its  sanctions  in  a  realm  outside  of  Nature 
instead  of  in  the  common  life  of  men,  and  by  the  institu- 
tions of  monasticism  and  a  celibate  clergy  ;  which  stunted 
the  moral  sense  of  the  nations  by  putting  a  priest  between 
every  man  and  his  conscience — this  system,  if  it  should 
ever  return  to  power,  must  be  expected  to  produce  worse 
evils  than  those  which  it  has  -  worked  in  the  past.  The 
house  which  it  has  once  made  desolate  has  been  partially 
swept  and  garnished  by  the  free  play  gained  for  the  na- 
tural goodness  of  men.  It  would  come  back  accompanied 
by  social  diseases  perhaps  worse  than  itself,  and  the  wreck 
of  civilized  Europe  would  be  darker  than  the  darkest  of 
past  ages. 


DR.  WARD. 

I  AGREE  with  the  Dean  of  St.  Paul's,  that  the  wording 
of  our  question  is  unfortunately  ambiguous ;  and  I 
think  that  this  fact  has  made  the  discussion  in  several 
respects  less  pointed  and  less  otherwise  interesting  than 
it  might  have  been. 

For  my  present  purpose,  I  understand  the  term  "  reli- 
gious belief "  as  including  essentially  belief  in  a  personal 
God  and  in  personal  immortality.  Less  than  this  is  not 
worthy  the  name  of  religious  belief ;  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  I  will  not  refer  to  any  other  religious  truths  than 


238  A  MODERN    SYMPOSIUM. 

these.  I  am  to  inquire,  therefore,  what  would  be  the  in- 
fluence on  morality  of  a  decline  in  these  two  beliefs. 

But  next,  what  is  meant  by  "  morality  ? "  I  will  explain, 
as  clearly  as  brevity  may  permit,  what  I  should  myself 
understand  by  the  term;  though  I  am,  of  course,  well 
a  \vare  that  this  is  by  no  means  the  sense  in  which  Sir  J. 
Fitzjames  Stephen,  or  Mr.  Harrison,  or  Prof.  Clifford,  un- 
derstands it. 

I  consider  that  there  is  a  certain  authoritative  rule  of 
life,1  necessarily  not  contingently  existing,  which  may  be 
regarded  under  a  twofold  aspect.  It  declares  that  certain 
acts  (exterior  or  interior)  are  intrinsically  and  necessarily 
evil ;  it  declares,  again,  that  some  certain  act  (exterior  or 
interior),  even  where  not  actually  evil,  is  by  intrinsic  ne- 
cessity, under  the  circumstances  of  some  given  moment, 
less  morally  excellent  than  some  certain  other  act.  Any 
given  man,  therefore,  more  effectively  practises  "morality," 
in  proportion  as  he  more  energetically,  predominantly,  and 
successfully  aims  at  adjusting  his  whole  conduct,  interior 
and  exterior,  by  this  authoritative  rule.  Accordingly,  when 
I  am  asked  what  is  the  bearing  of  some  particular  influ- 
ence on  morality,  I  understand  myself  to  be  asked  how 
far  such  influence  affects  for  good  or  evil  the  prevalence 
of  that  practical  habit  which  I  have  just  described ;  how 
far  such  influence  disposes  men  (or  the  contrary)  to  adjust 
their  conduct  by  this  authoritative  rule. 

1  To  prevent  misapprehension  I  may  explain  that,  in  my  view,  those 
various  necessary  truths  which  collectively  constitute  this  rule  are,  like  all 
other  necessary  truths,  founded  on  the  essence  of  God  ;  they  are  what  they 
are  because  he  is  what  he  is. 


A  DECLINE   IN   RELIGIOUS   BELIEF.  239 

These  explanations  having  been  premised,  my  answer 
to  the  proposed  question  is  this  :  The  absence  of  religious 
belief — of  a  belief  in  a  personal  God  and  personal  immor- 
tality— does  not  simply  injure  morality,  but,  if  the  dis- 
believers carry  their  view  out  consistently,  utterly  destroys 
it.  I  affirm — which,  of  course,  requires  proof,  though  I 
have  no  space  here  to  give  it — that  no  one  except  a  theist 
can,  in  consistency,  recognize  the  necessarily  existing  au- 
thoritative rule  of  which  I  have  spoken.  But  for  prac- 
tical purposes  there  is  no  need  of  this  affirmation,  because 
in  what  follows  I  shall  refer  to  no  other  opponents  of  re- 
ligion, except  that  antitheistic  body — consisting  of  agno- 
stics, positivists,  and  the  like — which  in  England  just 
now  heads  the  speculative  irreligious  movement.  .  Now, 
it  is  manifest  on  the  very  surface  of  philosophical  litera- 
ture that,  SM  a  matter  of  fact,  these  men  deny  in  theory 
the  existence  of  any  such  necessary  authoritative  rule  as 
that  on  which  I  have  dwelt.  A  large  proportion  of  theists 
accept  it,  and  call  it  "  the  Natural  Law  ;  "l  an  agnostic  or 
positivist  denies  its  existence.  It  is  very  clear  that  he 
who  denies  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  necessarily  ex- 
isting authoritative  rule  of  life  cannot  consistently  aim 
at  adjusting  any,  even  the  smallest,  part  of  his  conduct  by 
the  intimations  of  that  rule ;  or,  in  other  words,  cannot 


1  The  Natural  Law  more  strictly  includes  only  God's  prohibition  of  acts 
intrinsically  evil,  and  his  preception  of  acts  which  cannot  be  omitted  without 
doing  what  is  intrinsically  evil.  But  we  may  with  obvious  propriety  so  ex- 
tend the  term  as  to  include  under  it  God's  counselling  of  those  acts  which, 
as  clothed  in  their  ]full  circumstances,  are  by  intrinsic  necessity  the  more 
morally  excellent. 


240  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

consistently  do  so  much  as  one  act  which  (on  the  theory 
which  1  follow)  can  be  called  morally  good. 

Here,  however,  a  most  important  explanation  must  be 
made.  It  continually  happens  that  some  given  philoso- 
pher holds  some  given  doctrine  speculatively  and  theore- 
tically, while  he  holds  the  precisely  contradictory  doctrine 
implicitly  and  unconsciously ;  inasmuch  that  it  is  the  lat- 
ter, and  not  the- former,  which  he  applies  to  his  estimate 
of  events  as  they  successively  arise.  Now  |  the  existence 
of  the  Natural  Law — so  I  would  most  confidently  main- 
tain— is  a  truth  so  firmly  rooted  by  God  himself  in  the 
conviction  of  every  reasonable  creature,  that  practically  to 
leaven  the  human  mind  with  belief  of  its  contradictory  is, 
even  under  the  circumstances  most  favourable  to  that 
purpose,  a  slow  and  up-hill  process.  In  the  early  stages, 
therefore,  of  antitheistic  persuasion,  there  is.  $  vast  gulf 
between  the  antitheist's  speculative  theory  and  his  prac- 
tical realization  of  that  theory.  Mr.  Mallock  has  set  forth 
this  fact,  I  think,  with  admirable  force,  in  an  article  con- 
tributed by  him  to  the  Contemporary  of  last  January. 
When'  antitheists  say — such  is  his  argument — that  the 
pursuit  of  truth  is  a  "  sacred,"  "  heroic,"  "  noble  "  exercise 
— when  they  call  one  way  of  living  mean,  and  base,  and 
hateful,  and  another  way  of  living  great,  and  blessed,  and 
admirable — they  are  guilty  of  most  flagrant  inconsistency. 
They  therein  use  language  and  conceive  thoughts  which 
are  utterly  at  variance  with  their  own  speculative  theory. 
If  it  be  admitted  (1)  that  the  idea  expressed  by  the  term 
"  moral  goodness  "  is  a  simple  idea,  an  idea  incapable  of 


A   DECLINE   IN   KELIGIOUS   BELIEF.  241 

analysis ;  and  (2)  that  to  this  idea  there  corresponds  a 
necessary  objective  reality  in  rerum  natura — if  these 
two  propositions  be  admitted,  the  existence  of  the  Natural 
Law  is  a  truth  which  irresistibly  results  from  the  admis- 
sion.    On  the  other  hand,  if  these  two  propositions  be  not 
postulated,  then  to  talk  of  one  human  act  being  "  higher" 
or  "  nobler  "  than  another  is  as  simply  unmeaning  as  to 
talk  of  a  bed  being  nobler  than  a  chair,  or  a  plough  than 
a  harrow.     Whether  it  be  the  bed,  or  the  plough,  or  the 
human  act,  it  may  be  more  useful  than  the  other  article 
with  which  it  is  brought  into  comparison  ;  but  to  speak 
in  either  case  of  "  nobleness  "  is  as  the  sound  of  a  tinkling 
cymbal.     Or  rather,  which  is  my  present  point,  the  fact 
of  antitheists  using  such  language  shows  that  their  prac- 
tical belief  is  so  far  essentially  opposed  and  (as  I,  of  course, 
should  say)  immeasurably  superior  to  their  speculative 
theory.     To  my  mind  there  is  hardly  any  truth  which 
needs  more  to  be  insisted  on  than  this,  in  the  present 
crisis  of  philosophical  thought :  when  antitheism  success- 
fully conceals  its  hideous  deformity  from  its  own  votaries, 
by  dressing  itself  up  in  the  very  garments  of  that  rival 
creed  which  it  derides  as  imbecile  and  obsolete.  I  heartily 
wish  I  had  space  for  setting  forth  in  full  and  clear  light 
the  argument  on  which  I  would  here  insist.     I  may  refer, 
however,  to  Mr.  Mallock's  article,  for  an  excellent  exposi- 
tion of  it  from  his  own  point  of  view  j  and,  in  particular, 
I  cannot  express  too  strongly  my  concurrence  with  the 
following  remarks : 

"  All  the  moral  feelings  "  (he  says)  "  at  present  anoat  in  the  world 

16 


242  A  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM. 

depend,  as  I  have  already  shown,  on  the  primary  doctrines  of  re- 
ligion ;  but  that  the  former  would  outlive  the  latter  is  nothing  more 
than  we  should  naturally  expect ;  just  as  water  may  go  on  boiling 
after  it  is  taken  oft'  the  fire,  as  flowers  keep  their  scent  and  colour 
after  we  have  plucked  them,  or  as  a  tree  whose  roots  have  been  cut 
may  yet  put  out  green  leaves  for  one  spring  more.  But  a  time 
must  come  when  all  this  will  be  over,  and  when  the  true  effects  of 
what  has  been  done  will  begin  to  show  themselves.  Nor  can  there 
be  any  reason  brought  forward  to  show  why,  if  the  creed  of  unbelief 
was  once  fully  assented  to  by  the  world,  all  morality — a  thing  al- 
ways attended  by  some  pain  and  struggle — would  not  gradually 
wither  away,  and  give  place  to  a  more  or  less  successful  seeking  after 
pleasure,  no  matter  of  what  kind." 

I  would  also  recall  to  Sir  J.  Fitzjames  Stephen's  remem- 
brance an  admirable  statement  of  his,  which  occurred  in 
the  work  on  '  Liberty,  Equality,  and  Fraternity."  "  We 
cannot  judge  of  the  effects  of  atheism,"  he  says,  "  from 
the  conduct  of  persons  who  have  been  educated  as  be- 
lievers in  God,  and  in  the  midst  of  a  nation  which  believes 
in  God.  If  we  should  ever  see  a  generation  of  men, 
especially  a  generation .  of  Englishmen,  to  whom  the. 
word  '  God '  has  no  meaning  at  all,  we  should  get  a  light 
on  the  subject  which  might  be  lurid  enough."1 

So  far  I  have  used  the  word  "  morality  "  in  that  sense 
which  I  account  the  true  one.  But  a  different  acceptation 
of  the  word  is  very  common ;  and  it  will  be  better  per- 
haps briefly  to  consider  our  proposed  question  in  the  sense 
which  that  acceptation  would  give  it.  Morality,  then,  is 
often  spoken  of  as  consisting  in  a  man's  sacrifice  of  his 

1  Second  edition,  p.  326. 


A  DECLINE  IN  RELIGIOUS  BELIEF.  243 

personal  desires  for  the  public  good ;  so  that  each  man 
more  faithfully  practises  "  morality  "  in  proportion  as  he 
more  effectively  postpones  private  interests  to  public  ones. 
I  have  always  been  extremely  surprised  that  any  theist 
can  use  this^  terminology ;  though  I  am  well  aware,  of 
course,  that  many  do  so.  To  mention  no  other  of  its  de- 
fects, it  excludes  [from  the  sphere  of  morality  precisely 
what  a  theist  must  consider  the  most  noble  and  elevating 
branch  thereof,  viz.,  men's  duties  to  their  Creator.  Con- 
stant rememberance  of  God's  presence,  prayer  to  him  for 
moral  strength,  purging  the  heart  from  any  such  wordly 
attachment  as  may  interfere  with  his  sovereignty  over 
the  affections — these,  and  a  hundred  others,  which  are 
man's  highest  moral  actions,  are  excluded  by  this  strange 
terminology  from  being  moral  actions  at  all.  Still,  in  one 
respect  there  is  great  agreement  between  the  two  "  moral- 
ities "  in  question,  for  under  either  of  them  morality  very 
largely  consists  in  self-denial  and  self-sacrifice. 

Now,  if  it  be  asked  in  what  way  morality,  as  so  under- 
stood, would  be  affected  by  the  absence  of  religious  belief, 
I  think  the  true  reply  is  one  which  has  so  often  been 
drawn  out  that  I  need  do  no  more  than  indicate  it.  Firstly, 
apart  from  theistic  motives  there  is  no  sufficient  moral 
leverage ;  men  would  not  have  the  moral  strength  re- 
quired for  sustained  self -denial  and  self-sacrifice.  Secondly 
and  more  importantly,  if  theistic  sanctions  were  away,  no 
theory  could  be  drawn  out  explaining  why  it  should  be 
reasonable  that  a  man  sacrifice  his  personal  interest  to 
that  of  his  fellows. 


-44  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

On  this  matter  I  am  glad  that  I  have  the  opportunity 
of  ilrawing  attention  to  a  very  fine  passage  of  Mr. 
(Joldwin  Smith's,  published  in  the  Macmillan  of  last 
January  r1 

"Materialism  has,  in  fact,  already  begun  to  show  its  effects  on 
human  conduct  and  on  society.  They  may  perhaps  be  more  visible 
in  communities  where  social  conduct  depends  greatly  on  individual 
conviction  and  motive  than  in  communities  which  are  more  ruled  by 
tradition  and  bound  together  by  strong  class  organizations  though 
the  decay  of  morality  will  perhaps  be  more  complete  and  disastrous 
in  the  latter  than  in  the  former.  God  and  future  retribution  being 
out  of  the  question,  it  is  difficult  to  see  what  can  restrain  the  sel- 
fishness of  an  ordinary  man,  and  induce  him,  in  the  absence  of  ac- 
tual coercion,  to  sacrifice  his  personal  desires  to  the  public  good. 
The  service  of  humanity  is  the  sentiment  of  a  refined  mind  conver- 
sant with  history  ;  within  no  calculable  time  is  it  likely  to  overrule 
the  passions  and  direct  the  conduct  of  the  mass.  And  after  all, 
without  God  or  spirit,  what'is  '  humanity  ? '  One  school  of  science 
reckons  a  hundred  and  fifty  different  species  of  man.  What  is  the 
bond  of  unity  between  all  these  species,  and  wherein  consists  the 
obligation  to  mutual  love  and  help  ?  A  zealous  servant  of  science 
told  Agassiz  that  the  age  of  real  civilization  would  have  begun  when 
you  could  go  out  and  shoot  a  man  for  scientific  purposes  ;  and  in  the 
controversy  respecting  the  Jamaica  massacre  we  had  proof  enough 
that  the  ascendancy  of  science  and  a  strong  sense  of  human  brother- 
hood might  be  very  different  things.  l  Apparent  dirse  facies. '  We 
begin  to  perceive,  looming  through  the  mist,  the  lineaments  of  an 
epoch  of  selfishness  compressed  by  a  government  of  force." 

In  fact,  even  in  the  present  early  stage  of  English  anti- 
theistic  philosophy,  if  its  adherents  are  directly  asked  what 

1877. 


A    DECLINE   IN   KELIGIOUS   BELIEF.  245 

is  man's  reasonable  rule  of  life,  I  know  of  no  other  answer 
they  will  theoretically  give  except  one.  They  will  say 
that  any  given  person's  one  reasonable  pursuit  on  earth  is 
to  aim  at  his  own  earthly  happiness — to  obtain  for  him- 
self out  of  life  the  greatest  amount  he  can  of  gratification 
No  doubt  they  will  make  confident  statements  on  the  in- 
dissoluble connections  between  happiness  and  "  virtue." 
Still,  according  to  their  speculative  theory,  the  only  rea- 
sonable ground  for  practising  "  virtue  "  is  its  conducive- 
ness  to  the  agent's  happiness. 

Now,  let  us  suppose  a  generation  to  grow  up,  profoundly 
imbued  with  this  principle,  carrying  it  consistently  into 
detail,  emancipated  from  the  unconscious  influence  of 
(what  I  must  be  allowed  to  call)  a  more  respectable  creed. 
What  would  be  the  result  ?  Evidently  a  man  so  trained, 
in  calculating  for  himself  the  balance  of  pleasure  and  pain, 
will  give  no  credit  on  the  former  side  to  such  gratifica- 
tions as  might  arise  from  consciousness  of  conquest  over 
his  lower  nature,  or  from  the  pursuit  of  lofty  and  gener- 
ous aims.  These,  I  say,  will  have  no  place  in  his  list  of 
pleasures :  because  he  will  have  duly  learned  his  lesson, 
that  there  is  no  "  lower  "  or  "  higher  "  nature  ;  that  no  one 
aim  can  be  "loftier"  than  any  other;  that  there  is  nothing 
more  admirable  in  generosity  than  in  selfishness.  On  the 
other  hand,  neither  will  he  include,  under  his  catalogue 
of  pains,  any  feeling  of  remorse  for  evil  committed,  or  any 
dread  of  possible  punishment  in  some  future  life  ;  for  he 
will  look  with  simple  contempt  on  those  doctrines,  which 
are  required  as  the  foundation  for  such  pains.  His  com- 


246  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

mon-sense  course  will  be  to  make  this  world  as*  comfort- 
able a  place  as  he  can,  by  bringing  every  possible  pru- 
dential calculation  to  bear  on  his  purpose.  Before  all 
things,  he  will  keep  his  digestion  in  good  order.  He  will 
keep  at  arms'-length  (indeed  at  many  arms' -lengths)  every 
disquieting  consideration,  such,  e.  g.,  as  might  arise  from 
a  remembrance  of  other  men's  misery,  or  from  a  thought 
of  that  repulsive  spectre  which  the  superstitious  call  moral 
obligation. 

It  is  plain  that  duly  to  pursue  the  subject  thus  opened 
would  carry  me  indefinitely  beyond  my  limits  j1  and  I  will 
only,  therefore,  make  one  concluding  observation.  If  the 
term  "  virtue  "  be  retained  by  those  of  whom  I  am  speak- 
ing, it  will  be  used,  I  suppose  to  express  any  habitual 
practice  which  solidly  conduces  to  the  agent's  balance  of 
earthly  enjoyment.  I  am  confident  that — should  this  be 
the  recognized  terminology,  and  should  the  new  school  be 
permitted  to  arrive  at  its  legitimate  development — there 
is  one  habit  which  would  be  very  prominent  among  its 
catalogue  of  "  virtues."  The  habit  to  which  I  refer  is  in- 
dulgence in  licentiousness — licentiousness  practised,  no 
doubt,  prudently,  discreetly,  calculatingly,  but  at  the  same 
time  habitually,  perse veringly,  and  with  keen  zest. 

1  I  have  treated  at  somewhat  greater  length  in  an  article  which  I  con- 
tributed to  the  Dublin .Review  of  January,  1877,  pp.  15-21. 


A  DECLINE   IN   RELIGIOUS  BELIEF.  247 


PROF.  HUXLEY. 

WE  are  led  to  do  this  thing,  and  to  avoid  that,  partly 
by  instinct  and  partly  by  conscious  motives ;  and 
our  conduct  is  said  to  be  moral  or  the  reverse,  partly  on 
the  ground  of  its  effects  upon  other  beings,  partly  upon 
that  of  its  operation  upon  ourselves. 

Social  morality  relates  to  that  course  of  action  which 
tends  to  increase  the  happiness  or  diminish  the  misery  of 
other  beings ;  personal  morality  relates  to  that  which  has 
the  like  effect  upon  ourselves. 

If  this  be  so,  the  foundation  of  morality  must  ne"eds  lie 
in  the  constitution  of  Nature,  and  must  depend  on  the 
mental  construction  of  ourselves  and  of  other  sentient 
beings. 

The  constitution  of  man  remaining  what  it  is,  his  ca- 
pacity for  the  pleasures  and  pains  afforded  by  sense,  by 
sympathy,  or  by  the  contemplation  of  moral  beauty  and 
ugliness,  is  obviously  in  no  way  affected  by  the  abbrevia- 
tion or  the  prolongation  of  his  conscious  life  ;  nor  by  the 
mere  existence  or  non-existence  of  anything  not  included 
in  Nature ;  nor,  so  long  as  he  believes  that  actions  have 
consequences,  does  it  matter  to  him  what  connection  there 
may  be  between  these  actions  and  other  phenomena  of 
Nature. 

The  assertion  that  morality  is  any  way  dependent  up- 
on the  views  respecting  certain  philosophical  problems  a 
person  may  chance  to  hold,  produces  the  same  effect  upon 


248  A   MODEEN  SYMPOSIUM. 

my  mind  as  if  one  should  say  that  a  man's  vision  depends 
on  his  theory  of  light;  or  that  he  has  no  business  to  be 
sure  that  ginger  is  hot  in  the  mouth  unless  he  has  formed 
definite  views,  in  the  first  place,  as  to  the  nature  of  ginger, 
and,  secondly,  as  to  whether  he  has  or  has  not  a  sensitive 
soul 

Social  morality  belongs  to  the  realm  of  inductive  and 
deductive  investigation.  Given  a  society  of  human  beings 
under  certain  circumstances :  and  the  question  whether  a 
particular  action  on  the  part  of  one  of  the  members  of 
that  society  will  tend  to  the  increase  of  the  general  hap- 
piness or  not  is  a  question  of  natural  knowledge,  and,  as 
such,  is  a  perfectly  legitimate  subject  of  scientific  inquiry. 
And  the  morality  or  immorality  of  the  action  will  depend 
upon  the  answer  which  the  question  receives. 

If  it  can  be  shown,  by  observation  or  experiment,  that 
theft,  murder,  and  adultery,  do  not  tend  to  diminish  the 
happiness  of  society,  then,  in  the  absence  of  any  but  na- 
ural  knowledge,  they  are  not  social  immoralities. 

It  does  not  follow,  however,  that  they  might  not  be 
personal  immoralities.  Without  committing  myself  to 
any  theory  of  the  origin  of  the  moral  sense,  or  even  as  to 
the  existence  of  any  such  special  sense,  I  may  suggest 
that  it  is  quite  conceivable  that  discords  and  harmonies 
may  affect  the  congeries  of  feelings  to  which  we  give  the 
name,  as  they  do  others. 

I  see  no  reason  for  doubting  that  the  beauty  of  holi- 
ness and  the  ugliness  of  sin  are,  to  a  great  many  minds, 
no  mere  metaphors,  but  feelings  as  real  and  as  intense  as 


A   DECLINE   IN    RELIGIOUS   BELIEF.  249 

those  with  which  the  beauty  or  ugliness  of  form  or  colour 
fills  the  artist-mind,  and  that  they  are  as  independent  of 
intellectual  beliefs,  and  even  of  education,  as  are  all  the 
true  aesthetic  powers  and  impulses. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  do  not  doubt  the  existence  of  per- 
sons, like  the  hero  of  the  "  Fatal  Boots,"  devoid  of  any 
sense  of  moral  beauty  or  ugliness,  and  for  them  personal 
morality  has  no  existence.  They  may  offend,  but  they 
cannot  sin ;  they  may  be  sorry  for  having  stolen  or  mur- 
dered, because  society  punishes  them  for  their  social  im- 
moralities, but  they  are  incapable  of  repentance. 

Before  going  further,  I  think  it  may  be  needful  to  dis- 
criminate between  religion  and  theology. 

I  object  to  the  very  general  use  of  the  terms  religion 
and  theology,  as  if  they  were  synonymous,  or  indeed  had 
anything  whatever  to  do  with  one  another.  Religion  is 
the  affair  of  the  affections,  theology  of  the  intellect.  The 
religious  man  loves  an  ideal  perfection,  which  may  be  na- 
tural or  non-natural ;  the  theologian  expounds  the  attri- 
butes of  what  he  terms  "  supernatural."  Being  as  so  many 
scientific  truths,  the  consequences  of  which  work  into  the 
general  scheme  of  Nature,  and  are  there  discernible  by 
ordinary  methods  of  investigation.  What  the  theologian 
affirms  may  be  put  in  this  way :  that  beyond  the  natura 
naturata,  mirrored  or  made  by  the  natural  operations  of 
the  human  mind,  there  is  a  natura  naturana,  sufficient 
knowledge  of  which  is  attainable  only  through  the  chan- 
nel of  revelation. 

Now,  I  think  it  cannot  be  doubted  that   both  religion 


250  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

and  theology,  ds.  thus  defined,  have  exercised,  and  must 
exercise,  a  profound  influence  on  morality.  For  it  may 
be  that  the  object  of  a  man's  religion — the  ideal  which 
he  worships — is  an  ideal  of  sensual  enjoyment,  or  of  dom- 
ination, or  of  the  development  of  all  his  faculties  toward 
perfection,  or  of  self-annihilation,  or  of  benevolence  ;  and 
his  personal  morality  will,  in  part,  contribute  largely  to  the 
formation  of  his  ideal,  and  will,  in  part,  be  swayed  and 
bent  until  it  harmonizes  with  that  ideal. 

Moreover,  it  is  clear  that  a  man's  theology  may  give 
him  such  views  of  the  action  of  the  natura  naturans 
as  will  profoundly  modify  or  even  reverse  his  social  mor- 
ality. 

He  may  see  ground  for  believing  that  conduct  of  evil 
effect  upon  society,  which  is  part  of  the  natura  naturata, 
is  in  harmony  with  the  laws  of  action  of  the  natura  na- 
turans ;  and  that,  as  the  rewards  and  punishments  of 
men  are  but  slight  and  temporary,  while  those  inflicted 
by  the  greater  power  behind  the  natura  naturata,  are 
grievous  and  endless,  common  prudence  may  dictate 
obedience  to  the  stronger.  And  history  proves  that  there 
is  no  social  crime  that  man  can  commit  which  has  not 
been  dictated  by  theology  and  committed  on  theological 
grounds.  On  the  other  hand,  the  belief  that  the  divine 
commands  are  identical  with  the  laws  of  social  morality 
has  lent  infinite  strength  to  the  latter  in  all  ages. 

In  like  manner  it  seems  to  me  impossible  to  over-estimate 
the  influence  of  speculative  beliefs  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
Deity,  apart  from  all  idea  of  rewards  and  punishments, 


A  DECLINE   IN   RELIGIOUS  BELIEF.  251 

upon  personal  morality.  The  lover  of  moral  beauty  3 
struggling  through  a  world  full  of  sorrow  and  sin,  is  sure- 
ly as  much  the  stronger  for  believing  that  sooner  or  later 
a  vision  of  perfect  peace  and  goodness  will  burst  upon 
him,  as  the  toiler  up  a  mountain  for  the  belief  that  beyond 
crag  and  snow  lie  home  and  rest.  For  the  other  side  of 
the  picture,  who  shall  exaggerate  the  deadly  influence  on 
personal  morality  of  those  theologies  which  have  repre- 
sented the  Deity  as  vain-glorious,  irritable,  and  revenge- 
ful— as  a  sort  of  pedantic  drill-sergeant  of  mankind,  to 
whom  no  valour,  no  long-tried  loyalty,  could  atone  for  the 
misplacement  of  a  button  of  the  uniform,  or  the  misun- 
derstanding of  a  paragraph  of  the  "  regulations  and  in- 
structions ? " 

While  no  one  can  dare  histoiy,  or  even  look  about  him, 
without  admitting  the  enormous  influence  of  theology  on 
morality,  it  would  perhaps  be  hard  to  say  whether  it  has 
been  greater  or  less  than  the  influence  of  morality  on 
theology.  But  the  latter  topic  is  not  at  present  under 
discussion  ;  and  the  only  further  remark  I  would  ven- 
ture to  add  is  this — that  the  intensity  and  reality  of  the 
action  of  theological  beliefs  upon  morality  are  precisely 
measured  by  the  conviction  of  those  who  hold  them  that 
they  are  true.  That  such  and  such  a  doctrine  conduces 
to  morality,  and  disbelief  in  it  to  immorality,  may 
be  demonstrated  by  an  endless  array  of  convincing 
syllogisms ;  but,  unless  the  doctrine  is  true,  the  prac- 
tical result  of  this  expenditure  of  logic  is  not  appar- 
ent. I  have  not  the  slightest  doubt  that  if  mankind 


252  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

could  be  got  to  believe  that  every  socially  immoral  act 
would  be  instantly  followed  by  three  months'  severe 
toothache,  such  acts  would  soon  cease  to  be  perpetrated. 
It  would  be  a  faith  charged  with  most  beneficent  works, 
but  unfortunately  this  faith  can  so  easily  be  shown  to  be 
disaccordant  with  fact  that  it  is  not  worth  while  to  be- 
come its  prophet. 

For  my  part  I  do  not  for  one  moment  admit  that  mor- 
ality is  not  strong  enough  to  hold  its  own.  But  if  it  is 
demonstrated  to  me  that  I  am  wrong,  and  that  without 
this  or  that  theological  dogma  the  human  race  will  lapse 
into  bipedal  cattle,  more  brutal  than  the  beasts  by  the 
measure  of  their  greater  cleverness,  my  next  question  is 
to  ask  for  the  proof  of  the  truth  of  the  dogma. 

If  this  proof  is  forthcoming,  it  is  my  conviction  that 
no  drowning  sailor  ever  clutched  a  hen-coop  more  ten- 
aciously than  mankind  will  hold  by  such  dogma,  what- 
ever it  may  be.  But  if  not,  then  I  verily  believe  that 
the  human  race  will  go  its  evil  way ;  and  my  only  con- 
solation lies  in  the  reflection  that,  however  bad  our  pos- 
terity may  become,  so  long  as  they  hold  by  the  plain  rule 
of  not  pretending  to  believe  what  they  have  no  reason  to 
believe  because  it  may  be  to  their  advantage  so  to  pre- 
tend, they  will  not  have  reached  the  lowest  depths  of 
immorality. 


A   DECLINE   IN    RELIGIOUS   BELIEF.  253 


MR.  R  H.  HUTTON. 

THAT  has  happened  to  us  which  happened  to  the 
disputants  in  that  Attic  Symposium  from  which,  I 
suppose,  the  name  for  our  discussion  was  taken.  We  have 
been  interrupted  by  a  "  great  knocking  at  the  door  "  and 
the  entrance  of  an  unbidden  guest,  who,  however,  shows  no 
sign  either  of  Alcibiades's  intoxication,  or  of  that  gener- 
ous disposition  to  crown  the  most  deserving  with  garlands 
which  may  perhaps  have  had  some  connection  with  the 
excesses  of  the  brilliant  Athenian's  potations.     The  Sat- 
urday Reviewer,  who,  without  dropping  his  mask,  has 
thrust  upon  us  his  own  criticism  on  our  discussion,1  has 
certainly  not  conferred  the  most  meagre  of  wreaths  on 
any  one,  unless  indeed  it  may  be  said  that  he  grudgingly 
crowns  the  Dean  of  St.  Paul's  and  the  Duke  of  Argyll 
with  a  withered  sprig  or  two  of  parsley,  for  pointing  out 
that  our  subject  is  much  too  vague,  and  for  trying  to 
narrow  a  discussion  so  "  abstract  and  ill-defined."     His 
general  criticism  is  contained  in  the  harsh  remark  that 
"  all  the  fine  talk  of  the  chosen  illuminati  is  a  mass  of 
words  with  very  little  meaning,"  and  that  "  the  delibera- 
tions of  the  Symposium  bear  a*  very  strong  resemblance 
to  those  of  the  diplomatists  who  have  been  lately  con- 
cocting protocols ;    that  is,  they  consist  of  empty  phrases 
to  which  all  the  parties  can  agree  because  they  do  not 

i  See  Saturday  Revietg  for  March  31,  1877.    Article,  "  A  Modern  Sym- 
posium." 


-•">4  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

touch  any  of  the  points  on  which  the  co-signataries  would 
be  likely  to  differ."  That  is  a  much  crueler  interruption 
than  any  caused  by  Alcibiades  to  the  guests  assembled  at 
the  Symposium  of  Plato,  nor  do  I  think  it  is  quite  just, 
though  there  is  enough  justice  in  it  to  make  me  try  to 
bring  out  what  seem  to  me  the  clearly-understood  issues 
between  us  a  little  more  distinctly,  in  the  few  words  I 
have  to  say.  To  limit  the  subject  as  much  as  possible,  I 
will  speak  of  nothing  but  the  effect  likely  to  be  produced 
on  morality  by  any  decline  in  the  belief  in  a  righteous 
God  independent  of.  and  external  to,  the  human  race — 
in  one,  that  is,  whose  leading  purpose  in  relation  to  us  is 
believed  to  be  to  mould  our  motives  and  characters  into 
the  likeness  of  his  own.  Now  it  seems  to  me  that  all 
the  previous  speakers  except  two,  Mr.  Frederic  Harrison 
and  Prof.  Clifford,  believe,  for  different  reasons,  and  in 
different  degrees,  that  such  a  decline  in  such  a  belief  in 
God  would  probably  result'  in  a  parallel  decline  in  human 
morality ;  though  some  insist  most,  like  Sir  James  Ste 
phen  and  Prof.  Huxley,  on  the  point  that  any  attempt 
to  bolster  up  the  belief  artificially  for  the  sake  of  its 
moral  consequences,  by  discountenancing  free  discussion, 
would  result  in  a  worse  decline  of  morality,  and  others 
insist  most,  like  Dr.  Martineau,  Lord  Selborne,  and  Dean 
Church,  on  the  point  that  the  same  causes  which  result 
in  a  decline  in  this  belief  (especially  as  it  is  represented 
in  Christianity)  are  likely  to  result  also  in  a'  decline  in 
the  force  of  the  ethical  principles  so  closely  associated 
with  it.  But  I  do  not  understand  any  o»e  to  differ  with 


A   DECLINE   IN   RELIGIOUS   BELIEF.  255 

Prof.  Huxley,  that  if  the  belief  can  be  shown  to  be  false, 
be  the  moral  consequence  what  it  may,  it  ought  to  go. 
On  the  other  hand,  I  understand  both  Mr.  Harrison  and 
Prof.  Clifford  to  assert  that  the  causes  which,  as  they 
think,  have  undermined  and  are  undermining  the  beliet 
in  a  righteous  God,  external  to  the  human  race,  have  no 
tendency  to  undermine  the  binding  power  of  the  highest 
human  ethics,  but,  on  the  contrary,  have  a  direct  ten- 
dency to  elevate  and  refine  them,  though  Prof.  Clifford 
regards  this  tendency  as,  on  the  whole,  slight,  and  con- 
fined chiefly  to  the  blow  which  such  a  change  in  belief 
will  have  in  diminishing  the  control  of  the  clergy,  while 
Mr.  Harrison  expects  very  much  indeed  from  it,  if  only 
through  its  tendency  to  concentrate  on  the  desirable  aims 
of  a  real  world,  an  enthusiasm  now  so  much  dissipated  in 
his  opinion,  by  lavishing  it  on  imaginary  objects. 

Now,  while  I  heartily  admit  with  Prof.  Huxley  the 
conceivability  that  a  gross  delusion — like  the  belief  that 
"  every  socially  immoral  act  would  instantly  be  followed 
by  three  months'  severe  toothache" — if  it  could  be  palmed 
off  successfully  upon  our  race,  would  have  some  very  ben- 
eficial consequences — (some,  also,  by  no  means  beneficial) 
— and  should  not  a  bit  the  less  regard  a  conspiracy,  even 
if  one  were  practicable,  to  impose  such  a  delusion  on  our 
race,  as  a  great  sin,  I  cannot  the  more  on  that  account 
see  how  to  disentangle  the  question  whether  there  be  a 
righteous  God  external  to  men  from  the  question  whether 
there  would  be  a  great  moral  loss  to  human  nature  in  the 
dissipation  of  the  belief  in  such  a  God.  It  is  quite  con- 


256  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

ceivable — nay,  it  has  often  happened — that  a  sincere  de- 
lusion has  produced  the  best  results.     The  belief  in  an 
imaginary  danger  of  death,  for  instance,  has  often  made 
a  man  take  life  more  seriously ;    and  the  belief  in  an 
imaginary  danger  of  invasion  has  probably  often  bound 
a  divided  nation  together  and  given  it  a  greater  nervous 
strength  and  manliness.     But  though  it  is  easy  to  con- 
ceive a  belief,  in  some  respects  beneficial,  which  is  wholly 
false,  it  seems  to  me,  in  the  case  before  us,  that  the  very 
element  in  the  belief  we  are  discussing,  which  makes  it 
beneficial,  is  also  a  clear  note  of  its  truth.     What  makes 
the  belief  in  such  a  God  as  I  have  spoken  of  beneficial  is 
that  this  belief,  and  this  only,  gives  to  the  attitude  of  man's 
mind,  in  relation  to  right  motive  and  right  action,  that 
mixture  of  courage  and  cheerful  irresponsibility  for  the 
result  characteristic  of  a  faith.     Luther's  great  saying, 
"  We  say  to  our  Lord  God  that  if  he  will  have  his  Church, 
he  must  uphold  it,  for  we  cannot  uphold  it,  and,  even  if 
we  could,  we  should  become  the  proudest  asses  under 
heaven,"1  would  be  of  course  simply  untranslatable  into 
any  humanist  or  positivist  dialect  at  all.   I  do  not  indeed 
quite  know  what  Mr.  Harrison  means  when  he  talks  of  a 
"  frankly  human  "  religion  which  shall  provide  us  with 
a  "  Providence  "  whom  we  are   "  to  love  and  serve  ;"  but 
I  suppose  he  must  mean  that  we  are  to  love  that  law  of 
the  universe  which  produces  a  certain  amount  of  corres- 
pondence  between  our  nature  and  its   "  environment," 


"  Tisohreden,"  edition  Fdrstemaun,  Leipsic,  1844,  vol.  ii.,  p.  330.  • 


A  DECLINE   IN   KELIGIOUS  BELIEF.  257 

and  that  we  are  to  cooperate  with  that  law.  At  least 
this  is  the  only  meaning  I  am  able  to  attach  to  "  loving 
and  serving"  a  Providence  without  believing  in  God. 
Now  for  myself  I  am  incapable  of  loving  a  mere  law  of 
any  kind,  whether  it  be  a  law  of  gravitation,  a  law  of 
assimilation  between  my  organism  and  its  environment, 
or  any  other  ;  and  as  for  "  serving"  it,  I  like  to  judge  for 
myself,  and,  instead  of  allowing  myself  always  to  be 
assimilated  to  my  "environment,"  I  sometimes  prefer 
what  is  called,  in  the  language  of  the  same  philosophy, 
"  differentiating  "  myself  from  it.*  But  I  think  even  Mr. 
Harrison  would  hardly  justify  language  of  trust  like 
Luther's,  toward  a  "  Being  "  of  whom  we  are  supposed  to 
know  nothing  except  that  it  has  given  rise  to  the  earth 
we  live  on,  and  will  most  likely,  in  a  few  thousand  years, 
also  put  a  final  end  to  it.  You  cannot  trust  a  being  of 
whose  purposes,  or  capacity  for  having  purposes,  you 
know  nothing,  because  trust  implies  approving  those 
purposes  and  believing  them  to  be  accompanied  by  a  far 
higher  range  of  knowledge  and  foresight  than  your  own. 
Yet  has  not  all  the  benefit  of  trust  in  God  arisen  from  that 
humility  and  courage,  that  self-abandonment  to  a  higher 
will,. -that  sense  of  complete  irresponsibility  for  the  result 
when  the  right  thing  is  once  done,  which  constitute  moral 
heroism  ?  Could  such  moral  heroism  sustain  the  belief 
in  a  divine  will  which  is  shaping  all  right  action  to  a  per- 
fect end  ?  Suppose  we  believed  in  unknown  causes  which 
produce  indeed  such  moral  phenomena  as  those  of  human 
life  for  a  moment  in  the  long  ages  of  evolution — which 
17 


258  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

bring  them  like  a  ripple  to  the  surface,  but  quench  them, 
like  that  ripple,  for  evermore,  and  which  are  as  certain 
so  to  quench  them  as  the  sun  is  one  day  to  be  burned 
out — is  it  possible  we  could  cast  ourselves  on  such  un- 
known causes  with  the  sort  of  faith  in  God  that  has 
"  moved  mountains,"  and  that  will  move  mountains 
again  that  will  say,  for  instance,  to  this  huge  dead  weight 
of  secularism  and  positivism,  "Be  thou  cast  into  the  sea," 
and  it  will  obey  ? 

Nor  can  I  see  any  better  help  in  Prof.  Clifford's 
substitute  for  God — namely,  the  higher  self  represented 
by  "  the  voice  of  our  Father  Man  who  is  within  us,"  i.e., 
by  "  the  accumulated  instinct  of  the  race  poured  into  each 
one  of  us "  and  overflowing  us,  "  as  if  the  ocean  were 
poured  into  a  cup."  The  "  accumulated  instinct  of  our 
race"  includes  a  great  deal  of  evil  as  well  as  good,  and  is 
often  unaccompanied  by  any  accumulation  of  instinct  for 
the  suppressing  of  the  evil  by  the  good.  I  quite  agree 
with  those  who  have  urged  that  it  was  the  "  accumulated 
instinct "  of  the  Athenian  people  which  taught  them  the 
necessity  of  putting  down  Socrates  as  one  who  was  under- 
mining the  social  order  to  which  he  belonged.  I  do  not 
doubt  that  Socrates  shared  that  accumulated  instinct  not 
less — nay,  probably  much  more — than  the  rest  of  his  coun- 
trymen. Probably  it  overflooded  him  "  as  an  ocean  might 
overflow  a  cup."  Nevertheless  the  solitary  voice  within 
him,  which  he  attributed  to  his  "  daemon,"  though  it  could 
not  drown  the  voice  of  this  "  accumulated  instinct,"  was 
heard  above  it,  and  prevailed  over  the  pleas  of  comrade- 


A  DECLINE  IN   RELIGIOUS   BELIEF.  259 

ship,  and  over  what  Prof.  Clifford  deems  the  only  "  spring 
of  virtuous  action,"  the  impulse  which  invites  men  to 
make  individual  sacrifices  to  promote  the  greater  effi- 
ciency of  the  social  bond. 

"  Some  one  may  wonder  (says  Socrates,  in  Plato's  Apology) 
why  I  go  about  in  private  giving  advice  and  busying  myself  with 
the  concerns  of  others,  but  do  not  venture  to  come  forward  in  pub- 
lic and  advise  the  state.  I  will  tell  you  the  reason  of  this.  You 
have  often  heard  me  speak  of  an  oracle  or  sign  which  comes  to  me, 
and  is  the  divinity  which  Meletus  ridicules  in  the  indictment.  This 
sign  I  have  had  ever  since  I  was  a  child.  The  sign  is  a  voice  which 
comes  to  me  and  always  forbids  me  to  do  something  which  I  am 
going  to  do,  but  never  commands  me  to  .do  anything,  and  this 
is  what  stands  in  the  way  of  my  being  a  politician.  And  rightly,  as 
I  think.  For  I  am  certain,  O  men  of  Athens,  that  if  I  had  engaged 
in  politics  I  should  have  perished  long  ago,  and  done  no  good  either 
to  you  or  to  myself.  And  don't  be  afraid  of  my  telling  you  the 
truth,  for  the  truth  is  that  no  man  who  goes  to  war  with  you  or  any 
other  multitude,  honestly  struggling  against  the  commission  of 
unrighteousness  and  wrong  in  the  state,  will  save  his  life  ;  he  will 
really  fight  for  the  right,  if  he  would  live  even  for  a  little  while, 
must  have  a  private  station  and  not  a  public  one."1 

This  is  unsocial  doctrine  enough,  and,  of  course,  Prof. 
Clifford  will  say  that,  though  fatal  to  the  existing 
Athenian  state,  it  had  its  source  in  instincts  essential  to 
a  higher  political  virtue  and  to  the  cohesion  of  a  nobler 
kind  of  state.  Grant  it  for  a  moment.  Yet  how  can  we 
expect  moral  heroism  of  the  same  type  as  that  which  is 
convinced  that  invisible  Power  is  on  its  side,  and  trusts  to 

i  Prof.  Jowett's  "  Plato,"  vol.  i.,  p.  346,  first  edition, 


260  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

the  vindication  of  the  future,  if  instead  of  ascribing  the 
origin  of  its  impulses  to  a  divine  power  which  is  the  same 
yesterday,  to-day  and  forever — a  power  above  it  and 
beyond  it — he  who  has  to  evince  this  moral  heroism  be- 
lieves that  there  is  no  inspiring  mind  higher  than  his  own, 
and  holds,  therefore,  that  he  must  rely  on  himself,  and 
on  himself  alone,  for  the  fine  faculty  to  discriminate  be- 
tween the  inchoate  order  of  a  new  society  and  the  worn-out 
guarantees  of  an  order  which  is  passing  away  ?  How  is 
one  who  is  fully  aware  that  he  is  dissolving  the  ancient 
bonds  of  a  venerable  society  and  polity,  but  who  only 
hopes  that  he  is  creating  the  germs  of  something  better, 
to  set  his  face  against  the  brotherhood  among  whom  he 
lives,  and  to  defy  the  wrath  of  the  fellow-citizens  whom 
he  sees,  and  all  without  the  whisper  of  approval  from 
any  spiritual  being  behind  the  veil  ?  Surely  the  hesita- 
ting inspiration  of  that  long-buried  ancestor,  "  our  Father 
Man  "  — to  admit,  for  a  moment,  Prof.  Clifford's  assump- 
tion— when  it  spells  out  dubious  and  unaccustomed  les- 
sons which  the  voices  of  our  brother-men  join,  in  loud 
chorus,  to  decry,  would  not  be  very  likely  to  triumph 
over  fears  and  scruples  which  "  our  Father  Man "  also 
authenticates,  and  authenticates  much  more  positively 
than  he  ever  can  authenticate  the  first  faintly  uttered 
principles  of  a  new  kind  of  social  union  against  the 
old.  What  was  it,  as  I  asked  before,  which  stimulated 
Luther  to  his  gigantic  enterprise  ?  Not  the  doubtful 
guess  that  buried  generations  had  transmitted  to  him  the 
glimpse  of  a  reform  which  would  transfigure  society,  but 


A  DECLINE  IN  RELIGIOUS  BELIEF.  261 

the  belief  that  he  could  honestly  use  the  language  of  that 
psalm  that  he  so  much  delighted  to  appropriate  to  him- 
self :  "  They  came  about  me  like  bees,  and  are  extinct 
even  as  the  fire  among  the  thorns,  for  in  the  name  of  the 
Lord  I  will  destroy  them."  Whether  the  belief  in  "  our 
Father  Man  "  and  in  a  tentative  Providence  which  does 
not  foresee,  but  only  accommodates  the  individual  to  his 
"  environment,"  as  the  only  guides  of  our  moral  life,  be 
wild  or  sober,  this,  I  think,  is  clear,  that  it  does  not  provide 
the  martyr  or  the  reformer  with  the  stimulating  power  of 
a  faith ;  that  it  can  give  no  confidence  like  that  in  an  in- 
spiration of  far  wider  grasp  and  far  deeper  purpose  than 
any  which  the  reformer  himself  commands  ;  that  it  leaves 
him  a  mere  pioneer  amid  dangers  and  difficulties  to  which 
it  may  turn  out  that  both  he  and  his  race  are  quite  un- 
equal, instead  of  a  humble  follower  obeying  the  beckoning 
of  one  who  holds  both  past  and  future  in  his  hand. 

And  now  as  to  my  second  point — that  the  very  element 
which  gives  so  beneficial  a  character  to  the  belief  that 
conscience  is  the  inspiration  of  God — the  very  element 
which  makes  it  a  useful  and  practically  stimulating  be- 
lief, and  not,  as  Prof.  Clifford  calls  it,  a  mere  source  of 

"  refined  and   elevated  pleasure" — is  also   a   note  of  its 

• 

truth.  I  hold  this  to  be  so  because  the  very  experience 
which  produces  the  trust  is  an  experience  of  life,  and  of 
life  morally  higher  than  one's  self.  Surely,  if  we  are 
competent,  as  we  are,  to  say  when  our  friends  and  our 
favourite  books  tempt  us,  and  when  they  raise  us  above 
temptation,  we  are  also  competent  to  say  when  thoughts 


262  A  MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

that  strike  with  a   living  power  upon  the  heart  come 
from  a  higher  and  when  they  come  from  a  lower  source 
than  that  of  our  own   habitual   principles   of  action — 
when  they  come  with  promise  and  command,  and  when 
they  come  with  discordant  sneers,  discouragement  and 
enervation.     When  we  grasp  dimly  at  a  great  moral  prin- 
ciple which  is  full,  to  use  Prof.  Tyndall's   language,  of 
"  the  promise  and   potency  "  of  all  forms  of  life — when 
the  more  we  consider  it,  the  less  we  see  where  it  is  lead- 
ing us,  and  yet   only  feel   the  more   confidence  in  it  on 
that  account — when  we  recognize  a  clue   and  a  guide 
without  recognizing  where  that  clue  and  that  guide  are 
pointing  to — when   we  know  that  it  is  our  duty  to  defy 
the  world  in  the  name  of  a  principle  of  which  we  cannot 
gauge  the  full  meaning,  or  measure  even  the  immediate 
effects  (and  this  is  as  I  maintain,  the  true  phenomenon 
visible  in  all  great  moral,  as  in  all  great  intellectual,  origina- 
tion)— then  it  does  seem  to  me  to  be  a  sober  and  whole- 
some conviction  that  that  which  we  do  not  know,  there 
is  one  who  puts  the  clue  into  our  hands,  who  does  know ; 
that  what  we  cannot  foresee,  there  is  one  who  does  foresee ; 
that  we  are  grasping  the  hand  of  a  Power  which  knows 
the  way  before  as   well   as   behind;  that   we  are  fol- 
lowing the  glimmer  of  a  ray  which  will  lead  us  on  to  the 
day-spring  from  which  it  descended.  I  cannot  but  believe 
that  we  have  as  secure  a  faculty  to  discriminate  the  superi- 
ority  of  the  life  in  which  a  moral  impression  orginates 
as  we  have  to  discriminate  its  rightness  itself — that  it  is 
one  and  the  same  act  of  discrimination  which  says,  "This 


A  DECLINE   IN   RELIGIOUS   BELIEF.  263 

is  obligatory,"  and  which  says,  "  This  is  instinct  with 
divine  life  and  promise."  To  suppose  that  a  dead  ances- 
try are  flashing  though  us  these  commands  which  at  once 
repudiate  their  principles  and  nerve  us  against  the  wrath 
of  their  descendants,  seems  to  me,  I  confess,  a  degrading 
superstition.  If  "  we  boast  to  be  better  than  our  fathers." 
It  must  be  some  one  better  than  our  fathers  who  is  giv- 
ing us  our  watchword.  This  is  why  I  hold  that  to  lose 
the  faith  in  God  would  be  to  lose  a  great  inheritance  of 
moral  order  and  moral  progress,  and  also  to  lose  at  the 
same  moment  a  truth  in  comparison  with  which  all  other 
truths  are  as  dim  and  isolated  sparks  beside  a  pillar  of 
fire  that  can  guide  us  though  a  wilderness  that  we  have 
never  even  explored. 


SIR  JAMES  STEPHEN. 

THE  paper  which  began  this  discussion  was  entitled 
"  The  Influence  upon  Morality  of  a  Decline  in  Reli- 
gious Belief."  The  Dean  of  St. Paul's  remarks :  "It  seems  to 
me  difficult  to  discuss  this  question  till  it  is  settled,  at  least 
generally,  what  morality  is  influenced,  and  what  religious 
belief  is  declining."  The  Duke  of  Argyll  observes  that 
these  papers  "  deal  with  a  question  very  abstract  and 
ill-defined."  Dr.  Ward  says  that  "  the  wording  of  our 
question  is  unfortunately  ambiguous,  and  1  think  that 
this  fact  has  made  the  discussion  in  several  respects  less 


264  A   MODERN   SYMPOSIUM. 

pointed  and   less   otherwise   interesting  than  it  might 
have  been." 

To  these  criticisms  I  reply  that  the  title  of  my  paper 
contains  no  question  at  all,  and  was  not  intended  to  do 
so.  It  is  simply  an  indication,  in  the  most  general  terms 
of  the  subject  to  which  the  paper  of  which  it  is  the  title 
relates.  Any  one  who  will  take  the  trouble  to  read  the 
paper  will  see  that  its  principal  object  was  to  assert  the 
proposition  with  which  it  concludes,  which  is  in  these 
words: 

"  This  [i.  e.,  the  whole  of  the  preceding  argument]  shows  that  the 
support  which  an  existing  creed  gives  to  an  existing  system  of 
morals  is  irrelevant  to  its  truth,  and  that  the  question  whether  a 
given  system  of  morals  is  good  or  bad  cannot  be  fully  determined 
until  after  the  determination  of  the  question  whether  the  theology 
on  which  it  rests  is  true  or  false.  The  morality  is  [I  should  have 
said  "  may  be  "]  good  if  it  is  founded  on  a  true  estimate  of  the  con- 
sequences of  human  actions.  But  if  it  is  founded  on  a  false  the- 
ology it  is  founded  on  a  false  estimate  of  the  consequences  of  human 
actions  ;  and,  so  far  as  that  is  the  case,  it  cannot  be  good  ;  and  the 
circumstance  that  it  is  supported  by  the  theology  to  which  it  refers 
is  an  argument  against,  and  not  in  favour  of,  that  theology." 

"  The  only  "  question  "  which  my  paper  was  intended 
to  raise  is  the  question  whether  that  proposition  is  true 
or  not  ?  I  do  not  see  how  its  truth  can  depend  (as  the 
Dean  of  St.  Paul's  suggests)  upon  further  particulars  as 
to  "  what  morality  is  influenced,'"'  or  "  what  theology 
is  declining."  I  said  nothing  about  the  decline  of  any 
partciular  theological  belief,  or  its  influence  on  any  par- 


A  DECLINE  IN   RELIGIOUS   BELIEF.  265 

ticular  system  of  morals.  My  proposition  would  apply 
to  all  creeds  and  all  forms  of  morality. 

As  to  the  Duke  of  Argyll's  statement  that  "  the  ques- 
tion is  very  abstract  and  ill-defined,"  I  should  admit  its 
justice  if  the  title  of  the  paper  were  taken  as  the  state- 
ment of  a  question.  But  this  is  not  the  case.  The  pro- 
position which  I  put  forward,  in  the  hope  that  it  would 
be  discussed,  is  no  doubt  general  in  its  terms,  but  it 
seemed,  and  still  seems  to  me,  definite  enough  to  be  dis- 
cussed. As  to  the  "  ambiguity "  of  which  Dr.  Ward 
complains,  I  cannot  see  how  my  Jproposition  can  have 
more  meanings  than  one. 

The  papers  which  have  been  written  subsequently  to 
my  paper  raise  a  great  variety  of  points  which  I  feel  much 
tempted  to  discuss,  but  I  hardly  feel  at  liberty  to  do  so, 
as  they  do  not  in  any  way  qualify  anything  said  by  me. 
Each  paper,  indeed,  is  an  illustration  of  the  truth  of  some 
part  of  my  proposition  or  of  the  assertions  by  which  it 
is  introduced  ;  for  each  shows  in  various  ways  how  very 
close  is  the  connection  in  the  writer's  mind  between  the 
theological  system  which  he  believes  to  be  true  and  the 
moral  system  which  he  considers  to  be  good;  and  this, 
again,  shows  that  the  question  of  truth  must  precede  the 
question  of  goodness,  and  cannot  be  determined  by  any 
answer  which  may  be  given  to  the  latter  question.  I  can- 
not help  thinking  that  if  this  were  understood  generally 
it  would  affect  very  deeply  the  character  of  a  great  pro- 
ionrpto  of  current  theological  speculation. 


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